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INTRODUCTION
When the terms ‘human rights’ and ‘sub-Saharan Africa’1 are used together pessimistic 
comments are usually heard. In the early 1990s, this pessimistic outlook seemed to have 
subsided and in certain cases, it was even replaced by sentiments of hope that were aroused 
by the fall of authoritarian regimes and the start of démocratisation processes, which were 
marked by the réintroduction of political pluralism. This period has even been referred to as a 
‘second independence’ for Africa after that of the European colonial domination. All of the 
states which had been dominated by one-party or military systems, some of which were 
inspired by the Soviet Socialist model, held multi-party elections and in succession, almost 
all of them adopted new constitutions or amended existing ones. The liberal-democratic 
model, which had been harshly questioned both in theory and practice until the end of the 
1980s, became the common paradigm. The new constitutions sanctioned a model of political 
organisation based on the principles of the rule of law, the separation of powers, multiparty 
democracy and the respect for fundamental rights and freedoms. The constitutional 
developments which occurred in sub-Saharan Africa are mirrored on a global level, as seen in 
the rise of the liberal-democratic form of political organisation as the “universal” model on 
which the legitimacy of states seems to depend, following the collapse of the Soviet Union 
and the Eastern European communist systems.2 3 Certain authors have spoken of a
» i
“mondialisation de i ’Etat de droit”, which signifies a state’s adherence to the rule of law and 
the respect of human rights.
However, the reference to the liberal-democratic paradigm and the constitutional 
protection of human rights were not a new experience for the region. Almost all of the 
constitutions of sub-Saharan African countries, which achieved their independence from the 
European colonial powers between the late 1950s and early 1960s,4 were designed on this 
model and recognised, in different degrees, human rights.
The independence constitutions were rather short-lived. Within a few years, a new 
constitutional phase opened up in sub-Saharan Africa. The independence constitutions were
1 Sub-Saharan Africa is the term used to define the states lying south o f the Sahara. These countries present a number of 
common features. With the exception o f Liberia, all o f them were subjected to European colonisation and attained their 
independence after the Second World War. Moreover, they have experienced common constitutional and political 
developments.
2 G. Amato, “Forme di stato e di govemo", in G. Amato e A. Barbera (a cura di), M anuale di diritto pubblico, II Mulino, 
Bologna, 1994, p. 59.
3 J. Chevallier, “La mondialisation de l'État de droit", in M. Borgetto (coordination), in Mélanges Philippe Ardant. Droit et 
politiques à la  croisée des cultures, L.G.D J ., Paris, 1999, p. 325 et seq.
4 Only Angola, Mozambique, South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe, gained independence from European rule later.
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de facto not applied, or often replaced by new charters, which did not include any human 
rights protection in certain cases. Some were amended or suspended following coups d’état. 
In this way, the one-party systems and military regimes, together with the state inspired by 
the Soviet model, prevailed in the political landscape of sub-Saharan Africa until the early 
1990s. This evolution was justified by the alleged distance of the constitutional systems 
adopted at independence with traditional African culture and their inability to deal with the 
problems inherited from the decades o f colonialism. These included underdevelopment and 
the need for nation building. In particular, the liberal human rights model embodied in the 
independence constitutions was under attack. The polemic against this model was mirrored in 
a lively scholarly debate, involving both African and Western academics, on the relevance of 
a human rights model for Africa, which was based almost exclusively on civil and political 
rights. In particular, two problematic issues were raised. The first pertained to the definition 
of (liberal) human rights, which is built upon the notion of the individual as an autonomous 
being, and, thus, was considered as an alien concept in African culture. The second issue 
concerned the non-viability of a human rights model centred on civil and political rights in 
states which had to face the challenge of development and which were also weakened by 
centrifugal forces. It was contended that the guarantee of civil and political liberties would 
hinder the efforts of the independent African states to deal with the problems of 
underdevelopment and to forge national unity among the diverse ethnic and religious groups, 
which had been forced to co-exist within artificially created borders by European powers.
This debate seems to have disappeared in sub-Saharan Africa since the 1990s when 
the liberal human rights model was again constitutionally recognised and enriched, albeit to 
different degrees, by the protection of social, economic and cultural rights as well as the so- 
called third generation rights. Moreover, contemporary African rulers do not appear to, at 
least openly, claim a distinct African human rights model alternative to the “Western” one 
and African civil societies have demonstrated an increasing concern regarding human rights. 
However, the persistence of autocratic and nepotistic behaviour by current leaders and a poor 
human rights record in many sub-Saharan African countries question the extent to which the 
constitutionalisation of human rights corresponds with a real appreciation of their meaning 
and a commitment to their observance. Taking into account the early experience of liberal 
constitutionalism in sub-Saharan Africa, and in particular, the resistance to the protection o f 
individual rights and freedoms which belong to the liberal tradition, it could be asked whether 
history is simply repeating itself. In other words, is sub-Saharan Africa witnessing a renewed
2
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experience of the ‘mimétisme0 and are the constitutions currently in force destined to 
encounter the same obstacles faced by the constitutions of the 1960s?
In order to address this question, a number of sub-questions will be dealt with: Firstly, 
is the human rights model of the constitutional charters of the 1990s exactly the same as in 
those of the 1960s? Secondly, who are the actors behind the renewed and reinforced 
protection of individual rights and freedoms in the sub-Saharan African constitutions? 
Thirdly, what are the respective motivations of these actors and what is the relationship 
between them? Finally, what is the status of implementation of human rights constitutional 
provisions and what is the attitude of civil society vis-à-vis human rights?
To answer these questions, this thesis analyses the three constitutional cycles which 
sub-Saharan Africa has undergone and which have been characterised, respectively, by the 
import of the liberal-democratic model; the questioning of this model; and finally its 
réintroduction.
Considering that the overwhelming majority of sub-Saharan African states were either 
British or French colonies and that colonization has affected their constitutional and political 
developments, this thesis concentrates on Anglophone and Francophone Africa5 6 and each of 
these will be dealt with separately. Zambia and Benin are the respective case studies which 
will be considered in detail. These countries were chosen due to the fact that they provide a 
clear representation of the constitutional developments of sub-Saharan Africa and notably, of 
the three political systems which typified the region until the end of the 1980s. Both achieved 
their independence in the 1960s and had constitutions modelled on those of their colonial 
masters and included a human rights protection inspired by liberal sources. In addition, 
Zambia became a one-party state in 1972. Benin, which was marked by high political 
instability reflected in the succession of six constitutions, experienced both military and 
Marxist regimes. Finally, Zambia and Benin were the first countries in English-speaking and 
French-speaking Africa, respectively, to reintroduce democratic systems and to adopt new 
constitutions fully adhering to the liberal democratic-model in the 1990s.
The thesis is structured in three parts, which correspond with the three constitutional 
phases experienced by sub-Saharan Africa. Each of these parts analyses the constitution­
making processes and, in particular, the provisions concerning human rights. An analysis of 
the constitution-making process allows for the identification of the actors that were
5 This is the term employed by French scholarship to describe the development o f African constitutionalism and defined by 
Chevallier as a phenomenon "qui passe par des emprunts à des systèmes étrangers érigés en modèles de référence " and “qui 
n 'est que l'enveloppe form elle de rapports de domination see Chevallier, c it, p. 333.
6 In the thesis the temi Francophone Africa does not include former Belgian former colonies.
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responsible for the adoption of the specific constitutional model during the phase under 
investigation and also for the discovery of the underlying rationale of these events.
The first part of the thesis concerns the constitutions adopted at independence and 
examines not only their content with regard to the human rights protection, but also the 
factors which determined the import of the liberal human rights model. To this end, the 
examination of the role played by the colonial powers and African nationalist leaders, their 
interests and relative power relations are analysed.
The second part of the thesis inquires into how sub-Saharan African countries became 
one party systems, military and Marxist regimes, and how these systems have impacted upon 
the conception of human rights embodied in the new constitutional systems and also on their 
actual implementation. Moreover, it critically evaluates the arguments developed by African 
governments who argued that the liberal model of human rights was inadequate for sub- 
Saharan Africa. Even though these arguments were used by African leaders to preserve their 
position of power, they also raise some important issues. The liberal model of human rights 
met serious obstacles in sub-Saharan Africa. This thesis interprets the findings of the study of 
both the constitution-making processes of the first constitutional phase (carried out in part 
one) and the status of human rights during the second constitutional cycle through the lens of 
the scholarship on legal transplants. This scholarship provides the analytical instruments to 
clarify the dynamics elicited by the adoption of the liberal human rights model upon 
independence and to establish why and to what extent this model has ‘failed’ in sub-Saharan 
Africa.
The third part of the thesis follows the same organisation as part one. It examines the 
constitution-making processes, the content of the human rights provisions in the constitutions 
and also the actual human rights’ record of Zambia and Benin. Furthermore, the domestic 
discourse on human rights is also considered. The actors which are taken into account include 
African governments, African civil society and international actors, including donor 
countries, Bretton Woods institutions and international non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs). This approach is adopted in order to contextualise the analysis of Zambia and 
Benin’s constitutional developments by inserting them in the global context of the evolution 
of international human rights law and international relations.
The conceptual framework developed and employed in the second part of this thesis is 
used to deal with the crux of the thesis, in other words, to ascertain the extent to which a new 
phase in the constitutional history of sub-Saharan Africa actually occurred in the 1990s or, 
conversely, whether Africa is experiencing a phase similar to the one that occurred at the end
4
of the European colonial rule, when the enthusiasm and expectations aroused by the 
independence struggle and the achievement of independence were bitterly disappointed.
African constitutional developments of the 1990s require an historicist reading, which 
takes into account not only the post-independence period, but also pre-colonial and colonial 
history and interprets them as interrelated phases, in which each period is influenced by the 
preceding one. The other main underlying idea of the thesis is that African constitutional 
developments cannot be understood without taking into account the changes which have taken 
place in African cultural categories and societal structures since pre-colonial times and the 
complex relationships of dependence between sub-Saharan Africa and external actors, ranging 
from former colonial powers, donor countries, Bretton Woods institutions and international 
civil society. The developments occurring within Africa are also the outcome of dynamics 
triggered off by such relations.
Finally, the main challenge of this thesis lies in the interpretation of the role of human 
rights in the contemporary African constitutional systems by analysing the complexities of the 
discourses in sub-Saharan Africa. Much of the literature in this area dealing with the 
interpretation and evaluation of the status of human rights within the African constitutional 
framework is carried out by merely examining the action of governments or African society, 
thus assuming that uniform entities existed everywhere. Conversely, this thesis argues that 
African human rights constitutional developments can only be effectively grasped if a variety 
of domestic actors are taken into account and their diverse cultures and interests are 
recognised. It is not only the position of African governments and African civil society vis-à- 
vis human rights which differs, but the understanding of human rights even varies within civil 
society. These differences can be determined by gender, age, social status, level of education 
and “acculturation” (in respect to Western models). s
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PART Is HUMAN RIGHTS AND INDEPENDENCE AFRICAN 
CONSTITUTIONS: THE ‘TRANSPLANT’ OF THE LIBERAL MODEL
The first constitutions of independent sub-Saharan African states were adopted between the 
late 1950s and early 1960s in the wave of the decolonisation process, which affected most of 
the sub-Saharan African countries. The issue of the building of constitutional systems was 
solved by adopting constitutional charters shaped on the constitutional orders of the colonial 
powers, which involved the transplanting of the liberal-democratic principles and institutions 
in the region. It is interesting to note that the human rights conception embodied in African 
constitutions was more liberal than those in Europe. With regard to the constitutions of 
Francophone Africa, Vasak has pointed out that they were closer to the liberal legacy of the 
French revolution of 1789 than to the human rights orientation which emerged in the Europe 
after the second World War,7 which was enriched by social, economic and cultural rights. 
Scant reference can be found in the independence sub-Saharan Africa constitutions to second- 
generation rights. The context in which the constitution making processes in both English and 
French-speaking Africa developed and, notably, the political and cultural dependence of 
African élites on the colonial powers provides an explanation for this. The constitutions of 
English-speaking Africa were adopted before the colonies became independent sovereign 
states. Moreover, the need to obtain international legitimacy constituted a core concern of 
African independentist leaders, which certainly influenced their attitude vis-à-vis 
constitutional models. An interaction of colonial (or neo-colonial) interests and African 
concerns accompanied by a legal and political “acculturation” of the African élites, made the 
transplant of the liberal human rights model an easy, but not well thought-out choice for 
African leaders, who had the difficult task to rule sovereign states after having fought for 
independence. Moreover, the fact that European colonial powers largely determined what 
kind of protection of human rights could be inserted in sub-Saharan African constitutions also 
resulted from the fact that African leaders at the time had not devoted much time to the issue. 
During their struggle against colonialism, African nationalist leaders focused only on the right 
to self-determination and the principle of equality in order to denounce the colonial 
domination, the practice of racial discrimination and all the abuses committed by the colonial 
administration. They condemned colonialism as being contrary to the UN Charter,8 the
7 R. Vasak, "The European Convention of Human Rights Beyond the Frontiers of Europe”, 12 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, 1963, p. 1218.
8 June 26, 1945,59 Stat 1031, T.S. 993,3 Bevans 1153, entered into force 24th October 1945.
7
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Universal Declaration of Human Rights9 and the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.10 The conferences held in the late 1950s and early 
1960s, which led to the establishment of the Organisation of African Unity in 1963, can be 
seen as representative of the African attitude at that time since they were attended by 
delegates of the then few independent African states and by representatives of African 
nationalist parties. The first two conferences, which took place in Accra in 1958 and Addis 
Ababa in 1960, underlined the value of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but only 
with the goal of promoting independence claims and censuring the practice of racial 
discrimination. The question of human rights was discussed in the context of future 
independent African constitutional systems for the first time at the Conference on the Rule o f  
Law held in Lagos in 1961, which was organised on the initiative of the International 
Commission of Jurists (ICJ) and was attended by African lawyers. The Conference not only 
adhered unanimously to the principles of the Universal Declaration but also adopted a 
resolution known as the ‘Law of Lagos’ which invited “the African governments to study the 
possibility of adopting an African Convention on Human Rights”, and also stated that “the 
fundamental rights, especially the right to personal liberty, should be entrenched in the 
constitutions of all countries and that such personal liberty should not in peace time be 
restricted without trial in a Court of Law”.11 However, the resolution was not representative o f  
the African political leaders’ view on this matter. Two years later the Organisation of African 
Unity was created and in the preamble of its Charter a reference was made to the Universal 
Declaration. However, the suggestions of the Conference of Lagos were not taken into 
account and specific rights were not expressly mentioned. Therefore, by the 1960s, we can 
already see a diversity of attitudes and concerns vis-à-vis human rights. The views of the 
political leadership prevailed. However, the position of civil society, in this case represented 
by the legal community, was not ineffective. Even though its work was not very visible 
outside Africa for many years, it nurtured the regional discourse on human rights, which also 
resulted in the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights.
9 G A Resolution 217 A  (III) of 10 December 1948.
10 Rome, 4th November 1950.
11 International Commission of Jurists, African Conference on the Rule o f Law: A Report on the Proceedings o f  th e  
Conference, Lagos, Nigeria, 3rd-7th January 1961, p. 9.
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CHAPTER 1: The ‘Transplant’ of the Liberal Model of Human Rights in Anglophone 
Africa
In the framework of this thesis, the expression Anglophone or English-speaking countries 
encompasses countries which were subjected to British colonisation and achieved their 
independence in the decolonisation wave which took place between the late 1950s and 1960s. 
They include Gambia, Sierra Leone, Ghana and Nigeria in West Africa; Kenya, Malawi, 
Tanganyika, Uganda and Zambia in East and Central Africa; and Lesotho, Botswana, 
Swaziland and Mauritius in Southern Africa. They achieved their independence respectively 
in 1965, 1961, 1957, 1960, 1963, 1964, 1961,12 1962, 1964, 1966, 1966, 1968 and 1968. All 
of these countries went through constitutional developments, which, despite some variations, 
have followed a common political and constitutional pattern. Upon independence all of them 
had constitutions written before becoming sovereign states. Moreover, they all had a 
Westminster-style form of government and, with the exception of Ghana and Tanganyika, 
they all had bills of rights in their constitutions.
1.1 The Constitution-Making Processes
The three main features of the constitutional processes, which yielded the independence 
constitutions, were firstly the major role of the colonial power, secondly the lack of popular 
involvement, and finally the interdependence of the constitutional processes with the 
independence processes. The British Crown adopted constitutions before granting 
independence to the colonies during a process in which the main actors were the Colonial 
Office and the representatives of the African political parties.13
The constitution-making process took place in two distinct phases. Firstly the 
delegates of the African nationalist parties negotiated the constitutional texts during 
conferences which were attended by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, along with his 
advisers, as representatives of the British government. The objective of these Conferences was 
to elaborate upon proposals for the constitutions of the countries which would soon achieve
12 Tanganyika, along with Zanzibar, gave birth to Tanzania in 1964 and achieved its independence in 1963.
13 The British territories already had constitutions, which were drafted by the Colonial Office and adopted by the 
British Crown. It should be noted, however, that with the enhancement of the nationalist movements and 
African political parties, some of these constitutions were written with African contribution. For example, the 
1950 Constitution of Tanganyika was drafted by the Colonial Office, but was preceded by the formulation of 
proposals by a Commission which included representatives of the national parties present in the Legislative 
Council. In the case of the 1950 Constitution of the Gold Coast, proposals were formulated by a Commission 
composed only of African representatives. The 1951 Nigerian Constitution followed consultations held at 
village, division, provincial, regional and national levels; see P.-F. Gonidec Les droits africains. Évolution et 
sources, LGDJ, Paris, 1976, pp. 83-85.
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their independence. To this end, reports were written and subsequently transmitted to the 
Colonial Office, which then drafted the texts of the new constitutions. The latter were then 
formally adopted by the British Crown in the Privy Council upon government advice, usually 
in the form of subsidiary legislation of the “Orders in Council”, which implied that the British 
Parliament was merely informed. The local legislatures of the African colonies were also 
excluded from the constitution-making process. They were only made aware of the 
constitutional texts that were negotiated between the British representatives and the African 
political leaders after they had already been drafted and, therefore, were incapable of being 
changed.14
The constitutions of the former British colonies can, therefore, be seen as “de sortes de  
pactes conclus entre la puissance coloniale et les dirigeants politiques africaines”,15 in which 
the colonial voice was predominant. This predominance was often enhanced by specific 
political circumstances. This occurred when disagreement arose among the African nationalist 
parties, which allowed the Colonial Office to play the role of arbiter and consequently, to  
make the final decisions, as in the case of Kenya.16 The superior position of the colonial 
power was a general feature of the constitutional processes in Anglophone Africa at the time 
of decolonisation, and it manifested itself independently o f contemporary conditions. This 
was due to the link between the adoption of the constitutions and the achievement o f  
independence. In other words, the fact that the constitutions were negotiated before the 
attainment of independence left the African representation at the conferences in a weaker 
position and with less freedom to disagree, as agreement on the constitution was, in substance, 
a pre-requisite to obtaining independence from Britain. Therefore, on some issues, the African 
position on some issues was influenced by their eagerness to obtain independence and the fear 
of this process being delayed through disagreement with the UK. This was put extremely 
clearly by one of the African protagonists of that period, the future President of Ghana, 
Nkrumah, who denounced the Constitution of Ghana of 1957 as an “affront” to the 
sovereignty of Ghanaians, since the provisions of the constitution “were the entrenched 
clauses which the British government insisted upon writing into the constitution as a condition 
to our accession to independence”.17
14 Sierra Leone, for example, became independent on 27th April 1961 and on 20th March 1961 the local 
legislature had still not read the constitutional text.
15 Gonidec, Les Droits, cit., p. 84.
16 See Y.P. Ghai and J.P.W.B. McAuslan, Public Law and Political Change in Kenya, Oxford University Press, 
Nairobi, 1970, pp. 177-178.
17 K. Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite, Panaf Books, London, 1963, p. 59.
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The preceding overview shows that the constitution-making processes, which 
endowed Anglophone Africa with its first independence constitutions, were not occasions of 
real debate and reflection on the type of institutions which would have been most suitable for 
the new African states. Constitutions were the product of decisions taken by the colonial 
power with African political leaders, neither of whom were greatly concerned with the 
adoption of a constitution adequate to the needs and specificities of Africa countries. The 
former viewed the constitutions as a means of retaining special links with the ex-colonies, to 
ensure the coexistence of all the groups, interests and regions which would compose the new 
states and above all, to provide the European minorities with sufficient guarantees at the end 
of the colonial rule. With regard to the latter, the bill of right was conceived as a key 
instrument for their protection.
1.2 The Bills of Rights
With the exception of the Constitutions of Ghana and Tanganyika, all of the independence 
constitutions in English-speaking Africa contained a chapter, which was extremely detailed 
both in the enumeration of the rights protected and in the specification of the possible 
limitations, as well as the means of enforcement. The first constitution in Anglophone Africa 
to include a Bill of Rights was the Nigerian Constitution, which provided a model for the texts 
that were adopted afterwards. The Bill of Rights of Sierra Leone,18 9 Uganda,20 Kenya,21 
Malawi, Zambia,22 Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland are defined as neo-Nigerian Bills of 
Rights. It is interesting to observe that the Nigerian Bill of Rights represented a deep change 
of attitude for Britain with respect to the issue of human rights protection. Traditionally, 
Britain has always displayed distrust towards the formal declaration of rights, and had also 
confirmed this attitude during the drafting of the constitution of Ghana, which preceded that 
of Nigeria. In fact, at the time of the adoption of the Constitution of Ghana in 1957, the UK 
decided against the drafting of a Bill of Rights, although both the Ghanaian government led 
by Dr. Nkrumah and its opponents were in favour of its inclusion in the constitution.23
18 See G. Fisher, “La decolonisation et le rôle des constitutions’*, in Annuaire français de droit international, 
1962, p. 805-806 and p. 822.
19 On the Constitution of Sierra Leone, see T.O. Elias, Ghana and Sierra Leone: the Development o f  their Laws 
and Constitutions, Stevens & Sons, London, 1962; T. Bankole, The Constitutional History and Law o f Sierra 
Leone (1961-1995), University Press of America, Lanham, 1996.
20 See H.F. Morris and J. Read, Uganda: the Development o f its Laws and Constitution, Stevens & Sons, 
London, 1966.
21 Y.P. Ghai and J.P.W.B. McAuslan, Public Law, cit.
22 L. Zimba, The Zambian Bill o f Rights, East African Publishing House, Lusaka, 1984.
23 See F.A.R. Bemion, The Constitutional Law o f Ghana, Butterworths, London, 1962, pp. 58-59; G. Bing, Reap
11
a tl j- j -¡^ 1
Consequently, the independence constitution of Ghana of 1957 did not include a Bill of 
Rights, but merely made a brief reference to the freedom of conscience and religion, and 
prohibited racially discriminatory laws as well as property expropriation, except in pursuit o f 
a law requiring the payment of adequate compensation and providing for a right to access to 
the courts for the determination of the right to compensation.
The Nigerian Constitution thus constituted a major turning point in the constitutional 
building of Anglophone Africa. The history of the adoption of the Nigerian24 and neo- 
Nigerian Bills of rights is extremely interesting because it allows us to assess African position 
on human rights, which in turn, enables us to evaluate the factors which determined the 
ineffectiveness of the constitutional provisions on fundamental rights.
The first constitutional conference for the drafting of the Nigerian Constitution was 
held in London in May and June 1957. At this time, Nigeria was divided into three regions 
(Northern, Eastern and Western Nigeria), whose governments were dominated by political 
parties representing the major tribal and linguistic groups of the regions concerned. Tensions 
were strong among the parties in power on one side and the tribal and linguistic minorities and 
parties governing in the other regions on the other side. In order to solve the problem o f  
minorities, the party ruling in the Western region, the Action Group, presented two proposals, 
namely, the creation of new regions and the inclusion in the constitution of specific provisions 
guaranteeing a set of fundamental rights. The conference welcomed in principle the idea o f  
the constitutional declaration of rights and postponed the decision on new regions because o f  
both the opposition of the party which ruled the Northern region and because of the fear of the 
British that the country would disintegrate.25 It was clear that the British government would 
have delayed the concession of independence if the creation of new regions was insisted upon. 
For this reason, the Action Group abandoned the defence of that idea. With the purpose o f  
assessing the best solution for the problem of the minorities, the Conference agreed on the 
creation of a Commission of Enquiry was mandated to “ascertain the facts about the fears o f
the Whirlwind, MacGibbon and Kee, London, 1968, Appendix. The Ghanaian government adopted a White 
Paper which was recommended to the British government after receiving the approval by the Assembly. This 
White Paper contained a draft constitution, which included seven articles for the protection of fundamental 
rights mainly drawn from the Constitutions o f India and the Irish Free State. However, this draft was rejected by 
the United Kingdom.
24 On the Nigerian Bill of Rights, see S.A. De Smith, The New Commonwealth and its Constitutions Stevens & 
Sons, London, 1964; S.A. De Smith, “Fundamental Rights in the New Commonwealth-II”, 10 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, 1962, p. 215; T.O. Elias, Nigeria, the Development o f their Laws and 
Constitutions, Stevens & Sons, London, 1962; R.K. Hahn, “The British Influence on the Initiation and 
Introduction of Commonwealth Bills of rights”, 16 Journal o f  Commonwealth, 1988, p. 54; C. Heyns, “African 
Human Rights Law and the European Convention”, 2 South African Journal on Human Rights, 1995, p. 252; 
Vasak, The European Convention, cit., p. 1206.
25 See De Smith, The New Commonwealth, cit., pp. 178-179.
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minorities in any part of Nigeria and to propose means of allaying those fears, whether well or 
ill-founded”. This Commission, which was presided over by Sir Henry Willink, proposed 
that provisions on fundamental rights should be included in the constitution and submitted a 
text entirely framed on the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms of 1950, with one or two provisions drawn from the Constitutions of 
Malaysia and Pakistan. The Commission motivated its proposals as follows:
“[provisions of this kind in the Constitution are difficult to enforce and 
sometimes difficult to interpret. Nevertheless, we think they should be 
inserted. Their presence defines beliefs widespread among democratic 
countries and provides a standard to which an appeal may be made by those 
whose rights are infringed. A government determined to abandon democratic 
courses will find ways of violating them but they are of great value in 
preventing a steady deterioration in standards of freedom and the unobtrusive 
encroachment of a government on individual rights. We have therefore 
considered that provisions might suitably be inserted in the Constitution and 
have given particular attention to the Convention on Human Rights to which, 
we understand, Her Majesty’s Government has adhered on behalf of the 
Nigerian Government”.26 7
On the basis of this proposal, the British Colonial Secretary formulated a draft text which was 
accepted at the Constitutional Conference held in London in September and October 1958. 
The Nigerian Constitution of 1st October 1960, thus, included a bill of rights in chapter three 
of the second part under the title of “Fundamental Rights”.28
According to Anthony Rushford, a former Foreign and Commonwealth Office official 
who had a role in the drafting of the Nigerian Constitution, there were three main reasons for 
using the European Convention as a model. Firstly, this was in line with the method used by 
the British in the drafting of legal texts, secondly with the Nigerian preference for the 
enumeration of guarantees and corresponding limitations, and, finally, with the specific desire 
of Nigerian politicians and administrators to know the exact limits on their activities.29 
Another determining factor was the fact that Britain had already formally applied the
26 Quoted in Vasak, The European Convention, c it, p. 1216.
27 Cmnd. 505(1958), p. 97.
28 At the request of the Nigerian political leaders, the chapter on human rights was promulgated before 
independence for the federal elections which took place on 18th December 1959.
29 Anthony Rushford, interview, 9th May 1985 mentioned in Hahn, The British Influence, cit., p. 57.
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European Convention in its African territories since 1953,30 on the basis of the “colonial 
clause” contained in Article 63 of the Convention which provides that “[a]ny State may ... 
declare ... that the present Convention shall extend to all or any of the territories for whose 
international relations it is responsible”.31 Therefore, the use of the European Convention was 
considered a natural step, especially in light of the absence of a written Constitution in 
Britain.
All of the constitutions adopted after Nigeria followed this model. The only exception 
was the 1961 Constitution of Tanganyika which did not have a Bill of Rights because of the 
firm opposition of Nyerere’s government. The opposition of Tanganyika anticipated some o f  
the questions pertaining to the adequacy of a liberal Bill of Rights for sub-Saharan Africa, 
which emerged after a few years in the whole region. The reasons for the government’s 
opposition were not ail made public, but scholars have pointed out that one motivation m ay 
have been the fact that at that time, most of the judges of the superior courts who should have 
enforced the constitutional guarantees were non-Africans.32 Furthermore, the possibility that 
citizens would claim their rights may have been viewed by the government as a potential 
hindrance to the economic development of the country.33 Finally, the constitutional 
recognition of rights and freedoms was seen as a possible source of conflict between the 
different branches of government. The then Prime Minister, Rashid Kawawa, explained this in  
the following terms: “A Bill of Rights merely invites conflict between the executive and the  
judiciary; that is the kind of luxury which we could hardly afford to entertain”.34 A
30 The Convention was applied in Basutoland, Bechanaland, Gambia, Gold Coast, Kenya, Mauritius, Nigeria, 
Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somaliland, Swaziland, Tanganyika, Uganda, 
Zanzibar. It was not applied in Southern Rhodesia likely since it had the status of self-governing colony at that 
time.
31 In fact, the extension of the European Convention to the colonies did not improve the human rights situation o f  
Africans. Clause 3 of Article 63 added that, upon the declaration of the extension, “the provisions of th is 
Convention shall be applied in such territories with due regard ... to local requirements”, which means that the  
colonial power was entitled to exclude the application of some rights on the grounds of specific local situations, 
or rather, as it was pointed out in the Consultative Assembly, according to “political requirements”; see Vasak, 
The European, cit., p. 1209. This clause gave Britain a legal basis for upholding its practices and laws infringing 
upon the rights and freedoms recognised in the Convention. Moreover, the UK had not accepted the right o f  
individual petition or the compulsory jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights. The UK did not even 
fulfil the obligation provided by Article 15 o f the European Convention to report derogations to the Council o f  
Europe in case of declaration of states of emergencies. The only reported case in which Article 63 was invoked 
occurred when the African National Congress of Nyasaland asked Island to present an inter-state complaint 
against the UK for the detention of their leader, Dr. Banda. He was released before a complaint was filed.
32 See De Smith, The New Commonwealth, cit., p. 213. De Smith reported that according to the survey carried 
out by the Denning Committee on Legal Education for Students from Africa in December 1960, out of the 
hundred lawyers present in Tanganyika only one was African. Early in 1963 the number increased only to five.
33 C.M. Peter, “Five Years of Bill of Rights in Tanzania: Drawing a Balance-Sheet”, 18 Eastern Africa L aw  
Review, 1992, p. 149.
34 Par!. Deb., National Assembly, l*1 Sess., 3rd Mtg., 1088 (June 28, 1962), quoted in De Smith, The New 
Commonwealth, cit., p. 214.
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parliamentary democracy and an independent judiciary were conceived as sufficient 
guarantees for individual rights and freedoms. The preamble to the constitution of 
Tanganyika, indeed, stated that human rights “are best maintained in a democratic society 
where the government is responsible to a freely elected but sovereign Parliament 
representative of the people, and where the courts of law are independent and impartial”. The 
absence of large ethnic groups in the country facilitated the success of this position.
In the same year when Tanganyika refused to adopt a Bill of Rights, all of the 
remaining territories under British rule agreed upon its inclusion in their constitutions. The 
question is, however, whether these Bills of Rights were the product of an African request, or 
at least of an agreement deriving from a firm belief in their necessity, or whether they were 
the result of a British imposition. While the British standpoint on the matter of the 
constitutionalisation of fundamental rights is clear, the African view is problematic. On this 
subject, the testimonies are often conflicting and there is scant attention given to this issue in 
the literature. What results from the existing literature is that a demand for the constitutional 
entrenchment of human rights rarely came from the African side. The only exception to this 
was the case of Nigeria, however in this instance, the request came from the Action Group 
party alone, and was directed towards a specific aim, that is to obtain guarantees that the 
minorities in the Northern Region could freely exert their political opposition against the 
traditionalist, Muslim party, the Northern People’s Congress (NCP). The Action Group was 
not concerned with the protection of the rights of the individual, but rather with that of the 
minorities; in fact, it was not satisfied with the British drafting of the Bill of Rights since it 
was formulated in individualistic terms. Moreover, in 1958, the Willink Commission reported 
that, during the investigations carried out to find a solution to the minority problem, it was 
discovered that there was “little enthusiasm for the entrenchment of fundamental rights as a 
safeguard for minorities”.35
During the debates for the Republican Constitution of 1966, Dr. Banda, the President 
of Malawi, stated (and this statement was confirmed by the member of the opposition) that he 
had declared his reservations to the inclusion of a Bill of Rights in the independence
35 See ibidem, p. 178. With regard to Northern Rhodesia it can be of some interest to remember what the 
Colonial Secretary said: “I think the conference may ... now turn its attention to safeguards, both for the 
individual and for minority communities. The latter is perhaps of particular importance in a territory which is 
not yet fully developed and a society which is not homogeneous. Whereas in a developed homogenous country 
such as Britain, the protection of minority interests is maintained by certain recognised and traditional 
conventions, in underdeveloped and mixed communities special provisions are needed for this purpose, and it 
has been usual in Commonwealth countries to enact by law safeguards”, Cmnd. 1295, p. 4. See also Zimba, The 
Zambian, c it, p. 85.
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constitution and had even made it clear to Mr. Butler, the Head of the Central African Office, 
that the constitution would probably have to be amended soon after its adoption.36 He had 
only surrendered to British will in order to avoid delay in the achievement of independence. 
Apparently, however, constitutional guarantees were encouraged also by the minority United 
Federal Party.37
In the following section, the case of Northern Rhodesia shall be described in further 
detail as an example of a country in which the issue of the guarantee o f individual human 
rights appears to have been really an integral part of the political programme of an African 
national movement.38 There, the notion of human rights was not only used by the United 
National Independence Party (UNIP) to give a legal and theoretical foundation to the claim o f  
emancipation from the colonial dominance but also as a project for the future.
The commitment of UNIP seems, however, to be an exception in the overall 
framework of English-speaking Africa, where generally the entrenchment of Bills of Rights 
in the constitutions was more the outcome of a British concern about defending the interests 
of the Europeans who would remain in the former colonies after the end of colonial rule. This 
was certainly the case for Kenya, Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia. The Governor of Kenya 
stated during the negotiations for the constitution: “I have seen the vital contributions that 
Europeans and Asians have made, and are making, to the economy of Kenya, and I have seen 
with admiration the work that has been done by a devoted public service. Kenya needs the 
brains, devotion, and capital of all its peoples. This calls for a society and an economy 
without discrimination of race, creed or colour, where individual rights are firmly recognised 
and maintained”.39
Despite the clear situation in some countries, the African position on the Bills o f  
Rights appears controversial in many others. Thus, apart from the above-mentioned cases o f  
clear opposition (i.e. Nyerere in Tanganyika and Banda in Malawi) and of demand (i.e. the 
Action Group in Nigeria) or commitment (i.e. UNIP in Northern Rhodesia), it is difficult to 
determine whether the bills of rights were perceived elsewhere by the African side as
It is interesting to observe that Britain was so convinced about the usefulness of Bills of Rights that it urged for 
their inclusion even where, for example in Sierra Leone, there was no serious minorities problem and, allegedly, 
even no national demand in that direction; see A.B. Timbo, Human Rights in Sierra Leone: A Comparative 
Study, University o f  London, Ph.D. thesis, 1979, p. 55 quoted in Hahn, The British, cit., p. 59.
36 Official Report of the Proceedings of the Parliament of Malawi, 29 October 1964, pp. 222-224 and p. 227, 
quoted in Hahn, The British, cit., p. 61.
^  See S. Roberts, “The Republican Constitution of Malawi”, Public Law, 1966, p. 321 and Report of the 
Nyasaland Constitutional Conference, Cmnd. 1887 (1962), p. 7.
38 Zimba, The Zambian, cit., p. 86.
39 Cmnd. 1700 (1962), p. 8, quoted in Hahn, The British, cit., p. 66.
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necessary or ‘imposed’ by Britain (by ‘imposed’ is meant that African governments were 
compelled or strongly urged by Britain to accept the constitutional protection of rights in 
order to obtain independence). The testimonies given by those involved in the constitution­
making processes on the British side are rather ambiguous. Most admitted that Britain 
suggested the formulation of constitutional guarantees but denied that there was any 
imposition. As Sir Kenneth Roberts-Wray, a former legal adviser to the Secretary of State for 
the Colonies and the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, stated: “I am not in a 
position to affirm that persuasion has never been necessary, or indeed to deny it, but it can be 
easily demonstrated that the suggestion is not in keeping with the facts in some cases”.40 This 
testimony is confirmed by another former legal adviser who has stressed the existence of an 
African demand: “[o]nce Nigeria had a constitution containing a code of Fundamental Rights, 
the political leaders of other territories (apart from Tanganyika) came to the conference table 
expecting to be offered, and prepared to accept, a constitution containing such a code and 
discussion in conference was directed to the details of the code rather than to the general 
principle”.41 However, the Secretary General of the Commonwealth has defined the insertion 
of Bills of Rights in independence constitutions as “a parting gift” which in nearly every case 
was “one selected for the occasion by the fledging state itself’,42 and Anthony Rushford 
admitted that “there was UK prompting” but added that there was no imposition 43 While Ian 
McLeod, the Secretary of State for Colonies reported to the Parliament that “[i]t was very 
much the desire of the Nigerian leaders themselves that there should be such a code”,44 the 
Willink Commission explained that there was no widespread demand. Only some of the 
Christian groups had called for their inclusion.
In light of the subsequent developments and also of the overall constitutional 
experience of decolonisation, it seems that the judgement formulated by James Read on 
Anglophone constitutions can be used with specific reference to the Bills of Rights, in other 
words, they represented a “compromise solution provisionally accepted in order to expedite 
independence”.45 There was no coercion, however African leaders were so eager for
40 K. Roberts-Wray, “Human Rights in the Commonwealth", 17 International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 
1968, p. 917.
41 Sir James McPetries, Notes, quoted in Hahn, The British, cit., pp. 54-55.
42 S.S. Ramphael, Fundamental Rights -  The Need for a New Jurisprudence, 8 Caribbean Quarterly 1962, p. 
142.
43 Interview, 9 May 1985, quoted in Hahn, The British, cit, p. 58.
44 625 H.C. Debates, 5s., 1793, quoted in ibidem, p. 57.
45 J. Read, “Bills of Rights in “The Third World": Some Commonwealth Experiences", 6 Verfassung und Recht 
in Ubersee, 1973, p. 27. The same author has spoken of an “encouragement” from the UK to adopt enforceable 
Bills of Rights upon independence “as part of their constitutional settlement”: see J. Read, “Human Rights
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independence that they did not seek long discussions on the content of the constitutions, and 
allowed the British to write a bill of rights according to a model only here and there adapted to 
local circumstances.46
An analysis of the contents of the Bills of Rights will now be provided. As stated 
above, the Nigerian Bill of Rights represented the model in English-speaking Africa and 
having been modelled on the European Convention, it contained a clear liberal imprint. What 
is interesting is that it was even more radically liberal than the European Convention. Thus, 
the Nigerian Bill of Rights did not contain any reference to the so-called second-generation 
rights. Although it mentioned education, it did not deal with it in terms of a positive right. By 
repeating an article of the Pakistani Constitution of 1956, it merely prohibited the imposition 
of religious instruction or observances on persons of other religions, and guaranteed religious 
communities the right to provide religious instruction for their members in schools which they 
maintained. The European Convention, on the other hand, albeit extremely sparing with the 
matter of second-generation rights, protects the right to marry and to found a family (Article 
12) and its Protocol47 recognises the right to education and that the State shall respect the 
religious and philosophical convictions of parents in the provision of teaching. As for the 
other rights, the Nigerian and neo-Nigerian Bills of Rights follow provisions laid down in the 
European Convention.
The rights protected in the Nigerian Constitution included the right to life (Article 17; 
cf. Article 2 of the Convention); to protection against torture and inhuman or degrading 
punishment or treatment (Article 18; cf. Article 3 of the Conv.); to liberty and security of the 
person (Article 20; cf. 5 of the Conv.); to the proper administration of justice (Article 21; cf. 
Article 6 of the Conv.; furthermore Article 21(7) forbids the retroactive application o f  
criminal legislation similar to Article 7 of the Conv.); to respect for private and family life, 
home and correspondence (Article 22; cf. Article 8 of the Conv.); to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion (Article 23; cf. Article 9 of the Conv.); to freedom of expression 
(Article 24; cf. Article 10 of the Conv.); to freedom of peaceful assembly and association 
(Article 25; cf. Article 11 of the Conv.); of movement (Article 26);48 to protection against
Protection in Municipal Law”, in C.F. Forsyth and J.E. Schiller (eds.), Human Rights: the Capetown 
Conference, Juta, Capetown, 1979, p, 60,
46 Sir Kenneth Roberts-Wray wrote that the chapters of fundamental rights “were apparently prepared more with 
scissors and paste than with pen and pencil”, in K. Roberts-Wray, Human Rights, cit, p. 908.
47 Paris, 20 March 1952.
48 This right is not envisaged in the Convention. It is recognised in Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 of 16 November 
1963.
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discrimination (Article 27; cf. Article 14 of the Conv.);49 to compensation in the event of 
expropriation (Article 30).
The Anglophone Bills of Rights are also strictly liberal in the wide protection given to 
the right to property, which, conversely, is absent from the European Convention, and 
included in Article 1 of the Protocol.50 The Nigerian and the neo-Nigerian Bills of Rights 
provided that adequate compensation was to be envisaged by law in the case of compulsory 
expropriation, and, moreover they indicated the kinds of laws which were not covered and 
entrusted the determination of the right to compensation to the jurisdiction of the High Court.
The liberal inspiration of the Bill of Rights of English-speaking Africa is also 
confirmed by the lack of any mention of citizens’ duties, even though they are referred to, 
albeit indirectly, in the European Convention. Article 10(2) states that “[t]he exercise of these 
freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such 
formalities, conditions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic 
society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the 
reputation of the rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in 
confidence, or for maintaining the authority and the impartiality of the judiciary”.
Finally, all of the Anglophone Bills of rights provided for judicial protection of the 
recognized rights. In Nigeria, for example, any person was entitled to bring an action before 
the High Court alleging a violation of a right guaranteed by the constitution. The Court, in 
turn, was empowered to give any orders to guarantee the enforcement o f the right 
concerned.51 52 The decision of the High Court could then be appealed before the Federal 
Supreme Court, with the final decision resting with the judicial committee of the Queen’s 
Privy Council.53
However, the scope of some of the specific rights was reduced, by enabling public 
authorities to take restrictive measures in the interest of defence, public safety, public order, 
public morality or public health provided that these measures were established by law and
49 The non-discrimination clause is more detailed in the Nigerian constitution than in the European Convention 
and is not confined to the rights and freedoms expressly envisaged in the document as it is in the European 
Convention. However, the Nigerian Constitution does not include sex as a possible ground for discrimination 
and it prohibits discrimination only with regard to Nigerian citizens while the European Convention extends it to 
everyone independently of their nationality.
50 Article 1 merely states that “[e]very natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his 
possessions. No one should be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the 
conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law”.
51 Article 31.
52 Article 110 s.2 (d).
53 Article 114 s.l (c).
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“reasonably justifiable in a democratic society” (Nigerian Constitution)54 or, with a more 
restricted formulation, “reasonably required” (as in the Constitutions of Sierra Leone, Uganda, 
Kenya, Nyasaland). In the European Convention, the condition for the adoption of restrictive 
measures is narrower than the latter. The measures must be “necessary in a democratic 
society”55 and not simply “reasonably justifiable” or “required”. In addition to this, English- 
speaking African vested the power to adopt emergency measures in the President.56
These provisions played an important role in the poor human rights record of the states 
of English-speaking Africa. As it will be shown in the next section, they constituted the legal 
basis for the widespread suppression of human rights, which affected sub-Saharan Africa 
since independence.
A final consideration must be devoted to the procedure of the amendment of the Bills 
of Rights which conditions the actual safeguarding of fundamental rights and freedoms. The 
Nigerian Constitution, in allegiance to its liberal inspiration, envisaged a procedure which in 
theory made it difficult to amend the Bill of Rights. Its amendment required the approval o f at 
least two-thirds of the members of each House at second and third readings, followed by the 
additional approval of each legislative House of at least two regions.57 In fact, the presence o f  
parties which enjoyed a secure majority in Nigeria and, in other countries, of one dominant 
party made the revision of the Bill of Rights easier than it might have appeared.
1.3 Zambia: the 1964 Constitution
The State of Zambia acquired independence from Britain on 24th October 1964 when 
Northern Rhodesia58 became the independent Republic of Zambia.59 The independence 
Constitution of 1964 entered into force the same day and was included in the Schedule II o f 
the Zambia Independence Order promulgated by Her Majesty in Council under the provisions 
of the 1890 Foreign Jurisdiction Act. Only one year before it had achieved self-government.
34 Articles 22-26.
35 See Articles 8-11. On the measures of derogation in Anglophone constitutions, see De Smith, The New 
Commonwealth, cit., p. 188; B.O. Nwabueze, Constitutionalism in the Emergent States, C. Hurst, London, 
1973, p. 44-47; Vasak, The European, cit., 1219-1220.
56 Article 28.
57 Article 114 ss. 4(1), (2).
38 From 1890 to 1924, Northern Rhodesia was administered by the British South Africa Company led by John 
Cecil Rhodes and until 1911, was divided into north-eastern Rhodesia and north-western Rhodesia. In 1924, 
Northern Rhodesia passed under the direct administration o f the British Government. From 1953, Northern 
Rhodesia was federated with Southern Rhodesia (today Zimbabwe) and Nyasaland (today Malawi). The 
Federation was dissolved in 1963.
35 See the Zambia Independence Act and the Zambia Independence Order of 1964.
2 0
w ffruw rim M ioim f
The Prime Minister was Kenneth Kaunda, leader of UNIP, which obtained a huge victory in 
the 1962 elections.
The Constitution provided a President, head of the executive, which appointed 
Ministers from among members of the National Assembly. These formed a Cabinet, which 
was responsible before the President. The latter was also Commander-in Chief of the armed 
forces. Legislative function was vested exclusively in the Parliament, which was composed by 
the President, seventy-five elected members and up to five members nominated by the 
President. The President had the power of veto over legislation and, if a bill was re-passed by 
a two-thirds majority by the Parliament, he could still avoid the enactment of the law by 
dissolving the Assembly. The Judiciary will be discussed in more detail below.
1.3.1 The Constitution-Making Process
As explained above, similar to the other constitutions of former British colonies, the 1964 
Constitution was written before Northern Rhodesia became the independent Republic of 
Zambia. The British Government and the representatives of the Zambian nationalist parties, 
the United National Independent Party (UNIP) and the African National Party (ANC) agreed 
upon it during the conference in which the independence of Northern Rhodesia was 
negotiated. The Northern Rhodesia Independence Conference was held from 5th to 9th May 
in London under the chairmanship of Mr. Duncan Sandys, Secretary of State for 
Commonwealth Relations and for the Colonies. The British Delegation, the Governor of 
Northern Rhodesia, the Northern Rhodesia Government, the Northern Rhodesia Government 
Officials, the representatives of Zambian parties attended the conference. On that occasion, it 
was decided that the provisions of the independence constitution relating to human rights 
should follow the model of Chapter One of the Northern Rhodesia Constitution of 1963 
establishing self-government,60 subject to some modifications. The self-government 
Constitution included a Bill of Rights modelled on the European Convention.
The British favoured the inclusion of the bills of rights due to concerns for the 
protection of the various African and non-African minority groups in Northern Rhodesia. This
60 Northern Rhodesia Constitution 1963, Schedule to the Northern Rhodesia (Constitution) Order in Council 
1963, Chapter 1. It entered into force on 3rd January 1964. The inclusion o f a Bill of Rights in the constitution 
followed the appointment of a Commission in 1959 chaired by Viscount Monckton with the task of formulating 
recommendation on the review of the Constitution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. This 
Commission, which had only two African members (one from Northern Rhodesia and one from Nyasaland), 
recommended the inclusion of human rights provisions in response to the complaints of racial discrimination to 
the advantage of Europeans as well as specific demands for the guarantee of fundamental human rights; see 
Report of the Advisory Commission on the Review of the Constitutions of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Cmnd. 
1148,1960 (the Monckton Report).
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consisted of seventy-three African ethnic groups, the most numerous of which were the Lozi, 
the Bemba and the Ngoni, and the communities of Europeans and Asians who had come to 
Zambia attracted by the business opportunities offered by the mining industry. The British 
viewed a bill of rights as a bastion in the defence of minorities, whose rights might be 
threatened by a government controlled by a single party. The idea of the bill of rights also 
found the support of the representatives of the chiefs of the Zambian ethnic groups who 
favoured it as a guarantee for the groups which might not be represented in the government. 
The UNIP was equally favourable to the idea of a bill of rights, who had adopted a document 
entitled “UNIP Declaration of Fundamental Human Rights” in 1960, in which it was asserted 
that “[t]he constitution shall contain fundamental safeguards guaranteeing the freedom of the 
individual and providing against abuses of power by the Executive”. The Declaration added 
that this safeguard was addressed not only to minority groups but also to all the people of the 
country. Finally, it defined these safeguards as “an expression of UNIP’s belief in the dignity 
and freedom of the individual, and in the principles of justice and charity to all”.61 The 
document culminated with a list of rights and freedoms to be embodied in the constitution and 
these were all drawn from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. They included the 
right to life, liberty and security of person; equality before the law; freedom from arbitrary 
arrest, detention or exile save in accordance with law; freedom from interference of one’s 
privacy, family, home, or correspondence; freedom of peaceful assembly and association 
including the right to form political parties and trade unions, freedom of expression; freedom 
of thought, conscience and religion; right to property; protection from discrimination on the 
grounds of race, colour or sex ; right to vote and rights to due process of law. The only social 
and economic rights mentioned were the right to an adequate standard of living including 
good health for oneself and the family, the right to education and the duty of the state to 
safeguard the interest of the weaker members of the community. In the pre-independence 
Constitution of UNIP, there is also a commitment to the realisation of civil and political 
rights. The position taken on this issue of social and economic rights is more extensive. The 
UNIP constitution stated that the aims of the Party were “ to abolish all forms o f 
discrimination and segregation based on race, colour, tribe, clan and creed ” (para, c); “ to 
ensure that freedom of speech and freedom of the Press shall not be infringed, and that the 
people of Northern Rhodesia shall be free to think, speak, write, assemble, work and trade in 
accordance with the laws of the country ” (para, j); “ to secure for the people of Northern
61 UNIP Declaration o f Fundamental Human Rights, October 1960 published in Appendix II in D.C. Mulford, 
The Northern Rhodesia General Election, Oxford University Press, Nairobi, 1962, pp. 191-192.
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Rhodesia freedom of worship, according to conscience” (para, k); “ to achieve African 
democratic socialism for Northern Rhodesia, raise the standard of living of the people ” (para. 
1); “ to secure the most equitable production and distribution of the wealth of the country in 
the best interests of the people of Northern Rhodesia *’ (para, m); “ to protect working people 
by legislation for living minimum wages for skilled and unskilled labour, in addition 
humanising the conditions of labour and guaranteeing social security for the people of 
Northern Rhodesia” (para, p); “ to facilitate educational grants and scholarships to any 
deserving men and women for study ” (para, r); “ to ensure that free health services shall be 
provided by the central and local governments for all the people of Northern Rhodesia who 
are in need of such services ’* (para, s).62
In the UNIP post-independence constitution, the place of human rights was weaker, 
despite confirmation that one of the objectives is “ to ensure that freedom of speech, worship 
and freedom of the Press shall not be infringed and that the people of Zambia shall be free to 
think, speak, write, assemble, work and trade in accordance with the laws of the country *\63 
Nevertheless, the achievement of “ African democratic socialism ” in the new constitution 
was the primary goal: “ [t]o achieve African democratic socialism, raise the standard of living 
of the people and generally strive to make the people of Zambia contended and happy ”.64 
This is linked to the objective “ to co-operate with any movement or organisation for the 
improvement of workers* conditions and to secure the most equitable production and 
distribution of the wealth of the country in the best interests of the people ”.65
During the Independence Conference, the British and the Zambian required only two 
weeks to design the future constitutional order of Zambia and agreed to use the already 
existing Constitution which had been drafted in the previous year by the British Colonial 
Office. Although there had been some African participation in this process, this merely 
involved the expression of “views** to the Monckton Advisory Commission. The only point 
which was subject to real debate during the Conference on Independence was raised by the 
British and regarded the issue of the applicability of the provision on the right to property not 
only to individual persons but also to legal persons such as companies or unincorporated 
associations.66
62 For the list of the objectives contained in the UNIP pre-independence constitution, see K. Kaunda, Humanism 
in Zambia. A Guide to Its Implementation, Government Printer, Lusaka, 1966, pp. 9-10.
63 Para. (k). The list of the objectives of the post-independence UNIP’s constitution are also in ibidem, p. 11.
64 Para. (a).
65 Para. (c).
66 See Northern Rhodesia Independence Conference, Papers fo r Discussions and Consideration, DO 183/78.
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Therefore the insertion of a liberal Bill of Rights was not the product of a careful 
debate. Indeed, the fact that the drafting of the independence constitution was carried out 
before the attainment of independence and with the participation of the colonial power, which 
held the actual decision-making power, did not provide a better framework for a free 
discussion on the future constitutional system. While Britain saw the Constitution and 
specifically the bill of rights as a means to provide some form of protection for the non- 
African minorities remaining after its departure, the main goal for the Zambian leaders was 
independence and not the constitution itself which could be amended in the future. A 
demonstration of the ease with which agreement on the provisions on human rights was 
reached can be seen from the minutes of the Conference, which reveal the scarce resistance 
from the Zambian leaders on the few controversial points raised.67 On the other hand, the 
Declaration on Fundamental Rights of the UNIP had only been drafted four years earlier. The 
human rights discourse was not alien to Zambian leaders, however by looking at the specific 
context in which it was referred to and at the following developments that were already 
anticipated by the UNIP post-independence constitution, it is probably true that at the tim e 
human rights were used more as a “sword” to obtain independence and as a “shield” to  
reassure the international community,68
The 1964 Constitution and its bill of rights was, therefore, the outcome of a rather 
hasty adoption of a model with a specific regional European origin advocated by the British 
and facilitated by the position taken by Zambian leaders during the independence struggle.
1.3.2 The Bill of Rights
The independence constitution of Zambia contained an extensive and detailed Bill of Rights 
modelled on the European Convention. Preceded by a Declaratory section,69 it recognised the
67 One of the points raised by Kenneth Kaunda concerned the procedure for the amendment o f the constitution. 
Kaunda believed that a two-thirds majority was sufficient, thus opposing the idea of introducing a referendum 
for certain matters among which the Bill o f Rights; see Minutes o f Sixth Plenary Session N.R.I., (1964), 6th 
Meeting.
68 Zimba, The Zambian, cit., p. 86.
69 Section 1: “Whereas every person in Zambia is entitled to the fundamental rights and freedoms of the  
individual, that is the right, whatever his race, place of origin, political opinions, colour, creed or sex, but subject 
to respect for the rights and freedoms of others and for the public interest to each and all of the following, 
namely -(a) the right to life, liberty, security of the person and the protection of the law; (b) freedom o f  
conscience, of expression and of assembly and association; and (c) protection for the privacy of his home an d  
other property and from deprivation of his property without compensation; the provisions o f this Chapter shall 
have effect for the purpose of affording protection to those rights and freedoms subject to such limitations o f  
that protection as are contained in those provisions, being limitations designed to ensure that the enjoyment o f  
the said rights and freedoms by any individual does not prejudice the rights and freedoms of others or the public 
interest”. This section has merely the value of a preamble, which lacks binding legal effect as decided in th e  
case ofNkumbula v The Attorney-General o f Zambia (1972) ZLR III.
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right to life70 and to personal liberty,71 the freedom from slavery and forced labour72, the 
freedom from inhuman treatment,73 the right to property and freedom from its deprivation,74 
the right to privacy of home and other property,75 the right to protection of the law,76 the 
freedom of conscience including the freedom of thought and religion,77 the freedom of 
expression,78 the freedom of assembly and association,79 the freedom of movement,80 81the 
freedom from discrimination on the grounds of race, tribe, place of origin, political opinions,
Q 1
colour or creed. In the latter regard, it should be emphasised that the protection from 
discrimination was subject to some exceptions, which contributed to the legitimisation of 
discrimination against women. The first one was derived from the provision that the 
prohibition of discrimination did not apply in the sphere of application of customary norms82 
Thus, the principle of non-discrimination “shall not apply to any law so far as that law makes 
provision -  (d) for the application in the case of members of a particular race or tribe of 
customary law with respect to any matter to the exclusion of any law with respect to that 
matter which is applicable in the case of other persons”.83 84Furthermore, the principle of non­
discrimination did not apply in the field of personal law. The Constitution stated that it was 
not applied “with respect to adoption, marriage, divorce, burial, devolution of property on 
death and other matters of personal law”.
The right to personal property was given extensive protection in the Constitution, 
which resulted in the inclusion of detailed limitations imposed on the compulsory acquisition 
of property, as well as guarantees on the right of compensation. This was included due to the
70 Section 14.
71 Section 15.
72 Section 16.
73 Section 17.
74 Section 18.
75 Section 19.
76 Section 20.
77 Section 21.
78 Section 22.
79 Section 23,
80 Section 24.
81 Section 25.
82 Another recognition of the traditional specificities of Zambia can be found in the institution of a House of 
Chiefs, to which Chapter VI is devoted. The functions of the House of Chiefs have an advisory nature: it “may 
consider and discuss (a) any bill introduced into or proposed to be introduced into the National Assembly that is 
referred to the House by the President; or (b) any other matter referred to the House for its consideration by the 
President or approved by the President for consideration by the House.” Moreover, the House of Chiefs had the 
power to submit resolutions on bills or other matters to the President, which would be laid down on Presidential 
initiative before the National Assembly, see s. 86.
83 Section 25(4)(d).
84 Section 25(4)(c).
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fears of the European colonial powers that the Zambian authorities would impinge upon the 
right to private property upon the attainment of independence.
Political rights strictu sensu are not listed in the Bill of Rights, but can be derived from
the constitutional provisions, which established a multi-party political system in Zambia and,
«/
in particular, from Chapter V, in which the right to register as a voter and to stand for
A4
parliamentary seats was regulated.
However, the actual enjoyment of the rights safeguarded was subject to significant 
limitation. The protection of some rights was subject to exceptions, which could be made in 
specific circumstances.88 Moreover, there was a wide scope for the restrictions of rights which 
could occur in the following ways. The first consisted of the limitations effected by measures 
adopted under the authority of a law of the Parliament in the public interest such as defence, 
public order, public safety, public morality or public health.89 Following the Nigerian model, 
in order to be considered legitimate, such measures had to be “reasonably justifiable in a  
democratic society” and the public interests in the name of which the limitation of rights 
could be imposed, constituted notions wide enough to raise interpretative problems to b e  
solved by the judiciary.
The enjoyment of human rights could also be limited by derogative measures adopted 
following the declaration of a state of emergency or of threatened emergency. According to  
Article 26 “[njothing contained in or done under the authority o f any law shall be held to b e  
inconsistent with or in contravention of sections 15, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24 or 25 to the extent 
that it is shown that the law in question authorises the taking, during any period when the  
Republic is ai war or any period when a declaration under article 30 is in force (declarations 
relating to emergencies or threatened emergencies) (emphasis added), of measures for the  
purpose of dealing with any situation existing or arising during that period”.90 In accordance 
with the European Convention, the right to life, the freedom from slavery and inhuman 
treatment and the right to protection of the law were excluded from the possibility o f  
derogation. It is immediately clear from this provision that the Constitution did not supply any
85 Section 18. Regarding compensation, other constitutions such as those of Kenya and Lesotho were even more 
protective of private interests. They spoke of a “prompt payment offu ll compensation” (emphasis added), while 
the Zambian text required “a prompt and adequate compensation” (emphasis added).
86 Section 66.
87 Sections 61-62.
88 The rights subject to specific exceptions were the rights to life, personal liberty, freedom from inhuman 
treatment, slavery and forced labour, freedom from discrimination, and the right to protection o f law.
89 The rights concerned by these provisions were the right to privacy of home and other property, freedom from 
deprivation of property, of conscience, expression, assembly and association, and movement.
90 The only rights not subject to derogation were the right to protection from slavery and forced labour and from 
inhuman treatment and the right to protection of law.
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definition of what could constitute an emergency, thus giving broad discretionary power to the 
President who had the authority to make the above declarations. The European Convention 
also provides that “in time of war or other public emergencies threatening the life of the 
nation” derogative measures can be taken, but only “to the extent strictly required by the 
exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its 
obligations under international law” (emphasis added).91
Presidential emergency powers were also regulated by the Emergency Powers Act,92 
and the Preservation of Public Security Act93 which is related to the declaration of a 
threatened emergency. According to the former act, “the President may, by statutory 
instrument, make such regulations as appear to him to be necessary or expedient for securing 
the public safety, the defence of the Republic, the maintenance of public order and the 
suppression of mutiny, rebellion and riot, and for maintaining supplies and services essential 
to the life of the community”.94 In the pursuit of these goals, the President could, for example, 
decide the detention of persons or the restrictions of their movement, the deportation and 
exclusion from the Republic of persons who were not citizens of Zambia, take possession or 
control of any property or undertaking, or the entry and search of any premises.95 According 
to the latter act, the term public security signified “the securing safety of persons and 
property, the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the life of the community, the 
prevention and suppression of violence, intimidation, disorder and crime, the prevention and 
suppression of mutiny, rebellion and concerted defiance of and disobedience to the law and 
lawful authority, and the maintenance of the administration of justice”.96 The President was 
entitled to provide measures such as the prohibition of the publication and dissemination of 
matter prejudicial to public security and the regulation and control of the production, 
publishing, sale, supply, distribution and possession of publications; the prohibition, 
restriction and control of assemblies; the prohibition, restriction and control of residence, 
movement and transport of persons; the possession, acquisition, use and transport of movable 
property, and the entry to, egress from, occupation and use of immovable property.97
The power to declare a state of emergency was vested in the President. A control on 
his decisions was anyway envisaged by the constitution by subordinating the continuation of
91 Article 15.
92 Section 13 of the Zambian Independence Order, 1964 (Laws of Zambia, Cap. 108).
93 Cap. 106 of the Laws of Zambia.
94 Emergency Powers Act, Section 3(1)
95 Ibidem, Section 3(2).
96 Preservation of Public Security Act, Section 2.
97 Ibidem, Section 3.
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effects of the presidential declaration to the approval of the National Assembly. In the case 
that a declaration was made when the Parliament was sitting or had been summoned to meet 
within five days, the declaration ceased to have effect upon the expiration of a period of five 
days commencing from the day on which the declaration was published,98 otherwise the 
declaration lost its effect upon the expiration of a period of twenty-one days, beginning from 
the date of publication of the declaration unless it was approved by a resolution passed by the 
National Assembly.
These provisions did not constitute an innovation in Zambia nor in the former British 
colonies in general. The provisions concerning the derogation from fundamental rights and 
freedoms represented a colonial heritage. The President of the sovereign Zambian State w as 
attributed the same powers as the colonial Governor and the Preservation of Public Security 
Act was essentially the same as the Preservation of Public Security Ordinance of 1960, which 
was renamed in 1964. The latter came into operation before independence in July 196499 w ith  
the declaration of a threatened emergency issued by the colonial Governor, which remained in  
force in Zambia until 1991.
With regard to the enforcement of protective provisions, the 1964 Constitution 
provided the citizens with a minimal form of protection. Any person who alleged that any o f  
the rights and freedoms protected “have been, is being or is likely to be contravened in  
relation to him” could apply to the High Court for redress. The latter could “make such order, 
issue such writs and give such directions as it may consider appropriate for the purpose o f  
enforcing or securing the enforcement of any of the provisions of sections 13 to 26 (inclusive) 
of this Constitution”.100 The Constitution envisaged, furthermore, that if the question o f th e  
violation of a provision included in the Bill of Rights emerged during a proceeding pending 
before a subordinate court, the person presiding over the court “may, and shall if any party to  
the proceedings so requests, refer the question to the High Court unless, in his opinion, th e  
raising of the question is merely frivolous or vexatious”.101 No appeal could be presented 
against a determination of the High Court which dismissed an application as frivolous o r  
vexatious. As clarified in the case Harry Nkumbula v the Attorney-General fo r  Zambia,102 th e
98 The declaration, once approved by resolution of the National Assembly, could remain in force for a period o f  
six months and its effectiveness could be extended for further periods of six months as well as revoked at a n y  
time by the Assembly.
99 The declaration of threatened emergency was the response to the disorders provoked by the followers o f  th e  
Lumpa Church lead by Alice Lenshina, who claimed to owe allegiance only to their prophetess and not to th e  
government. During the revolts, over six hundred people lost their lives.
100 Section 28(2).
101 Section 28(3).
102 Appeal No. 6,1972 of 4 Dec. 1972.
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reference to the violation of human rights provisions made in “relation to him " (i.e. the 
appellant) in section 28, restricts the acts which may be challenged before the High Court to 
administrative, executive or individual acts, but does not include laws as such. These could 
only acquire relevance as the legal grounds of a specific act directly affecting the appellant’s 
rights.
Some specific safeguards were guaranteed to persons in preventive detention. They 
had the right to be informed of the grounds of their detention within five days from the 
beginning of the detention in a language which they understand. Their detention and the legal 
provisions under which this was effected had to be made public by notification published in 
the government gazette not more than fourteen days after the beginning of the detention. After 
a maximum of one month after the commencement of the detention and then at intervals of 
not more than six months, the case had also to be reviewed at intervals by an independent and 
impartial tribunal established by law and presided over by a person appointed by the Chief 
Justice. The tribunal addressed recommendations to the President on the necessity or 
expediency of continuing the detention. These recommendations did not have, though, any 
binding effect.103
The actual protection of human rights depends largely on the presence of an 
independent judiciary. In this regard, the Zambian Constitution did not provide for any 
adequate guarantee of this as the President appointed the Chief Justice. This also applied to 
the judges of the Court of Appeal and the High Court. In this case, the President acted in 
accordance with the advice of the Judicial Service Commission, which was subject to 
Presidential appointment.104 This body was composed of the Chief Justice, the Chairman of 
the Public Service Commission (also appointed by the President), a justice of Appeal or a 
puisne judge designated by the Chief Justice and a an additional member appointed by the 
President.105
Other safeguards were envisaged within the context of the legislative activity of the 
Parliament. In this respect, an interesting feature of the Zambian Constitution was special 
procedure envisaged in section 27, which allows for an assessment by a special tribunal of the 
compatibility of bills and statutory instruments with Chapter III. According to this special 
procedure, which was in fact never used, the tribunal was to be appointed by the Chief Justice 
and was composed of two persons selected “from amongst persons who hold or have held the
103 See Sections 26(2) and (3).
104 See Section 97 and 98.
105 See Section 104.
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office of a judge of the High Court”. The appointment of this special tribunal was provided to 
take place when not less than seven members of the National Assembly made a request to the 
Speaker for a report on a bill, within three days after the final reading by the Assembly. In the 
case of a statutory instrument, the request had to be submitted to the relevant Minister within 
fourteen days after its publication in the gazette. The report of the tribunal had to be presented 
to the President and to the Speaker of the National Assembly. The Constitution did comment 
directly on the effect of a report alleging the violation of the Bill of Rights. It results indirectly 
from section 71(4)106 that the President made the final decision as he was entitled to either 
deny or concede his assent to the bill, and also to affirm or annul the statutory instrument. In 
the case of withholding of the assent to the bill, this had to be returned to the National 
Assembly and could only be submitted to the President again if it had received the support o f  
not less than two-thirds of the members of the Assembly within six months.107 In this case, the  
President could either agree to the bill within twenty-one days of its presentation or dissolve 
the Assembly, which entailed the indictment of the presidential elections.
Another function of the special tribunal involved the granting of legal aid. The C h ie f 
Justice had the power to appoint the tribunal when he “considers it necessary for the purpose 
of determining claims for legal aid in respect of proceedings under section 28”, for an alleged 
violation or threatened violation of a right guaranteed in the Constitution.108 The tribunal 
could grant aid at public expense when the applicant “intends to bring or is an applicant in  
proceedings under section 28(1) or 28(4)”, “had reasonable grounds for bringing th e  
application” and could not “afford to pay for the costs of the application”.
A final guarantee for the effectiveness of the protection of human rights came from th e  
special procedure for the amendment of the Bill of Rights.109 The ordinary procedure o f  
amendment of the constitution was that the relevant bill had to be approved by not less th an  
two-thirds of all of the members of the National Assembly. In the case o f a revision 
concerning the Bill of Rights, the relevant bill also had to be submitted to a referendum110 and  
had to be supported by the votes of a majority of all the persons entitled to vote in order to
106 This stated: “Provided that if the President withholds his assent to a bill in respect of which a tribunal h a s  
reported under section 27 of this Constitution that it would, if enacted, be inconsistent with Chapter III o f th is  
Constitution, the bill shall be returned to the Assembly only i f  the President so directs. " (emphasis added).
107 Section 71(4)(5)(6).
108 Section 27(1 )(b).
109 Section 79. After the amendment bill has been published for not less than thirty days in the government 
gazette, it had to be submitted to a referendum. Only if it obtained the support of the majority of the persons 
entitled to vote in the referendum it could be submitted for reading to the National Assembly. The special 
procedure applied also to the article which regulated the amendment procedures.
110 Section 72 (3).
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come into force. The bill would be considered approved if it obtained the vote of a two-third 
majority of the members of the Assembly in the second and third readings. The special 
procedure should have been a bulwark against revision, which conversely it did not prevent. 
Upon independence, Zambia, along with many other African countries, featured a dominant 
party, which made constitutional revision a simple endeavour.
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CHAPTER 2: The ‘Transplant’ of the Liberal Model of Human Rights in Francophone 
Africa
In this thesis, the term Francophone or French-speaking Africa refers to the French colonies. 
These include the following countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Congo, Côte 
dTvoire, Gabon, Guinea, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Central African Republic, 
Senegal, Chad and Togo. With the exception of Guinea, they all followed the same path to 
independence. Moreover, at independence all of the constitutions, including Guinea, were 
modelled on the 1958 French Constitution.
2.1 The Constitution-Making Processes
Francophone constitutions were drafted after the territories under French domination achieved 
autonomy following the adoption of the French Constitution of 4th October 1958, which 
entitled the overseas territories to decide whether to join the Community provided for by the 
Constitution itself. Article 1 states: “La République et les peuples des territoires d ’outre-mer 
qui, par un acte de libre détermination, adoptent la présente Constitution instituent une 
Communauté?*. The Community was to be presided over by the President of France and the 
overseas territories could participate as member states enjoying the status o f Republics with 
full internal autonomy (ex Article 77).m The decision to join the Community was to be taken 
after the referendums on the new Constitution. In the case of a positive vote the territorial 
assemblies could resolve either to adhere to the Community or maintain the status quo (ex 
Article 76(1)) or become “départment d ’outre-meryy as provided for in Article 76(2). In the 
case of a negative vote on the Constitution, the overseas territories would achieve full 
independence outside the Community.1 12
The referendums on the Constitution, which were held in October 1958, were 
preceded by a visit of the President of France to the overseas territories from 21st to 27th
111 The Community was responsible for international relations, defence, money, joint economic and financial 
policy and the matter of strategic material as well as (except for the case of special agreements, the 
administration of justice) higher education and the general organisation of transports in common and 
telecommunications (Article 78). Special agreements could create other Community powers or regulate the 
transfer of the powers of the Community to one of its Members; see Egyptian Society of International Law, 
Constitutions o f the New African States. A Critical Survey, Brochure No. 17, 1962, pp. 8-14.
112 Article 86 of the French Constitution provided for the right of the member States to leave the Community. 
On the basis of that provision in I960 African States gained full independence and international personality 
through agreements which were made with Fiance transferring sovereign powers. As a result of the 
constitutional law of 4th June 1960, a Member State was allowed to gain full independence “without thereby 
ceasing to belong to the Community”. Madagascar was the only one which did not adopt a new constitution 
opting for a revision of the constitution of 1959.
It has also to be pointed out that with the collapse of the Federation of Mali, the Republic of Sudan named itself 
Republic of Mali and adopted an independent Constitution in 1960.
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August. During this visit, he underlined that Africans were completely free to choose and that 
France would not interfere. At the same time, however, he emphasised that in the case of a 
negative vote on the constitution, France, “en tirera bien sûr les conséquences”. In light o f  
this, only Guinea113 voted against it at the referendum, thus endorsing the position taken by 
Sekou Touré.114 After the referendum, all of the territories which voted in favour of the 
Constitution, except for the five which opted for the status quo, decided to join the 
Community.115
The achievement of the status of Republic entailed the adoption of constitutions.116 
The overwhelming majority were drafted and approved by the territorial assemblies,117 in 
other words, by assemblies elected on the basis of a French law enacted when these countries 
had still the status of overseas territories.118 The assemblies attributed to themselves 
constituent powers with the same deliberations with which they decided after the referendums 
on the status of the territory which they represented. The only exceptions were Niger and 
Madagascar. In Niger, a new assembly with constitutional and legislative powers was elected 
after the dissolution of the territorial assembly, which followed the resignation of the Head o f  
Government. In Madagascar, a National Assembly with constituent powers was elected by the 
congress of the provincial assembly.119
The three features that were so evident in the constitutional processes in Anglophone 
Africa were not so apparently present in the constitutional processes of French-speaking
113 Also in Niger, the head o f government, M. Djiho Bokari, and in Senegal both the Party of Independence and 
trade unions were against the Community but the pressures exerted by France on the customary chiefs prevented 
these two countries from voting no,
114 The threat made by France was actually fulfilled. France stopped the financial aid which it had attributed to 
Guinea until then, and it did not recognise the new state. However, one year later were co-operation agreements 
concluded with Guinea, which were interpreted as equivalent to a recognition of the State.
115 See P.F. Gonidec, Constitutions des États de la Communauté, Sirey, Paris, 1959, pp. 1-6.
116 Guinea adopted its constitution on 12th November 1958 after the referendum. The other Francophone states 
adopted their constitutions in 1959: Sudan, 23rd January; Senegal, 24th January; Central Africa Republic 9th 
February; Dahomey, 15th February; Gabon, 20th February; Congo, 20th February; Upper Volta, 28th February; 
Niger, 12th March; Mauritania, 22nd March; Côte d’Ivoire, 26th March; Chad, 31st March; Madagascar, 29th 
April. In 1959 Senegal and Sudan formed the Federation of Mali, whose constitution was adopted on 17th 
January 1959.
117 The Constitution of Guinea was also adopted by the Territorial Assembly.
118 These assemblies were created on the basis of a law of 1956. They were elected with universal suffrage and 
in a single national constituency. A wide range of matters (territorial services) were attributed to the Territorial 
Assemblies and to Governmental Councils elected by the Assemblies.
1,9 A completely different situation was that of Togo and Cameroon which, as trust territories, obtained statutes 
drafted directly by France in 1958. Togo was a UN trusteeship under French administration from 1946 to 1958. 
Its independence was proclaimed on 27th April 1960. Cameroon was a trust territory under mandate to the 
League of Nations under French (East Cameroon) and British administration (West Cameroon). The French 
Cameroon received internal autonomy by a decree of 16th April 1957. East Cameroon was granted 
independence on 1st January 1960. The Federal Republic of Cameroon was formed on 1st October 1961 
following a plebiscite on which the Southern part of West Cameroon decided to join the East Cameroon (the 
northern part chose to join Nigeria).
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Africa. In reality, however, the latter were also characterised by an important role being 
played by the colonial power, by the link with the independence processes and by the lack of a 
real debate on the constitutions.
With regard to the first point, it should be taken into account that France was not 
indifferent to the constitutional choices made by its former territories even though it is true 
that its intervention in the constitutional processes was more limited than that displayed by 
Britain. The French Constitution formally allowed African countries to adopt any kind of 
constitutional system, provided it respected the provisions regarding the Community included 
in Title XII of the Constitution, the principles of “liberté, égalité, fraternité " mentioned in the 
preamble (“La République offre aux territoires d'outre-mer qui manifestent la volonté d'y 
adhérer des institutions nouvelles fondées sur l'idéal commun de liberté, d ’égalité et de 
fraternité et conçues en vue de leur évolution démocratique”) together with the principle of 
democracy proclaimed both in the preamble and in Article 77 of the French Constitution. 
Contrary to the opinion of Fisher, the formal absence of further constraints on the constituent 
power of African countries does not mean that ‘7a pratique française ne témoigne pas 
d ’intérêt pour la constitution en tant que moyen susceptible d'assurer la transmission du 
modèle et l'exportation des institutions ou de garantir le maintien de certains liens et le 
respect de certains intérêts”.m  As Gonidec has pointed out, France also intervened in the 
constitutional processes of its former territories, albeit in a less evident manner than Britain. 
All of the Francophone constitutions were, indeed, not only drafted with the assistance of 
French experts but also under “certaines influences occulte d'ordre politique” originating 
from representatives of the French government. Evidence of the weight carried by France in
the constitution-making processes can be seen from the differences in the contents existing 
between the Constitution of Guinea, that is of the only former French territory which decided 
not to join the Community, and the remaining Francophone constitutions. The latter were all 
shaped on the French constitutional model, while the former included some elements of 
originality with respect to the French system.
As in Anglophone countries, the constitution-making processes in the ex-French 
territories were conditioned by the independence processes. The Community undoubtedly 
needed a certain extent of constitutional homogeneity among the Member States, which could 
only be realistically achieved by imitating the French system. 120
120 Fisher, La décolonisation, cit., p. 828.
121 Gonidec, Les droits, cit., p. 80 and Gonidec, Constitutions, cit., p. 7. A. Mabileau, “La Communauté et la 
francisation limitée du régime”, in A. Mabileau et J. Meyrat, Décolonisation et régimes politiques en Afrique 
noire, Colin, Paris, 1967, p. 28.
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Finally, with reference to the lack of debate in the constitutional processes, it is true 
that Francophone constitutions were approved by elective African assemblies, however, their 
role was actually confined to a mere ratification of texts to which they had not contributed. 
The governments drafted the constitutions with the assistance of advisory bodies, whose 
members in some cases were appointed by the governments (for example the constitutional 
commission of Senegal), in others by the assemblies (for example Congo) and by the 
governments together with the assemblies (for example Madagascar). The projects were then 
approved by the assemblies without a real debate.122 1234Only the Constitution of Upper Volta 
provided that the Constitution approved by the Assembly had to be compulsorily submitted to 
a referendum. Other states also provided for referendums on the constitutions, but this was 
confined to the case in which the projects had not been adopted with qualified majority, which 
in reality never occurred. All of the constitutions were approved unanimously or almost 
unanimously. In this regard, it is important to take into account that many states in French- 
speaking Africa already had single or dominant party political systems. In such situations, 
therefore, the approval of the governmental projects was rather easy to achieve. Moreover, the  
constitutions of French-speaking Africa were also drafted “à la hate"X2z as the primary 
importance for African leaders was the accession to government, for which an established 
constitutional framework was required.
2.2 The Constitutional Recognition of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms
All of the constitutions of the French-speaking Africa states adopted after the referendum o f  
1958, including that of Guinea, recognised individual rights and freedoms. The constitutional 
recognition of fundamental rights in French-speaking Africa seems to have been the outcome 
of an African choice, albeit conditioned by the particular situation in which it was taken. I t  
seems, indeed, that France was not particularly interested in the embodiment of provisions o n  
liberties in the constitutions of its ex-territories. Thus, on 12th June 1959, the President o f the  
French Community adopted a decision in which he stated that the member states had a n  
obligation to ensure the enjoyment of individual rights and freedoms “tels qu'ils ont é té  
rappelés par la Constitution de 4 Octobre I958”.m  Moreover, the Cour Arbitrale would have  
been given the competence to guarantee that this obligation was respected. In this way, it w as
122 Gonidec, Les droits, cit., p. 82.
123 G. Coñac, “L’évolution constitutionnelle des Etats francophone d’Afrique Noire et de la République 
Démocratique Malgache”, in G. Coñac (dir.), Les Institutions constitutionnelles des Etats d ’A frique  
Francophone et de la République Malgache, Económica Ed., Paris, 1979, p. 11.
124 J.O. Communauté, 15th June, p. 45.
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implied that there was no need for the member states of the Community to provide for a 
constitutional definition of liberties.125 In French-speaking Africa, however, the constitution 
as a whole and in particular the proclamation of liberties were seen as symbols of the 
accession to independence and of the achievement of the same dignity as the other members 
of the international community.126 127Thus, there was the idea that “la formulation d ’un régime 
politique serait incomplète” without the inclusion of provisions protecting fundamental
rights in the constitutions.
Following the French example, the recognition of liberties was contained in the 
preambles to the constitutions. The only exceptions were the constitutions of Dahomey (today 
Benin), Senegal and Chad, which also included provisions protecting certain rights in the 
bodies of the constitutions.
The technique used for the guarantee of human rights was achieved, in the 
overwhelming majority of cases, through references (in the preambles) to the French 
constitution, which refers to the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen of 1789, and 
to the preamble of the French Constitution of 1946.128
Most of the constitutional charters, which referred to the French constitution, also 
contained a reference to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.129 Furthermore, the 
constitution of Madagascar, which expressly defined the rights and freedoms protected, stated 
that its source of inspiration was the Universal Declaration. Although lacking such a clear 
statement, the list of rights and liberties proclaimed in the preamble to the constitution of the 
Central African Republic also reveals that it used the Universal Declaration as a model.
The same conception and definition of liberties present in the constitutions enacted 
immediately after the referendum of 1958 can be found in the charters which were adopted in 
1960 upon the achievement of full independence, including the independence constitutions of 
Togo of 1960, Cameroon of 1960 and later the Federal Republic of Cameroon of 1961. These 
constitutions, indeed, formally referred to the French Declaration of 1789 either in their 
preambles or, less often, in the constitutional texts, and often along with a commitment to
125 The problem raised by this solution was that when dealing with human rights, the French Constitution only 
refers to the French people (Le peuple français proclame solennement son attachement aux droits de l ’homme 
...). Moreover, the attribution of competence in this field to the Cour Arbitral, whose general competence is to 
solve controversies which emerge among states, would have entailed the intervention of the President of the 
Community as “gardien de la Constitution”. The final result would have been a limitation of the sovereignty of 
the member states; see Gonidec, Constitutions, cit., p. 8.
126 See A. Hauriou and J. Gicquel, Droit Constitutionnel et institutions politiques, Montchrestien, Paris, 1980.
127 C. Leclercq, “Les libertés publiques en Afrique noire”, in Conac, Les institutions, cit, p. 224.
128 See Constitutions of Côte dTvoire, Dahomey, Gabon, Upper Volta (today Burkina Faso), Mauritania, 
Senegal, Sudan and Chad.
129 For example the Constitutions of the Cote dTvoire, Dahomey, Gabon, Senegal and Chad.
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respect for the Universal Declaration.130 Other constitutions featured a detailed discipline of 
rights and freedoms in the bodies of the constitutions (see Article 2 of the Constitution of 
Dahomey, Article 2 seq. of the Constitution of Senegal, Article 5 of the Constitution of Chad) 
or in the preambles. Both the Constitutions of Madagascar of 1960 and that of Gabon of the 
same year, as well as the Constitutions of Senegal of 1960 and 1963, embodied a detailed list 
of rights together with a formal reference to the French Declaration of 1789, as well as to the 
Universal Declaration of 1948. The Constitution of the Central African Republic of 1960, 
similar to the preceding one of 1959, contained an elaborate definition o f the fundamental 
rights in the preamble.
This overview clearly shows the predominant liberal inspiration of the first 
Francophone constitutions adopted after the referendum of 1958. This emerges not only 
indirectly from the sources to which these constitutions referred but also from the list of rights 
explicitly mentioned, i.e. only civil and political rights. The only exception was the 
constitution of Guinea of 1958, which, after proclaiming the guarantee of the classic liberal 
rights and freedoms, recognised some of the so-called ‘second-generation rights’ in Article 
44, including the right to work, rest, social assistance and education. Nevertheless, even 
Guinea, which was a Marxist-Leninist regime, adopted an approach to the issue of the 
protection of fundamental rights which was largely inspired by the liberal constitutional 
culture. Its constitution, indeed, only devoted Article 44 to social rights and committed itself I 
to the protection of civil and political liberal rights, as turns out not only with regard to the j 
rights expressly proclaimed but also in a statement contained in the preamble according to 
which “[t]he State of Guinea adheres fully to the Charter of the UN and to the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights”.
The liberal underpinning of these constitutions is also confirmed by the virtual total 
absence of references to duties, which conversely characterised the constitutions enacted in 
the following years.131 The only exception was the constitutions of Guinea of 1958 which 
mentioned citizens’ duties. Title X of the constitution of Guinea was entitled “On the rights 
and fundamental duties of citizens” and dedicated two articles to the latter. According to 
Article 47 “[a]ll citizens of the Republic of Guinea shall conform to the Constitution and other
130 See the Constitutions of the Côte d’Ivoire of 1960, Mauritania of 1961, Niger of 1960, Cameroon of 1961 
and Togo 1960.
131 All o f the Francophone states underwent a situation of chronic instability from the end of 1962 which was 
made evident by the succession of numerous constitutions. Ouguergouz, La Charte, cit., p. 30 and Leclercq, Les 
libertés, cit., pp. 227-228.
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laws of the Republic, pay their taxes and fulfil in an honest manner their duties”. Moreover, 
Article 48 proclaimed “the sacred duty” of the defence of the nation.
Furthermore, it is interesting to observe that the Western inspiration of these 
constitutions was mitigated only in these three by references to an African distinctive 
character. In the Constitutions of Senegal and Togo, the awareness of the existence of 
elements which distinguish African societies was translated in specific terms with regard to 
the protection of rights. In this way, the Mali constitution of 22nd November 1960 referred in 
its preamble to the concept of African personality, stating that “[t]he Republic of Mali shall 
organise the conditions necessary to the harmonious development of the individual and of the 
family within a modem society and with respect for the African personality” (emphasis 
added). Moreover, it added that “[t]he people of Mali conscious of the historical, moral and 
material imperatives which unite the States of Africa, desirous of accomplishing the political, 
economic and social unity which are necessary to the affirmation of African personality, 
affirms its determination to pursue its task with a view to the realisation of African unity” 
(emphasis added). The preamble to the 1963 Constitution of Senegal which replaced that of 
1960 maintained the inspiration of the preceding one,132 and similar to the Constitution of 
Mali, it contained a reference to the ideal of African personality: “conscient de la nécessité 
d'une unité politique, culturelle, économique et sociale, indispensable à Vaffirmation de la 
personnalité africaine”. The constitution of Senegal, however, did not confine itself to this 
concept but also acknowledged in terms of rights one of the typical features of African 
societies, that is, their communitarian dimension. Thus, it recognised the rights and liberties of 
the human person, the family and also “les collectivités locales” and recognised not only the 
individual but also the collective property.
As mentioned above, when dealing with the issue of human rights, it is cmcial to 
examine their enforcement. In this regard the Francophone constitutions seem quite weak.133 
They did not generally include provisions ensuring judicial protection to the rights formally 
recognised. Only the Constitutions of the Côte d’Ivoire, Mauritania and Guinea had 
provisions for the enforcement of the protected rights. Moreover, in the Constitutions of the
132 M. Prouzet, “Les procédures de révision constitutionnelle”, in Conac, Les institutions, cit., p. 314.
133 In this regard L.O. Adgebite has classified African constitutions in three classes: 1. Constitutions where 
rights are precisely defined and provided with judicial remedies (Constitutions of Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, 
Gambia, Uganda, Kenya, Malawi, Botswana, Lesotho and Somalia); 2. Constitutions where rights are 
declaratory and formulated in general terms (Francophone constitutions); 3. Constitutions which provide for the 
Ombudsman (Constitution of Tanzania), L.O. Adgebite, “African Attitudes to the International Protection of 
Human Rights”, in A. Eide and A. Schou (eds.), International Protection o f Human Rights, Proceeding o f the 
Seventh Nobel Symposium, Oslo, September 25-27/1967, Almqvist and Wiksells Bocktryckery A.B., Uppsala, 
1986, pp. 77-78.
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Côte d’Ivoire and Mauritania, the judicial protection of rights was granted only to the right to 
be presumed innocent until one’s guilt has been established: “[t]he judicial authority, guardian 
of individual liberty, shall ensure respect for this principle under conditions stipulated by 
law”.134 The Constitution of Guinea, on the contrary, stated in Article 37 that “the judicial 
authority, guardian of the individual liberty, shall ensure the respect of the rights of citizens 
under conditions stipulated by law” without restricting judge’s intervention to a specific right.
A final delicate question raised by these constitutions relates to the fact they did not 
envisage the possibility of challenging a law violating rights and freedoms. The inclusion of 
the recognition of the latter in the preambles made this even more unlikely because of the 
controversial legal force of preambles. Consequently, in the majority of jurisdictions, the 
competent bodies which check the constitutionality of the laws could not declare a law as 
constitutionally illegitimate for violation of the rights and freedoms protected in the 
constitution. Along with the controversial binding force of the preamble,135 the weakness of 
the human rights protection in these constitutions was linked to the weakness of the 
constitution themselves as effective documents. To a greater extent than Anglophone Africa, 
Francophone Africa displayed a high rate of constitutional instability, with constitutions 
frequently repealed, suspended and changed. Moreover, the recourse to special legislation and 
jurisdictions made the provisions protecting human rights inapplicable. The value of the 
constitutions and especially of the provisions concerning fundamental rights and freedoms 
rested on their symbolic weight, which was independent of their actual implementation.
23 Benin: The 1959 and 1960 Constitutions
Benin, which was called Dahomey until 1975, is an artificial creation of France, which unified 
the northern Reigns of Bariba and Djougou and villages with proto-state organisation with the 
southern Reigns of Abomey and Porto-Novo, which was comprised of approximately fifty 
ethnic groups. If a common feature of these different entities is to be found, this is represented 
by the fact that, apart from the villages in the North, they were all monarchies with 
decentralised systems based on chieftaincies {chefferies). Differences, however, existed with 
regard to their political and social evolution as the Reign of Abomey was more advanced than
134 Article 62, Constitution of the Cote d’Ivoire; Article 49 of the Constitution of Mauritania.
135 This was solved in France in an affirmative sense by the French Conseil constitutionnel in 1971. In sub- 
Saharan Africa, a recognition of the binding force o f preambles was stated by Philippe Yace, President of the 
National Assembly of Côte d'Ivoire, who stated: “Le préambule n'est pas un simple énoncé de principes 
philosophiques et moraux exempt de valeur juridique. Il a même valeur que la constitution, il est source de 
droits positifs, à l'égard des pouvoirs publics et des particuliers”, quoted in G. Conac (dir.), Dynamiques e t 
finalités des droits africains, Economica Ed., Paris, 1980, p. 393.
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the others. Moreover, both in the North and in the South, animism was widespread, however 
Islam was professed in the North and Christianity in the South. The existing differences 
between the North and the South were accentuated by the politics of the French, which 
privileged the South over the North. The lack of infrastructure and educational opportunities 
in the South were among the most visible signs of such politics. With regard to education, 
however, the establishment of schools by France in the Islamic North was also hindered by its 
strong opposition to the colonial presence and specifically to colonial educational institutions. 
The result was a gap in the development of the two regions, which also continued after the 
end of the French colonisation.136
It is against this background that the colony of Dahomey acquired independence on 1st 
August 1960 and adopted its first constitution as an independent state on 25th November 
1960. Its first constitution, however, dates back to 1959 when Dahomey opted for becoming a 
Republic as a member of the French Community.
2.3.1 The Constitution-Making Processes
The liberal principles, which can be found in both the 1959 and 1960 constitutions, are due to 
a large extent to the modalities of development of the processes, which firstly led to autonomy 
in Dahomey and then to independence.
The enactment of the 1959 constitution did not involve much time or debate because, 
as argued above, its content was heavily conditioned by the participation of Dahomey in the 
French Community. Thus, on 4th December 1958, the Republic was proclaimed and on 15th 
February 1959, the Assemblée Territoriale, which had become Assemblée Nationale 
Constituante, adopted the constitution.
In addition, the content of the independence constitution, and above all of the parts 
relating to fundamental rights and freedoms, did not give rise to much discussion. This 
depended on Dahomey’s leaders being more concerned with affirming their power in a 
political struggle dominated by a regionalist logic than with what form of state and 
government to design for their country.
In 1959, the government of the Republic of Dahomey was composed of three parties 
which emerged from the fragmentation of the Union Progressiste Dahomeyan, in other 
words: the Bloc Populaire Africain, which later took the name of Union Démocratique 
Dahoméenne (UDD) led by Justin Ahomadegbé, the Parti Républicain du Dahomey (PRD)
136 S. Decalo, “Regionalism, Politics, and the Military in Dahomey”, in 7 The Journal o f Developing Areas, 
1973, p.451.
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led by Sorou Migan Apity and the Rassemblement Démocratique Dahoméen (RDD) led by 
Hubert Maga. All of these parties had a geographical character. The UDD represented the 
Southwest of the country, the PRD the Southeast and the RDD the North. Since then, 
regionalism appeared the main challenge within the political landscape of the country. T he 
choice of which party to support was linked to its regional imprint and a strong appeal w as 
also exerted by the personality of the leader, who was identified with the party itself and 
respected in the same way as traditional chiefs were. m ,
The relationship between the three parties, which formed coalition governments, w as 
not easy. They were unable to even find an agreement on the issue of independence. T he 
UDD was overtly against it and the RDD held an ambiguous position. In reality, on ly  
intellectuals pushed for independence. Political parties later manifested their support to th e  
cause of independence merely because of the influence exerted by Felix Houphoët-Boigny in  
Côte d’Ivoire and the Conseil d\Entente,137 138The choice for independence was therefore not th e  
result of a political debate, but rather of a rapid decision determined more by external rather 
than internal forces. As Glélé has written: “Chacun voulut se faire passer pour le champion d e  
Vîndépendance ou du nationalisme dahoméen, mais en réalité personne n ’avait mesuré la  
portée de la démarche, personne n'avait réfléchi à l'Indépendance*9.138 The absence o f  an  
analysis of the meaning of such a step was reflected in the constitution adopted after th e  
attainment of independence on 1st August 1960. On 20th October 1960, the Prime Minister 
Maga presented a project of constitution to the Legislative Assembly. A Committee composed 
of eighteen members, with six from each party, was set up with the task to examine it. W hile 
the project was pending, the political clash between the parties became worse. The U D D  
accused the Premier of regionalism and presented a “motion de censure** against th e  
government. Moreover, the situation in the country was made tense by a strike organised b y  
trade unions linked to the UDD and by threats of secession coming from the North. The id ea  
that a single party would be more appropriate to the contingent situation was raised by th e  
UDD as well as by students and workers’ organisations. After a first failed attempt, the R D D  
of Maga and the Parti des Nationalistes Dahoméens, which resulted from the union o f th e  
PRD of Apity with the Parti de la Fédération Africaine of Derilin Zinsou, formed the P a rti 
Dahoméen de l'Unité (PDU) on 13th November 1960. L’UDD did not participate in th is  
union. These political developments did not have any impact on the composition of the ad h o c
137 The Conseil d'Entente was a federation established on 29th May 1959 between the Côte d'Ivoire, Dahomey, 
Haute-Volta and Niger.
138 P.-F. Gléglé, Naissance d'un état noir (L'évolution politique et constitutionnelle du Dahomey, de la  
colonisation à nos jours), LGDJ, Paris, 1969, p. 180.
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Committee. However, already before these events, the constitution had appeared to be a 
matter o f political polemic rather than debate. The contrast did not really concern the content 
of the project presented by the government, but rather the legitimacy of the Assembly to adopt 
the constitution. In response to this objection, a law approved on 8th November 1960 
transformed the National Assembly into a Constitutional Assembly. On 25th November 1960, 
the Constitution, similar to the one of 1959, was approved unanimously following the 
submission to the Assembly of some modifications to the project originally presented by the 
Premier and concerning the provision for a Vice-President (14th November).
2.3.2 The Constitutional Protection of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms
The 1959 Constitution followed the same pattern as the other constitutions of the French 
Community, as it was also modelled on the 1958 French Constitution. The commitment of the 
Republic of Dahomey to protect fundamental rights and freedoms is expressed in the 
preamble and in Articles 1 and 3, which enshrined the principle of equality, religious freedom 
and the right to form political parties. The preamble stated that Dahomey “affirme son 
attachement au droit à la libre détermination des peuples et aux libertés fondamentales de 
Vhomme définies par les déclarations des Constitutions de la République française”. As far as 
the form of government was concerned, the constitution introduced a parliamentary form of 
government with a legislature with a single house.
In the 1960 independence constitution, the preamble sanctioned the new state’s 
commitment to safeguard human rights by referring to the French Declaration of the Rights of 
Man and of the Citizen, the Universal Declaration and the constitution itself: “Le peuple du 
Dahomey proclame solennellement son attachement aux principes de la Démocratie et des 
Droits de l'Homme, tels qu'ils ont été définis par la Déclaration des Droits de l'Homme et du 
Citoyen du 1789, par la Déclaration Universelle de 1948, et tels qu’ils sont garantis par la 
présente Constitution. ” The body of the 1960 Constitution expressly recognised the principle 
of equality without any distinction based on origin, race, sex and religion, the freedom of 
religion and the right to form political parties. Article 6 stated: “La République assure à tous 
l'égalité devant la loi sans distinction d'origine, de race, de sexe ou de religion. Elle respecte 
toutes les croyances”, According to Article 7: “Les partis et groupements politiques 
concourent à l'expression du suffrage. Ils se forment et exercent leur activité librement sous
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condition de respecter les principes de la souveraineté nationale et de la démocratie, et les 
lois de la République”.139 140
It could be argued that a potential threat to human rights came from the form of 
government. The constitution provided a President and a Vice-President elected by universal 
suffrage. The provision of a Vice-President was devised as a mechanism to ensure that both 
the North and the South would be represented in the executive. Moreover, the President was 
ultimately the key organ of the entire constitutional system. Gléglé has even described the 
system introduced in Dahomey as “une chefferie nouveau style qui représente une synthèse 
des traditions africaines et des institutions d'inspiration européenne, française et 
américaine”.m  There was no real mechanism of checks and balances envisaged with respect 
to the powers attributed to the President. The President was elected for five years and was re- 
eligible for election without limits. He was the “détenteur exclusif du pouvoir exécutif ' 
(Article 12) and also appointed the members of the government and determined their 
competencies. The ministries were only responsible to him. Moreover, the President was 
entitled to adopt exceptional measures when the institutions of the Republic, the independence 
of the nation, the integrity of the territory or the execution of its international engagements 
were under threat (Article 19). He also held competencies, which limited the sphere of action 
of the National Assembly. This was composed of sixty members who were elected every five 
years. Following the French model, the President had the power to enact regulations in all the 
matters which the Constitution did not explicitly attribute to the competence of the law 
(Article 44). In addition, the President shared the power of legislative initiative and o f 
constitutional revision with the members of the Assembly, and had the right of veto. The 
Assembly could also delegate to the President the power to adopt measures in areas reserved 
to the law. Moreover, the Assembly did not exert any control over the executive, except for 
the power to vote its impeachment before the Haute Cour de Justice by a majority of two 
thirds in the case of high treason (Article 66) and to vote on the budget. Even this latter 
control could be superseded because the Constitution provided that if  the budget was not 
voted upon within sixty days from the day of submission of the project, its provisions could 
be put into force by ordonnance (Article 51). The disposal on impeachment was, furthermore, 
virtually dead letter as not only was there no definition of high treason given by the
139 The recognition of religious freedom, in combination with the proclamation of the secular character o f the 
republic should not be seen as a mechanical import of a foreign principle, but rather as a way to ensure 
continuity to a specific characteristic of the country consisting in the coexistence of animist cults with the 
imported religions of Islam, Catholicism and Protestantism.
140 Gléglé, Naissance, cit., p. 220.
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Constitution but the High Court itself was never set up. The judiciary was weakened not only 
by the provision that the guarantee of its independence was conferred to the President (Article 
59, 2), but also by the fact that its highest organs either had scarce powers or were never 
established. This observations is valid both for the High Court and for the other two judicial 
organs provided by the Constitution, i.e. the Cour Supreme and the Conseil Supérieur de la 
Magistrature. The former was charged with reviewing the constitutionality of laws, but it had 
only advisory powers and its advice could be requested either by the President of the Republic 
or the President of the National Assembly. The latter was never set up, as it could have been 
easily foreseen, considering that when the Constitution was drafted, the country had merely 
ten national magistrates.141
As Glélé observed the liberal-democratic principles included in this Constitution, 
which were already weakened by the broad powers vested in the President, “ne correspondent 
pas le plus souvent à ses [du pays] traditions ni culturelles, ni politiques”.142 In this regard, it 
should be noted the respect still elicited by the traditional political institutions of Dahomey 
despite the manipulation and transformation carried out by the colonial power. Monarchical 
dynasties were still strong when the constitution was adopted to the extent that national 
political leaders, who in many cases descended from these dynasties, more or less explicitly 
presented themselves and were still perceived as their representatives. This attitude reinforced 
in the idea in the minds of the population that party leaders could not be questioned and above 
all removed.143 The vitality of traditional culture is clear if one considers that even though 
Dahomey had a consistent number of educated persons, to such an extent that it was called “le 
quartier latin d'Afrique”, ninety-two per cent of the population was illiterate and the great 
majority lived in rural areas. Moreover, the educated section of the population had been 
exposed to French culture and from 1944, following the introduction of elective assemblies in 
the colonies, it could also experience in practice the functioning of democratic institutions. 
However, such experience was enjoyed only by a minority of the population because the right 
to vote was not held by everyone but was attributed on the basis of a “système de capacités 
The experience of democratic institutions was also further limited in a temporal sense because 
these institutions were introduced only fifteen years before independence. In addition, the 
educated élite was composed of doctors, teachers, midwives and officials formed by the
141 Ibidem, p. 225.
142 Ibidem.
143 This is the reason for the emphasis included in the constitution of the republican character of the State and 
the express exclusion of the republic form of state from the possibility of being subject to constitutional 
revision.
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French to serve the colonial administration. Therefore, what was lacking was not only a 
widespread knowledge of constitutionalism but also, among those familiar with it, an 
experience of government as decision-makers.
In theory, a factor which might have contributed to the success of liberal-democracy in 
the country was the political maturity of its educated élite. Since the aftermath World War I, a 
strong anti-colonial engagement emerged and the French Declaration was used to claim an 
end to the abuses and exploitation imposed by France. However, the reference to the French 
Declaration seems to have been used as a strategic consideration rather than a real 
appropriation of its meaning on the part of Dahomeans. Moreover, the contacts that they had 
with French organisations and parties channelled political ideas coming from France, 
however, these were of different nature and also included non-liberal ones. For example, in 
the period from 1920-1921, a movement of passive resistance to colonisation was organised in 
the region of Porto-Novo and one of its leaders Louis Hunkarin was affiliated to a number o f  
French movements, including both the Ligue des droits de l ’Homme, of which he established 
a branch in Dahomey, and communist movements. As it will be argued in the following part, 
this political consciousness was among the factors of the country’s political instability and 
also of its recent democratic renewal.
It is against this background that Gléglé concluded that the principles included in the 
constitution had a normative character. “2Zs expriment des veeux”,144 subject to assessment by  
history.
144 Ibidem, p. 216.
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PART II: FAILURE OF THE LIBERAL MODEL OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA?
CHAPTER 3: A New Constitutional Phase for Sub-Saharan Africa: Constitutions 
without Constitutionalism
Shortly after independence, sub-Saharan Africa witnessed a questioning and alteration, and in 
certain cases an outright rejection of the constitutional institutions and principles introduced 
upon independence. Some of the constitutions were amended, others were replaced in 
succession, others were suspended. In certain cases, these constitutional changes were a 
consequence of the successions of leaders, which was often determined by military coups 
d’état. New constitutional models were presented as more suitable to African culture and 
tradition and were experimented with in the name of a right to difference, which in certain 
cases was claimed in the constitutional field by the doctrine of l ’authenticité. According to 
this doctrine, Africa should base its state systems on its own traditions.145 This entailed the 
abandonment of the principles and institutional machinery which represented the initial 
constitutional foundations of independent African countries such as the separation of powers 
and the protection of civil and political rights. Presidentialism146 and one-party systems 
introduced either de facto or de iure, which were fashioned after the Soviet model in certain 
states, constituted the most concrete expression of the pursuit of new constitutional forms of 
state organisation, which were considered as more suitable to African culture and socio­
economic structures. In the field of human rights, the emphasis on the collective right to 
development, on economic, social and cultural rights and on duties, as well as on the 
corresponding challenge to civil and political rights were the main features of the conception 
of liberties which replaced the liberal-oriented model. Some constitutions gave expression to 
this new approach. However, in many cases, the erosion of the idea of rights introduced in 
sub-Saharan Africa at independence was not formally translated in the constitutional texts. 
Indeed, they tended to continue to give rights, including civil and political rights, 
constitutional recognition either in bills of rights or in programmatic provisions embodied in 
their preambles. Fundamental rights were therefore suppressed through recourse to special 
legislation, which was often inherited by the colonial administration. A broad interpretation
145 Conac, L’évolution, cit., p. 19.
146 The concept of presidentialism is conceived as a degeneration of the presidential form of government The 
degeneration is a result of the lack of mechanisms of checks and balances with respect to the powers of the 
President, which in the classic presidential model are exerted by the legislature and the judiciary; see G. De 
Vergottini, Diritto costituzionale comparator Cedam, Padova, 1993, ft. 6, p. 843.
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of the conditions was also provided for by the constitutions, which allowed for the limitation 
of rights, apart from those regimes which did not even include a superficial veneer of legality 
to defend the fundamental rights violations. Among the measures with a constitutional 
foundation include measures taken on the basis of a broad interpretation of notions such as 
public order, defence or security. As seen in Part 1, in order to safeguard these public 
interests, some constitutions (particularly in Anglophone Africa) explicitly permitted the 
limitation of rights. More specifically, the concept of public order paved the way for the 
restriction of the freedom of press, opinion, assembly and association (especially that o f  a  
political character). Criticism of the state institutions and policy were often defined and 
punished as attacks on public order. Moreover, the appeal to exceptional circumstances 
allowed the declaration of states of crises, emergencies, necessities or sieges, during which 
the heads of states were constitutionally entitled to exert special powers. Constitutions w ere 
therefore used as an instrument of internal and international legitimisation, however, their 
existence was not a guarantee of constitutionalism.
In other cases, the restriction of fundamental rights was carried out through 
parliamentary or presidential acts enacted in contrast with the constitutional provisions w hich 
protected rights.147 Their application was assisted by a general attitude of “judicial self- 
restraint”148 adopted by the judiciary in the evaluation of the constitutional legitimacy o f  
legislative or governmental acts. Derogatory measures were, for example, enacted in  
disregard for the formal and substantial conditions provided for by the constitutions. These 
measures must have been provided by a law approved by the Parliament and must have been  
unavoidable, temporary and proportionate. In contrast with these provisions, n on - 
proportionate and tendentiously permanent acts were adopted.149 Furthermore, th e  
recognition of the right to personal liberty was deprived of any value by the regular adoption 
of preventive detention acts. The freedoms of the press and opinion were restricted b y  
sedition laws, which provided a legal basis to define as seditious and thereby punish a n y  
expression of criticism or opposition.150 However, in political situations where monopartism 
dominated, the freedom of the press was de facto suspended as newspapers, broadcasting a n d  
television services were owned by the state, i.e. by the single or dominant party. The freedom
147 See Y.P. Ghai, “Constitutions and the Political Order in East Africa”, 21 International and Comparative L a w  
Quarterly, 1972, p. 404; V.T. Le Vine, “The Fall and Rise of Constitutionalism in West Africa”, in 35 T h e  
Journal o f Modem African Studies, 1997, pp. 189-191; B.O. Nwabueze, Presidentialism in Commonwealth 
Africa, C. Hurst, London, 1974, pp. 298-353.
148 See Roberts-Wray, Human Rights, cit., pp. 923-924.
149 On emergencies see Nwabueze, Constitutionalism, cit., pp. 173-185 and Presidentialism, cit., pp. 298-353.
150 See Nwabueze, Constitutionalism, c it, pp. 150-151.
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to form and join political parties was suppressed not only by preventing the activity of parties 
through political coercion or electoral malpractice, but also by governmental acts explicitly 
banning opposition groups.
If then we look more closely to Anglophone and Francophone Africa, some 
differences can be detected with regard to their constitutional law developments and also the 
status and conception of human rights in their respective constitutional systems.
3.1 Constitutional Developments in Anglophone Africa
With regard to human rights, the new constitutions of English-speaking Africa were not very 
different from those adopted at the time of decolonisation. Those Constitutions, which had 
originally included Bills of Rights, tended to continue to preserve them in the new or 
amended constitutions and to maintain the same liberal orientation. The list of rights was not 
only extremely detailed, but civil and political rights continued to be recognised.151 152The 
Constitutions of Zambia of 25th August 1973 and Sierra Leone of 14th June 1978 are the 
only charters which, apart from including a long list of civil and political rights, proclaimed 
the duties of the individual in their preambles, whose fulfilment was considered as a
1 <¡'7necessary condition for the enjoyment of rights and freedoms.
However, some states adopted new constitutional texts which did not contain any 
reference to the protection of fundamental rights. This included the case of the Constitution 
of Swaziland of 9th October 1978 which replaced the independence Constitution of 1967; 
that of Lesotho of 16th August 1983 which followed the two constitutions of 1965 and 1966; 
and that of Malawi of 6th July 1966, which established a one-party system. The first sign of 
change in Malawi was the 1964 amendment to the Constitution of 1961, which enabled the 
Prime Minister to order the detention of anyone in the interest of national defence, public 
order and public security. However, the Charter of 1964 referred to the Universal 
Declaration (Article 2) and guaranteed the right to property and equality in the enjoyment of
151 Ouguergouz, La Charte, cit., p. 31. See Articles. 30-40 of the Constitution of Nigeria resulting from the 
amendments of 1979; of Kenya of 1969, Act n. 5 amended in 1979; of Gambia of 24th April 1970; Uganda of 
8th July 1967; Zambia of 25th August 1973; Botswana of 30th September 1966 amended in 1969.
152 See paragraph 5 of the preamble to the Constitution of Zambia which proclaimed: “Recognising that 
individual rights of citizens including freedom, justice, liberty and equality are founded on the realisation of the 
rights and duties of all men in the protection of life, liberty ... within the context of our national constitution”; 
paragraph 13 of the preamble to the Constitution of Sierra Leone stated: “And whereas we are satisfied that men 
are united together in our community, it is their duty to respect the rights and dignity o f their fellow men, to 
uphold the laws of the State and to conduct the affairs of the State so that its resources are preserved, developed 
and enjoyed for the benefit of all its citizens a whole and so as to prevent the exploitation of man by man”. 
Similarly the Constitution of Tanzania of 1965 maintained in the preamble that the individual had the duty to 
respect others’ rights and dignity.
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1rights and freedoms. As was mentioned above, Tanzania and Ghana are particular cases 
because their independence constitutions did not even include bills of rights.153 The 1960 
Constitution of Ghana, which followed that o f 1957, dedicated only one article to 
fundamental principles,154 while the Constitution of 1964 did not mention liberties at all. It 
was only with the constitution of 1969 that Ghana came to have a bill of rights with a liberal 
formulation. However, the Constitution of 1969 was replaced by another charter in 1981 after 
a coup d'état, which committed the state to respect fundamental human rights but without 
actually specifying the content of these rights (Article 1).
Tanzania did not have a Bill of Rights in its Constitution until 1984 when a Bill o f  
Rights was inserted in the 1977 Constitution,155 which entered into force in March 1985. 
Until then, however, liberties were loosely enumerated in the preambles, with the 
consequence that they were not judicially enforceable. Nevertheless, these constitutions, 
starting with Tanganyika’s interim Constitution of 1965, provided for an alternative solution 
aimed at guaranteeing the enforcement of fundamental rights. This solution consisted in the 
establishment of a type of Ombudsman, which was called the Permanent Commission o f  
Enquiry (PCE). This body had the power to hear citizens' complaints against the government 
and party bureaucrats. However, this body had to report directly to the President, who was the 
only person entitled to decide whether to pursue the matter.156
3.2 Constitutional Developments in Francophone Africa
French-speaking Africa was characterised by the succession of many constitutions after those 
adopted in 1958. Between 1960 and 1985, forty-three constitutions were enacted in the 
eighteen French-speaking countries.157 They continued to give explicit recognition to 
fundamental rights generally through reference in the preambles or even in the body itself o f  
the constitutions158 to both the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen 
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of 1948 or else to the UDHR alone.
133 Chapter IV of Constitution of 1969 besides the classic liberal rights, recognised in Article 13 the right of the  
child and of mother as well as parents’ duties towards the children. Moreover, this Constitution expressly 
prohibited monopartism and provided for the Ombudsman.
154 Freedoms from racial discrimination, of conscience and religion were guaranteed. Moreover, the compulsory 
acquisition of property except on payment o f adequate compensation was prohibited.
1ÎS Fifth Amendment Act No. 15 of 1984.
156 C.M. Peter, “Five Years of Bill of Rights in Tanzania; Drawing a Balance-Sheet”, in 1 Eastern Africa L aw  
Review, 1992, p. 149-150.
157 See F. Reyntjens, “Recent Developments in the Public Law of Francophone African States”, 30 Journal o f  
African Law, 1986, p. 75.
138 This was the case of the Constitution of Senegal, Title II of which was entitled “des libertés publiques et de  
la personne humaine” and of the Constitution of Mali of 2nd June 1974.
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The general trend continued to be a reference to the Universal Declaration. In 1988, only 
three constitutions mentioned the French Declaration: Côte dTvoire, Gabon and Senegal. 
Even the Constitutions of Guinea of 10th November 1958 and Benin of 26th August 1977, 
which were regimes of Marxist-Leninist orientation, referred to the Universal Declaration in 
addition to the UN Charter. Some of these constitutions also explicitly indicated the rights 
protected either in their preambles or in the body of the constitutions. The Madagascar and 
the Congo Constitutions of 31st December 1975 and 12th July 1973 respectively were the 
only ones which did not include any reference to either the French Declaration or the 
Universal Declaration, however they did mention certain specific rights.159
The enforcement of these rights was conditioned by the general absence of systems of 
control of the constitutionality of the legislation even when provided by the constitution, as in 
the case of the Constitution of Togo of 1980. Furthermore, the activity of the administrative 
courts, which should have safeguarded the rights of citizens in respect to acts of the state, 
proved to be extremely weak.160
The maintenance of the reference to the Universal and French Declarations did not 
prevent new Francophone constitutions from introducing elements which were alien to the 
liberal tradition. This feature distinguished Francophone charters from the Anglophone ones, 
which were reluctant to change the definition of rights introduced in the first independence 
constitutions. A new characteristic of the constitutions of French-speaking Africa was the 
place accorded to economic, social and cultural rights, which were only expressly included in 
the 1959 Constitution of Guinea after decolonisation. However, liberal rights continued to be 
the most prominent, apart from the constitutions of Marxist orientation, as is in the Charters 
of Benin of 9th September 1977, Congo of 9th July 1979, Guinea of 14th May 1982 and 
Madagascar of 31st December 1975. In these texts, economic, social and cultural rights were, 
indeed, given considerable importance. Moreover, they contained an element of originality 
due to the recognition of the family and the child as specific holders of rights, which 
indicated an attempt to give recognition to specific African values through the imported 
language of rights. The constitutions of the regimes which followed the Marxist-Leninist 
ideology also featured the suppression or consistent limitation of the right to individual 
property in favour of the collective propriety of the means of production.
159 On the issue of human rights in this new constitutional phase in French-speaking Africa see Leclercq, Les 
libertés, cit, pp. 222-231.
160 A. Ajavon, “La protection des droits de l’homme dans les constitutions des états de l’Afrique noire 
francophone”, in 45 Revue Juridique et Politique Indépendance et coopération, 1992, p. 87.
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The position given to citizens’ duties is another aspect which characterised 
Francophone Africa and which illustrates how the approach to human rights in these 
constitutions had consistently changed since the 1960s. The value accorded to duties was 
clearly expressed by Bongo, the President of Gabon, in 1971: “Le citoyen n’est pas défini par 
son appartenance à un groupe particulier mais par un ensemble de droits et de devoirs qui 
font les citoyens égaux”.161 Thus, the declaration of duties often accompanied the 
proclamation of rights in these constitutions. Other Constitutions which mentioned citizens* 
duties included those of Mali (1974), Madagascar (1975), Benin (1977), Burundi (1981), 
Cameroon (1972), Comoros (1975), Congo (1979), Djibouti (1977), Gabon (1975) and 
Guinea (1982). The most frequently imposed duties included working, paying taxes, 
defending the homeland, respecting the law and, in the socialist states, respecting the socialist 
orientation of the State, in defence of which the enjoyment of human rights was subordinated.
33  The Claim for a Distinctive African Approach to Human Rights
The new constitutional definition of human rights and the restriction, either de iure or de  
facto, of civil and political rights were justified on theoretical grounds. This constitutional 
phase coincided with a debate with the Western world on the idea of the universal validity 
and applicability of the liberal model of human rights, which found its most solemn 
consecration in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.162 >‘.
It was argued that the Western conception of human rights, which has shaped 
international legal instruments on human rights since the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights of 1948 and which focuses on civil and political rights cannot be applied in Africa. In 
addition, the idea that human rights (as defined in the Universal Declaration) can have a  
universal value was questioned. The fact that they were presented as such when the 
overwhelming majority of African states were still colonies,163 and therefore without any 
consideration of the African position on the matter, was the most powerful evidence of the 
alleged cultural bias of the UDHR and of the conception of human rights it encompasses.
161 0. Bongo, Gouverner le Gabon, Imp. Bory Monaco, 1971, p. 26.
1W Behind the Universal Declaration there is not only the liberal ideology. The contribution of the Socialist 
countries is visible in the recognition of economic, social and cultural rights (Articles 2-27); in the provision o f  
individuals’ duties towards the community (Article 29.1) and that rights and freedoms find a limitation 
consisting in that they cannot be exercised contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations (Article 
29.3) and against the rights of other individuals and groups (Article 30). The foundation on which the document 
is constructed is, however, liberal or to be more precise is constituted by the natural law theory. On the 
philosophy underpinning the Universal Declaration, see A. Cassese, I  diritti umani nel mondo contemporaneo, 
Laterza, Bari, 1988, pp. 36-38 and J. Morsink, “The Philosophy of the Universal Declaration”, in 63 Human 
Rights Quarterly, 1984, pp. 309-334.
163 Only Egypt, Ethiopia and Liberia were independent states when the UNDHR was adopted.
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Beyond that, two main arguments were used by African leaders to sustain such a position.164 
First of all, it was maintained that the Western human rights conception cannot be reconciled 
with African needs for economic development and national unity. Secondly, it was 
emphasised that this notion of human rights is alien to African culture.
The assumption underlying the emphasis on development and the corresponding de­
evaluation of individual human rights was the belief that these rights could only be 
guaranteed in a situation of social well being and political stability, for which the attainment 
of self-determination and economic development were essential.165
It was argued that the situation of underdevelopment left behind by colonialism 
required a strong executive whose action could not afford to be delayed by parliamentarian 
opposition. Thus, the priority of development was the fundamental belief on which these 
systems were built, conceived in terms of economic growth and stability.166 167According to Issa 
Shivji, “developmentalism” was the “ruling ideology in post-independence Africa*’, which 
operated as a “dépolitisation” of the people by focusing the ideological discourse on 
economics to the detriment of politics. This ideology was compounded by a concentration of 
the political decision-making power either on the executive or the military.
At the domestic level, the argument was compounded by the claim that socio­
economic rights had to be given priority over civil and political rights. The priority of social 
and economic rights is based on the belief that a person whose basic needs are not ensured is 
not interested in the so-called first generation rights. This view, effectively labelled by Rhoda 
Howard, as the “full-belly” thesis,168 was expressed by Julius Nyerere, President of Tanzania, 
with the following rhetorical question:
“[w]hat freedom has our subsistence farmer? He scratches a bare living from the 
soil provided the rains do not fail; his children work at his side without schooling, 
medical care, or even goodfeeding. Certainly he has freedom to vote and to speak 
as he wishes. But these freedoms are much less real to him than his freedom to be 
exploited. Only as his poverty is reduced will his existing political freedom
164 See R. Howard, “The Dilemma of Human Rights in sub-Saharan Africa”, 35 International Journal, 1980, pp. 
725 et seq.
165 A.H. Robertson, Human Rights in the World: An Introduction to the Study o f the International Protection o f 
Human Rights, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1982, pp. 8-9.
166 See R.I. Meltzer, “International Human Rights and Development: Evolving Conceptions and their 
Application to EC-ACP Relations”, in C.E. Welch, Jr. and R.I. Meltzer, Human Rights and Development in 
Africa, State University of New York Press, Albany, 1984, p. 208 seq.
1671.G. Shivji, The Concept o f Human Rights in Africa, Codesria Series, London, 1989, p. 83.
168 R. Howard, “The Full-Belly Thesis: Should Economic Rights Take Priority Over Civil and Political Rights? 
Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa”, in 5 Human Rights Quarterly, 1983, p, 467.
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become properly meaningful and his right to human dignity become a fact o f
human dignity”.169 170
The same view can be found in the following statement by Colonel Acheampong, the 
former Head of State of Ghana. He stated: “[o]ne man, one vote, is meaningless unless 
accompanied by the principle 'one man, one bread*”. The fact that this view was shared 
by two very different leaders, the former considered as a “man deeply committed to 
improving the lot of Tanzania’s people” and the latter as “the archetypical autocratic, corrupt, 
military dictator”,171 shows how entrenched the idea that the enforcement of civil and 
political rights should wait until the basic economic needs can be fulfilled was among African 
leaders. Civil and political rights were seen as a luxury which African countries could neither 
appreciate, nor afford.
A survey of how this argument was used to justify the restriction of specific rights will 
now be undertaken in order to better understand the African position in the matter. The 
imperative of economic development was specifically used as a basis for the limitation of civil 
and political liberties of speech, of the press, and to form and adhere to parties through which 
opposition can be expressed. It was assumed that development required a strong government 
which is not prevented by outside forces from pursuing this goal. The freedom of movement 
and residence within the borders of the state and the freedom to leave one’s country were also 
restricted on the ground of the development-based argument. The former was limited by 
“villagization” programmes,172 adopted in order to rationalise the cultivation of land and the 
use of agricultural equipment and the freedom of movement was affected by constraints on 
the movement of the most educated people. The underlying assumption was that citizens have 
a duty to contribute to the development of their own country. On the same grounds, the right 
to form and to adhere to trade unions was restricted. It was maintained that workers’ claims 
would represent an element of delay to economic growth. The only trade union allowed was 
that affiliated to the party. By using the development-based argument to impose the duty to 
work for the collectivity, often within civil service programmes, the freedom to work was also 
limited.173 Furthermore, the right to property was restricted by nationalisation carried out by 
many governments, often at the expense of foreign individuals and corporations. Finally, the 
freedom of the press was restricted on the basis of the developmentist ideology. The freedom
169 J.K. Nyerere, Stability and Change in Africa, 2 Africa Contemporary Record, 1969-70, C30-31.
170 Amnesty International, Background Paper on Ghana, London, 1974, quoted in Howard, The Full-Belly 
Thesis, cit., p. 467.
171 Ibidem, p. 468.
172 See for example the villagization programmes introduced in Ethiopia by Menghistu Haile Mariam.
173 See K. Mbaye, Les droits del'hommeen Afrique, Pedone Ed., Paris, 1992, pp. 63-69.
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of the press was restricted by envisaging the role of journalists as instrumental to government 
goals.174 175This ideology even constituted the basis for a permanent state of emergency. In this 
relation, it has to be reminded that independently of a formal declaration, the situation of 
underdevelopment in sub-Saharan Africa was frequently defined in terms of a state of 
emergency. Even legal scholars have included underdevelopment among the situations giving 
rise to a state of emergency. However, such an approach seems not only dangerous but also 
unconvincing from a legal point of view. On the one hand, it is true that development is a 
condition for the full realisation of fundamental rights and freedoms as recognised by both the 
Commission on Human Rights176 and the UN General Assembly.177 On the other hand, 
framing the sub-Saharan African condition as a state of emergency would legitimate a 
derogation from human rights for which the constraints and guarantees provided for by both 
constitutional and international law in cases of a formally declared state of emergency could 
not operate.178 The risk is therefore that the decision on both the extent and the duration of the 
derogation is left completely in the hands of the executive. Moreover, one of the fundamental 
characteristics for a state of emergency is absent, in other words, its temporary character. 
Underdevelopment is a structural situation and not a temporary economic crisis for which a 
state of emergency can be declared.179
The pluralistic social composition of sub-Saharan Africa was the other structural 
argument used to justify the constraints on civil and political rights. It was emphasised that 
the presence of different tribal, ethnic, linguistic and religious groups living within the
174 Kaunda was very clear in this regard. In the “Watershed Speech” he defined the role of the press as “to 
promote humanist moral and cultural values” and argued that journalists should be “entirely committed to the 
philosophy of the revolution K. Kaunda, The Watershed Speech, Address to the National Council of the 
United Independence Party, June 30, 1975, Lusaka, p. 27, quoted in R. C. Moore, The Political Reality o f the 
Freedom o f the Press in Zambia, University Press of America, London, 1992. Concrete obstacles also existed to 
the enjoyment of this freedom. In Zambia, the two national newspapers, the Times of Zambia and the Daily 
Mail, were owned by the government, as well as the radio and television. The only independent newspaper was 
the National Mirror established by an organisation of Christian churches.
175 See S.P. Marks, “Principles and Norms of Human Rights Applicable in Emergency Situations: 
Underdevelopment, Catastrophes and Armed Conflicts”, in K. Vasak and P. Alston, The International 
Dimension o f Human Rights, Greenwood Press, Westport, 1982, p. 175 seq.
176 The Commission committed itself to also take into consideration “the effects o f the existing unjust 
international economic order on the economies o f the developing countries, and the obstacle that this represents 
fo r the implementation o f human rights and fundamental fr e e d o m s Commission Resolution 6 (XXXVI) 
quoted in ibidem, p. 181.
177 The UN General Assembly stated in 1977 that “[tjhe fu ll realization o f civil and political rights without the 
enjoyment o f economic, social and cultural rights is impossible; the achievement o f lasting progress in the 
implementation o f human rights is dependent upon sound and effective national and international policies o f 
economic and social development General Assembly Resolution 32/130 o f 16 December 1977, para, (b), 
quoted in Marks, Principles, cit., p. 181.
178 As Marks himself recognises: “... how, in the absence of reliable indicators and competent bodies, one can 
judge whether these conditions have been met or the emergency situation ended?”; ibidem, p. 185.
179 See J. Oraa, Human Rights in States o f Emergency in International Law, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992, p. 
31.
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artificial borders created by colonialism and maintained by the independent African states 
meant that every effort was needed to ensure a sense of national identity which is necessary 
for the survival of African states. On the basis of this assumption, it was argued that the 
recognition of the freedom to form political parties, speech, and the press could be 
detrimental to the formation of such a consciousness because these freedoms can be exerted 
by the different groups with the purpose of imposing their particularistic claims.180
The other argument elaborated to support the limitations of civil and political rights 
was the specificity of African culture. As Hyden has put it “[t]he first couple o f decades o f 
independence in African states were understandably characterised by a search for a new 
identity - one that gave countries back some of their “Africanness”.181 Leaders such as 
Kwame Nkrumah, Sekou Toure and Julius Nyerere challenged the suitability of the human 
rights culture for Africa as it was bom in the West. They claimed that Africa had to retrieve 
its own “authentic” values, especially the conception of freedom. The cultural argument 
invoked in the construction of an African human rights conception was specifically linked to 
the consideration that the human rights ideal rooted in the liberal philosophy was based on 
the perception of the status of the individual which was not shared by Africans. The liberal 
human rights conception is built on the belief of the inherent value and autonomy of each 
individual. Conversely, African societies are founded on a communitarian ideal according to 
which the individual has no importance as such, but achieves his or her personhood only by 
belonging to a certain group and by fulfilling his or her obligations to the group. This ideal is 
complemented by other two components: the consensual-based decision-making processes 
and the redistributive and non-profit-oriented economies.182 In the light of this, it was 
assumed that an African human rights system consistent with African culture cannot be 
modelled on the idea of the centrality of the individual and, consequently, that civil and 
political rights cannot be perceived as fundamental in the African mentality. In particular, the 
restriction of freedom of thought, opinion and assembly and free and fair elections was 
justified on the basis of a particular feature of African culture which was the consensual 
character of the traditional decision-making process. The supporters of the idea o f a
180 See the opinion o f Julius Nyerere, former President of Tanzania, expressed in 1966: “where there is one 
party; and that party is identified with the nation as a whole, the foundations o f democracy are firm er than they  
can ever be where you have two or more parties, each representing only one section o f the community”. J.K.. 
Nyerere, Freedom and Unity, Oxford University Press, Dar-es-Salaam, 1966, p. 196.
18‘ G. Hyden, “The Challenges of Domesticating Freedom in Africa: A Right Long Overlooked”, in R. Cohen, 
G. Hyden, W.P. Nagan (eds.), Human Rights and Governance in Africa, University Press of Florida, 
Gainesville, 1988, p. 261.
182 See R. Howard, “Is There an African Concept of Human Rights?”, in RJ. Vincent (ed.), Foreign Policy and  
Human Rights, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986, p. 13.
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distinctive African approach to human rights stressed that in Africa, decisions are taken 
unanimously after an open discussion involving the chiefs and the elders of the community. 
Consequently, it was argued that a state model based on a competitive relationship between 
the government and the citizens was completely alien to African philosophy. On the basis of 
this reasoning, the one-party model was presented as more suitable to both African needs and 
political tradition. Furthermore, it was claimed that this system was simply another form of 
democracy, alternative to the Western multi-party one. This represents the most challenging 
aspect of this debate. In this way, it was argued, that open discussion was guaranteed within 
the single party which represents the nation, or in other words the community.183
All of the above arguments refer to an African structural or cultural distinctiveness. 
Until the collapse o f the Soviet Union, some countries used the Marxist doctrine to justify the 
rejection of the liberal conception of liberties. The idea that rights are bourgeois 
“inventions”184 created to protect class interests indeed represented a convenient ideological 
foundation on which some African states could claim the legitimacy of their practices in the 
field of human rights.
This latter observation indicates how the constitutional developments concerning 
human rights are strictly linked to the political system in force. In this respect, sub-Saharan 
Africa was dominated by one-party states, military regimes and systems with a Marxist- 
Leninist orientation until the démocratisation wave which started at the end of the 1980s. 
Therefore the following chapters will examine the impact of the three political systems on the 
conception of human rights, their constitutional status and their effective implementation.
183 See P.F. Nursey-Bray, “The Polis, The African Traditional Community and African Natural Law”, in A.A. 
Mazrui and H.H. Palatel (eds.), Africa in World Affairs: The Next Thirty Years, Third Press, New York, 1973, p. 
33.
184 Hyden, The Challenges, cit., p. 261. See also Y. Boundel, Human Rights and Comparative Politics Adelshot, 
Darthmouth, 1997, pp. 16-17.
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CHAPTER 4: The One-Party System and the Role of the Judiciary: The Case of 
Zambia
Until the démocratisation wave began in 1989, the political system which dominated sub- 
Saharan Africa was the single-party system.185 Its introduction represented a dramatic shift 
with respect to the constitutional patterns adopted at the time of independence when all of the 
sub-Saharan African states had adopted constitutions inspired by the liberal-democratic model 
of the European states by whom they had been colonised.
By using Zambia as a case study, this chapter explores the impact of the establishment 
of the single-party system on the status of human rights in sub-Saharan Africa at both a 
theoretical and a practical level. To this end, a review of the spread of the single-party system 
in the region will be carried out, attempting to reconstruct a theory of the African single-party 
system with specific reference to the understanding of human rights. The chapter will then 
focus on Zambia, surveying the processes leading to the establishment of the one-party 
system, the regime of human rights in the constitutional system and the judiciary’s attitude 
when called upon to enforce fundamental rights and freedoms. On the basis of the survey of 
the Zambian experience, the question of whether the one-party system can be considered 
compatible with the protection of human rights will be addressed.
4.1 One-Party States in Sub-Saharan Africa
A few years after their independence, the majority of sub-Saharan African states opted for the 
establishment of single-party systems.186 Botswana, Gambia (until the military coup d’état in 
1994), Senegal, Zimbabwe and Mauritius continued to be among the only multi-party states.
185 On the single-party system in sub-Saharan Africa, see J.S. Coleman and C.G. Rosberg, Political Parties and 
National Integration in Tropical Africa, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1970; W. Tordoff, 
Government and Politics in Africa, Macmillan Press Ltd, London, 1984, pp. 113-144; D-G. Lavroff, “Le statut 
des partis politiques”, in Conac, Les Institutions, cit, 1979, pp. 210-222; P.-F. Gonidec, Les Systèmes Politiques 
Africains, L.G.D.J., Paris, 1974, deuxième partie, pp. 28-49.
186 In this regard, there is a difference between the experience of French-speaking and that of English-speaking 
Africa. In Francophone Africa, this system emerged almost immediately after independence in a spontaneous 
way (with some exceptions such as Cameroon, Chad, Gabon and Togo where electoral fraud and force were 
used to establish one-party rule). The electoral system, which was in force in most of the former French colonies 
facilitated one party to dominate the political arena. The election of the members of the National Assembly was 
effected on the basis of a composite national list and therefore the party, which obtained the majority of the 
votes also obtained all of the seats in the Assembly. This system discouraged minorities parties to compete. In 
English-speaking Africa, conversely, the establishment of the one-party regime was more gradual and when it 
did not take place through constitutional institutionalisation, it was the outcome of the banning of the opposition 
party (see for example Kenya or Uganda) or the merging of parties determined by a climate which was hostile to 
any opposition. Two alternative paths were taken in these cases: either they joined the ruling party or had 
recourse to violence in order to gain power. A particular case in the Anglophone African context can be found in 
Tanzania where TANU was virtually unopposed since 1959.
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Some countries were de iure one-party regimes,187 18 having legally or constitutionally 
institutionalised the single-party system. Others were de facto one-party states. Even military 
regimes created by coups d'état tended to legitimise themselves by setting up single parties.
Beyond the specific ideologies which the sub-Saharan African one-party states might
too
have formulated, there are some common assumptions behind the phenomenon of the 
single-party model which were explored in Chapter 3 and which could be seen as developing 
a theory of African one-party system. This theory was based on the assumption that the 
freedoms restricted at state level could be fully enjoyed within the Party. In fact, in formal 
terms, the introduction of this new political system did not entail significant changes in the 
constitutional provisions on the protection of human rights. The recognition of fundamental 
rights and freedoms in the bills of rights or in the preamble of the constitutions was generally 
retained with the emphasis on civil and political rights. Indeed, there were only a few 
constitutions which did not include provisions specifically protecting fundamental rights and 
freedoms after the establishment of one-party systems. The claim that the one-party system 
was compatible with human rights was ambiguous as it recognised that certain rights are 
necessarily suppressed by the denial o f multi-partism. On the other hand, this 
acknowledgement was counterbalanced by the assertion that the freedoms restricted at state 
level could be fully enjoyed within the party.
Despite this allegation, the very nature of this system, originating with the denial o f 
the freedom of association, as well as its ideology and the type of state organisation which it 
entailed, had a clear impact on the status of civil and political liberties. The study of the 
Zambian experience will illustrate the impact that this kind of political system had on the 
actual protection of fundamental rights and freedoms. Zambia is an interesting case study as it 
was a de iure one-party state from 1972 to 1991 with a constitution embodying a Bill o f 
Rights of liberal inspiration. As the presence of the Bill of Rights shows, the introduction of 
the single-party system in Zambia was accompanied by a general assertion, referred to above,
187 In English-speaking Africa, this was the case of Ghana (see Article 1A o f the amended 1964 Constitution), 
Tanzania (see Article 3(1) of the 1965 Interim Constitution), Malawi (see section 4(1 )(2) of the 1966 
Constitution), Zambia (Article 12 A of the amended 1964 Constitution and afterwards Article 4 of the 1973 
Constitution), Sierra Leone (see 1978 Constitution), Kenya (see Constitution of 1982). After the establishment 
of the one-party system, these countries adopted new constitutions, with the exception of Ghana which merely 
amended the 1964 Constitution. Kenya became a de iure one-party state in 1982. In French-speaking Africa, the 
de iure single-party states were Central Africa (see Article 13 of die Constitution of 1966), Congo (see Article 2 
of the Constitution o f 1973), Mali (see Article 5 of the Constitution of 1974), Mauritania (see Article 9 of the 
Constitution of 1961) and Chad (see Constitution of 1965).
188 For example humanism in Zambia, African socialism in Kenya or “ujamaa** in Tanzania.
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that this system was not at odds with the protection of human rights -  including civil and 
political rights.
4.2 Zambia: The 1973 One-Party Constitution
The study of the one-party Constitution is divided into two parts, the first dealing with the 
political and constitutional processes leading to the adoption of the constitution and the 
second with the text of the constitution. The investigation of the process is made with the aim 
of assessing how the constitutionalisation of the single-party system was presented and 
justified in respect to the issue of the protection of human rights by the Zambian leadership 
and how it was perceived by Zambian civil society. The survey of the content of the 1973 
Constitution will be focused on the status of human rights in the new political system.
4.2.1 The Process Leading to the Introduction of the Single-Party System 
The single-party system was formally introduced in Zambia in 1972 by constitutional 
amendment,189 which was preceded by the announcement on 25th February by President 
Kaunda that the Cabinet had decided that Zambia should become a “one-party participatory 
democracy”. This decision contradicted the commitment of Kaunda not to make Zambia a 
one-party state by legislative act. He was in favour of a one-party state but believed that this 
change could have been reached through the gradual disappearance of the opposition due to 
its electoral losses.190
Unlike Tanzania, the Zambian political landscape was pluralistic. Since the nationalist 
struggle, there had been two main political actors, the United National Independence Party 
(UNIP) and the African National Congress (ANC) led by Harry Nkumbula.191 In 1966, 
another party was created, which was called the United Party under the leadership of a former 
UNIP minister, Mundia. This party was banned in 1968. Therefore, the only opposition party 
was the African National Congress, which in the early years of independence seemed destined 
to disappear because of the decrease in electoral support.192 At the general election in 1968,
189 Constitutional Amendment (No. 5) Act of 1972.
190 This commitment was expressed on different occasions by Kaunda; see Zimba, The Zambian, cit., pp. 152- 
153 and ft. 8 p. 258. Kaunda expressed this commitment also in his work A Humanist in Africa, cit., pp. 105- 
107.
191 UNIP was founded by the ANC’s militants in disagreement with the ANC’s policy, which was judged as too 
moderate.
192 This belief was based on the results of the 1964 election where the UNIP obtained 56 seats, while the ANC 
obtained 8. The National Progressive Party (NPP), the party of the European settlers, obtained 10 seats on the 
reserved European roll. The NPP was dissolved in 1968.
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however, the ANC made significant advances,193 even prevailing in the Western province,194 
which was traditionally pro-UNIP.
Apart from the electoral successes of the ANC, another threat to the UNIP’s 
predominance came with the formation of another party in 1971, the United Progressive Party 
(UPP). This was founded by eminent figures of the UNIP and of the Zambian nationalist 
struggle, including the Vice-President Simon Hwansa Kapwepwe. In addition, the UPP 
enjoyed the support of the Bembas, the numerically majoritarian Zambian group, which was 
dominant in three provinces, Northern, Luapula, Copperbelt, and in parts of the Central 
Provinces, which were the economic core of the country. The situation was made even more 
serious for UNIP by the economic and social difficulties which faced the government.195
The decision to contradict the previous commitment and to introduce a single-party 
system through constitutional amendment was justified by Kaunda with the widespread 
demands following the creation of the UPP.196 Despite Kaunda’s allegations, the broad 
mobilisation against the UPP came only from the UNIP’s sympathisers and members, which 
can be explained by the capacity for coercion and patronage of the UNIP.197 In September 
1971, Kaunda gave his authorisation for the detention of the UPP’s more prominent figures, 
among which all of its MPs except its leader, Kapwepwe, were arrested.198
Following these events, on 25th February 1972, Kaunda announced that, upon the 
Cabinet’s decision, Zambia should become a one-party democracy and that a Commission 
would be established to determine what “form the one-party state should take in the context o f  
the philosophy o f humanism and participatory democracy”. The decision to introduce a 
single-party system was not, however, open for discussion. The Commission on the 
Establishment of the One-Party State,199 appointed on 1st March 1972 under the chairmanship 
of the Vice-President Mainza Chona, was entrusted to:
“consider the changes in (a) the Constitution o f the Republic o f Zambia; (b) the 
practices and procedures o f the government o f the Republic; and (c) the
193 It obtained 23 seats, against the 81 of UNIP, and turned out to be dominant in two of the eight provinces o f 
Zambia.
194 The UNIP almost disappeared here: of the eleven seats, eight went to the ANC.
195 On the situation preceding the constitutional amendment see R. Molteno, “Zambia and the One-Party State”, 
in 9 East African Journal, 1972, p. 6.
196 These demands, and the opposition to the UPP coming from individual citizens, trade unions, local 
authorities, and the House of Chiefs also took the form of acts of intimidation against the supporters of the 
newly formed party.
197 See Molteno, Zambia, cit, p. 9.
198 After one month, 116 people had been detained.
199 See Statutory Instrument No. 46 of 1972.
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mConstitution o f the United National Independence Party; necessary to bring about 
and establish o f a One-Party participatory democracy in Zambia”.200 
The composition of the Commission aimed to represent the widest range of Zambian civil 
and political society. Representatives from the UNIP, the trade unions, the churches, business 
and industry, the university, the security forces, the House of Chiefs and the government 
were present. Even the ANC’s president and his deputy were appointed, however they 
refused to participate.201
The Commission fulfilled its work by touring all of the provinces of the country for 
three months, collecting the views of the population, in both written and oral form. The debate 
on the Constitution was, however, rather limited as it only involved the participation of the 
most highly educated and, above all, as the introduction of the single-party system itself was 
not under debate. The Commission refused to record the positions expressed by Zambians on 
this issue, even though these amounted to three-quarters of the petitioners.202 This data is 
extremely important because it shows how African civil society did not confirm the thesis 
sustained by its political leaders that civil and political liberties are alien to African culture 
when given the opportunity to express itself. By questioning the introduction of unipartism, 
Zambians queried the limitations to their individual civil and political freedoms showing that 
the idea of political opposition was not meaningless for Africans (or at least to the most 
educated ones).
According to the mandate given by the government, the Commission had to propose 
the more suitable form of the one-party system. However, in carrying out this task, it was 
obliged “to pay due regard and adhere to” nine principles defined as “cardinals, inviolable and 
built-in safeguards of the one-party participatory democracy”. Among these principles, it was 
stated that:
"the supremacy o f the rule o f law and independence o f the judiciary shall 
continue to be maintained” and that “the fundamental rights and freedoms o f the 
individual shall be protected as now provided under chapter III o f the 
Constitution o f the Republic o f Zambia“.203
200 Report o f the National Commission on the Establishment o f a One Party Participatory Democracy in 
Zambia, Lusaka, 1972, Government Printer, Appendix 1.
201 The ANC challenged the governmental decision to introduce a single-party system before the High Court and 
the Court of Appeal although ANC’s petitions were dismissed. These decisions will be examined in section 3.
202 The Commission reported that “[a] number o f petitioners did not confine themselves strictly to the terms o f 
reference regarding the form  o f the one-party democracy as such and discussed matters relating to the pros and 
cons o f its establishm entReport of the National Commission, cit., par. 13.
203 Report of the National Commission, cit., p. ix. In regard to this, the case of Zambia differs from those of 
Tanzania and Malawi, both of which also set up similar Commissions. In Tanzania, the President confined
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Evaluating the contradictory task of retaining the bill of rights in its present form, and at the 
same time drafting a one-party constitution, the Commission simply observed that
“notwistanding the directive in our terms o f reference that fundamental rights and 
freedoms o f the individual shall be protected as now provided fo r under chapter 
III ...» we consider that by implication those sections which gave people the 
freedom to form more than one political party could not be retained in the 
constitution”,204
It subsequently recommended that:
“apart from the freedom to belong to the only political party, people be free to 
form and to belong to non-political associations, provided they are not prejudicial 
to the national interest”.205 206
There were no other comments formulated or questions raised.
However, despite such unwillingness to face the general question of the impact of the 
introduction of the one-party system on the enjoyment of civil and political rights (besides the 
right to form political parties), the Commission displayed sensitivity towards the safeguarding 
of human rights in specific recommendations, which was also a sign of a certain degree of 
independence. For example, the Commission recommended the strengthening of the 
guarantees for personal liberty and freedom of movement in the case of the exercise of the 
presidential powers of preventive detention.207 These recommendations were formulated 
taking into account that “many petitioners made strong representations in favour o f the right 
to personal liberty and the right to freedom o f movement as enshrined in the Constitution, 
They criticised many aspects o f the provisions relating to restrictions and detention without
himself to indicating as a “guidance” the promotion of “national ethic” by guaranteeing the rule of law and the 
safeguarding of human rights. No guidance was given on the necessity to include a Bill of Rights in the one- 
party constitution. In Malawi, the Constitutional Committee did not receive any kind of indications. The one- 
party constitution-making process of Siena Leone was, conversely, similar to that of Zambia.
04 Report of the National Commission, cit., para. 30 and 31.
205 Report o f the National Commission on the Establishment o f a One-Party Participatory Democracy in 
Zambia; Summary o f Recommendations accepted by Government, Government Printer, Lusaka, 1972, p. 3.
206 The Zambian Commission displayed greater independence and courage than the commissions set up in 
Tanzania, Malawi and Sierra Leone.
207 The Commission recommended that preventive detention should be confined to the cases of state of 
emergency; that a written statement spelling out the grounds of the detention should be given to the detainee or 
restrictee within ten days; that the notification of detention or restriction should be published in the government 
gazette within fourteen days from the beginning of the detention or restriction; that a tribunal should be 
established with the aim of reviewing cases of preventive detention and restriction within three months and with 
die power to adopt binding decisions; that the tribunal should be composed by a chairman and two other 
persons, one of which a lawyer, appointed by the chief justice in consultation with the President of the Republic; 
that detainees should be free to communicate with their lawyers; that in case the state of emergency was 
declared when the parliament was not in session or was dissolved, it should be convened within twenty-eight 
days from the day of the proclamation of the state of emergency; finally that a state of emergency would cease 
its effects after six months from its proclamation unless its continuation was approved by the parliament.
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îria r .208 This reaction on the part of the people shows the educational value of the bill of 
rights. As has been remarked, “[w]hen a similar exercise took place in Tanganyika- a country 
which had never a bill of rights- there was no comparable clamour for fundamental freedoms 
of the individuals. The Zambian Bill has endeared itself to a people that are to a large extent 
largely unsophisticated”.209 However, these recommendations were rejected by the 
government, who explained that “at this stage in the nation 's development and in view o f 
Zambia's geo-political position in Southern Africa these recommendation could not be 
implemented without detriment to Zambia's security and sovereignty”} 1® In this way, 
development was a priority to which also individual rights were subordinated. Moreover, 
Kaunda could justify his refusal by citing Zambia’s support for the African liberation 
movements of South Africa, Rhodesia, Mozambique and Angola, which made it a target of 
economic and military retaliation by the respective colonial governments.
Another recommendation of the Commission which aimed to enhance the protection 
of human rights, was the réintroduction of the special procedure for the amendment of the bill 
of rights, which was originally provided in the 1964 Constitution and changed in 1969.211 21
According to the special procedure, the alteration of Chapter III had to firstly be approved by 
a two-thirds parliamentary majority and then by a referendum. With the 1969 amendment, the 
provision for the referendum was repealed. This recommendation was also rejected by the 
Government, who motivated that in a one-party participatory democracy “ƒtjhrough 
consultations at various levels by Members o f Parliament and other Government and Party 
agencies in line with our democratic principle, the people will give the Party and hence the 
National Assembly power to exercise responsibilities on their behalf \  212 In sum, it is asserted 
that decisions on human rights are left to the Party because the Party represents the whole 
people.213
208 Summary of Recommendations, cit., para. 32
209 S.V. Mubako, “Fundamental Rights and Judicial Review: The Zambian Experience”, in 2 Zimbabwean Law 
Review, 1984, p. 115.
210 See Government White Paper, No. 1,1972, p. 3.
211 Constitutional Amendment (Act) No. 3 of 1969.
212 Summary of Recommendations, cit, p. 12.
213 Nyerere also theorised on this issue. He postulated that the rationale behind Western multi-partism is the 
existence of conflicting social and economic interests which the parties represent. Conversely, he argued, in 
Africa this element of division is not present: there are no class cleavages and political parties are the product of 
a common straggle, i.e. the straggle against colonialism. From here, the artificiality of a plurality of parties in 
Africa; see J.K. Nyerere, Democracy and the Party System, Dar es Salaam, 1962.
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4.2.2 The Constitutional Protection of Human Rights in the 1973 One-Party Constitution 
The Constitutional Amendment (Act) No. 5 of 1972 inserted a new Chapter III A in the 1964 
Constitution, entitled the “One Political Party”.214 215Article 12A stated that (1):
‘7ijhere shall be one and only one political party in Zambia, namely, the United 
National Independence Party ... ' ; (2) Every citizen who complies with the 
requirements laid down from time to time, by the constitution o f the Party shall be 
entitled to become a member o f the Party”; (3) Nothing contained in this 
Constitution shall be so construed as to entitle any person to lawfully form or 
attempt to form any political organisation other than the Party or to belong to or 
assemble, associate, express opinion or do any other thing in sympathy with such 
political party or organisation
Many sections of the Constitution were amended in such a way that the offices of the 
President, Vice-President, Ministers, Attorney-General, Speaker and Deputy Speaker and 
MPs had to be held by members of the single-party. If they ceased to be members of the Party, 
they were required also to vacate their offices or seats. In particular, the candidate to the 
presidency of the country was the president of the Party, appointed by the Party’s General 
Conference, and there was no temporal limit to the presidential mandate. The separation 
between the State and the Party was, thereby, removed. It is worth noting that this provision 
did not reflect the view expressed by the majority of the petitioners during the constitution­
making process as they declared their preference for a system in which the president was not 
only elected by the people in an open contest but the candidature to the presidency was also 
open to every citizen. In addition, the absence of a limitation of the presidential term did not 
correspond to the recommendation of the Commission which stated that after two terms the 
president should not be eligible to stand again for a period of five years.
Furthermore, the presidential powers were enhanced. The Prime Minister, who 
replaced the office of Vice-President, was only vested with an advisory function to the 
President, who presided over cabinet meetings and had the power to appoint and dismiss 
ministers.
214 The Constitutional Amendment (Act) No. 3 of 1969 made it easier for the UNIP to introduce this amendment 
since it was able to rely on a majority of two thirds of the members in the Assembly.
215 The General Conference was convened every five years and was comprised of the members of the National 
Council, up to 600 delegates from each of the eight provinces and one delegate from each of the recognised 
trade unions and other organisations affiliated to the Party (Constitution of UNIP, Section 32). The National 
Council was formed by the members of the Central Committee, MPs, District Governors, Regional Officials, 
and heads of Zambian missions abroad; see S.V. Mubako, “Zambia’s Single-Party Constitution - A Search for 
Unity and Development”, in 5 Zambia Law Journal, 1973, p. 73.
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These provisions were confirmed when a new Constitution was enacted in 1973.216 It 
was almost identical to that of 1964 apart from the 1972 amendments and for the insertion of 
a preamble in which Zambia was defined as a “One-Party Participatory Democracy under the 
Philosophy of Humanism”.217 218In the preamble, a significant emphasis was placed on the 
concept of the union of the nation, which provides a further evidence of the urgency of this 
concern at that time in sub-Saharan Africa. An important variation with respect to the 
liberal constitutional model of the 1964 Constitution was the addition of a reference to 
individual duties in the preamble. By using the concept of “participatory democracy”, the 
basic claim of African unipartism was immediately highlighted, in other words, that the denial 
of the freedom to form political parties did not lead to the suppression of democracy which 
would have been guaranteed by the openness of the party to all Zambian citizens and by the 
freedom of expression within the single party.
As for the Bill of Rights, all of the provisions contained in the 1964 Constitution were 
reproduced and remained unaltered. Formally, the freedoms of association and assembly 
(Article 23), expression (Article 22) and from discrimination on political grounds (Article 25) 
continued to be recognised with the same wording of the independence constitution. Their 
curtailment derived only indirectly from Article 4, which declared the UNIP as the only 
political party and prohibited the formation or attempts to form and belong to any other 
political party except for the UNIP.
A new institution established by the new constitution as a response to the concern 
provoked by the introduction of the single-party system, was the office of an ombudsman 
called the ‘Investigator-General’ 219 The Investigator General was appointed by the President 
and vested with the task of investigating any matter of individual injustice or administrative 
abuse of power or authority on the part of state or party officials.220 However, several features 
of this office undermined its role of guarantee as he was obliged to investigate upon
216 Constitution of Zambia (Act) of 25 August 1973,
217 By referring to humanism, an attempt was made to provide the state with an ideological foundation. 
Humanism was, indeed, a sort of ideology, which was elaborated upon by Kaunda, and presented as alternative 
to both capitalism and communism, or also as a form of African socialism, purportedly inspired by Christian 
principles as well as African tradition. On Humanism, see K. Kaunda, Humanism in Zambia and a Guide to Its 
Implementation, Government Printer, Lusaka, Zambia, 1967.
218 The Preamble stated: “In pursuance o f our determination to uphold our inherent and inviolable rights to 
decide, appoint and proclaim the means and style whereby we shall govern ourselves as a united and indivisible 
Sovereign State under the banner o f our motto "One Zambia, One Nation ".
219 See Articles 117-119. The first Investigator-General was appointed in 1973.
220 The investigation could concern any persons in the service of the Republic, local authorities, party officials, 
officials of institutions or organisations in which the government held a majority of shares, had financial or 
administrative control as well as members of any commission established by the Constitution or Act of 
Parliament.
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presidential request. Conversely, in the case of a complaint from a citizen, the decision to 
initiate an investigation was left to its discretion.221 Moreover, any matter which related to the 
exercise of presidential prerogative was removed from its jurisdiction. The President also had 
the power to limit the Investigator General’s field of investigation if  he thought that the 
disclosure of some information would be prejudicial to national security or international 
relations or would concern the deliberations of the Central Committee of the Party regarding 
secret or confidential issues. Finally, the result of the Investigator General’s investigations 
was communicated to the President, who had the exclusive power to decide on the necessity 
and possible nature of the action to take.222 The President tended to follow the 
recommendations of the Investigator General, which never questioned the one-party political 
system.
One year after the adoption of the single-party Constitution, the Bill of Rights was 
amended.223 The provisions revised concerned the rights of detainees and restrictees. The first 
Assembly elected after the adoption of the single-party Constitution decided that the courts 
should be prohibited from making orders for damages or compensation “in respect o f 
anything done under or in execution o f any restriction o f detention order signed by the 
President” unless the claim for damages or compensation arose from physical or mental ill- 
treatment or any error in the identity of the person restricted or detained.224 However, the 
tribunal which reviewed the case of a restricted or detained person was entitled to recommend 
to the President the payment of a compensation if it found that the person had suffered loss or 
damage as a result of anything done under or in the execution of a restriction or detention 
order signed by the President. The President was not, however, bound by the tribunal’s 
recommendation. This amendment was a response to the trend among the courts in the period 
from 1966-1974 to confer damages of a considerable amount for procedural errors. In fact, it 
constituted not only a limitation on the rights of individuals under detention or restriction but 
also a constraint on the judiciary’s institutional role of enforcement o f fundamental rights. It is 
important to take into account that this amendment was in direct opposition to the suggestions 
of the Zambian petitioners during the tour of the Commission, which had asked for a reform
221 Investigation Act, No. 23 of 1974. Judicial remedies had to be exhausted before presenting complaints to the 
Attorney General.
222 Before Zambia, Tanzania had already envisaged a form of ombudsman with the Permanent Commission of 
Enquiry (PCE) in the 1965 Interim Constitution (s. 67(4)), before which individuals could present complaints of 
abuse of power by government or party officials or other public officials. The PCE consisted of a chairman and 
four other persons appointed by the President. The main difference between the Tanzanian and the Zambian 
ombudsman is that in Tanzania, the PCE was also allowed to start an enquiry on its own initiative.
223 Constitutional Amendment (Act) No. IS of 1974.
224 Article 4(b) amending Article 29.
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giving better protection to individuals under preventive detention. Furthermore, the bill was 
strongly criticised when it was presented. Opposition was widespread and came not only from 
civil society organisations and individual citizens who expressed their discontent through the 
press but also from members of the Assembly.225 With the same Amendment Act, Article 18 
on the right to property was also amended. In 1969, the Zambian leadership, which was no 
longer subject to British conditionalities of the period preceding independence, intervened to 
make expropriation easier. To this end, the provision, which guaranteed that in the case of the 
deprivation of property a “prompt and adequate compensation” had to be paid, was cancelled. 
Under the amendment, the compensation would be determined by the National Assembly, 
whose decisions could not “be called into question in any court on the grounds that such 
compensation is not adequate”. Due to this amendment, the Zambian government was able 
acquire the property of land and mines throughout the country without excessive expense.
A final amendment to the Constitution which affected the actual enjoyment of human 
rights was made in 1975.226 27This created an institutional framework in which the exercise of 
civil and political rights became even more difficult. The amendment at issue marked, in fact, 
the constitutionalisation of the principle of “party supremacy”. This was realised by an 
amendment to Article 4, which stated: “7here shall be one and only one political party or 
organisation in Zambia, namely the United National Independence Party ..., the Constitution 
whereof is annexed for information”. Following the 1975 amendment, the last phrase was 
deleted and “ƒwjhere any reference to the Constitution o f the Party is necessary for the 
purpose o f interpreting or construing any provision o f this Constitution or any written law or
225 Due to this opposition, the original amendment bill was withdrawn. Initially, it removed from the courts also 
the power to adjudicate on the legality of the detention. On the Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Act No. 
18 of 1974, see L. Zimba, “The Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Act No. 18 of 1974”, in 10 Zambia Law  
Journal, 1978, p. 86. In reality, a first curtailment of the guarantees for individuals under preventive detention 
had already been made in 1969 by Constitution (Amendment) Act no. 33 of 1969. This raised from five to 
fourteen the days after the commencement of the detention or restriction within which the grounds for detention 
or restriction had to be provided for and from fourteen days to one month the time for publishing in the Gazette 
the notification of the detention or restriction. In addition, the detainees were deprived of the right to have their 
detention or restriction reviewed after six months and then at further intervals of six months. Following the 
amendment, the review was subordinated to an explicit request of the detainee or restrictee and to the pre­
condition that one year from the beginning of the detention had passed.
226 Constitutional Amendment (Act) No. 22 of 1975.
227 This amendment was preceded and in a sense pre-announced by the speech of Kaunda known as the 
“Watershed” speech given before the National Council of UNIP in July 1975. On that occasion, Kaunda 
declared: “The United National Independence Party is supreme over all institutions in our land. Its supremacy 
must not be theoretical nor is it enough to merely reduce it to a constitutional provision'-, see the “Watershed” 
Speech by President Kaunda to the National Council of UNIP, 30th June-3 rd July 1975, Government Printer, 
Lusaka, 1975, p. 3 quoted in L. Zimba, ‘The Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Act, No. 22 of 1975: The 
Legal Recognition of the Principle of ‘Party Supremacy* in Zambia”, 12 Zambia Law Journal 1980, p. 67. 
Following this speech, the National Council of the Party passed a resolution where it declared the need for an 
amendment so that the Constitution formalised the supremacy of the party defined as “the sole custodian o f the 
people rs interests".
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fo r  any other purpose, the text o f the Constitution o f the Party annexed hereto, together with 
such amendments as may from time to time be made thereto by the Party and published in the 
Gazette, shall be taken to be the sole authentic text o f the Constitution o f the Party ” was 
added.228 By virtue of this provision, the Constitution of the Party had acquired a 
constitutional relevance and furthermore became an instrument for the interpretation of the 
Constitution.
The amendment of other provisions made the supremacy of the party more concrete. 
The Party’s organs were not only institutionalised by vesting on them responsibilities in the 
decision and implementation of state policy, but their supremacy over state institutions was 
also sanctioned. The Central Committee of the Party was vested with the task of formulating 
government policy and advising the President on government and party policy. In addition, 
where a decision of the Central Committee was in conflict with a decision of the Cabinet, the 
decision of the Central Committee prevailed.229 Therefore, the Central Committee was, in 
effect, the real policy-maker. The office of Secretary-General of the Party was also 
institutionalised. After the 1975 constitutional amendment, the President was obliged to 
consult not only the Prime Minister, but also the Secretary-General of the Party, on the 
appointment and removal of Ministers, the Attorney General and other senior government 
officers. Consequently, the Secretary General became the second-ranking official in the state 
instead of the Prime Minister. Furthermore, along with the members of the Cabinet, the 
Central Committee of the Party was entitled to raise the question of the mental or physical 
capacity of the President to discharge his functions and therefore, to provoke his removal. As 
for the person entrusted with the task of taking over the functions of the removed President, 
the 1973 Constitution had already attributed this to the Secretary-General of the Party or, in 
his absence, to a Central Committee member nominated for this purpose.230 The 1975 
amendment merely added that the person who exerted the presidential functions was required 
to act upon the advice of the Cabinet and of the Central Committee of the Party. Thus, the 
fusion between the state and the party had been completed.
228 S. 2(b)(3) of the Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Act No. 22 of 1975.
229 Section 47(c)(2) of the Constitution.
230 Section 40(3).
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4.2*3 Justification for the Establishment of a One-Party State in Zambia
During the debate on the text of the 1973 constitution, it was emphasised that the adoption of 
a new constitutional charter should meet the needs for an “autochthonous” constitution. In the 
case of Zambia, the search for autochthony had a dual purpose. Firstly, it was linked to the 
fact that the British Parliament was the legal source of the independence constitution. The 
necessity of having a document which was “ “home-grown”, created on their own soil, and
not imported from the United Kingdom” was felt. Obviously, the considerations relating to 
the content of the constitution were also at stake. The need to have a document which was, as 
Vice-President Chona stated, "more suited to our own conditions " and "more pertinent to the 
aspiration o f our people " was also highlighted.* 232 The conditions were described as follows. 
Firstly, Kaunda justified the introduction of a one-party system in Zambia by citing the 
“constant demand” which had been coming from the population since independence. In 
reality, however, as described in section 2.1, this demand only came from the UNIP’s 
supporters. Moreover, the argument relating to the artificiality of multi-partism233 that could 
have been argued in Tanzania where the TANU had virtually been the only party since 
independence, this was certainly not the case in Zambia where the political scene had been 
pluralistic since the time of the nationalist struggle.
A further condition, which was often referred to, was the multiethnic composition of 
Zambia. Multi-partism was depicted as a threat to national unity since Zambian society is 
composed of seventy-three ethnic groups and both the ANC and UPP parties obtained their 
support among specific groups -  such as the Lozi and Ila-Tonga for the ANC and the Bemba
‘3I This position also emerges clearly from the Report of the National Commission, c it, at par. 16 where it was 
stated that "with the establishment o f the one-party participatory democracy, Zambia should no longer be tied 
by the British constitutional provisions The enactment of the new constitution was accompanied by the repeal 
of the Zambian Independence Act and the Zambian Independence Order, which constituted one document with 
the Zambian Constitution of 1964. See K.C. Wheare, The Constitutional Structure o f the Commonwealth, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1966.
232 National Assembly Debates, Hansard. No. 33, 4thJuly -30th August, 1973, Col. 87, quoted in Zimba, The 
Zambian, cit., p. 156. With more rhetoric, Kaunda expressed the same concept in his work A Humanist in 
Africa: ‘7  thought my reference to the one-party state would get a rise out o f you! I  know that anyone 
conditioned to the democratic system as it operates in Great Britain or the United States tends to detect an 
ominous undertone in the very sound o f the term. But i f  we are to make sense o f contemporary Africa, we must 
escape from the strait-jacket o f our preconceptions and have the charity to assume that where the political 
systems o f African States diverge from those o f the ex-metropolitan power this is not necessarily due to the 
pique or hunger fo r novelty; it may be that we have our own ideas about what is best fo r our people. The 
trouble is that Britain exported to the African continent the Westminster Model, a system refined and polished 
over marry centuries, and is utterly unable to believe that any sane African Government would wish to deviate 
from it. But difficult though it may be fo r devotees o f the Westminster Model is not so much the finest flower o f 
democratic systems as a beautiful anachronism-a pattern ideally suited to the genius o f the British people but o f 
limited value, without drastic modifications, in modem A fr ic a Kaunda, A Humanist, cit., pp. 105-106.
233 Press Conference on 25th February 1972 quoted in Zimba, The Zambian, cit., p. 153.
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for the UPP - instead of among Zambians at large. Their campaigns were addressed precisely 
to those groups.
An additional justification for the option for unipartism was the conflicting relation 
between Zambia and the racist regimes of South Africa and Rhodesia and with the Portuguese 
colonies of Mozambique and Angola, in light of the support given to the African liberation 
movements of these countries. To face the problems posed by ethnic rivalries and external 
enemies, the governmental action could not, it was held, be hampered by the Western-style 
lengthy democratic process centred on a confrontation between the government and the 
opposition. The primary argument for this position was that the situation which Zambia and 
sub-Saharan Africa faced was comparable to that of a state of emergency, where it was 
legitimate to impose derogation from individual liberties in the interests of the collectivity. 
From this it followed that
“ƒtjhere is not time for endless debate and arguing ... Inevitably, therefore, the 
Legislature ceases to be the major focus ofpower. It is not unimportant as a forum 
o f national debate and a sounding board ofpublic opinion. But most leaders in the 
new Africa find  themselves having to take initiatives and formulate policies which 
in the older societies o f the West would emerge from somewhat leisurely process o f 
parliamentary debate".234 235 :■ .
Kaunda went further and stated that “ƒhjard though it may sound, in my way, survival is 
more important than freedom o f expression... National survival is the basic good; all 
other qualities such as unlimited freedom o f expression are contingent upon it  The great 
enemy o f freedom is not totalitarianism but chaos” P s The above quote highlights the core 
rationale for unipartism and the limitation of the rights linked to the functioning of a 
multiparty liberal democracy: the priority o f the national interest over the rights through 
which individuals may show their opposition to the executive, which is imposed by the 
necessity to respond adequately to a state of “emergency”.
234 Kaunda, A Humanist, cit., pp. 108-109.
235 Ibidem, p. 108.
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43 A Survey on the Zambian Human Rights Case Law23*
The examination of the decisions handed down by the High Court and by the Court of Appeal 
of Zambia under Section 28 of the Constitution236 37 is essential to understanding the conception 
and actual status of human rights in Zambia under the one-party regime.238 More notably, this 
analysis helps us to grasp the extent to which the human rights discourse advanced by the 
political class was shared and supported by the judiciary.
The number of cases brought before the judiciary regarding the alleged violation of 
fundamental rights and freedoms was not very significant. The majority concerned the right to 
personal liberty and arose from measures of preventive detention. The judiciary, however, 
was also used to fight political battles. Among the few cases regarding the violation of human 
rights other than personal liberty was the Nkumbula casef39 which had a central place in 
Zambian constitutional and political history. This case arose from a claim for redress by the 
leader of the African National Congress before the High Court after the government 
announced its intention to establish a one-party system in Zambia. Nkumbula claimed that 
such an announcement and the appointment of the Commission, which was given the task to 
make recommendations for the new system, were likely to contravene the rights guaranteed 
by Sections 13, 23 and 24 of the 1964 Constitution protecting the freedom from 
discrimination on political grounds, to assembly and association, expression; or that it was 
contrary to the spirit of the Constitution. The petitioner firstly asked for a declaration attesting 
that the Commission was bound to adhere to the principle that the fundamental rights and 
freedoms of the individual should continue to be protected as provided under Chapter 3 of the 
1964 Constitution meant that Section 23 should remain unchanged. This implied maintaining 
provisions for the guarantee of the freedom of assembly and association, which encompasses 
also the freedom to form political parties. Therefore, the petitioner asked the Court to declare 
that the Commission should hear evidence against the establishment of a single party system. 
The Chief Justice, however, refused to issue such a declaration and found that this did not 
constitute a breach of individual freedoms. He stated that, “ƒq]uite clearly, s. 23 in its existing 
form would be inconsistent with the notion o f one-party state in that at present it guarantees 
freedom o f association, including by implication power to form political parties”, He added
236 The present survey covers decisions taken until 1984.
237 Section 28: i f  any person alleges that any o f the provisions o f sections 13 to 26 (inclusive) o f this
Constitution has been or is likely to be contravened in relation to him, then, without prejudice to any other 
action which is lawfully available, that person may apply to the High court for redress”.
238 For a collection of the cases on fundamental rights and freedoms in Zambia from independence until 1984, 
see M. Ndulo and K. Turner, Civil Liberty Cases in Zambia, The African Law Reports, Oxford, 1984.
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that the term of reference to which the applicant referred, i.e. the maintenance of Chapter 3 in 
a one-party state, was to be considered as “merely a guiding factor in considering the form o f 
a one-party state” and consequently, it did not necessarily follow that “s. 23 must be rigidly 
adhered to in its present form”, Moreover, it was outside the terms of reference of the 
Commission that witnesses could be heard on the issue of the establishment of a one-party 
state. According to the Court, the inability of the citizens to express their views did not 
constitute a limitation of their freedom.
Nkumbula also asked for a second declaration that any statement inhibiting any 
expression of opinion against the establishment o f a one-party system was in contravention of 
the spirit of the Constitution and, in particular, o f Sections 13,22 and 23. In this instance, the 
petitioner was referring to the statement of the district governor of Lusaka, Mr. Justin Kabwe, 
who said that “UNIP was ready to crush anyone who opposed the formation of a one-party 
state” and that “whether people liked it or not, the one-party democracy had to come to stay in 
Zambia”. The Chief Justice replied that this statement could not be considered as 
representative of the government’s policy. Moreover, according to the Justice, “ƒt]he evidence 
shows that the petitioner has freely expressed his opinion against a One-Party State”. The 
restrictive understanding of the freedom of expression held by the Chief Justice can be clearly 
seen from the following: “The petitioner is at liberty to put forward his views in public or in 
private. That he cannot put them forward before a particular Commission set up to deal with 
other matters is no restriction upon this freedom ”.
Furthermore, Nkumbula requested the Court to state in the third declaration that the 
introduction of the one-party state was contrary to the spirit of the Constitution and to the 
rights guaranteed under Sections 13 and 23. The Chief Justice also rejected this request due to 
the fact that this situation had not yet occurred, although it was highly probable that this 
would be the outcome of the amendment. He argued, “/  have no doubt that the introduction o f 
a One-Part State will prohibit the formation o f political parties, and that it will be a 
restriction on the present right o f assembly contained in s. 23. In that sense it is inconsistent 
with the present Constitution. ” However, “[t]here is no evidence that under the Constitution, 
as it at present exists, any action will be taken to prevent the formation ofpolitical parties. It 
is only when the Constitution has been amended — and this will involve an alteration to s. 23 
restricting rights o f assembly by different political parties -  that any interference will take 
place with the p e titio n e rThe reasoning of the Court was inspired by the logic of narrow 
formalism. The Court argued that the government was entitled to amend the Constitution, 
including the Bill of Rights, and furthermore that the mere declaration of such an intention
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could not be challenged. In addition, once the amendment had taken place, there would not 
have been any infringement of the right of association because this would have no longer been 
protected by the constitution.240
Nkumbula presented an appeal (Nkumbula v Attorney General)241 against the decision 
of the High Court. There were two grunds upon which the appeal was based. The first was 
that the appointment of the Commission of Inquiry was ultra vires and null and void because 
the matters to be inquired into could not be considered ‘for the public welfare’ as required by 
the Inquiry Act under which the Commission was appointed.242 The appellant remarked that 
the deprivation of the citizens of the fundamental rights and freedoms could not be considered 
for the public welfare. The Court observed that the power o f the President to make such a 
decision could only be challenged on the ground that he acted “in bad faith or from improper 
motives or on extraneous consideration or under a view of facts or law which could not 
reasonably be entertained”.
However, the central issue involved the actual interpretation of the concept of ‘public 
welfare’. On the one hand, the appellant maintained that “the public welfare means the 
welfare of the individuals comprising the public, and ... to derogate from individual rights 
and freedoms cannot be for their welfare.” On the other hand, the Court replied that M[t]he 
ordinary meaning o f ‘the public ' is the community in general, as an aggregate, the people as 
a whole”. This confrontation between Nkumbula and the Court o f Appeal summarises the 
more general conflict underlying the introduction of the one party-system in sub-Saharan 
Africa. The clash is between two different ways of perceiving the relationship between the 
public interest and individuals’ rights. The appellant believed that the common good should 
not be referred to as an abstract entity but as to the sum of the individuals constituting a 
society and, more specifically, that their interest can only be fulfilled if their individual rights 
are respected243 and that when a conflict arises between the interest of society at large in the 
area of individual rights and freedoms, the latter must prevail. Conversely, the Court of 
Appeal viewed the relationship of the public interest and fundamental rights as between two
240 The Court terminated saying that “ƒwjhen the Constitution is amended, that will be a different matter and his 
rights will be such as provided in that new Constitution”.
241 HP/CONST/Ref./1/l972, of April 1972.
242 Section 2(1) of the Inquiries Act (Cap. 181) states: “The President was entitled to appoint a commission “to 
inquire into any matter in which an inquiry would, in the opinion of the President, be for the public welfare” 
(emphasis added).
243 [Counsel for die applicant] argued that “although there are many areas in which the interests o f the society at 
large and the requirements o f orderly government are in conflict with the interests o f individuals and lead 
inevitably to restrictions on the freedom o f action and behaviour o f individuals, where such a conflict arises in 
the area o f individual rights and freedoms as protected by Chapter III o f the Constitution the interests o f the 
individual must prevail*.
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autonomous entities: the collectivity and the individuals. Within such a relationship, the Court 
advanced the idea of the prevalence of the former over the latter, which was the idea upon 
which African political leaderships built their single-party systems. This extract from the 
Court’s decision expresses this opinion in a clear-cut way: “ ... it is unthinkable to suggest that 
the government o f a country elected to run an ordered society is not permitted to impose 
whatever constitutional restrictions on individual liberties it regards as necessary to enable it 
to govern to the best advantage for the benefit o f the society as a whole ... and if  the interests 
o f the society are regarded as sufficiently important to override the individual interests, then 
the action in question must be held to be in the public interest or for the public benefit
With the second ground of appeal, Nkumbula challenged the refusal of the High Court 
to accept his petition for a declaration stating that the introduction of a one-party system 
would infringe his freedom of association under Section 23. The appellant reminded the Court 
that Section 28(5) allowed petitions for redress even when a right or freedom “is likely to be” 
infringed. Therefore, he asserted that he did not have to show that the introduction of a one- 
party system would infringe his rights, but simply that his right, as provided for at the time of 
the appeal, was likely to be infringed by the introduction of a one-party state. The Court 
dismissed the appeal on the ground that under Section 28(5) u[n]o application shall be 
brought under clause (1) on the grounds that the provisions o f Articles 13 to 27 (inclusive) 
are likely to be contravened by reason o f proposals contained in any bill which, at the date o f 
application, has not become a law”. This conclusion is formally correct but the appellant, 
recognising that a declaration by the Court would have little value if Section 23 was amended, 
believed that “in the area of individual rights and freedoms it would be a salutary warning to 
the government for the courts to say that a proposed amendment is in conflict with existing 
rights”. The Court did not share this belief, being of the opinion that it is “no part o f the 
function o f the courts to issue warnings to the Government as to the legality o f its proposed 
actions”, but only to enforce or secure the enforcement of the provisions included in the Bill 
of Rights. In this case, however, even this function was limited. Given the fact that the 
government was considering an amendment to these provisions, the Court felt that under such 
circumstances “i f  the court could ... enforce or secure the enforcement o f the existing 
provisions this would mean that the court could prevent the amendment”.244
244 A similar case was also taken in Sierra Leone. The plaintiff alleged that the appointment by the government 
of a one-party committee constituted a threat to or an infringement of the rights guaranteed under Sections 12-23 
and particularly the freedoms o f assembly and association. The application was dismissed on the basis of 
arguments similar to those of the Nkumbula case. In relation to s. 24 which corresponds to the Zambian s. 28, 
the Chief Justice found that **what that section means is this: to entitle a person to invoke the judicial power o f
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The Nkumbula case shows how the constitution-making power was perceived as 
unfettered power in the African context. The Zambian judiciary rejected the idea that 
fundamental rights represent a restraint on the power to revise the constitution and 
consequently as a restraint on political power. Conversely, here the Court held that it was its 
duty to avoid any pronouncements which might hinder the free exercise of the amendment of 
the constitution by the government even when such an amendment related to the Bill of 
Rights. Its only concern was the procedural correctness of this revision.
Apart from the Nkumbula case, most human rights cases in Zambia related to 
measures of preventive detention taken under the preservation of public security regulations, 
which the President was entitled to adopt under a state of emergency. As seen above, a state 
of threatened emergency was declared in 1964 and it was prolonged until 1991 in the name of 
the security and economic problems deriving from the support to the African liberation 
movements operating in the Southern African region. Despite the formal motivation for the 
prolonging of the state of emergency, the use of the power of detention without trial was 
mostly used to silence “local political opponent than ... spies or saboteurs from Rhodesia or 
South Africa”.245 Furthermore, the continuation of the state of emergency was certainly not in 
conformity with the principles in the matter laid down on this matter at international level by 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which Zambia had ratified 
on 10th April 1984. The state of emergency under which Zambia remained until 1991 was in 
sharp contrast with the temporary character that it should have “by its very nature”.246 In fact, 
Article 4 of the Convention does not establish any principle on the duration of the state of 
emergency, however the Human Rights Committee derived the principle of the necessary 
temporal limitation through the principle of proportionality established by Article 4, under 
which states may take measures derogating from their obligations under the Covenant only 
“to the extent strictly required by the exigencies o f the situation”. In this regard, Zambian state 
of emergency was also inconsistent with the principle that Oraa has defined as “qualitative 
proportionality”, consisting of the instrumental link between the emergency and the measures 
adopted.247 This link was, indeed, lacking since the power vested in the executive under a
this court, that person must show by allegations o f material fact in his pleadings that as a result o f the 
legislative or executive acts complained o f he has sustained, or is sustaining, or is immediately in danger o f 
sustaining, a direct injury, and this injury, is not one o f a general nature common to all members o f the public 
see Steele and Others v Attorney General, in Africa Law Report, SLI, 1976, p. 1.
245 J.M. Mwanakatwe, The End ofKaunda Era, Multimedia Publications, Lusaka, p. 147.
246 Oraa, Human Rights, cit., p. 30.
247 Ibidem, pp. 146-147.
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state of emergency was used not to deal with the cause of the alleged emergency, but as a tool 
in the internal political struggle. In addition, the principle of proportionality can also be 
derived from Article 30 of the Zambian Constitution, in which it stated that derogatory 
measures taken in a state of emergency cannot be considered as a violation of the Bill of 
Rights “unless it is shown that the measures taken exceeded anything which, having due 
regard to the circumstances prevailing at the time, could reasonably have been thought to be 
required for the purpose o f dealing with the situation in question” (emphasis added). It should 
also not to be overlooked that the declaration of a threatened emergency is not permitted 
under the Covenant as the situation of emergency must be present or at least imminent. Article 
4(1) of the ICCPR refers to a “public emergency which threatens the life of the nation”.
Due to the de facto permanent state of emergency, the recourse to preventive detention 
was considerable over the course of Zambian history.248 In this sphere, the judiciary proved to 
be willing in many instances to declare the relevant acts invalid, although this attitude was 
contradicted at other times by decisions interpreting both the presidential powers and the 
notion of public security in a wide manner. A review of the most meaningful decisions will 
illustrate this dual face of the Zambian judiciary, and will demonstrate how it corresponded 
with an uneasy solution to the problematic relationship between the public interest and 
fundamental rights and freedoms.
The judiciary was often inclined to give prevalence to rights of the citizens with 
respect to interest of security in the name of which detention orders were taken. Thus, it based 
its judgments on the principle that procedural irregularities made a detention order invalid.249 
In the cases of invalid detention orders, the applicant was often awarded considerable 
damages, and as it has been seen in the preceding section, this practice convinced the 
government of the necessity to introduce a constitutional amendment to restrict the possibility 
of obtaining damages for unlawful detention. The reason given by courts for conferring 
damages for procedural irregularities reveals their awareness of their role in the safeguarding 
of individual liberties. In the case of Attorney General v Chipango of 1971,250 for example,
248 Between March 1971 and 21st September 1981, approximately 901 detention and restriction orders were 
adopted, see Nwabueze, Presidentialism, cit, p. 341.
249 In most instances, the procedural irregularities which gave rise to a judicial recourse were the lack of respect 
of the term of 14 days to provide the detainee with the grounds of detention or the vagueness of the grounds; see 
Attorney-General v Chipango (Court of Appeal, 1971); In Re Kapwepwe and Kaenga (Court of Appeal, 1972); 
In Re Puta (High Court, 1973); Attorney General V Musonda and others (Supreme Court, 1974); Kawimbe v 
Attorney General (Supreme Court, 1974); In Re Seegers (High Court, 1976); Mutale v Attorney-General (High 
Court, 1976); Sithole v Attorney-General (High Court, 1977); Banda (J.) v Attorney-General (Supreme Court, 
1978).
250 (1971) SJZ(CA).
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the Court of Appeal asserted that the respect for the term of 14 day limit to furnish the 
detainee with the grounds of his/her detention “is not a mere procedural step ... but it goes 
vitally to the fact o f detention.” In relation to the assignments of damages, the Chief Justice 
observed, *7 think that is a very small consequence compared to the necessity to safeguard the 
rights and liberties o f the common mart'. In the same case, at the first instance, the High 
Court had already granted damages to the plaintiff and justified this decision by stating that 
u[t]he individual *s right to personal liberty is one o f the pillars o f the fundamental rights and 
freedoms under the Constitution o f the land and is clear in the minds o f the Zambian people 
that it ought not to be allowed to pass through their fingers like quicksilver; it should be 
jealously guarded against any illegal encroachment from any source no matter how great or 
powerfuF7.251 253
Nevertheless, the judiciary tended to uphold the position of the government especially 
in cases with a significant political dimension as in the case o f In Re Kapwepwe and 
Kaenga, in which the two plaintiffs were leaders of the UPP and were detained under 
Regulation 33 of Public Security Regulations. They alleged that the grounds of their detention 
were too vague. In response, the Court, firstly, supplied a definition of detailed grounds for 
detention. It, then, dismissed the appeal, by finding the grounds in compliance with its 
definition. The explanation reached by the Court is worthy of closer scrutiny. From its 
judgement, the concern of the judiciary for the ideology of the Zambian political leadership of 
the time is clearly visible. It supported the link between political pluralism and the threat to 
public security based on the perception, which did not need to be proved, that in the Zambian 
context, political pluralism would have led to tribalistic politics and would therefore pose a 
danger for public security. This was precisely one of the grounds given for the preventive 
detention of one of the plaintiffs. The fact that that this individual was involved in organising 
the UPP, was per se evidence that he would create tribal conflict in the country and therefore 
endanger its security. The Court argued that this ground was sufficiently detailed by pointing 
out that the UPP drew its support from “the Bemba and allied tribes and that the party is in 
the popular image a Bemba party ”. Given this context, the detainee was allegedly organising 
the party “as a tribal party which in the result is likely to cause conflict with other tribes and 
prejudice security ”. Facing the difficult question of whether the mere act of party membership
251 Chipango v Attorney-General {High Court, 1971).
252 Court of Appeal, 1972.
253 According to the Court's definition grounds “must enable the detainee to make representations not only on 
the basis of mistaken identity, alibi, and the like, but also of the merits; the detainee must be put in a position 
where he can dispute the truth of the allegations against him.”
could constitute an activity endangering the security of the Republic and could be considered 
a sufficient ground for detention, the Chief Justice admitted that he was troubled by “the 
thought o f depriving o f his liberty a person who it is recognised may be entirely innocent o f 
any intention to prejudice the security o f the S t a t e The dilemma was solved on the basis of 
the principle that the evaluation made by the President was unquestionable and completely 
discretionary. In this case, Justice Baron declared: "... there is no onus on the detaining 
authority to prove any allegation beyond reasonable doubt, or indeed to any other standard 
or to support any suspicion. The question is one purely for his subjective satisfaction”.254 In 
considering this decision, it has also to be taken into account that the absence of a definition 
of public security both in the constitution and in the legislation allowed the judiciary to 
interpret this notion widely.255
In the 1980s, the Zambian judiciary displayed a change of direction by becoming more 
willing to evaluate the executive’s behaviour in relation to detention apart from the procedural 
irregularities. On some occasions, the judiciary asserted its power to assess the reasonableness 
of the executive’s decisions.256 257Thus, nine years later, the High Court completely reversed its 
orientation as shown in the In Re Kapwepwe and Kaenga case. In the case of In Re Waslamba 
and Sampa, the Court had to rule on a case of preventive detention as a result of the alleged 
incitement of workers on the part of the plaintiffs to strike in the Copperbelt. Both plaintiffs 
were placed in detention due to declarations which, according to the charges against them, 
were the causes of the strikes. The Court held that there was no causal relationship between 
these declarations and the strike and that the plaintiffs’ freedom of expression was 
unconstitutionally infringed because its restriction could not be considered reasonably
254 The same conception of the discretionary power of the President was expressed in the cases Re Buitendag 
(1972) ZR 156. In this case, the plaintiff was detained on the same grounds in respect to which he was acquitted 
in a trial before the High Court. Another example is the case Maseka v Attorney-General (unreported) High 
Court case HP/97of 1979. Once again, the grounds for detention were the same used for criminal charges which 
were subsequently withdrawn. The only chance to overcome this obstacle would have been to demonstrate the 
mala fide of the President, which was obviously virtually impossible.
255 In the case Mudenda v Attorney General (ZR 24,1979), the High Court stated that the definition contained in 
the Preservation of Public Security Act is not “exhaustive” but simply “illustrative”. A similar opinion was put 
forward in the case Chibwe v Attorney General (ZR 10, 1980) where justice Sakala found that the 
externalisation o f Zambian currency, which was the ground of detention of the plaintiff, “from a country whose 
economy is experiencing great difficulties is certainly prejudicial to public security, which activity if left 
uncontrolled would lead to certain economic consequences and hardships on the people of this country”. Justice 
Cullinan reached different conclusions in the case Kaira v Attorney General (ZR 65, 1980). He found that the 
only type of crimes which “Parliament had in mind in the definition of Public Security as given in the 
Preservation of Public Security Act may lead to detention. Thus he specified that “the connection with public 
security cannot in itself give rise to the necessity for detention”. The same conclusion was reached by J. 
Cullinan in Re Kapwepwe and Kaenga.
256 See Lombe and Chisata v Attorney General ([1981] ZR 35) and later Chiluba v Attorney General 
( 198 l/HN/713 (unreported)).
257 High Court, 1981.
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required for the purpose of dealing with the existing situation as provided for by Section 26 of 
the Constitution. In relation to one of the plaintiffs, Mr. Sampa, the rationale for the decision 
illustrates that the Court’s interpretation of civil rights was completely at odds with that of the 
political leadership. One of the reasons for Mr. Sampa’s preventive detention was his 
declaration that there would have been a coup d’état, if the president had not changed the 
army personnel and that the ultimate goal of the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) 
was to take over the leadership of the country. In this case the Court found, firstly, that the 
plaintiffs statements could not lead workers to strike and, secondly, that “simply to express 
an ambition to take over the leadership o f the country per se does not make the author o f that 
statement a public security risk'1. In this decision the Court marked in a clear way the distance 
between political confrontation and threat to the security of the state. This case can be seen in 
sharp contrast with the previous judgement, in which the mere membership of the UPP was 
held to be a sufficient ground for preventive detention.
The judiciary was also called upon to rule on another form of restriction of 
fundamental rights and freedoms apart from a declared state of emergency, which consisted of 
their limitation for reason of a public interest. The Zambian Constitution provided three 
conditions for the limitation o f fundamental rights and freedoms: that it had to be provided for 
by law, that it had to be reasonably required in the interests of defence, public safety, public 
order, public morality or public health, and finally that it had to be reasonably justifiable in a 
democratic society. The judiciary formulated its definition of the latter two requirements on 
two occasions with contrasting decisions. It is important to remark that these decisions date 
back to the period preceding the introduction of the one-party system and show that in reality 
the problematic relationship between individual rights and the public interest existed before 
the creation of a political climate and constitutional framework unfavourable to individual 
rights. The first case was Feliya Kachasu v The Attorney General fo r Zambia.25* The case 
concerned a girl who was suspended from school because she refused to sing the national 
anthem and salute the national flag, as provided for by the Education (Primary and Secondary 
Schools) Regulations of 1966, because it was contrary to her beliefs as a Jehovah’s Witness. 
She claimed that these regulations were in breach of Section 21 of the Constitution 
guaranteeing freedom of conscience, thought and religion. Furthermore, she requested redress 
on the basis of Section 28 as she claimed that the suspension constituted an infringement of 
the rights guaranteed by Section 21 of the Constitution. According to Section 21 the freedom *
2SS SJZ, 1967/HP/273.
of conscience, including the freedom of thought and religion, could be subject to restraints 
provided for by a law, if it was ‘reasonably required’ in the interests of defence, public safety, 
public order, public morality or public health and finally ‘reasonably justifiable’ in a 
democratic society. This decision is interesting in particular with regard to the definition of 
the concepts of ‘reasonably required’ and ‘reasonably justified’ in a democratic society. 
According to the applicant, the regulation and the concrete limitation of her right effected by 
the suspension were not reasonably required in the interest of defence, public safety or public 
order and the law could not be considered as reasonably justifiable in a democratic society. 
With regard to the requirement of ‘reasonably required’, the High Court found that “bearing 
in mind the compelling consideration, particularly at present time, o f national unity and 
national security, without which there can be no certainty o f public safety nor guarantee o f  
individual rights and freedoms, I  think it is reasonable requirement that pupils ... in schools 
should sing the national anthem and salute the national fla g ”. The judiciary shared the 
government’s belief that the idea that national identity was a paramount value which should 
be interpreted as a pre-requisite for public safety.259
In relation to the requirement that the law was ‘reasonably justifiable’ in a democratic 
society, the Court argued that ‘ft] he criteria o f what is reasonably justifiable in a democratic 
society might vary according to whether that society is long established or newly emergent. ” 
From this it went on to observe that “Zambia is newly emergent. It would be unrealistic to 
apply the criteria o f a long-established democratic society. We should look to the democratic 
society that exists in Zambia; and having found that these regulations are reasonably 
required in Zambia I  have no hesitation in finding that they are reasonably justifiable in the 
democratic society that exists here”. This decision highlights, in the first place, that the 
concept of “reasonably justifiable in a democratic society” is relative. This understanding 
corresponds with the general claim made by African political leaders that there is no uniform 
conception of democracy and that, given its specificities, the notion of democracy which 
should be applied in Africa cannot be the same as in the West. In the second place, this 
decision held that the concept of ‘reasonably required’ by a public interest corresponds with 
that o f‘reasonably justifiable’, which considerably restricts the evaluation of the legitimacy of 
a limitation of human rights by the judiciary. By formulating the equation between reasonably
259 The concept of ‘public safety* is rather difficult to define. It may be of assistance to refer to the literature 
concerning this concept as used in the ICCPR. From the discussion on Articles 18, 21 and 22 of the ICCPR, 
which was carried out in the Third Committee, it seems that public safety concerns “the safety of persons, to 
their life, bodily integrity, or health”, see A.C. Kiss, “Permissible Limitations on Rights”, in Henkin, The 
International, cit., p. 298.
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required and reasonably justifiable in a democratic society, the latter requirement is, in fact, 
excluded from any assessment by the judiciary. The problem with this reasoning is that the 
purpose of this parameter should be to guarantee that the consideration of the public interest is 
not left to the complete discretion of the state. By considering political freedom and the 
guarantee of individual rights against the state as basic common features of a democratic 
society,260 the assessment of the justifiable limitation of a right in a democratic society should 
assure that this limitation is effected in the most restricted form.261
A different opinion was subsequently adopted in the case of Jasbai Patel v The 
Attorney General case.262 In this case the High Court decided that “fr is necessary to adopt the 
objective test o f what is reasonably justifiable, not in a particular democratic society, but in 
any democratic society.,, some distinction should be made between a developed society and 
one which is still developing, b u t... one must be able to say that there are certain minima 
which must be found in any society, developed or otherwise, below which it cannot go and 
still be entitled to be considered as a democratic society”.263 The perspective on democracy is 
different in this case with respect to that adopted in the previous year. This is also true for the 
relationship between reasonably required but this does not automatically mean that it is also 
reasonably justifiable in a democratic society. The Court observed that it might occur that a 
regulation is reasonably required but from this does not automatically derives that it is also 
reasonably justifiable in a democratic society. What has to be considered is the “method”, and 
“the manner in which the power ... was exercisable and in fact exercised which (is) in 
question
This review of Zambian human rights case law confirms that the main attack upon 
civil and political rights came from the theory that in the case of a conflict between the public 
interest and individual rights and freedoms priority should be given to the former. At the same 
time, however, it also demonstrates that the bill of rights still provided protection for the 
individual’s rights and that, despite many constraints, the judiciary could enjoy a measure of
260 It is worth reminding that the ICCPR refers to “necessarly required” and not simply “justifiable in a 
democratic society” (see Articles 14,21 and 22).
261 A  further aspect of this decision endangering fundamental rights and freedoms was the assertion of the 
principle of the presumption of the constitutionality of laws and rules made by a minister acting under the 
statutory powers conferred on him by the legislature. This presumption extended to the requirement that laws 
were necessary and reasonably justifiable.
262 SJZ, 1 OF 1968.
263 The Court adopted the definition of a “democratic country” given by the U.S. Supreme Court as a “jree  
society in which government is based upon the consent o f an informed citizenry and is dedicated to the 
protection o f the rights o f all, even the most despised minorities " (Speiser v Randell (357 U.S. 513 (1958)) and 
as a 'free government ... that leaves the way wide open to favour, discuss, advocate, or incite causes and 
doctrines however obnoxious and antagonistic such views may be to the rest o f us” (Yates v United States, 354 
U.S. 298(1958)).
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independence in this domain. Moreover, it shows how, in the absence of alternative spaces for 
political struggle, the bill of rights was the only means through which to challenge 
government action and the courts, which were entrusted with its enforcement, were used as 
the forum to conduct a political battle such as the fight against the introduction of 
unipartism.264 Finally, it demonstrates that the African discourse and experience of human 
rights, prior to the démocratisation processes of the 1990s, was more complex than it may 
have appeared. Non-political actors offered a view on human rights which was not at all at 
odds with the liberal ideology, at least with regard to the one relationship between the political 
power and the citizen.
4.4 The Impact of the Single-Party System on the Protection of Human Rights 
The introduction of a single-party system had a clear impact on human rights protection. 
Nothwistanding the divergences among one-party African states in respect to their human 
rights record, the single-party system itself proved to be incapable of safeguarding human 
rights.
The International Seminar on ‘Human Rights, their Protection and the Rule of Law in 
a One-Party State* convened by the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) in 1976 at Dar- 
es-Salaam can be used as a basis for a reflection on this issue.265 The participants at the 
seminar found that human rights in African single-party states were not adequately protected, 
however in their conclusions it was stated that, despite the obvious limitations on the freedom 
of association and expression, fundamental rights and freedoms can be guaranteed under a 
single-party system.266 This was, indeed, the fundamental claim put forward by the advocates 
of the one-party rule in sub-Saharan Africa. This was not only clear in states like Zambia 
where a liberal bill of rights was included in the single-party constitution, but it was also put 
forward by states rejecting the adoption of a bill of rights.267 The advocates of the one-party
264 This is also what happened in Kenya since the late 1980s, see Y. Ghai, “The Kenyan Bill of Rights”, in P. 
Alston (ed.), Promoting Human Rights Through Bill o f Rights: Comparative Perspectives, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 1999, cit., p. 230.
265 The participants were politicians and scholars from Tanzania, Zambia, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and 
the United Kingdom. For a record of the Seminar see International Commission o f Jurists, Human Rights in a 
One-Party State, Search Press London, London, 1976.
266 Ibidem, p. 108.
267 Daudu Mwakawago, Minister of Information and Broadcasting in Tanzania asserted at the International 
Commission of Jurists’ Seminar on Human Rights in a One-Party State: “in Tanzania we do not have a bill o f 
rights in the constitution; but we have embodied the elements o f human rights in the party creed and the 
preamble to the constitution o f the country. We have a one-party system, yet we have tried to ensure that there is 
freedom o f conscience, expression and association ... In our country, where we have a one-party system, we do 
not claim our system is the ultimate protection o f human rights ... What we have rejected is the claim that a 
multi-party system is the ultimate p ro tec tio n see ibidem, p. 19.
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system did not call into question the relevance of the liberal conception of human rights as 
such. Instead, they challenged the emphasis given to civil and political rights in Western 
constitutionalism, proposing that these could be subject to restrictions as long as they were 
required in the public interest. Beyond the above allegation of the compatibility of the one- 
party system with the enjoyment of human rights, it was admitted that certain rights are 
necessarily limited in a single-party state. However, this admission was generally confined to 
the freedoms of association and expression.
However, as experienced in sub-Saharan Africa, unipartism cannot be reconciled with 
the enjoyment of civil and political rights due to both its institutional organisation, 
distribution (or rather concentration) of power, and also its theoretical justifications and 
premises.
4.4.1 Fundamental Rights Necessarily Infringed by the Single-Party System 
The idea that the problems of African states should be addressed by strong government 
necessarily involved the exclusion of any opposition and the restriction of the freedoms of 
association, assembly and expression. However, other freedoms were denied under the single­
party system and it was precisely these rights which the advocates of unipartism argued would 
receive better protection under unipartism than multi-partism. These included the right to vote 
and be elected and the right to participate in the government of one’s own country. 
Furthermore, the restriction of all of these freedoms was at the origin of the infringement of 
another right, the right not be discriminated against on political grounds.
The freedom of association and the right to freely choose which organisation to join 
were suppressed. These rights correspond with a specific duty on the State to ensure to 
everyone the possibility to choose and even to establish new organisations. 268
268 In fact, neither the UDHR (see Article 19) nor the ICCPR (see Article 22) mention the right to form and 
become a member of political parties as a component of the freedom of association, while the right to form and 
become a member of trade unions is expressly included in the ICCPR. Even during the discussion on the 
drafting of the Covenant, the issue of the compatibility of the single-party system with the freedom of 
association was hardly raised, nor was any conclusive position taken on the issue; see K.J. Partsch, "Freedom of 
Conscience and Political Freedoms”, in Henkin, The International, cit., p. 235. Partsch also states that although a 
proposal for the prohibition of certain political organisations was rejected (see Bracco (Uruguay), UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/SR.325 AT 15 (1952)), the proposal of a member of the Commission on Human Rights for including an 
explicit prohibition on the outlawing of political parties was also turned down; ibidem, p. 235. At regional level, 
the African Charter, consistent with the prevailing trend in the sub-Saharan African constitutional orders, has a 
very restricted formulation of the freedom of association. Article 10 states: “Every individual shall have the 
right to free association provided that he abide by the law". It does not mention either political rights or trade 
unions. Moreover, the African Charter leaves the legislature completely free to establish limitations on the 
freedom of association, while the other regional instruments require that possible restrictions are "prescribed by 
law and necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention 
of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection o f the rights and freedoms of
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Another component of the freedom of association which was also impinged upon by a 
single-party system was the right not to be forced to join any associations.269 In fact, several 
African states obliged their citizens to become automatic members of the single party.270 
Moreover, non-political organisations were indirectly compelled to affiliate themselves to the 
party, for example in the case of Zambia, by requiring that they were “not prejudicial to the 
national interest”.271
Another freedom which proved to be irreconcilable with the single-party system was 
the freedom of assembly. The prohibition of the formation of political organisations other than 
the single party also entailed the impossibility to convene or participate in the meetings of 
these organisations.
The question of the limitation of the freedom of expression, which is already limited 
by the restriction of the freedoms of association and assembly, was more complex.272 The 
problematic aspect regarding this freedom lies in the contention that it could be fully enjoyed 
within the party despite the fact it could not be used to oppose to the party and its policies. 
Even in some of the scholarly literature, it was suggested that the one-party system could be 
considered compatible with the enjoyment of the freedom of expression “as long as the state 
does not interfere with expression which suggests changing such a system”.273 However, in 
the African single-party systems, the state corresponded with the party and within it there 
were no institutional mechanisms provided within it to guarantee the freedom of expression.
However, the above condition advanced by Partsch is lacking. Even Kaunda, who 
declared that the party could welcome anyone as members (even those who did not share the 
objectives of the party), imposed the acceptance of “the constitutional provision that there be 
only one political party in Zambia”274 as a precondition for party membership.
others” (Article 11(2) of the European Convention). The American Convention contains a similar provision, see 
Article 16 (2). Article 22(2) of the ICCPR also states that “no restrictions may imposed unless prescribed by law 
and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, public 
order, the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the right and freedoms of others”.
269 See Article 20(2) of the UDHR.
270 This analysis shall be restricted to exploring how the structural features of single-party systems impinge on 
fundamental rights and freedoms, without considering the use of constriction. The freedom of association was 
also denied by making recourse to coercion. In Zambia, for example citizens were prohibited from entering 
markets or using public buses if  they did not have the membership card o f the UNEP; see Mwanakatwe, End, 
cit., pp. 96-97.
271 In all single party states, trade unions, women’s and student associations, co-operative movements, 
professional societies were co-opted by the party. The instrument used was that of “affiliated membership”.
272 Freedom of assembly can be considered as an “institutional form of freedom of expression”; see M. Novak, 
U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ICCPR Commentary, N.P. Emgel Publisher, Kehl, Strasbourg, 
Arlington, 1992.
273 Partsch, Freedom, cit., p. 225.
274 K. Kaunda, Comments by His Excellency President Kaunda o f Zambia on the Conclusions, in ICJ, Human 
Rights, cit., p. 125.
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In practice, freedom of expression in one-party systems in sub-Saharan Africa varied 
throughout the region. In Zambia, it has been observed that “a certain degree of pluralism 
was tolerated”275 both outside and inside the party. An example of this is the parliamentary 
opposition to the original 1974 Bill amending the constitutional provision concerning the 
right to damages in the case of invalid preventive detention. In the parliament, the 
preservation of immunity for parliamentarians regarding statements made in the Assembly 
allowed some MPs to play a role similar to that of a “minority opposition”.276 Outside the 
party, trade unions and student groups were among the most vibrant critics of the 
government. Their activity was not prohibited and, in certain cases, their freedom of 
expression was also safeguarded by the judiciary. Nonetheless, their critical presence cannot 
be defined as free, but rather as tolerated. Indeed, the government took various measures 
aimed at hampering their activities, among which included a ban of strikes. It is important to 
underline that the term used is “tolerate”, precisely because the enjoyment of the freedom of 
expression rested to a great extent on the discretion of the leadership.277
Therefore, as shown above, the single-party system was not capable of guaranteeing 
the right to political participation, defined by the ICCPR as the right “(a) to take part in the 
conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives; (b) to vote and to 
be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and 
shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will o f electors”.278
The ideal of political participation set forth by one-party states was the notion of mass 
participation through the party279 and not through elections and control of the government on 
the part of the people as in the liberal-democratic tradition.280
275 M. Bratton and N. Van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1997,p. 81.
276 See Mwanakatwe, End, cit, pp. 103-104.
277 Freedom of expression not only includes the “freedom to hold opinions without interference” (Article 19 of 
the UDHR and Article 19(1) of the ICCPR), but also the freedom to seek and receive information and ideas; see 
Article 19 of the UDHR and Article 19(2) of the ICCPR. This component is also limited under a single-party 
system because it confines the sources of information of political nature to the single-party and because the 
means of information are either owned or controlled by the party.
278 Article 25. See also Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
279 As seen above, in the preamble to the Zambian Constitution, the Zambian single-party state was defined as a 
“one-party participatory democracy”. The idea of popular participation in which electoral participation does not 
play die major role is confirmed, at regional level, by the African Charter. This does not even mention the right 
to vote, confining itself to provide that “every citizen shall have the right to participate freely in the government 
o f his country, either directly or through freely chosen representatives in accordance with the provisions o f the 
law”, see Article 13. The understanding of political participation and of the party advanced by one-party states 
resembles that of the Soviet Union; see H.J. Steiner, “Political Participation as a Human Right”, in 1 Human 
Rights Yearbook, 1988, pp. 77 seq. In concrete terms, according to African one-party ideology, there should 
have been several organs of political participation: the parliament and local councils, party committees and 
conferences at various levels starting from the village level which would have performed the role of channels of
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The conception of political participation advanced by African single-party states was 
considered adequate on the grounds that the party identified with the whole nation.280 81 The first 
factor undermining the viability of this model is specifically that this was an assumption 
which did not correspond with the reality. Not only is this demonstrated by the low number of 
paying members, as was the case in Zambia,282 but also in the fact that a prerequisite for 
joining the party was the supporting for its objectives. Even if it is assumed the party was 
open to everyone, it is still questionable whether a single-party state can assure political 
participation, which as a minimum requirement “should never require less of a government 
than provision for meaningful exercise of choice by citizens in some form of electoral process 
permitting active debate on a broad if not unlimited range of issues”.283 The various 
experiences in sub-Saharan Africa displayed the weakness of single-party system to guarantee 
this minimum.
Freedom of expression is an essential aspect of “active debate”. However, as seen 
above, the single-party system did not develop any institutional mechanisms for the guarantee 
of dissent, which was merely dependent on the degree of tolerance of the ruling élite or on the 
courage of the party’s individual members. With regard to the extent of popular involvement 
“in the conduct of public affairs” stated in the ICCPR, this should have been achieved through 
the local representation of the party. In reality, local branches of the various African single 
parties were either barely organised and rarely involved in the policy-making process.284
Mass participation was not even fully achieved in the selection of party leadership and 
the parliamentary and presidential candidates. Even in the most competitive countries such as 
Zambia and Tanzania, the nomination of parliamentary candidates by the local branches of the 
party was counterbalanced by the vetting power vested in the main body of the national party.
communications of ideas and reactions between the national and the local level; see P. Msekwa, “The Doctrine 
of the One-Party State in Relation to Human Rights and the Rule of Law”, in ICJ, Human Rights, cit., p. 27.
280 Of the two components of political participation set forth by the ICCPR (see Article 25), African states have 
emphasised the “take part” clause, while Western liberal-democracies have privileged the “elections” clause.
281 In Zambia, it was defined as “the sole custodian of the people's interests”; Resolution of the Nation Council 
of UNIP, 1975.
282 In Zambia only 7 percent of the population were paying members of UNIP in 1977; see Mwantakwe, End, 
cit, p. 96.
283 Steiner, Political, cit, p. 134.
284 Local branches of the party in Zambia “were merely passive recipients of what a few unrepresentative local 
officials wanted them to know or to do in the name of the party”; Mwantkwe, End, cit, p. 96. Even Tanzania, 
which among all of the single-party states in sub-Saharan Africa made more efforts in the direction of a 
participatory democracy, did not represent an exception; see H. Glickman, “Frontiers of Liberal and Non- 
Liberal Democracy in Tropical Africa”, in 23 Journal o f Asian and African Studies, 1988, p. 248.
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Moreover, members of the party were completely excluded from the nomination of the 
candidates for presidential elections, which rested with the highest body of the party.
As for the right to vote, the mere fact that periodic elections were held, as occurred in 
Zambia, does not mean that this right was enjoyed in its substantive meaning. The core of the 
right consists in the expression of a “free will” through the material act of voting. This 
presupposes the possibility to choose among a plurality of candidates presenting different 
programmes. In single-party states, these conditions were missing: there was only candidate in 
presidential elections, while in parliamentary elections - despite the presence of more 
candidates -  one could not choose among alternative programmes given the fact the 
candidates needed the support of the leading élite of the party as part of the selection 
process.285 86 In this regard, the right to be elected was also not fully guaranteed because party 
membership was a prerequisite for candidature at both presidential and parliamentary election.
Therefore, the historical experience in sub-Saharan Africa has shown that as a political 
system, unipartism was not supported by an institutional framework that had the ability to 
guarantee the citizens’ right to political participation, either in the form of electoral 
democracy, championed by the liberal constitutional tradition, or in the form of mass 
participatory democracy. Similar to freedom of expression, political participation ultimately 
depended upon the democratic commitment of each state, or more precisely of each national 
leader.287
4.4.2 The Absence of Restraints on the Political Power
Independently of the impact on individual rights, the single-party system proved to be 
intrinsically incompatible with the protection of human rights because of the absence of 
constitutional constraints of possible abuses on the part of the political power.
The single-party state lacked a system of checks and balances which can be only 
guaranteed through the separation of powers. Instead all of the power was concentrated within
285 In Zambia, candidates for parliamentarian elections were nominated at local level by party officials. All of 
the candidates were then vetted by the Central Committee o f the party, which had the power to reject candidates 
if judged “inimical to the interest of the state”. This system of veto allowed Kaunda to prevent any political 
opponent, particularly former UPP members who joined the UNIP, to be elected in parliament. In 1982, local- 
level primaries were excluded. Candidates were nominated by an electoral commission appointed by the Central 
Committee; see R. Howard, Human Rights, cit., p. 142.
286 When Kaunda was challenged in 1988 by two other candidates, he amended the party’s selection regulation 
providing that candidatures had to be firstly approved by the UNIP’s National Council. The other conditions for 
candidature were a minimum five-year membership of the party and the support of nomination by at least 
twenty delegates from each province of the country.
287 Above all Tanzania seems to have made attempts for intra-party democracy and a greater popular 
participation. In 1982, for example, the party decided to introduce a secret ballot in the election of the Chairman 
and the Vice-President of the party; see Howard, Human Rights, cit., p. 143.
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the Party.288 Both the executive and legislature corresponded with the Party. As seen in the 
preceding sections, a fusion between the party and the state was achieved at the level of the 
executive by the constitutional institutionalisation of the organs of the Party. Moreover, the 
sovereignty of the legislature was eroded by the fact that MPs were considered as agents of 
the Party. In fact, the status of the members o f Parliament rested on membership in the party: 
seats in parliament were forfeited in the case of loss of Party membership, which could be 
caused by expulsion in the case of a critical position with respect to the Party’s line. In this 
framework, the judiciary cannot be considered as a counterbalancing power as its 
independence was undermined by the presidential power of appointment and removal of 
judges. Furthermore, the creation of the office o f the ombudsman, cannot be deemed as a 
sufficient guarantee of citizens’ rights despite the undeniable positive aspects of this, such as 
the informality of procedures and the low costs of its proceedings. The presidential 
appointment of the office of ombudsman weakened its independence and the presidential 
prerogative to restrict its investigative powers only served to lower its actual effectiveness. 
The fact that its recommendations were left completely to the discretion of the President 
might deprive its activity of any effects in the final analysis.289 290
The lack of constraints on political power was also derived from the conception of the 
constitution as subordinate to politics, which was common to sub-Saharan African single- 
party states. The constitution was conceived as an instrument to be used by the political 
power and not as its foundation and constraint; this also implies that there were no core 
principles which were deemed unalterable. By refusing to take a position in relation to the 
introduction of the single-party system in the Nkumbula case, the Zambian High Court clearly 
expressed its understanding that the constitution was being completely subject to the power of 
intervention of the political power even as human rights are concerned. This is an important 
deviation from the interpretation of liberal constitutionalism where a limit on the constituent 
power is represented by fundamental rights and freedoms. Therefore, a part of the constitution
288 It has to be underlined that the establishment of single-party systems was usually accompanied by the 
enhancing of presidential power, giving birth to a form of government which some scholars have termed 
“presidentialist” and defined as a degeneration o f the presidential system, see above ft. 144.
2 9 The weakness of this institution is made clear through the way it was designed. At the ICJ Seminar, one 
member o f the Tanzanian PCE explained that this commission was set up because it “would provide better 
safeguards fo r  the individual than a bill o f rights " but he also added that it “should not limit the actions o f the 
government or party in way which would interfere with the task o f national b u ild in g see J.B. Mwenda, 
“Summary o f Procedures for Investigating Complaints in the Permanent Commission of Enquiry”, in ICJ, 
Human Rights, cit., p. 76.
290 Conac wrote that the constitution in sub-Saharan Africa “n 'est pas une barrière juridique amis l ’une des 
techniques que le pouvoir met au service de ses objectifs**; Conac, L’évolution, in Conac, Les institutions, cit., 
p.23. Evidence o f this perception is clearly seen in Zambia by the inclusion of the constitution of the party in the 
state constitution and by the interpretative value given to the former in respect to the latter.
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cannot be subject to revision by the political power because it is perceived as the ultimate 
foundation of the constitutional order. In this way, Sub-Saharan African constitutional 
development was conversely characterised by the idea that the constitution as a whole is an 
instrument of the political power and not a restraint on it.291
291 See M. Dogliani, “Potere costituente e revisione costituzionale nella lotta per la costituzione”, in G. 
Zagrebelsky, P.P. Portinaro, J. Luther (a cura di), II futuro della costituzione, Einaudi, Torino, 1996, p. 253; G. 
Zagrebelsky, Diritto costituzionale. Il sistema delle fonti, UTET, Torino, 1988, p. 100 seq.
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CHAPTER 5: Military Regimes and Systems Inspired by Socialist Constitutional 
Models: the Case of Benin
5.1 Military Regimes
One of the most striking features of the post-colonial history of sub-Saharan Africa is the 
large number of military coups d’état,292 which affected many countries including Benin, 
Burundi, Burkina Faso (former Upper Volta), Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, 
Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Liberia, 
Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, 
Sudan, Togo, Uganda, Zaire. The frequency of coups d'état was linked to the unwillingness or 
incapability of the civilian governments to address the critical economic and financial 
situation inherited at the time of independence, as well as the regionalist and ethnic tensions, 
which the civilian leaderships themselves helped create. The inefficiency and corruption of 
civilian governments together with the refusal of their leaders to ensure the transition to 
democracy undermined their legitimacy. In this context, the army was the only well-organised 
and disciplined institution, which could present itself as the only force in a position to 
administer the state, guarantee national unity and put an end to the abuses committed by the 
civilian regimes. The violation of human rights perpetuated by civilian governments was one 
of the abuses cited by the army as a justification for their intervention.
Military take-overs followed certain common patterns. They were usually organised 
upon the initiative of the head of the armed forces or of a collegial body, from which a leading 
figure soon emerged. Another usual feature was the way in which the army legitimised itself 
as a ruling force by linking itself with a political party, which could be either an already 
existing single party or a party which was formed for that purpose, as in the case of Benin. 
Therefore, what emerged was a type of fusion between the highest organ of the military, state 
institutions of a civilian nature and the Party. The power was centralised in the hands of one 
man, who was simultaneously the head of the army, the state and the party. In essence, 
military regimes were a variation of the authoritarian form of government which, in various 
forms, dominated the post-independence African states.
There are two principle models of military interventions which have been identified in 
the literature. In the first, the intervention of the army had a provisional character and aimed
292 See S. Decalo, Coups and Army Rule in Africa: Studies in Military Style, New Haven, Yale University Press, 
1976; S. Decalo, “Military Coups and Military Regimes in Africa”, in 11 Journal o f Modem African Studies, 
1973, pp. 105-127; W.F. Gutteridge, Military Regimes in Africa, Methven & Co., London, 1975.
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to re-establish order in a situation of conflict. After having fulfilled this mission, the military 
left the power to a new civilian government. The second model was articulated in different 
phases, through an initial period, which has been defined as “aconstitutional ”,293 294in which the 
army acted without a formal constitutional framework and with a simplified institutional 
structure; and a second phase, in which the regime tended to be more authoritarian and 
ideologically-inspired; and, finally, a third phase which involved the opening of the regime’s 
organs to civilians as well as the constitutionalisation of the system. After the initial phase 
when constitutions were repealed or suspended, new constitutions were adopted and generally 
submitted to referendum. In the second model, the constitution was used as a source of a 
legitimatisation for those in power with the further function of reducing their dependence on 
the army in order to ensure some stability within the new regime. The provisions relating to 
human rights protection always included civil and political rights as an essential component of 
the constitutional package which was necessary for the formal “decency” of the regime before 
the international community. In practice, civil and political liberties, for whose restoration the 
military claimed it had intervened, were suppressed to different extent in the different 
regimes. In case of violent take-overs, the rights which were immediately violated were the 
rights to life, personal liberty and security, which also continued to be suppressed after the 
stabilisation of the regime as a reaction to any manifestation of dissent or even suspicion of 
dissent. Freedom of expression was also restricted in the establishment of the military rule. 
One o f the first actions of the army consisted of taking control of the media. All political 
rights were denied because no alternative political force or opinion was permitted apart from 
that of the regime. The presence of a single party and a state ideology, as in the case of Benin, 
were further elements which reinforced the restriction of political freedom.
m  M.-L. Martin, “Note sur le changement politique et constitutionnel en République populaire du Bénin depuis 
l'indépendance”, in Année africaine, 1982, p. 107.
294 R.D. McKinlay and A.S. Cohan, “Performance and Instability in Military and Non-Military Regime 
System”, in 70 American Political Science Review, p. 853; C. Henderson, “Military Regimes and Rights in 
Developing Countries: A Comparative Perspective”, in 4 Human Rights Quarterly, 1982, pp. 110-123.
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5.2 Systems Inspired by Socialist Constitutional Models
The abandonment of the liberal-democratic constitutional model was marked by the 
emergence of socialist systems in certain countries, which was also a reflection of 
international politics and more particularly, of the fall under the Soviet and in certain 
instances, of China’s influence in certain African countries. Among these states, which the 
Marxist scholarship has defined as “états à option socialiste”,295 there were some which 
formally proclaimed their adherence to Marxist-Leninist doctrine. This proclamation can be 
found in the body of the constitutions themselves, as in the case of the 1977 Constitution of 
Benin, as well as in that of the constitutions of the Popular Republic of Congo (1973), 
Madagascar (1975), Mozambique (1975), Angola (1976) and Somalia (1979). Among the 
reasons underlying the success o f Marxist-Leninism in sub-Saharan Africa is the fact that it 
provided African leaderships with a tool to explain the reason for the socio-economic failures 
of previous regimes and to predict possible future development. Moreover, it provided an 
ideological justification for the concentration of power and the restriction of individual 
liberties, which was not unlike the situation in other non-Marxist single party African 
regimes. In Marxist and non-Marxist regimes, the relationship between individual citizens and 
the state was regulated by the ideal of the priority of the collective interest over individual 
rights. The difference consisted only in the concepts used to explain the collective interests, 
which included development, national unity and, in the regimes which adhered to Marxist- 
Leninism, the defence of the socialist revolution.
The African socialist states specifically referred to the constitutional models of the 
Soviet and also at times, the Chinese model. In reality, these states were characterised by the 
combination of elements belonging to many different traditions. Terms such as hybridisation 
and syncretism296 have been used to describe African constitutions, including those 
proclaiming to uphold the Marxist-Leninist ideology. For example, the states of Benin and 
Congo could not be defined as socialist if one considers that, despite the formal 
proclamations,297 they were ruled or controlled by the army, which, moreover, was allied to
29s y  Tchirkine, "L’état à option socialiste dans les Pays africains: apparition, nature sociale et perspectives 
d’avenir”, in Mélanges offerts à P.F. Gonidec. L'Etat Moderne: Horizon 2000, LGDJ, Paris, 1985, p. 257 seq. 
According to this author this definition could be applied to the following sub-Saharan African states: Angola, 
Benin, Guinea Bissau, Congo, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Mozambique, Cape Verde, Seychelles, S. Tome and 
Principe, Tanzania.
296 P.F. Gonidec, “Esquisse d’une typologie des régimes politiques africains”, in 25 Pouvoirs, 1983 p. 66-77; 
P.L, Agoudjo-Okawa, “L'état africain, un état hyride, neo-colonial”, in Mélanges P.F. Gonidec, cit., p. 30 seq. ; 
D.G. LavrofF, “Les tendances du nouveau constitutionnalisme africain”, in Conac, Dynamique, cit., 419-421.
297 The 1977 Constitution of Benin referred to *TUnion nationale de toutes les classes et couches sociales 
patriotiques et révolutionnaires du pays dont la base est l'alliance des ouvriers et des paysans".
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the country’s bureaucracy and traditional leaders.298 The formal recognition of individual 
property in broader terms than in the Soviet Constitution and the presence, as in the case of 
Congo, of a large private sector are further manifestations of the hybrid nature of the African 
socialist state. However, the basic tenets of socialist systems can be found in the African 
constitutions inspired by Marxist-Leninism. Firstly, the principle of the separation of powers 
was rejected in the name of a strict interpretation of the principle o f popular sovereignty. 
Thus, African constitutions, which were modelled on the Soviet constitutional model, 
provided for a distinction of functions within a power that was conceived as unitary. 
Secondly, on the basis of the above interpretation of the principle of popular sovereignty, all 
of the state organs were held responsible before the people or the organ representing it. This 
principle also applied to the judiciary. Both professional and lay judges were elected and their 
mandate could be revoked on the basis of political responsibility, which was linked to the fact 
that in applying the constitution and other sources of law, they were obliged to pursue the 
goals established by the Marxist-Leninist doctrine as indicated by the party. In this regard, 
another typical feature of the socialist systems introduced in sub-Saharan Africa was the 
constitutionalisation of the party.299 Other common features of the sub-Saharan Africa 
socialist constitutional systems included the principle of democratic centralism (Article 7 of 
the 1977 Constitution of Benin; Article 32 of the 1982 Constitution of Guinea); the provision 
of the parliamentary mandate as an imperative mandate of the party (Article 4 of the 
Constitution of Benin); the replacement of the legislature by the executive during the periods 
when the former was not in session (Article 77 of the 1975 Constitution of Madagascar); the 
immunity of the President (Article 63 of the Constitution of Benin; Article 24 of the 1982 
Constitution of Guinea); and the rejection of economic liberalism and the provision of 
centralised economic planning.
As far as human rights were concerned, the constitutions of socialist states 
acknowledged the rights and freedoms covered by the international covenants on human 
rights and, therefore, as far as the typology of rights was concerned, socialist African 
constitutions differed from the independence constitutions with respect to the previously 
lacking or very limited recognition of social and economic rights. However, the underlying 
conception of human rights was profoundly different from the liberal one and this conditioned 
their actual content and actual implementation. The socialist conception of human rights was
298 Agoudjo, L’Etat africain, cit, pp. 31-32.
299 See Article 32 of the 1982 Constitution of Guinea; Article 34 and 78 of the 1978 Constitution of Congo.
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based on two fundamental principles, namely the “unity and indissolubility of rights and 
obligations of citizens“ and the “unity and combination of personal and public interests”.300 
The first of these two principles indicate that rights were also conceived as duties. The 
socialist concept of obligations as correlative to rights differed from the liberal conception, 
where obligations (correlative to rights) are owed by society to the right-holders. In the 
socialist conception, these obligations were conceived as obligations of the right-holders 
themselves towards society. This perspective was linked to the “characteristic justificatory 
principle of socialist organisation [that is] the equal satisfaction of need at the highest level of 
fulfilment”.301 In human rights terms, this principle implied that “any particular person is both 
a receiver of what he needs and a contributor to the social mechanisms designed to see that he 
and others receive what they need”.302 A symbolic example of this was the right to work, 
which was defined as a right as well as a duty in the 1977 Constitution of Benin.
The correlative principle of the unity and combination of personal and public interests 
implied that personal freedom should be exerted in such a way to satisfy the collective 
interest. Liberties were not understood as individuals’ entitlements but rather as social 
functions. Under this view, personal freedom was defined as “personal arbitrariness” if it 
“disregards the interests of the society as a whole and the interests of the collectivity”.303 This 
conception of liberty corresponded with the requirement for individual rights to be exerted in 
pursuit of the objective of the consolidation of socialism and its achievements. It was also 
consistent with the idea that a situation of real freedom, in which human rights could be 
actually enjoyed, needs to liberate individuals from exploitation and therefore, lead to the 
realisation of a socialist society. In line with this perspective, civil and political rights 
continued to be recognised in sub-Saharan African constitutions, however their actual 
enjoyment was severely conditioned by the express subordination of their exercise to the 
ultimate goals of the socialist revolution (see Article 140 of the Constitution of Benin; 
Articles 16 and 28 of the 1975 Constitution of Madagascar; Article 29 of the Constitutions of 
Congo of 1973).304 In practice liberty was denied as it was permitted if it did not challenge the 
established order.
300 V, Kartashkin, ‘The Socialist Countries and Human Rights”, in Vasak, The International Dimension, cit, pp. 
632 and 634.
301 T, Campbell, The Left and Rights: A Conceptual Analysis o f the Idea o f Socialist Rights, Routledge and 
Kegar, London, 1983, p. 142.
302 Ibidem, p. 144.
303 Ibidem, p. 633.
3W Ajavon, La protection, cit, 1992, p. 86.
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5.3 Benin: A History of Political and Constitutional Instability
Until 1972, Benin was affected by a huge political and constitutional instability which was 
marked by several coups d’état and the succession of six constitutions. Apart from the 1977 
Constitution, the constitutions were short-lived and the one of 1968 was never even 
implemented. The political instability, which was reflected in the number of constitutions, 
was due to a range of factors. Among these, regionalism played a significant role. As seen 
above, this was due to the existence of a strong sense of regional belonging, which the French 
had encouraged and national leaders had exploited. The divisions caused by the regionalist 
politics of these leaders, accompanied by clientelisi politics and corruption which accounted 
for the inefficiency of civilian governments, served to reinforce social discontent, especially 
among students and workers, and allowed the army to emerge as the only force capable of 
solving the economic and financial problems of the country.305 Another element to take into 
consideration was the political activism of Benin’s educated élite and trade unions, which 
manifested itself in a strong opposition to governmental policies. This contributed to the 
frequency of political crises, which were usually ‘solved’ by the army. The activism of trade 
unions was closely connected to the composition of the majority of its membership, which 
was made of public employees and unemployed people with a strong educational background. 
They were more frustrated than others by the economic situation which had been left in a very 
poor condition by France and which the national civilian leadership were unable to deal with.
5.3.1 The Coup d'Etat and the Constitution of 1964
The Constitution of 1964 was the third constitution adopted in the history of the country and 
the first one which was adopted on the initiative of the military after a coup d’état.
The first elections following the unification of the PRD and the RDD held in 
December 1960 witnessed the victory of the new party over the UDD. The PDU obtained all 
of the seats in the Assembly and, thus, the new government was only formed of individuals 
from the new party, while Maga and Apity were elected President and Vice-President, 
respectively. The rivalry between the two leaders, the fears of a clash between the North and 
the South, the social tensions determined by the unpaid wages and the establishment of a 
unified trade union, which resulted in strikes and rallies, were the reasons invoked by Colonel 
Soglo for the coup d’état of 1963. On 27th October, a provisional government was formed 
and a constitutional commission was appointed with the task of drafting a new constitution. In
305 Martin, Note, c it, pp. 92-93.
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the meantime, a single party called the Parti Démocratique Dahoméen (PDD) was 
established. The new constitution was adopted by referendum in January 1964. The 
referendum had a participation rate of 92.7 per cent and the Constitution was approved by 
99.81 per cent of votes. The Constitution provided for a presidential form of government with 
a President and a Vice-President of the Republic which would be elected every five years by 
direct universal suffrage. As in the 1960 Constitution, the rationale behind this two-headed 
executive was the need to ensure that both the Northern and the Southern regions were 
represented.
The President presided over the Council of Ministers and had the power to call for a 
referendum. Furthermore, he had the same special powers as the President of the French 
Republic under Article 16 of the 1958 French Constitution. In order to be effective, these 
powers had to be exerted within the Council of Ministers or with the agreement of the bureau 
of the National Assembly. The Vice-President was the head of government and, as such, 
appointed ministers, determined and led the national policy, held regulatory powers and had 
legislative initiative.
The National Assembly was elected every five years by direct universal suffrage on 
the basis of a proportional electoral system. The powers conferred on the Assembly were 
substantially the same as those provided for in the 1960 Constitution, with the only additional 
power to request the executive for information and explanations for its actions. The 
organisation of the judiciary remained similar to that laid down in the previous constitution.
The inclusion of a title devoted entirely to human rights in the 1964 constitution set it 
apart from the previous ones of 1959 and 1960. Title II, entitled “Des droits et des devoirs du 
citoyen”, guaranteed the freedom of speech, press, assembly, association and demonstration 
under the conditions provided by the law. The inviolability of domicile and the secrecy of 
correspondence were also provided. Moreover, the Constitution prohibited arbitrary detention 
and established the principle of the presumption of innocence. Equality for all before the law 
without any distinction based on origin, race, sex, religion or political membership was also 
ensured. Economic and social rights were also recognised, including the right to work, the 
freedom of organisation of workers and the right to strike. With regard to the right to work, 
the Constitution specified that the state “s 'efforcé” to create the conditions which would make 
this right effective. Citizens’ duties were confined to the defence of the nation and the 
territorial integrity of the country.
Following the adoption of the new constitution, the new government was formed and 
for the first time in the nation’s history there were no representatives from the North. Due to
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renewed tension between Apity and Ahomadegbé, in November 1965, the army decided to 
intervene again by dissolving the PDD and forced the two leaders to resign. Thus, according 
to the Constitution, the President of the Assembly, Tahirou Congakou, became President and 
head of the provisional government. The army gave him the task of drafting a new 
constitution. In the meantime, tripartism returned to the political scene. Three parties led by 
the independence leaders were formed. These were Convention Nationale Dahoméenne (led 
by Apity), the Union Nationale Dahomeénne (led by Maga) and the Alliance Démocratique 
Dahoméenne (led by Ahomadegbé).
Apity and Maga boycotted the Assembly, which had to vote on the draft constitution, 
hoping for a military intervention in elections under the old constitution. This hope was 
subsequently satisfied. On 22nd December 1965, Soglo carried out a second coup d’état, with 
the support of public opinion, and formed a provisional government, which was also 
composed of civilians, with the programme to improve the economic situation of the country. 
In the absence of a constitution, the regime was organised around a cabinet presided over by 
Soglo and composed of three officers and ten civilians. Furthermore, a Comité de rénovation 
nationale was set up with a mixed composition and was vested with legislative powers in 
socio-economic matters. Finally, the local administration remained under the control of 
civilians.
53.2 The Constitution of 1968
The measures adopted by the new government to improve the economic and financial 
situation of the country were very unpopular. This led to the holding of strikes and a general 
strike was also threatened. The resistance to the economic policy of the government together 
with the tensions of regional306 as well as of political nature within the army between the new, 
politicised generation of officials and the colonial generation provided the background to a 
new coup d’état. This took place on 17th December 1967 on initiative of commander Maurice 
Kouandété. Similar to Soglo two years previously, Kouandété committed himself to re­
establishing a civilian government and to the drafting of a new constitution. In the meantime, 
he became the head of government, while the Lieutenant Colonel Alphonse Alley became the 
President of the Republic. Lieutenant Colonel Mathieu Kérékou was firstly made the Vice- 
President and then he became President of the Military Revolutionary Committee, which was 
created after the coup d’état.
306 Officers were mostly southern and Fon, while rank and file military were predominantly from the North.
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The new constitution which was drafted by a constitutional committee was submitted 
to a referendum on 31st March 1968 and entered into force on 11th April. With the aim of 
strengthening the executive, this constitution established a presidential form of government, 
which, for the first time since 1960, featured a unitary executive represented by a President, a 
head of state and government elected for five years by universal direct suffrage. The president 
continued to have special powers similar to the previous constitutions.
The most noteworthy feature of this constitution was the institutionalisation of the 
single party (“Parti nationale unique”), as well as the subjection of the country to a form of 
military **tutorat”.307 The single party participated in the formulation of the general policy of 
the nation (Article 104), in the “conscientisation des masses” and inspired the action of the 
government (Article 106). Moreover, the army was given the role of “garant du régime” and 
participated in its “édification" (Article 39-40).
The preamble of the Constitution proclaimed “rattachement aux principes de la 
démocratie et des droits de Vhomme, tels qu'ils ont été définis par la Déclaration des droits 
de Vhomme et du citoyen de 1789, par la Déclaration universelle de 1948 et la Charte de 
Nations Unies et tels qu 'ils sont garantis par la présente co n stitu tio n Moreover, Title II 
entitled “Des droits et des devoirs du citoyen” guaranteed a more extensive list of civil and 
political rights than the previous constitution. In addition, second generation rights and duties 
received increased attention. After proclaiming that “[l]a personne humaine est sacrée, L'Etat 
a l 'obligation de la respecter et de la protéger. Il en garantit le plein développmenf, the first 
article o f Title II (Article 6), provided that the state was obliged to guarantee equal access to 
education, vocational training and culture. Furthermore, similar to the Constitution of 1964, 
the right to work, to organise and to strike were recognised. As far as duties were concerned, 
the Constitution did not confine itself to the duty to defend the nation and the territorial 
integrity of the Republic, but also mentioned the duty “de travailler pour le bien commun, de 
remplir honnêtement toutes leurs obligations civiques et professionnelles, de s'acquitter 
scrupuleusement de leurs contributions fiscales et de se conformer en toutes choses à la 
constitution et aux lois de la République”,
Elections were held on 5th May 1968 and were marked by violence and irregularities. 
Only 27 percent of the population participated and the Revolutionary Committee did not 
announce the results. In July, the army appointed Emile Derlin Zinsou as President of the 
Republic and in the same month, Zinsou was confirmed by popular referendum.
307 M.-L. Martin, “Bénin”, in F. Reyntjens et al., Constitutions Africae, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 1988, p. 23.
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5.3.3 The 1970 Charter of the Presidential Council > •'«
Following dissent within the army with respect to its role in governing the country, a new 
coup d’état took place in December 1969 led by commander Kouandété. A Directoire 
militaire, composed of three persons, including Kouandété, was set up under the presidency 
of colonel Paul-Emile de Souza. According to the Charte du Directoire adopted by ordinance 
on 26th December 1969, the Directoire was accountable to the Supreme Council of the 
armed forces and was vested with both executive and legislative powers. A Court suprême 
and a Conseil économique and social with advisory powers were created on the basis of the 
Charte.
On 7th May 1970 the Directoire introduced a new constitution with the collaboration 
of the leaders of the independence period. This was the fifth since 1959 and was called 
Charte du conseil présidentiel and was marked by the return to power of civilians.
Both the executive and legislative powers and the power to determine the national 
policy were concentrated in the Conseil Présidentiel with a tripartite composition and 
presided in turn by the each of the leaders o f the three parties for a period of two years 
according to a pre-determined order. It was stipulated that decisions should be taken 
unanimously. However, decisions should be adopted by the majority in the case of opposition 
raised (at least three times) by one of the members of the Council. The President of the 
Council was head of the state and government and had the power to appoint the ministers. 
Furthermore, while providing that he was the supreme head of the armed forces, the 
Constitution expressly prohibited that recourse could be made to the army to retain his own 
power. A Court suprême and a Conseil supérieur de la Magistrature were also established. 
An Assemblée consultative composed of a political, an economic and a social section was 
created in 1972. ■'$
As far as fundamental rights and freedoms were concerned, this Constitution did not 
introduce any new element with respect to previous ones. The preamble confirmed Benin’s 
attachment to the principles of democracy and human rights as defined by the 1789 French 
Declaration, the Universal Declaration and the UN Charter. Moreover, Title II on “Des droits 
et des devoirs du citoyen” repeated the core list o f rights and freedoms guaranteed under the 
preceding constitution. Unlike the 1968 Constitution, however, the right to property was not 
mentioned. With regard to duties, the 1970 Charter only referred to the duty of the defence of 
the nation. 1
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5.3.4 The 1977 Basic Law
53.4.1 The Political and Constitution-Making Process Leading to the Adoption of the 1977 
Basic Law
The 1970 Constitution, which was presented as a provisional document, was in fact short­
lived. After an attempted coup d’état by Commander Koundété, another coup (this time 
successful) was organised by Captain Mathieu Kérékou on 26th October 1972, clearly 
showing that the army was a key actor in political the life of Benin.
Following this coup, the Constitution was suspended and Kérékou became President 
of the Republic and head of the Gouvernement militaire révolutionnaire (GMR), in which all 
the power was concentrated and was composed of twelve officials. Subsequently, an 
ordinance of 11th November 1972 (modified on 17th April 1973) established a Comité 
militaire pour la révolution, comprising fifteen members from all military grades. This 
committee was vested with advisory powers and the control of the administration. Finally, the 
institutional framework included a Comité consultatif national, which could be considered as 
a legacy of the Assemblée consultative of the Conseil Présidentiel of the previous regime and 
which was composed of approximately one hundred members representing the different 
economic, social, cultural and religious interests which existed in the country.
This military regime justified its existence on the basis of its commitment to the fight 
against corruption and to ensuring national unity, however, unlike the previous ones, it 
endowed itself with an ideological basis. In 1973, its ideological reference became the 
doctrine of “authenticitéformulated by Mobutu in Zaire and a year later, it was Marxist- 
Leninism. The decision to adopt Marxist-Leninism as the state ideology was due not only to 
the ideology of the junior officers who were responsible for this coup, but also to the fact that 
sectors of the civil society, in particular students, had exerted pressures in this direction.
On 30th November 1975, the country was re-named République populaire du Bénin 
and a single party, the Parti Révolutionnaire du peuple béninoise (PRPB), was formed. The 
ideological choice of the regime was expressed by a major campaign to spread Marxist- 
Leninism through the mass media and the educational system, which was completely 
reformed under the name of the “Ecole nouvelle*\ Moreover, seminars for teachers, the 
judiciary and the army were organised with this objective. All movements were dissolved and 
mass political organisations were created. At economic level, a nationalisation programme 
was elaborated.
The following phase was marked by the attempt by the regime to acquire internal and 
international legitimisation through the adoption of a constitution. The adoption of the
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Constitution was also due to pressures coming from the Beninese legal community, including 
lawyers, magistrates, judges, notaries and law professors.308
The constitution-making process309 began with the establishment by the Party of a 
constitutional commission in September 1976. The constitution drafted by the commission 
according to the Party’s directives was presented to Kérékou as President of the Central 
Committee of the Party and was modified by the Central Committee at its fourth session in 
January 1977. This text was submitted to a “campagne de popularisation " between 22nd May 
and 30th June 1977 in order to receive the feedback of the population. In fact this exercise 
was used to give the regime a democratic veneer. Only minor changes, not questioning the 
constitutional design decided by the Party, were introduced on the basis of the observations 
raised by the population. The text was then adopted by the National Revolutionary Council, 
the Revolutionary Military Government and the Central Committee of the PRPB on 26th 
August and promulgated as the Basic Law of the Popular Republic of Benin (“Loi 
fondamentale”) on 9th September,
53.4.2 The Marxist-Leninist Option and the Constitution
The 1977 Constitution confirmed the ideological imprint of the regime proclaiming that the 
“philosophical foundation” of the People’s Republic of Benin was Marxist-Leninism and 
that the state was inserted in a revolutionary process which, as stated in the preamble, had to 
develop in three stages, i.e. that of the Revolutionary Movement of National Liberation, of 
the People’s Democratic Revolution and of the Socialist Revolution. The socialist 
inspiration of the constitution turns out from the provision for the unity of powers, the 
supremacy of the single party conceived as party of avant-guard, the principle of democratic 
centralism, the collectivist economic orientation, the commitment against imperialism and 
colonialism and the expression of solidarity with the peoples fighting for liberation as the 
underpinning principle of Benin’s foreign policy.310 As it will be described below, also the 
provisions on human rights were influenced by the socialist conception.
The principle of the unity of powers was realised by concentrating all powers in the 
National Revolutionary Assembly, which was defined as “the supreme body of State 
authority” of Benin. The Assembly was composed of peoples* commissioners elected for
308 See Human Rights Watch, Protectors or Pretenders, Benin, cit.
309 See A.K. Olodo, “Les institutions de la République populaire du Bénin”, in 2 Revue juridique et politique 
indépendance et coopération, 1978, pp. 759-769; A. Paraiso, “La loi fondamentale et les nouvelles institutions 
de la République populaire du Bénin”, in 90 Penant, 1980, pp. 287-306.
310 On this Constitution see D.G. Lavroff, “L'évolution constitutionnelle”, in Année africaine, 1977, pp. 108- 
125.
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three years (five from 1984) and vested with legislative power as well as with the power to 
amend the Constitution (with the exclusion of the socialist orientation of the state) by a two- 
third majority of its members. The Assembly also elected the President of the Republic upon 
nomination of the Central Committee of the Party as well as the President of the Supreme 
Court and the Attorney General. Furthermore, it could exert all other competencies it deemed 
necessary.
According to the statute of the Party, which complemented the state constitution in the 
delineation of the state organisation, the President of the Central Committee of the Party was 
head of State and President of the National Council of the Revolution. The President of the 
Republic, elected for three years (five from 1984), was the head of State and of Government, 
as head of the National Executive Council. He was responsible before the Assembly and did 
not formally wield powers other than those of pardon. The exercise of other powers rested on 
a proposal or delegation of the Permanent Committee of the Assembly311 or of the Central 
Committee of the Party.
Even though the letter of the Constitution defined the Assembly the supreme authority, 
the real holders of state powers were the executive and, to a greater extent, the Party. This 
shift of powers in favour of the Party was the natural consequence of the competencies 
accorded by the Constitution to it, which consisted in the nomination of the persons at the 
head of the organs of the state including the President of the Republic, the members of the 
Permanent Committee of the Revolutionary National Assembly, the President of the Central 
People’s Court and the Attorney General of the Central People’s Prosecutor’s Department. 
Even the army, which was at the origin of the new regime and was defined as the protector of 
the interests of the people and of the conquests of the Revolution (Article 10, 3), was 
subordinated to the Party. Article 10 (1) provided that the People’s Armed Forces “are led by 
the Party of the People’s Revolution of Benin and owe fidelity to her”. In reality, it is difficult 
to establish if it is more correct to speak of supremacy of the Party on the State or rather of a 
confusion of the two considering that the President was the head of the Party and all the 
ministers were members of the National Council o f the Party. Taking into account that the 
President of the Republic was head of State and of Government and also head of the Central 
Committee of Party as well as of the army, it is natural that in fact all powers were 
concentrated in him.
311 According to the Soviet model, the Constitution provided for an internal body called the Permanent 
Committee of the Revolutionary National Assembly. This held not only competencies delegated by the 
Assembly, but also powers attributed directly by the Constitution.
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5.3.43 Human Rights in the 1977 Constitution and the Human Rights Performance of the 
Kérékou’s Regime
Chapter VII of the 1977 Constitution recognised certain civil liberties including the 
freedoms of speech, press, correspondence, assembly, association and demonstration 
(Article 134), religion (Article 135) as well as the right to personal security (Article 136), 
inviolability of the home and secrecy of correspondence (Article 137) and the freedom o f 
residence (Article 138). Also the right to private property (Articles 21-24 and 26-27) was 
recognised but was subject to significant limitations. Five types o f property were provided, 
i.e. of the State, of cooperatives, o f individual workers, of nationals and of foreigners 
(Article 128). Only the property of the State and cooperatives was not subject to any 
limitation. Conversely, the property and the economic activities of foreigners were subject to 
the condition of being useful to the economy of the country and to the interests of the people 
of Benin. Furthermore, private property of nationals was subject to two limitations. The first 
and potentially most constraining one was represented by the sweeping provision according 
to which “[t]he state prohibits all practices involving the use of the right to own private 
goods in order to disturb the national economic life, to undermine the economic 
independence or to obstruct the implementation of the State plan” (Article 25). Moreover, 
private property could be expropriated, confiscated or requisitioned in case of necessity and 
for reasons of public interests even without compensation, being this assigned only “if  
conditions so require” (Article 28).
The right to vote was not constitutionally protected and also in fact it was not 
implemented. The members of the first Assembly were appointed by the Government and 
from 1979, when the first elections were held, until 1989 elections consisted in approving or 
rejecting the candidates proposed by the government and this occurred in a climate of 
intimidation and coercion and, more generally, in disrespect of any elementary principle of 
fair electoral procedure. The right to freely participate in the government of the country was 
thus denied by the limitation of the right to vote and the suppression of any manifestation of 
dissent, which were complemented by the lack of democracy within the Party.
Independently of their formal recognition, the enjoyment of civil rights was also 
weakened by the subordination of their enjoyment to the fulfilment of the duties envisaged 
by the Constitution and the imposition of a state ideology. The emphasis given to duties was 
not a new feature given the fact that since 1964 all Benin’s constitutions provided them. The 
only difference is the ideological framework in which they were inserted and
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correspondingly the centrality of the duty to defend the “Revolution”. The duties established 
by Chapter VII of the Basic Law consisted in the payment of taxes (Article 141), the defence 
of not only the Fatherland, but also of the Revolution, which was defined as “the most noble 
and sacred of duties”, the fulfilment of military obligations and the permanent mobilisation 
for the defence of the Fatherland and the Revolution and the resistance against aggression 
(Article 142).
The impact of the imposition of a state ideology on fundamental rights and freedoms 
also results from article 12, which subordinated their exercise to the adherence to Marxist- 
Leninism. Civil rights were indirectly constrained by Article 7, which established that “[a]ll 
workers in all sections of activity must dedicate themselves to study Marxist-Leninism, 
...practice criticism and self-criticism” and “the State particularly watches over the moral, 
intellectual and physical education of the young on the basis of the principle of Marxist- 
Leninism” (Article 7). The exercise of these rights was also explicitly eroded by the 
provision according to which “[n]o citizen ... must abuse his democratic liberties in order to 
jeopardise State interests, the People and the Revolution” (Article 140). In addition, they 
were severely conditioned by the provision of a “right of denunciation”, on the basis of 
which citizens “have the right to present to all State bodies ... denunciations or complaints 
against all moral or physical persons for violation of the law or failure to do their duties” 
(Article 139).
Independently of what provided by the Constitution, any form of dissent was 
suffocated through the recourse to violence. Opponents, real or suspected, were subject to 
arbitrary arrests, detention and torture. One of the first acts of the regime was to put the 
former heads of state under house arrests except Zinzou, who, after being condemned to 
death, fled abroad. Former ministers were put in jail. Moreover, the regime formally denied 
the right to hold public office to entire classes of people such as those linked to the previous 
regime as well as persons defined as members of the bourgeoisie.
Consistently with its socialist inspiration, the Constitution in Chapter VII put large 
emphasis on social and economic rights. The rights protected by the Constitution were the 
right to work (Article 127); to form trade unions (Article 128); to leisure; to material 
assistance in old age, in case of illness or inability to work; to education and the freedom of 
intellectual and cultural creation (Articles 129-132). The Constitution also envisaged the 
right o f women to paid maternity leave before and after childbirth (Article 125) and the 312
312 Allen, Benin, cit, p. 72.
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developments of maternities, nursery schools and kindergartens (Article 126). Also their 
enjoyment was, nevertheless, conceived not as intrinsically valuable but as instrumental to 
the realisation of the revolutionary principles. The right to work was presented as a right, a 
duty and an honour like in the 1936 Soviet Constitution. The right to form trade unions was 
acknowledged, but not that of strike. Furthermore, trade union activities were not recognised 
as a means for workers to claim their rights and interests, but rather as a tool “to improve the 
worker’s awareness of the proletarian class” and the state’s objectives of an “independent 
economic development and the full satisfaction o f the needs of the popular masses” (Article 
128). Moreover, “[a] 11 activities of national social life ... are organised on this path [of 
socialism] under the centralised leadership of the Party of the People’s Revolution of Benin” 
(Article 4,2).
An element to be underlined, which confirms that despite formal differences African 
constitutional systems shared several common features, pertains to the status of women. The 
principle of equality between men and women, which is part of the basic principles o f the 
socialist human rights conception, was included in the constitution under an ambiguous 
formulation as far as the private sphere is concerned. Unlike other African countries such as 
Congo and Madagascar, Benin’s constitution did not claim to apply an “African socialism”, 
even though the constitution indicated that Marxist-Leninism had “to be applied vividly and 
creatively to Benin realities” (Article 3, 2). Moreover, when dealing with the principle of 
equality between men and women in political, economic, cultural and social matters and, very 
importantly, within the family (Article 124) Beninese cultural specificities were taken into 
account. The principle of gender equality was attenuated by the reference to the priority of the 
value of the family. A sound interpretation of the “just revolutionary principle” of equality in 
order to safeguard the “unity of the family” was requested: “ƒtjoutefois, l'unité de la famille 
doit être sauvegardée sur la base d'une saine compréhension de ce juste principe 
révolutionnaire d'égalité de l'homme et de la femme” (Article 124). This caveat was inserted 
as a compromise solution following the resistances encountered by the provision of equality 
between men and women during the “campagne de p o p u la risa tio nA derogation to this 
principle was thus allowed even though not explicitly as in Zambia.
As far as the enforcement of rights is concerned, unlike in Zambia, the liberties 
formally recognised by the constitution were deprived of any real judicial safeguard. Firstly, 
justice was conceived as an instrument of the revolution similarly to the Soviet model, where 
it was understood as a means for the achievements of the goals of the party in conformity with 
Marxist-Leninist principles. The Benin’s Constitution provided that “[¡Justice ... is rendered
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in the name of the Benin people and its Democratic and Popular Revolution” (Article 103,3). 
This also entailed that judges, in order to be appointed, had to share “la conviction politique 
révolutionnaire” Secondly, the independence of the judiciaiy, which was formally 
proclaimed (Article 108), was undermined by its responsibility before the Revolutionary 
Councils of the corresponding administrative levels and their executive bodies (Article 
110).31 14 Thus at national level, the Central People’s Court was responsible before the 
Revolutionary National Assembly or its Permanent Committee, the President of the People’s 
Republic of Benin and the National Executive Council (Article 116). Secondly, an attack to 
the principle of independence of the judiciary came from the presence of special jurisdictions, 
whose establishment was allowed by the Constitution and left to the discretional decision of 
the Party and the Assembly. Article 103 of the Constitution provided that W[w]hen necessary 
for the judging of special cases, the Central Committee of the Party of the People’s 
Revolution of Benin and the Revolutionary National Assembly may decide to set up courts of 
special jurisdiction”. In 1975 the National Council of the Revolution and later the National 
Executive Council as well as the Central Committee of the Party exerted the function of 
special jurisdictions trying political offences. In 1988 the Cour de Sûreté de l ’Etat was 
established by law (No. 88-001 of 26 April 1986). This was competent to judge a wide range 
of crimes including not only “les infractions connexes aux crimes et délits contre la sûreté de 
l ’état” and armed rebellion, but also voluntary murders, injuries, thefts ...
According to the Soviet model, the Parquet Populaire Central had the responsibility 
to control the observation of laws by “les organes locaux du pouvoir d’Etat, les fonctionnaires 
et les citoyens” (Article 117). The Procureur Général was elected for four years by the 
National Assembly on a Central Committee’s recommendation. According to the Act No. 81- 
004 of 23 March 1981, his power was confined to the transmission to the relevant 
administrative organ of his *'protestation” for the non compliance with the law, but it was the 
administration itself to have competence to take a decision on it. He could, however, suspend 
the execution of an illegal act until his "protestation” was examined by the competent
313 See Paraiso, La loi fondamentale, cit., p. 403.
314 The organisation of the judiciary included at national level the Central People’s Court, which was composed 
of both professional and non-professional judges. The former were appointed by the National Executive Council 
upon advise of the Permanent Committee of the Assembly and the latter were elected by the Revolutionary 
National Assembly upon a proposition of the Central Committee of the Party. The professional judges of the 
courts o f provincial levels were appointed by the National Executive Council upon advise of the Permanent 
Committee of the Assembly. The non-professional component was elected by the Revolutionary Councils. The 
courts o f all the others levels were composed of non-professional judges.
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administration. Moreover, he could have the illegal act corrected or repealed when at issue 
was an act or order of detention.
Finally, it should be pointed out that from a human rights perspective the 1977 
Constitution of Benin contained certain elements which set it apart other African 
constitutions, including those of socialist nature. The first element included the reference to 
the multinational character of the state, even though its unitary nature was also solemnly 
affirmed. The importance of this provision lies in the fact that nationalities were recognised as 
right-holders, or more precisely as holders of “equal rights and duties”, including the freedom 
to use their own languages and to develop their culture (Article 3). Moreover, active support 
was envisaged for the nationalities living in less developed areas. This provision, which was 
the subject of much debate during the popularisation campaign,315 was extremely significant 
as it constituted an original aspect in the sub-Saharan African constitutions. However, this 
provision was rather limited as the recognition of the multinational character of Benin was 
confined to the acknowledgement of the collective right to culture, and it did not go as far as 
envisaging the recognition of forms of autonomy.
315 See Martin, Bénin, p. 33.
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CHAPTER 6: A Critical Analysis of the Debate on the Inadequacy of the Liberal Model 
of Human Rights for Sub-Saharan Africa
This chapter aims to assess the validity of the arguments used by African governments to 
justify the inadequacy of the liberal model of human rights for sub-Saharan Africa. This 
analysis is also necessary to appraise the change of perspectives on human rights underlying 
the current revival of liberal constitutionalism in sub-Saharan Africa. The shift from a 
widespread questioning of the liberal notion of human rights to an almost complete adherence 
carries the risk of failing to address the real issues posed by the criticism of the past. The 
puipose of this chapter is, therefore, to reflect on the universal validity of the liberal model of 
human rights through a critical analysis and a theoretical reformulation of the debate which 
took place in sub-Saharan Africa. This should finally provide the tools to evaluate the 
potential for entrenching today of the liberal human rights model in contemporary sub- 
Saharan Africa. Moreover, an examination of the debate developed by African countries could 
be used as an instrument to critically evaluate current debates on the universality of human 
rights beyond the African experience. The universal value of the liberal concept of human 
rights is still the subject of both scholarly debate and political disagreement in the 
international arena, which is dominated by criticism of a universal perspective on human 
rights by some East Asian governments.316 Their arguments closely resemble those which 
were put forward by African leaders until the late 1980s and early 1990s.317
6.1 The Cultural Argument: the Liberal Model of Human Rights as “Western” and 
Alien to African Culture
As seen in the preceding chapters, a broad definition of culture encompassing the “totality of 
values, institutions and forms of behaviour transmitted within a society”,318 was one of the
316 See Kausikan, “Asia’s Different Standard”, in 92 Foreign Policy, 1993, p. 24-41 and M. Kishore, “The 
Pacific Way”, 74 Foreign Affairs, 1995, pp. 100-111. The former author was a governmental official and the 
latter was the permanent secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Singapore. Today, in Singapore 
“communitarianism, aimed at some notion of common good or collective well-being, is used to justify state 
intervention in all spheres of social life and a legal regime that seriously violates individual rights and inhibits 
public discourse... In this political context communitarianism may often mean authoritarianism”; M.C. Davis, 
“Constitutionalism and Political Culture: The Debate over Human Rights and Asian Values”, in 11 Harvard 
Human Rights Journal, 1998, p. 128.
317 One important difference between the positions of East Asian and African governments consists is the 
criticism voiced by the former with regard to economic and social rights which were considered as a priority in 
the African discourse on human rights.
318 R. Preiswerk, “The Place of Intercultural Relations in the Study of International Relations”, in 32 The 
Yearbook o f World Affairs, 1978, p. 251, quoted in A.A. An’Naim (ed.), Human Rights in Cross-Cultural 
Perspectives, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, 1991, p. 23.
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strongest arguments used by African governments to challenge the liberal model of human 
rights. In relation to this argument, a critique and reformulation of the concepts employed in 
this debate will be outlined. This conceptual clarification is aimed at providing a more 
articulated and complex interpretation of African culture than the one used in the debate. 
Finally, with regard to this redefined notion of African culture, the relevance of the liberal 
human rights model for sub-Saharan Africa will be dealt with.
6.1.1 A Reformulation of the Debate: Two Opposing Concepts of Human Dignity
African leaders did not dismiss the relevance of the idea of human rights for Africa. Instead, it 
was the inclusion of the liberal model of human rights in their constitutions which was 
rejected. It is important to underline that this challenge was, in fact, accompanied by the claim 
that traditional African cultural and socio-political systems embodied an alternative 
conception of human rights grounded on a communitarian perception of the human person. 
This two-fold claim that the conception o f human rights included in independence 
constitutions was culturally alien to Africa and African has produced its own idea of human 
rights was put forward by African leaders, among whom Kaunda was one of the most 
eloquent representatives. However, it is important to note that this debate was not confined to 
the political arena. This claim has also been strongly made by several scholars319 320who have 
underlined that the liberal underpinning of human rights (i.e. the individualistic view of the 
person as an autonomous being separate from and in need of protection from other 
individuals, the state and society) is in sharp contrast with the African understanding of 
personhood. In African culture, personhood is an attribute which depends on the membership 
of a community (family, clan, kinship group or tribe) and its existence rests on the fulfilment 
of obligations to the group, which in turn, are determined by the status of the individual 
within it. However, it is argued that this conception does not deny the existence of human
319 A. Pollis and P. Schwab, “Human Rights: A Western Construct with Limited Applicability”, in A. Pollis and 
P. Schwab (ed.), Human Rights. Cultural and Ideological Perspectives, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1979, p. 
1 seq.; C.C. Mojekwu, “International Human Rights: The African Perspective”, in J.L. Nelson and V.M. Green 
(eds.), International Human Rights: Contemporary Issues, Human Rights Publishing Group, Standfordville, 
N.Y., 1980, pp. 85-95; A. Legesse, “Human Rights in African Political Culture”, in K.W. Thompson (ed.), The 
Moral Imperatives o f Human Rights: A World Survey, University Press of America, Washington D.C., 1980, pp. 
123-138; Y. Khusahlani, “Human Rights in Asia and Africa”, in 4 Human Rights Law Journal, 1983, p. 418; C. 
E. Welch Jr., "Human Rights as a Problem in Contemporary Africa”, in Welch and Meltzer (eds.), Human 
Rights and Development, cit, pp. 11-30; L. Marasinghe, “Traditional Conceptions o f Human Rights in Africa”, 
in ibidem, pp. 32-45; L.O. Adgebeite, “African Attitudes to the International Protection of Human Rights”, in A. 
Eide and A. Schou (eds.), International Protection o f  Human Rights, Proceedings of the Seventh Nobel 
Symposium, Oslo, September 25-27,1967, Interscience Publishers, 1968.
320 I.A. Menkiti, “Person and Community in African Traditional Thought”, in R.A. Wright (ed.), African 
Philosophy: An Introduction, New York, University Press of America, 1984, pp. 171-181; R. Verdier,
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rights. The participatory, yet consensual, form of decision-making processes, the controls in 
place on the power of rulers which could lead to their removal and, finally, the distributive 
character of African economies provide some evidence that these rights exist. Within this 
reconstruction, the specificity of the African conception of human rights rests upon the fact 
that the group321 is the holder of rights, and, consequently, individuals only enjoy them as 
components of this group.
However, the second part of the cultural argument, in other words, the claim that 
traditional African culture included its own conception of human rights which individuals 
enjoyed within a communitarian social organisation is questionable. There are two main 
problems with this contention, which concern both the employment of the term human rights 
to describe the relationship between the individual and the community and the factual 
correctness of this description.
The claim that traditional African systems and culture enshrined a notion of human 
rights assumes, on the one hand, that the concept of human rights is equated with the notions 
of human dignity and of limited government.322
Human rights are, indeed, one of the possible ways of conceiving the protection of 
human dignity, which can be defined as “the inner (moral) nature and worth of the human 
person and his or her proper (political) relations with society”.323 The understanding of human 
dignity is to a large extent culturally determined and, in this way, different cultures may 
envisage alternative mechanisms for its protection.324 In African traditional culture human 
dignity is conceived in communitarian terms and, therefore, its protection is assured not by 
guaranteeing the individual a sphere of autonomy from the rest of society, as in the liberal
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“Problématique des droits de THomme dans les droits traditionnels d’Afrique noire”, 5 Droits et cultures, 1983, 
pp. 97*103; N. Rouland, "La tradition juridique africaine et la réception des declarations occidentales des droits 
de rhomme”, 26 Droits et Cultures, 1993, p. 197.
321 Mojekwu, International, cit., p. 86; Legesse, Human Rights, cit., p. 128 who has written that“[i]f Africans 
were the sole authors of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, they might have ranked the rights of 
communities above those of individuals”.
322 The idea of limited power is not necessarily linked to the idea of individual rights. In the liberal 
constitutional tradition, the limitation of power is instrumental to the guarantee of the enjoyment of rights, 
however, in the African context, it had a holistic meaning as it was used for the protection of the community; 
see J. Donnelly, “Human Rights and Human Dignity: An Analytic Critique of Non-Western Conceptions of 
Human Right”, in 76 American Political Science Review, 1982, p. 303-316 and R. Howard and J. Donnelly, 
“Human Dignity, Human Rights and Political Regimes”, in 80 American Political Science Review, 1986, p. 801- 
817.
323 Howard and Donnelly, Human Dignity, cit, p. 802.
324 On the cultural relativity of the notion of human dignity, see O. Schachter, “Human Dignity as a Normative 
Concept”, 77 American Journal International Law, 1983, p. 848 and p. 853 and R. Howard, “Dignity, 
Community and Human Rights”, in An-NaTm, Human Rights in Cross-Cultural, cit., p. 83 where she has 
revised her definition of human dignity as “the particular cultural understandings of the inner moral worth of 
the human person and his or her proper political relations with society”.
113
system, but through the performance of duties by each member of the community according 
to his or her status within it. The combination of these complementary and mutual obligations 
guarantees that the individuals’ human dignity will be respected by ensuring them physical 
and psychological security. Although the protection given may correspond with the substance 
of specific human rights, having rights (i.e. entitlements which can be claimed towards other 
individuals or the community) is a different issue. The contradictions arising from the use of 
the term of human rights to depict communitarian African society is clear from this statement 
made by Marasinghe that the right to free speech, the freedom of association, belief and 
property “are fundamental only in abstract. In fact, they are limited according to the needs of 
each extended family, as determined by the collective wisdom of its family council”.325 326
A further and often neglected feature of African traditional social systems which 
undermines the correctness of the description of the human rights regime in traditional 
African societies is that entire categories of individuals are excluded from the enjoyment of 
‘rights* and those who are included enjoy them to varying degrees according to their status, 
sex and age.
The reconstruction of the position of the individual in traditional Africa in terms of 
human dignity does not per se weaken the force of the challenge of the cultural argument 
against the introduction of the Western idea of human rights. It simply raises the issue of a 
reformulation of the problem in terms of a clash between two different conceptions of human 
dignity rather than human rights, according to one in which human dignity is considered to be 
in need of protection from the community which is seen as a potential threat and in the other, 
in which the community is its source of protection.
The debate was also biased by the confusion between the liberal conception of human 
rights and the “Western” model of human rights. Since the aftermath of the World War II, 
Western constitutionalism has incorporated social and economic rights as integral part of 
human rights. In fact the paradox of the African constitutional experience was the inheritance 
of a purely liberal human rights model from the colonial master, which they themselves had 
found incomplete. In reality, Western constitutionalism also embodies the idea that the
325 Marasinghe, Traditional, cit., p. 3.
326 Some members of society, i.e. slaves, outcasts, strangers, some categories of women such as childless 
women did not enjoy any protection; see Mojekwu, International, cit. p. 86; Adgebeite, African Attitudes, cit, p. 
69 and O.C. Eze, Human Rights in Africa. Some Selected Problems, The Nigerian Institute of International 
Affairs, Lagos, 1984, pp. 13-14. These authors, nevertheless, do not dispute the use of the terminology of human 
rights. Even Eze, who is very critical of the “romantic view” on African society merely speaks of 
“institutionalised derogation from human rights”, see p. 13.
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community has positive obligations towards individuals and that the members of the 
community share links of solidarity.
6.1.2 The Instrumental Use of the Concept of Culture
Even though the notion of human rights in not part of traditional African culture, it cannot be 
overlooked that the cultural argument has been instrumentally used to justify authoritarianism 
by African governments. In this respect, it has to be remarked that a problematic aspect of any 
discourse dealing with culture is the frequent disregard for the subjects that are legitimate or 
competent to determine and disclose to the outside world what constitutes the essence of 
culture. In this regard, it is important to emphasise how cultural interpretation is not a 
governmental function, and, moreover, government élites do not usually share the same 
culture as the governed, and often adopt developmental policies that are inconsistent with 
traditional culture.327 In general, they tend to ignore either the plurality of cultures existing 
within the state or the pluralism of perspectives present within each culture. Therefore, the 
African cultural challenge was biased as it was conducted on the basis of an interpretation of 
culture given by subjects lacking both epistemological and moral competence.328
Moreover, the portrayal of African culture and the conclusions, reached on the 
irrelevance of the liberal model of human rights was grounded on an interpretation of culture 
as an ontological, static and homogeneous unit. This concept has undergone a deep 
transformation in the last ten to fifteen years in both anthropology329 and sociology.330 Despite 
the fact that much of this scholarly reflection is linked to the phenomenon of globalisation, the 
redefinition which followed is also relevant to post-colonial African society before 
globalisation. Social, political, economic and cultural contact between different worlds has 
always taken place, even though on a lesser scale than today. In sub-Saharan Africa,
327 See M. Freeman, “Human Rights and Real Cultures: Towards a Dialogue on ‘Asian Values’, in 1 
Netherlands Quarterly o f Human Rights, 1998, p. 28.
328 See ibidem, p. 28.
329 It is this understanding of culture that has grounded the relativist position which has long dominated 
anthropologists’ work, of which the statement that the American Anthropological Association submitted to the 
Commission on Human Rights drafting the Universal Declaration in 1947 represents a significant expression; 
see American Anthropological Association, “Statement on Human Rights”, 49 American Anthropologist, 1947, 
p. 539 et seq. This states that: “ ... i f  the essence o f the Declaration is to be, as it must, a statement in which the 
right o f the individual to develop his personality to the fullest is to be stressed, then this must be based on a 
recognition o f the fact that the personality o f the individual can develop only in terms o f the culture o f his 
society For a critical review of the way anthropology dealt with the notion of culture and how this affected the 
way anthropologists confronted the issue of human rights and the need for a “reconceptualisation” of culture, 
see A.-B. S. Preis, “Human Rights as Cultural Practice: An Anthropological Critique”, in 18 Human Rights 
Quarterly, 1996, pp. 286-315 and also R.A. Wilson, “Human Rights, Culture and Context: An Introduction”, in 
R.A. Wilson (ed.), Human Rights, Culture & Context, Pluto Press, London, 1997, pp. 1-27.
330 For a critique of this portrayal of culture, see Howard, Commonwealth, cit., pp. 23-26.
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colonisation also involved the encounter between African traditional social, political and 
economic systems and the economic and political structures introduced by Europeans.331
It is precisely this awareness of the open nature of culture which calls into question the 
idea that it is a static and homogenous entity, endowed with rigid borders that separate it from 
equally static and homogenous entities of the “other” cultures. In reality, culture 
communicates and develops, losing its “purity” through communication. For this reason, it 
can be more appropriately described as a process, rather than as an entity.332
Furthermore, culture is not homogeneous. It is not correct in fact to speak- as it has 
been done at both the political and scholarly level- of an African culture or even “non- 
Westem” or “Third World countries” culture,333 as it ignores the different cultures existing 
within the African continent, the region of sub-Saharan Africa and also within the broad 
category of the Third World. Culture is not a coherent unit but rather a composition of 
different and sometimes even conflicting universes as “[pjeople participate in multiple, more 
or less discrepant, universes o f discourse; they construct different, partial and simultaneous 
worlds in which they move; their cultural construction o f reality springs not from one source 
and is not one piece ”.334 Culture is “multivocal”335 or as Jonathan Friedman has stated, it is 
"an enormous interplay o f interpretations o f a given social reality ”.336 Different groups, 
which can be distinguished on the basis of sex, age, economic and social status participate in 
different cultural worlds. Culture is “a tissu-réseau de communication” among the various 
social actors with many different interests.337 Therefore, a generic discussion about an African 
culture overlooks its plural dimension, and questions the validity of the argument against the 
universality of the liberal conception of human rights. In particular, it is erroneous to believe 
that a common cultural understanding could unite the African educated élites, and the urban 
and the rural communities. In fact, African culture is more complex than is portrayed in the 
discourse against “Western” human rights, in the same way as the social fabric of sub-Saharan 
Africa. The studies carried out in the preceding chapters provide evidence of the complexity 
of African culture in the context of its distinct legal culture, which following the words of
331 See J-F. Bayart, “Africa in the World: A History of Extraversión”, in 99 African Affairs 2000, pp. 218, in 
which it is argued that sub-Saharan Africa was included in the world economic system before colonisation.
332 Wilson, Human, c it, p. 9.
333 This is the case of Pollis and Schwab; see Human Rights, cit., pp. 1-18.
334 F. Bait, “The Analysis of Culture in Complex Societies”, in 3-4 Ethnos, 1989, p. 120.
335 P. Rabinow and W.M. Sullivan (eds.), Interpretative Social Science. A Reader, University of California 
Press, Berkeley, 1979, p. 6.
336 J. Friedman, Cultural Identity and Global Process, Sage, London, 1994, p. 73.
337 N. Intessüoglou, “Système juridique et culture: une approche sociologique globale du phénomène juridique”, 
in F. Chazal and J. Commaile (dir.), Normes juridiques et régulation sociale, LGDJ, Paris, 1991, p. 393.
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Lawrence Friedman, represent the “ideas, attitudes, expectations and opinions about law, held 
by people in some given society”.338 For example, the study of the Zambian constitutional 
process and human rights case law demonstrated the pluralism existing within both the 
internal and external legal culture.339 With regard to the former, we have seen how the 
Zambian judiciary did not always support the view that the communal interest of the nation 
(i.e. the community) should prevail over individual rights. In regard to individual rights, the 
majority of citizens who participated in the 1973 Zambian constitutional process, which 
mainly included those with a high level of education, called for the preservation of the Bill of 
Rights from the 1964 Constitution. Therefore, this provides clear evidence that at least part of 
Zambian society not only felt that the liberal model of human rights was culturally acceptable, 
but also considered it as a necessary component of their country’s constitutional system.
A further aspect to be considered concerns the sources used in the debate which gave 
the substantive content to the abstract notion of culture. In a discourse which uses culture as a 
basic premise, the degree of “invention”340 which is it embodied cannot be ignored. It should 
not be overlooked that the cultural relativist discourse is based on traditional African culture 
as it emerges from reports and documents drafted by Western ethnographers between the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries on the basis of descriptions given by a small section 
of African society, such as African chiefs and some Africans who were educated by 
missionaries. The outcome was a biased exposition which, on the one hand, corresponded to 
the European colonial administrators’ ideal categories and policies, and, on the other hand, 
legitimised the power positions of African chiefs and educated élite. These sources not only 
provided an incomplete perspective on African socio-political systems and culture, but they 
also turned the “loosely defined and infinitely flexible”341 African customs into rigid rules, 
which prevented them from adapting to the changes that had been taking place in society. 
While it may be unfeasible to separate the invented from the real, it is worthwhile, however, 
to take into account that the whole debate was conducted on the basis o f a static notion of 
culture, which is not only incorrect from a sociological point of view as stressed above, but
338 L.M. Friedman, “Is There a Modem Legal Culture?”, in 7 Ratio /arts, 1994, p. 118 and The Republic o f 
Choice: Law, Authority and Culture, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1990, p. 213.
339 These concepts refer respectively to the legal culture of legal professionals and the lay public (both 
individuals and groups), see L. M. Friedman, The Legal System: A Social Science Perspective, Russel Sage 
Foundation, New York, 1975.
340 On the concept of “invented tradition”, which is not a phenomenon confined to sub-Saharan Africa, see E. 
Hobsbawm and T. Ranger, The Invention o f Tradition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983. The 
levirate marriage is an example of a Zambian traditional practice, which was “re-interpreted” and altered. The 
levirate marriage was presented in terms of “widow inheritance”. Under this classification, women were 
depicted as a property of the deceased husband’ s family, which was not the traditional African perception.
341T. Ranger, “The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa”, in ibidem, p. 247.
also from a legal anthropological perspective which reminds us that African customs and the 
culture which they express were extremely adaptive to social developments. Consequently, 
the rigid defence of African culture in a given period is in sharp contradiction with its very
342nature.
In addition, both scholars (with a few exceptions) and African leaders gave a 
romanticised view of African political tradition, by excluding the features which could be 
considered incompatible with it, and particularly with the participatory, consensus-seeking 
and communitarian description. As a matter of fact, the whole discourse on the consensual 
and participatory nature of African political systems took place without referring to the fact 
that this political model applied to sub-Saharan African political entities which were not only 
small, stateless communities,342 43 but also powerful empires,344 some of which did not have any 
separation of powers, as in the case of the Kingdom of Dahomey, in present-day Benin.345 
Furthermore, the non-competitive nature of small, stateless communities in Africa has been 
over-emphasised to some extent. In reality, although traditionally an outspoken opposition 
was not voiced, it is not correct to assert that disagreement was not expressed. At the end of 
the discussions there was always someone who did not conform to the prevailing opinion, 
thus giving rise to a majority and a minority.346 Certain societies, such as of the Luo in Kenya, 
even possessed various forms of opposition among its factions.347 Nevertheless, the rhetoric
342 See Chapter 9.
343 Within the great variety and fluidity of African traditional political systems, it is possible to distinguish 
between "sociétés an-êtatiquen and "sociétés à Etat”. The former were organised along clan membership and 
did not feature any centralised power. Indeed, power was spread among transversal classes such as those based 
on age. The chief of the community was a leader and not a ruler, i.e. he merely directed the activity of the 
community. The latter political system had a centralised authority and was represented by legislative, executive 
and judicial apparatus; see P.-F. Gonidec, L 'Etat africain, LGDJ, Paris, 1985, pp. 31-37 and M. Fortes and E.E. 
Evans-Pritchard, African Political Systems, Oxford University Press, London, 1970 (first published in 1940), pp. 
5-6. In the former societies, the chief was chosen by the village councils of elders and could not adopt binding 
decisions for the community. Moreover, if he violated customary norms or abused his powers he was removed. 
In the latter societies, however, generally there were control mechanisms on the ruler because his power was 
counterbalanced by institutions such as the chiefs council, councils of elders, sacerdotal officials or aristocratic 
dynasties. The abuse of power or the breach o f his obligations could provoke a revolt or secession led by 
subordinate chiefs; see M. Fortes and E.E. Evans-Pritchard, African Political, cit., p. 12 and P.-F. Gonidec, 
“Constitutionalismes africains”, in 8 African Journal o f International and Comparative Law 1996, p. 2. For an 
example of the former kind of societies in Zambia, see A.I. Richards, The Political System o f the Bemba Tribe- 
North-Eastem Rhodesia, in Fortes and Pritchard, African Political, cit., pp. 83-120. For a similar organisation in 
the territory which corresponds to Benin, see J. Lombard, “Chieftancy among the Bariba of Dahomey”, in M. 
Crowder and O. Ikime (eds.), West African Chiefs, Universe of Ife Press, New York, 1970, pp. 124-133.
344 This refers to the case of Benin, In the 18th century, southern Benin was controlled by the kingdoms of Porto- 
Novo and Dahomey and also the kingdoms of Allada and Ouidah, before being respectively conquered and 
destroyed by the latter at the beginning of the century, A Yoruba Kingdom was also present until 1885. The 
North was divided among the Bariba kingdoms o f Nikky, Parakou, Kouandé, Kandi and Djougou.
345 See J. Lombard, “The Kingdom of Dahomey”, in D. Forde and P.M. Kerry (ed.), West African Kingdoms in 
the Nineteenth Century, Oxford University Press, London, 1967, pp. 70-91.
346 Gonidec, Constitutionalismes, c it, p. 14-15.
347 See P. Quantin, “Les élections en Afrique: entre rejet et institutionnalisation”, in 9 Revue camerounaise de
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of African consensualism has tended to ignore political experiences which did not conform to 
the model that it wanted to promote. As Bayart has warned, a "substantialiste” approach to 
culture, obscures the relationship of culture and politics. This cannot be seen as a relationship 
of two distinct entities, as the former is the subject of “stratégìes identitaires” pursued by 
specific and identifiable actors.348 This does not mean that human rights were a concept 
belonging to African culture before its encounter with European categories. What it means is 
that African leaders purportedly emphasised selected aspects of African culture and presented 
them as immutable in order to preserve their position of power. Moreover, as argued in the 
following sections, traditional African values are not incompatible with the concept of human 
rights. On the contrary, the denial of human rights in the name of traditional culture may lead 
to a denial of these values, given the changes that occurred in the African socio-political 
structures.
6.13  Culture in Socio-Political Context and the Denial of Traditional African Values: 
Human Dignity and Limited Government
The whole debate at both political and scholarly level was mainly conducted outside the 
context of the radical structural changes which occurred in sub-Saharan Africa since 
colonisation. In this regard, as Pollis has underlined349 it is necessary to develop both a 
theoretical framework and to carry out empirical studies which take into account the socio­
economic and political context in which culture is embedded. The issue of the relevance of 
“Western” human rights needs to be considered in a contextual perspective. More specifically, 
this involves a consideration of the repercussions of the introduction of the market economy 
on the traditional social and political systems, as well as of the impact of the import of modem 
state.
The market economy, labour migration and urbanisation introduced through 
colonisation, strengthened by the development policies of African governments, had a 
disruptive effect on the traditional subsistence economy, and weakened the communitarian 
ties of African traditional communities.350 This was not only an African phenomenon, as 
communitarianism is not a feature exclusive to African societies. Every traditional, pre­
science politique, Numero spécial, 2001/2002 at http://www.cean.u-bordeaux.fr/polis
348 J.-F., Bayart, L 'illusion identitaire, Fayard, Paris, 1996.
349 A, Pollis, “Cultural Relativism Revisited: Through a State Prism“, in 18 Human Rights Quarterly, 1996, pp. 
323-324.
350 See Howard, Human Rights in Commonwealth, cit, pp. 22-26 and pp. 39-40. By 1982, 45 percent of the 
population in Zambia was urban; see The World Bank, Accelerated Development in sub-Saharan Africa, 
Washington, D.C., 1981, Table 36.
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capitalist societies possessed communitarian traits. Indeed, the African experience is 
comparable to the one Europe underwent during the industrial revolution in the seventieth and 
eighteenth centuries when the development of the capitalist economy and the phenomenon of 
urbanisation eroded the communal structures which dominated the feudal period.351
The present-day crisis of the traditional community structure and the individualisation 
of the person challenge the relevance of the traditional communitarian conception of human 
dignity. It also questions the corresponding rejection of liberal rights. Disputing the human 
rights protection of human dignity on the basis of its cultural ‘foreignity’, in a context where 
traditional communitarian forms cannot operate any longer, could deprive the individual of all 
forms of protection. The priority of the good of the community and a conception of human 
dignity based on the fulfilment of obligations has a rationale as long as there is a mutuality of 
duties. When this network of duties does not exist any longer, only unilateral obligations 
remain, which fail to benefit the community as a whole, and instead only serve individuals 
purporting to speak on its behalf.
The fact that the concept of human rights has a Western origin does not necessarily 
mean that it is not relevant for other cultures. The justification of their validity outside the 
Western world is linked to the export of what Pannikar has called the “megamachine o f the 
modem technological world” by the Western powers, within which “for an authentic human 
life to be possible ... Human Rights are imperative’*.352
The relevance of an approach which takes into account the structural context in which 
a particular culture develops is also crucial for addressing the core of the debate on the 
“Western” model of human rights, in other words the possibility of claiming rights against the 
government. The contention that due to their adversarial nature civil and political rights were 
culturally alien and, therefore, irrelevant for sub-Saharan Africa has often been made without 
recognising that political power was not organised in post-colonial Africa in the same form as 
in pre-colonial Africa. In post-colonial sub-Saharan Africa, political power has taken the 
shape of a modem state of European origin, thus replacing traditional political structures. 
However, the imported idea of the nation-state was never challenged as the large emphasis on 
national unity demonstrates. In fact, the communitarian African tradition was presented as an 
obstacle to the import of an individualistic conception of rights but was also disregarded when
351 J. Donnelly, Human Rights in Theory and Practice, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London p. 69-71 
and I. Szabo, Historical Foundations o f Human Rights and Subsequent Developments, in Vasak and Alston, The 
International, cit., p. 13.
352 Pannikar, “Is the Notion of Human Rights a Western Concept”, in 120 Diogenes, 1982, p. 175.
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the claims of the diverse ethnic communities within the African states were at issue.353 The 
1979 constitution of Benin represents an exception to this contention.354 However, in the 
majority of cases, the approach taken on the question of ethnic pluralism was similar to the 
liberal states. Hence, the argument against liberal rights suffers from a serious contradiction. 
On the one hand, African leaders accepted and even defended the modem liberal state to the 
detriment of African traditional political entities, and on the other hand, they challenged 
liberal rights, which were historically conceived as a guarantee with respect to “the growing 
power of the nation state and its extending capacity to determine and control the life of its 
subjects”.355 This contradictory dichotomy (the defence of the modem state and the rejection 
of liberal rights) was purported to be resolved by claiming that it was possible to reproduce 
African traditional consensual and democratic form of politics within the framework of the 
modem state. However, the analysis of the political experience of Zambia has shown that 
African one-party systems did not bring about any efficient mechanisms for either a tangible 
popular participation or a constraint on the political power. The problem lies in the 
assumption that it is possible to recreate within the modem state, the same consensual model 
of politics which historically developed within the non-state, small-scale communities, or in 
other words, to equate the modem state with the traditional community. The two forms of 
organising power are, conversely, radically different. While “[t]he community, for the most 
part, depends on popular norms developed through forms o f consensus and enforced through 
mediation and persuasion. The state is an imposition on society, and unless humanised and 
democratised... it relies on edicts, the military, coercion and sanctions.”356 The administrative 
and coercive bodies through which the modem state exerts its authority on society were, 
indeed, absent in the pre-colonial African societies. Moreover, the centralisation of power and 
its depersonalisation which, using Weber’s typology,357 marks the passage from the traditional 
to legal-rational type of authority, render the control on the authority more complex. Even the 
presidentialist forms of government introduced in African single-party systems did not 
suppress the institutional complexity of the modem African state. Moreover, the territorial 
organisation of the modem state questions the viability of any comparison between the single-
353 The same contradiction can be found in the human rights discourse made today by East Asian governments, 
see Ghai, Human, cit, p. 16.
354 Article 3 of the Zambian constitution only provided for a House of Chiefs with advisory powers,
355 D. Castiglione, “The Political Theory of the Constitution”, in R. Bellamy and D. Castiglione (eds.), 
Constitutionalism in Transformation: European and Theoretical Perspectives, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, 
1996, p. 22.
356 Ghai, Human, cit, p. 17.
357 M. Rheinstein (ed.), Max Weber on Law in Economy and Society, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
Mass., 1954.
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party and the consensual system of decision-making, which was also linked to the weak social 
stratification, which existed in traditional African societies.358 As emphasised by Nwabueze, 
the frequent comparison between the single-party and traditional decision-making assembly is 
flawed:
“fwjhile it is true that political parties, as such, did not exist in so-called 
traditional African societies, it also follows logically that the concept o f political 
party cannot be used in analyzing politics in pre-capitalist African societies. 
People who justify the one-party system on the basis o f our cultural heritage have, 
therefore been essentially involved in false analogies. ”359
This equation has also led to a betrayal of African constitutionalism, as depicted, and 
at times romanticised, by African leaders themselves. In this regard, scholars such as Keba 
M’Baye have presented this by arguing that African traditional culture embodies a concept of 
human rights which corresponds to the Western model. According to M’Baye, even though 
they were not clearly articulated, the right to life, expression, education and the freedoms of 
religion, association, movement and work were recognised in traditional Africa. As argued 
above, the fact that life, education or the freedom of expression and association were 
respected, does not mean that they constituted individual entitlements as the term human 
rights suggests. M’Baye has admitted this observing that the African specificity consists in the 
fact that rights are presented from the perspective of the corresponding duties and are not 
perceived in conflictual terms.360 However, what can be said is that traditional African culture 
encompassed forms of guarantee of human dignity. In a similar way, many scholars have 
indicated that Africa also had a political tradition of limited government and political 
participation. In this sense, modem African states have betrayed traditional African 
constitutionalism. Furthermore, the value of social harmony emphasised by African leaders 
was certainly not achieved in traditional Africa by stifling divergent opinions, as in post­
colonial Africa, but through a patient mediation among the various existing views until 
consensus was reached. Preventive detention measures, sedition laws and press censorship 
cannot be explained by invoking the African consensual political culture.
358 R. Howard, “Evaluating Human Rights in Africa: Some Problems of Implicit Comparisons”, in 6 Human 
Rights Quarterly, p. 176.
359 Nwabueze, Constitutionalism, cit, pp. 168-169.
360 K. M’Baye, Human Rights in Africa, in Vasak and Alston, International, cit, pp. 589-591 and Les droits de 
I'homme en Afrique, Pedone, Paris, 1993 pp. 53-55. See also H. Hannum, “The Butare Colloquium on Human 
Rights and Economic Development in Francophone Africa: A Summary and Analysis”, 1 Universal Human 
Rights, 1979, p. 64; D.M. Wai, “Human Rights in Sub-Saharan Africa”, in Pollis and Schwab, Human Rights, 
cit., p. 115-144 and S.B. Asante, “Nation Building and Human Rights in Emergent African Nations”, 2 Cornell 
International Law Journal, 1968, pp. 72-107.
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In reality, the stark rejection (as in Benin) or the “corrections” (as in Zambia) to the 
liberal human rights model on the ground of its being culturally alien led in the denial of two 
ideals belonging to African culture, namely, human dignity and limited government.
6.2 The Structural Argument: The Liberal Model of Human Rights as an Obstacle to 
Development
The second argument on which the relevance of the liberal model of human rights was 
challenged was linked to the structural condition of underdevelopment in sub-Saharan Africa. 
According to this argument, the need for an effective policy to correct this situation would 
make the exercise of civil and political rights a “luxury” whose guarantee should be 
postponed until after the problem of underdevelopment had been solved. In this way, it was 
argued that civil and political rights could hinder government action and, therefore, act as an 
obstacle to development.
It is important to note that this discourse is not isolated to an African view of the 
relationship between human rights and development and, for this reason, the relevance of its 
debate goes beyond the African borders.
The thesis that it is necessary to temporarily constrain human rights in order to 
adequately face underdevelopment and that human rights are an outcome and not a pre­
condition of development was also a leading theme in political science, in particular between 
the 1960s and the 1970s. This perspective was still common in the early 1980s.361 Since then, 
this thesis has undergone a critical re-thinking and a positive link between human rights and 
development has been progressively recognised and the 1990s marked a turning point in this 
regard. Since then the need to integrate human rights in development has been increasingly 
recognised. At the Vienna World Conference on Human Rights in 1993, consensus was 
reached that democracy, development and human rights are interdependent and mutually 
reinforcing.362 In June 2000, the special session of the General Assembly, entitled “World
361 See, e.g. S.P. Huntington, “Political Development and Political Decay”, 17 World Politics, 1965, pp. 386- 
430; S.M. Lipset, “Some Social Requisites for Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy”, 
in 53 American Political Science Review, 1959, pp. 69-105. On this issue, see J. Donnelly, "Human Rights and 
Development: Complementary or Competing Concerns?, in 36 World Politics 1983/84, pp. 255-283 and R.L. 
Barsh, “Democratization and Democracy”, in 14 Human Rights Quarterly, 1992, pp. 124-126.
362 See Vienna Declaration and Programme o f Action, Distr. GENERAL A/CONF. 157/23 12 July 1993 
available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu5/d/Vienna.htm. See also the interdependence of development and 
civil and political rights in Question o f the Realization in A ll Countries o f the Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights Contained in the Universal Declaration o f Human Rights and in the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and Study o f Special Problems which the Developing Countries Face in 
Their Efforts to Achieve These Human Rights, U.N. ESCOR, Commission on Human Rights, 54th Sess., 51st 
mtg., 4(d), U.N. Doc. E/CN.41998/33 (1998), at http://www.unhchr.ch/tml/menu4/chrres/1998.res/44.htm
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Summit for Social Development and Beyond: Achieving Social Development for All in a 
Globalizing World”, expressed the belief that “the promotion and protection of all human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, including the right to development” are “some of the 
essential elements for the realisation of social and people-centred sustainable 
development”.363 Since the 1995 World Summit for Social Development, development has 
been defined as “social” development with the human person as its core concern.
Similarly, since the 1990s, agencies working in the field of development have begun 
to show an interest in human rights and a human rights approach to development has been 
increasingly advocated. This has been defined as the operational expression of the link 
between development, defined as human development and human rights. It expresses “a 
conceptual framework for the process of human development that is normatively based on 
international human rights standards and operationally directed to promoting and protecting 
human rights”.364 In this way human rights are not considered an afterthought of development. 
Both civil and political rights and socio-economic and cultural rights assist in setting the 
goals, as well as the acceptable costs of development agendas. Within this approach, the 
beneficiaries of development are conceived as rights-holders, and consequently, they are not 
the passive recipients of models of development “generously” supplied by others, but rather 
the “directors” of development. This involves an active, free and meaningful participation.365 
It does not deny that the realisation of development depends upon the availability of resources 
and the existence of institutions. The existing capacities necessarily affect the policy choices 
for the advancement of a development in which human rights are an integral objective. 
Capacity constraints require the setting of priorities, however this process should carried out 
with the participation of the people concerned.366
It is in this context that financial institutions, which traditionally refused to take 
human rights into account, have started considering civil and political rights as a fundamental 
aspect for development. The World Bank's emphasis on “good governance”,367 which refers 
to transparency, accountability and the rule of law, as a condition for development represents 
an indirect recognition that this can only be achieved in a situation where civil and political
363 See also the Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development and Programme o f Action adopted at the 1995 
World Summit for Social Development endorsed by the UN General Assembly in resolution 50/161.
364 U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Human Rights in Development: What, Why and 
How, Geneva, 2000.
365 See Article 2(3) of die UN Declaration on the Right to Development.
366 See UNDP, Human Development Report, 2000. This Report argues the mutually reinforcing link between 
human rights and development, emphasising the need for an integrated approach in this regard.
367 See World Bank, Governance and Development, Washington D.C., 1992.
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rights (at least those encompassed by the concept of good governance) are guaranteed. 
However, the above description is not complete as the ‘liberty trade-off argument continues 
to be advanced by Southeast Asian governments, which link the respect for traditional values 
with national development, in a similar way as African governments did in the past.368 Unlike 
African countries, however, they can put forward their economic success as an evidence of the 
validity of the liberty trade-off thesis. Nevertheless, this approach to development is 
misleading as it is based on a restricted notion of development, which fails to deal with the 
connection between human rights and development. Moreover, even its strict definition is 
empirically questionable. As it shall be argued below, the suppression of civil and political 
rights is not necessary for development, and furthermore, civil and political rights can actually 
contribute to development.
6.2.1 Defining Development
The concept of development itself is controversial369 and many different definitions exist. The 
liberty trade-off thesis is usually used in relation to a narrow concept of development which 
corresponds with economic growth, expressed by gross national product (GNP). This 
definition does not take into account either the distribution of wealth or the extent to which 
economic and social rights are guaranteed.
A broader notion which also takes these aspects of development in account has 
emerged since the late 1960s, when the International Labour Organisation’s World 
Employment Programme argued that an equitable participation in economic development 
should be guaranteed by employment policies. Furthermore, the elaboration of the concept of 
“human development” by the UNDP has contributed significantly to the articulation of 
development beyond the narrow focus of economic growth. Human development indicates 
both “a process of enlarging people's choices”,370 by expanding human capabilities - i.e. the 
range of things which a person can do and be in leading a life - and the level of well-being. 
From this perspective, income is only one aspect and not a goal of development For this 
reason, human development is not estimated in terms of GNP, but instead by assessing 
longevity, knowledge and a decent standard of living,371 which signifies human capabilities.
368 See F. Zakaria, "Culture is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew”, 73 Foreign Affairs, 1994, pp. 
109-126. Lee Kuan Yew is a former Prime Minister of Singapore.
369 For a survey on the concept of development and the evolution of the perspectives on its relationship with 
human rights, see J. Donnelly “Human Rights, Democracy, and Development”, in 21 Human Rights Quarterly, 
1999, pp. 622-628.
370 UNDP, Human Development Report, 1998, p. 14.
371 The measurement of human development is effected through a human development index (HDI) expressed in
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Therefore, this definition of development not only encompasses economic growth but also the 
enjoyment of economic and social rights.372 In fact, the concept of human capabilities adopted 
in the human development definition corresponds, in fact, to the substance of these rights.
The winner of the 1998 Nobel Prize in Economic Science, Amartya Sen, has been a 
central figure in the reformulation of the understanding of development. He created the 
concept of human capabilities adopted by the UNDP,373 and referred to development as 
freedom or as the process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy, which correspond 
with the capabilities of persons to lead the type of lives which they have reason to value. In 
this understanding of development, social and economic rights as well as political and civil 
liberties are not only conducive to development but are also an integral part of i t374 Within 
this definition, economic growth is only one means to achieve development along with others, 
such as education and health services and the liberty to freely express one’s opinion.
6.2.2 The Liberty Trade-Off: Compatible With but Not Necessary for Development
A survey of the post*independence history of sub-Saharan Africa reveals the inadequacy of 
the trade-off argument. In the 1960s, sub-Saharan African GNP per capita grew at a rate of
1.3 percent, whilst in the 1970s it had decreased reaching a rate o f 0.8 percent, and in the 
1980s several countries had negative rates.375 The experiences of other regions of the world 
seem, however, to confirm this thesis. Countries such as South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan and, 
more recently, China- where civil and political liberties are constrained to different degrees- 
have remarkable performances of economic growth. This empirical observation cannot, 
however, be considered to be a sufficient evidence of the value of the liberty trade-off theory 
as other cases can be cited which prove exactly the opposite and, in this regard, sub-Saharan 
Africa is exemplary. Botswana, one of the few African states which have been democratic 
since independence, has had the most constant and equitable economic growth in the region 
and one of the fastest rates of growth in the world. This shows how it is not possible to build a 
theory simply on the basis of a statistical observation of the coexistence of a certain political 
regime with economic growth. A mere statistical approach, which is not supported by a causal
indicators of the three above-mentioned main and quantifiable components of the concept. The indicators are 
life expectancy, educational attainment and adjusted income per capita.
372 This is expressly recognised also by the UNDP, see Human Development Report, 1992, p. 29 where it is 
stated that “[t]he human development index is an attempt to measure economic and social rights and the extent 
to which they are realized”.
373 See A. Sen, Resources, Values and Development, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1984, p. 317.
374 A. Sen, Development as Freedom, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1999.
375 Howard, Human Rights in Commonwealth, cit., p. 60.
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analysis, could be used to validate both a liberty trade-off and a human rights approach to 
development. Furthermore, when studies of the factors which have determined good 
economic performances in authoritarian states have been carried out, a range of factors which 
are not incompatible with political systems which respect civil and political rights have 
always been singled out.376 378Therefore, the only possible interpretation of successful economic 
growth in authoritarian states is that the repression of civil and political liberties is compatible 
with economic growth but not necessary for its achievement
However, even compatibility is questionable when one considers economic security as 
a further indicator of development. In this regard, Amartya Sen has demonstrated through 
empirical studies that famines have historically occurred in countries which did not suffer 
from any scarcity of food and were even able to fulfil economic and social rights. The 
absence of democracy was a common feature of these states. In fact, he has shown that no 
famine has ever taken place in democratic states where freedom of the press was respected. 
The electoral costs and the public outcry provoked by such a catastrophe are too high a price 
to pay for any government
6.23 The Constructive and Instrumental Role of Civil and Political Rights
Not only is there no convincing evidence that an authoritarian state can achieve an easier or 
faster economic growth than a state in which civil and political rights are guaranteed, but it is 
also arguable that the absence of civil and political rights may hamper development or, 
conversely, that civil and political rights can play a positive role in development, including 
both economic growth and human development. Indeed, this is the conclusion which can be 
drawn from the sub-Saharan African experience. This contention is confirmed not only by a 
statistical survey but also through an analysis of the interrelation of cause and effect between 
the existence of underdevelopment and the constraints on civil and political rights.
376 With reference to Southeast Asia, see A. Sen, “Freedoms and Needs”, 31 The New Republic, 10 and 17 Jan. 
1994, p. 32.
377 This was the case of China in 1958-61 when a famine provoked the deaths of millions of people. Moreover, 
in Africa the famine of 1983-84 was more severe in countries which were relatively less affected by drought. 
Countries such as Botswana, Zimbabwe and to a lesser extent Kenya and Capo Verde were able to avoid the 
large-scale famines of Ethiopia and Sudan. The main reason for the different results was due to the nature of 
their respective political systems, which especially in the case of Botswana and Zimbabwe were relatively open 
and pluralist; see A. Sen and J. Dreze, Hunger and Public Action, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989, p. 71.
378 See A. Sen, “Human Rights and Economic Achievement”, in J.R. Bauer and D.A. Bell, The East Asian 
Challenge fo r  Human Rights, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999, pp. 88-102; Human Rights Watch, 
Indivisible Human Rights: The Relationship o f Political and Civil Rights to Survival, Subsistence and Poverty, 
1992; Donnelly, Human Rights and Development, cit; Howard, The Full-Belly Thesis, cit; R.E. Goodin, “The 
Development Trade-Off: Some Unwarranted Economic and Political Assumption”, in I Universal Human 
Rights, 1979, pp. 31-42; H.S. Park, "Human Rights and Modernization: A Dialectical Relationship?”, 2 
Universal Human Rights, 1980, pp. 91.
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The pursuit of ineffective economic policies, which in addition only benefited a small 
élite, was possible due to the absence of accountability mechanisms such as free elections and 
open criticism, which are possible only if the right to speech, press, association and assembly 
can be freely exercised. This does not deny that other external factors may have contributed to 
African underdevelopment, as the advocates of the ‘dependence theory’ have emphasised. 
However, an interpretation of the causes of underdevelopment in sub-Saharan Africa cannot 
be considered as complete if internal reasons are ignored. Among these, the limits imposed 
on the exercise of human rights had a substantial weight. Indeed, human rights can play what
AAA
Amartya Sen has called an “instrumentar role, in other words, they act as an incentive for 
the adoption of adequate development policies, also in strict macroeconomic ternis. The risk 
for the government of not being re-elected and the internal criticism from opposition parties or 
the media represents a powerful guarantee against economically inadequate policies. This is 
particularly true if they only privilege a small portion of the population and their costs have to 
be paid by the remaining majority, as occurred, for example, with the agricultural measures 
imposed in Zambia in the name of modernisation. These measures only provided advantages 
to a minority and marginalized the rural population, whose traditional cultivation was 
replaced by the forced cultivation of maize. In addition, in the long term, they resulted in 
being harmful both from a macroeconomic and environmental standpoint.379 8081 ;
Apart from the instrumental perspective, civil and political rights can also play what 
Amartya Sen has called a “constructive” role, which rests on their intrinsic value. The 
constructive role consists in the promotion of public discussion, which is conducive to a 
knowledgeable elaboration of needs and values. However, this role has been disregarded 
because of the implicit premise of the trade-off argument that development policies are only 
matter of technical decisions. However, this premise is erroneous as, in reality, development 
policies are the subject of the political evaluation of values, needs and priorities. Hence, there 
is not unique pattern of development, which can be established by politically neutral 
appraisals, but instead, there are many different models of development. For example, human 
and sustainable development which takes into account both the impact on the environment 
and future generations’ needs,382 requires a knowledge of public concerns and, therefore,
379 See Howard, Commonwealth, c it, pp. 68-78.
380 Sen, Human Rights and Economic Achievement, cit., pp. 90-96.
381 See in J.-P. Raison, wDe Tor rouge à l’or vert? Dualisme économique, Etat-providence et virage libéral: les 
mutations des politiques agricoles en Zambie”, in J.-P. Daloz et J.D. Chileshe, La Zambie contemporaine, Ed. 
Karthala, Paris, pp. 165-176.
382 See United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Agenda 21: Programme o f Action fo r  
Sustainable Development 1992.
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implies that these can be freely expressed. This model of development does not necessarily 
require a high GNP. However, it can put a virtuous cycle in motion for an increase in 
economic growth which can, in turn, contribute to a further improvement of human 
development.383 In this regard, education plays a basic role. Firstly, it improves and enlarges 
the skills on which a country can rely, which leads to both a quantitative and a qualitative 
enhancement of productivity, a more rational selection and use of the technology imported 
and the development of domestic science and technology. Furthermore, the presence of people 
with a higher level of education reinforces legal, political and financial institutions of the 
country in question. This not only improves the quality of development strategies that these 
institutions are called upon to formulate but also contributes to strengthening the state 
structure and, consequently, the state ability for self-determination, which is at the centre of 
the African political and human rights concerns.
A human development pattern in which the existing resources are used for the 
fulfilment of economic and social rights also has a fundamental advantage in terms of another 
major African concern, namely political stability. This model of development reduces the risk 
that popular discontent for the low standard of living would lead to opposition against the 
state. Sub-Saharan Africa is an example of how stability may be undermined by such 
dissatisfaction, which can also be easily manipulated. African governments were aware that 
stability also depended upon development, however, in this regard, they interpreted 
development in merely macro-economic terms, considering it as a condition of the state. Thus, 
they overlooked the link between stability and individual (social and economic) development.
However, the constructive role of civil and political rights can be appreciated not only 
with reference to the human sustainable model of development, but also in considering the 
mere technical aspect of development programmes. A broad range of information is necessary 
and this can be obtained only if the freedoms of speech, press, association and assembly as 
well as free elections are guaranteed.
Furthermore, from the perspective of African governments* theoretical approach to 
human rights, it is arguable that popular participation is consistent not only with an African 
interpretation of development linked to economic and social rights, but also to an African 
definition of the right to self-determination, which is at the core of the regional human rights 
discourse. Indeed, public participation can be seen in terms of the exercise not only of
383 See G. Ranis, F. Stewart, A. Ramirez, “Economic Growth and Human Development”, in 28 World 
Development 2000, pp. 197-219. Starting from the assumption that the ultimate objective is human development 
and that economic growth is a means to achieve it, they have empirically assessed that economic growth itself 
can only be sustained if it is preceded or accompanied by an enhancement of human development
individual civil and political rights, but also of the collective right to self-determination, 
which according to the African Charter implies that peoples “shall pursue their economic and 
social development according to the policy they have freely chosen”.384 In this way, the 
liberty trade-off argument seems to contradict the African approach to development, not only 
in the way that it is interpreted, but also in the way that it should be pursued. In fact, the 
definition of self-determination which is included in the African Charter also referred to 
development and implicitly embraces political and civil freedoms, unless the term ‘peoples’ is 
interpreted to signify the government.
An additional aspect to consider when dealing with development concerns the issue of 
the effectiveness of the relevant policies. In this regard, it should not be overlooked that their 
implementation largely depends on the citizens’ support. However, this support can only be 
obtained as far as these policies take into account people’s opinions and needs, which can 
only be discerned if the freedom of speech, press and association are protected. In fact, the 
failure of the policies of sub-Saharan African states was often due to the neglect of the 
citizens* views. The repression of civil and political liberties has not only determined the 
ineffectiveness of development measures,385 but it has often proved costly in terms of long- 
run economic development. For example, preventing peasants from demanding an increase in 
the prices of their produce has often resulted in an expansion of the black market or an 
enhancement of smuggling.386 Moreover, the high cost of the popular sense of alienation 
from government policies can be seen in the success of demagogical politics and frequent 
coups d’état, as the history of sub-Saharan Africa clearly shows.
A further role that civil and political rights can play with reference to development 
consists in creating an environment in which the more educated are generally willing to stay 
and work. Authoritarian states induce the highly educated to leave their countries, thus 
depriving the nation of the expertise needed for development. Moreover, a development 
policy which does not invest resources for the use of the people with higher education may 
even produce more serious consequences. The discontent of the intellectual élite in illiberal 
contexts may lead to undemocratic forms of expression and contribute to political instability, 
as in the case of Benin.387 Therefore, the combination of civil and political rights with
384 Article 20(1).
385 This was the case of ‘villagization' programs in Tanzania in 1973-75. Peasants, forced to leave their villages, 
refused to cultivate the lands where they were re-settled. This provoked a dramatic decrease of the maize 
production and the need for Tanzania to become an importer of food.
386 Howard, Full-Belly, cit, p. 471-72.
387 E. Hodginson, in P. Englebert, “Benin”, in Africa South o f the Sahara, Europa Publications, London, 2000, p. 
189.
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investment in social and economic rights is a fundamental condition for the training and use 
of the experts needed for development.
In conclusion, the contention that there is a positive link between development and 
civil and political rights does not ignore that there are some democracies which have 
consistent records of economic growth with unsatisfactory levels of human development. 
High per capita incomes may, indeed, be counterbalanced by an unequal distribution of 
wealth and a scarcity of public services. This does not, however, question the importance of 
civil and political liberties but it certainly does pose a challenge for democratic states to 
enhance political participation of their citizens and to give greater consideration to their needs 
and concerns.
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CHAPTER 7: Why Has the Liberal Model of Human Rights Found Obstacles in Sub- 
Saharan Africa?
Despite the differences among the various experiences of sub-Saharan African countries, the 
study of Zambia and Benin’s modem constitutional histories has shown that the liberal model 
of human rights has met serious obstacles in sub-Saharan Africa and these problems were not 
only of an ideological nature as described in the previous chapter. This chapter will attempt to 
clarify the nature of these obstacles in the light of the scholarship on the theory of legal 
transplant. This will also have the preliminary function of providing the analytical tools to 
interpret the dynamics that the liberal model of human rights provoked in the region.
7.1 The Theories of Legal Transplants
From the perspective of the present study, there are two fundamental questions concerning 
legal transplants, namely, why they occur and what is their effect? Correlative to the latter 
question is the issue of the reasons underlying the outcome of the transplants. As far as the 
first question is concerned, Alan Watson, who has written extensively on the subject, has 
argued that “law develops by transplanting”388 and from his studies on the spread of private 
Roman law in continental Europe he has concluded that there are two reasons for the 
widespread recourse to legal transplanting. The first centres on the fact that the legal 
profession enjoys a high degree of autonomy, which allows it to operate without responding 
to external pressures of a social, political or economic nature. As he has stated,
“to a large extent, law possesses a life and vitality of its own; that is, no extremely 
close, natural or inevitable relationship exists between law, legal structures, 
institutions and rules on the one hand and the needs and desires and political 
economy of the ruling élite or of the members of the particular society on the 
other hand. If there was such a close relationship, legal rules, institutions and 
structures would transplant only with great difficulty, and their power of survival 
would be severely limited”.389
The second reason lies in the fact that the legal profession has traditionally developed its 
argumentation on authority and precedent and therefore it prefers to refer to and borrow from
388 A. Watson, “Comparative Law and Legal Change”, in 37 Cambridge Law Journal, 1978, p. 315; on 
Watson’s position see also legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law, 2nd edition, University of 
Georgia Press, Athens, 1993; “Legal Change, Sources of Law and Legal Culture”, in 131 University o f 
Pennsylvania Law Review, 1983, pp. 1121-1157; “Legal Transplants and Law Reform”, in 92 The Law 
Quarterly Review, 1976, pp. 79-84.
389 Watson, Comparative Law, cit., pp. 314-315.
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institutions which already exist in foreign legal systems. Therefore, legal change and law are 
generally not the expression of societal needs.390
As far as the choice of the model is concerned, Watson has argued that this depends 
largely “on matters such as linguistic tradition shared with a possible donor, the general 
prestige and accessibility of the possible donor, the training and experiences of the local 
lawyers”.391 Furthermore, Rodolfo Sacco has elaborated on this point by highlighting 
imposing and prestige as the two main determinants in the selection of a model.392 Sacco has 
explained that “[u]sually reception takes place because of the desire to appropriate the work of 
others. The desire arises because this work has a quality one can only describe as 
“prestige”.393 Therefore, transplants may occur without considering the socio-economic, 
political or cultural features of the recipient system. The crucial question is whether this 
affects the success of legal transplants. In this regard, there are two extreme and opposing 
schools of thought, which correspond to an autonomist and a contextualist perspective of law.
The most well known exponent of the former view is Watson. He has argued that legal 
transplants are easy to perform even among societies with different socio-economic structures 
as “legal rules may be very successfully borrowed where the relevant social, economic, 
geographical and political circumstances of the recipient are very different from those of the 
donor system”.394 395
The first contextualist response to Watson’s approach was formulated by Kahn 
Freund, who drew from Montesquieu’s theory that “/as lois politiques et civiles de chaque 
nation ... doivent être tellement propre au peuple pour lequel sont faites, que c'est un grand 
hasard si celles d'une nation peuvent convenir à une autre”?95 Montesquieu found that the 
possibility for transferring private or public was extremely difficult (“un grand hazard*) 
because of a series of factors which determined the “esprit des lois” and which could be 
political, such as the nature of the government, and also environmental. The environmental 
factors can be geographical (such as size and geographical position of a country, climate,
390 However, in other writings Watson has refined this ‘insulation thesis’ by admitting that “law does reflect... 
people’s desires and needs... And who would deny that much of law reflects the interests of the ruling élite?”, 
see A. Watson, Society and Legal Change, Scottish Academic Press, Edinburgh, 1977, p. 4. On the “weak” and 
“strong” versions o f Watson’s insulation theory, see W. Ewald, “Comparative Jurisprudence (II): The Logic of 
Legal Transplants”, in 43 American Journal o f Comparative Law, 1995, pp. 489-510.
391 Watson, Comparative Law, cit., p. 327.
392 Sacco, Introduzione al diritto comparato, UTET, Torino, p. 148.
393 Sacco, “Legal Formants: a Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law”, in 39 The American Journal o f 
Comparative Law, 1991, p. 398.
394 Watson, Legal Transplants and Law Reform, cit., p. 80, More recently, Watson has conceded that transplants 
may undergo change and adaptation determined by a particular context, see A. Watson, Legal Transplants and 
European Private Law, lus Commune Lecture, Maastricht, Metro 2000.
395 Montesquieu, Esprit de Lois, Book I, Chap. 3 (Des lois positives).
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fertility of the soil), social and economic (such as occupation, density, wealth of the 
population, trade) or cultural, such as religion, traditions and customs. By developing upon 
Montesquieu’s theorisation, Kahn-Freund distinguished two types of legal transfers, which he 
has defined as ‘mechanical’ and ‘organic’. The former can be compared with the insertion of a 
part of a machine into another machine and include the transfer of legal institutions which are 
not deeply embedded into the culture of the donor society and for this reason they are easy to 
perform. The latter can be compared to the transplant of an organ of a human body and 
involve the transfer of institutions which are profoundly embedded in a society and its culture 
and are often difficult to perform and can fail, as it is in the case of organic transplants. 
According to Kahn-Freund, therefore, the degrees of transferability of legal institutions are 
variable and depend on the strength of the link between law and society. Consequently, he has 
cautioned us that, “we cannot take for granted that rules or institutions are transplantable... 
any attempt to use a pattem of law outside the environment of its origin continues to entail the 
risk of rejection”.396
According to this author the geographical, economic and social, and cultural factors 
indicated by Montesquieu among the elements conditioning the viability of legal transfers 
have lost their importance to a great extent due to the occurrence of a process of economic, 
social and cultural assimilation or integration among developed countries and the dominant 
classes in the developing world. Conversely, the political factor, signifying the link between 
law and the power structures of a given society, has become more relevant However, Kahn- 
Freund has recognised that Montesquieu’s list of environmental factors has not entirely lost its 
validity, in particular “in the relations between the so-called developed and the so-called 
developing nations or countries”397 given the fact that the economic, social and cultural 
integration is less evident in certain parts of the globe, including in Africa.
Kahn-Freund’s emphasis on the political factor was strongly affected by the 
international political situation of the 1970s, however, it contains elements which are still 
valid and provide a tool for interpreting the contemporary dynamics provoked by legal 
transplants. Apart from highlighting the political differences which existed between the 
communist and non-communist world, as well as the dictatorships and democracies in the 
capitalist world and those between the presidential and the parliamentary forms of 
government, he has singled out another political difference, which is represented by “the 
enormously increased role which is played by organised interests in the making and in the
396 0. Kahn-Freund, “On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law”, in 37 The Modem Law Review, 1974, p. 27.
397 Ibidem, p. 8.
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maintenance of legal institutions”.398 He has clarified that organised groups not only relate to 
groups representing economic interests such as big business, agriculture, trade unions, 
consumer organisations, but also organised groups concerning cultural, religious and 
charitable interests, among others. All of these share in the political power and possess a 
certain degree of influence. For this reason, in order to evaluate the potential success of legal 
transplants it is necessary to address the strength of the link between the transferred institution 
and the power structure of the donor system, as expressed not only in the formal constitution, 
but also by the social groups which, as Kahn-Freund highlights, play a decisive role in the 
law-making and decision-making processes of democratic countries.
The final point which will be made regarding Kahn-Freund’s contextualist approach 
concerns his belief that the knowledge of the transplanted law and its context is necessary in 
order for it to be successfully entrenched in a new environment. In this regard, he referred to 
the import of the British form of parliamentary government to Africa as an example of how a 
transplant can fail as the recipient countries did not share the same history, social structure 
and political consensus of the donor country. Therefore, the use of comparative law, and the 
recourse to transplants, “requires a knowledge not only of the foreign law, but also of its 
social, and above all its political context”,399 otherwise it risks turning into an “abuse”.
A more sceptical view of the feasibility o f legal transplants is expressed from a 
culturalist perspective by Legrand, who argued that “transplants are impossible”. He objected 
to Watson’s approach as it neglects the epistemological dimension of the legal rule and 
contended that rules are the expression and bear the imprint of specific cultures.400 In essence, 
Legrand stresses that “[l]egal systems are but the surface manifestation of legal culture and, 
indeed, of culture tout court”.401 Therefore, it is possible to transplant the rule as a 
‘propositional statement*, but not its meaning, as the latter is culturally determined. A society 
which borrows a legal rule interprets the propositional statement incorporated in it and gives it 
a meaning which is different from the original one. The result is that “a crucial element of the 
ruleness of the rule -its meaning- does not survive the journey from one legal system to 
another”402 and at the end of the journey, a different rule is created. Consequently, even when
398 Ibidem, p. 12.
399 Ibidem, p. 27.
400 P. Legrand “The Impossibility of ‘Legal Transplants*”, in 4 Maastricht Journal o f European and 
Comparative Low, 1997, pp. 111-124. See also P. Legrand, “What “Legal Transplants”?”, in D. Nelken and J. 
Feest, Adapting Legal Cultures, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2001, pp. 55-70.
401 P. Legrand, “European Legal Systems are not Converging’*, in 45 The International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly, 1996, p. 55.
402 Legrand, The Impossibility, cit., p. 117.
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legal systems contain same rules, as far as phraseology is concerned, they remain different as 
their respective culture and “legal mentalités”, (i.e. the cognitive structure of a legal culture), 
are not the same.
A reformulation of the debate on legal transplants, which tries to overcome the 
dichotomy between context and autonomy, has been advanced by Teubner. He has recognised 
the validity of Watson’s thesis regarding the role of the legal profession but he finds that this 
observation is only justified in the sense that the inner logics of the legal discourse tend to 
draw solutions from the global legal system rather than inventing new ones. However, this 
does not exclude that fact that legal transplants are a reaction to external stimuli emanating 
from culture and society. Moreover, it could also be argued that Watson neglects the 
contribution which may be played by non-legal actors of a domestic or international nature.
In addition, Teubner acknowledges the value of Watson’s contribution, which consists 
in demonstrating that legal change does not necessarily mirror social changes. Nevertheless, 
Teubner does not agree with Watson’s claim that the autonomy of law from society is a 
general pattern. This claim is based on the specific experience of the spread of Roman private 
law in continental Europe. In this respect, prior to Teubner, Ewald pointed out how Watson’s 
insulation theory cannot be applied to European public law or to non-Westem cultures given 
its limited empirical foundation. Moreover, Ewald acknowledged that Watson’s critique of the 
“law-mirror-society” approach is valid when it affirms that “law does not reduce to economics 
(or politics or philosophy or society)” and therefore does not necessarily reflect social needs 
and evolution, but it is not valid when it implies that “law is entirely unrelated to these 
subjects”.403 According to Ewald, Watson’s challenge to the “law-mirror-society” perspective 
should be interpreted as a suggestion that in looking at the links between law and society, one 
should be aware of the complexity of their relationship and that “whatever they turn out to be, 
they are unlikely to be straightforward; indeed it is reasonable to expect that the causal 
relationships between law and society will prove to be reciprocal, interactive, and multi- 
layered”.404
Teubner primarily highlights the failure of the proponents o f the contextualist 
approach to capture the complexity of the relationship between law and society. Thus he 
questions the fact that Legrand recognises the pluralism of cultures but ignores the 
fragmentation of discourses existing within cultures, which has been described in post­
403 See Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence II, cit., p. 508 and “The American Revolution and the Evolution of 
Law”, in 42 The American Journal o f Comparative Law (supplement volume), 1994.
404 Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence, cit, p. 509.
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modernist scholarship.405 As Teubner underlines, law is not tied to society as a whole, but 
rather to different social worlds or sub-systems within society. Moreover, law cannot be 
considered any longer as an expression of a nation’s own culture and unique cultural 
experience. “Rather, national laws - similar to national economies - have become separated 
from their original comprehensive embeddedness in the culture of a nation”. Therefore, in 
Teubner’s view, this means that contemporary legal transfers should be seen as “a direct 
contact between legal orders within one global discourse”. However, Teubner does not go as 
far as to say that the ties between a nation’s culture and law have ceased to exist, and he 
admits that “in spite of all differentiation and all autonomy of law we should not lose sight of 
the cultural ties of the laws and closely observe what happens to them when laws are de­
coupled from their national roots”.406 Furthermore, in line with Ewald,407 Teubner argues that 
even where law and society are only loosely tied, legal transfers are not easy to realise, in 
contrast with Kahn-Freund’s reference to ‘mechanic’ transfers. In addition, Ewald has 
emphasised that “legal institutions cannot easily be transferred from one context to other like 
the ‘transfer* of a part from one machine to another. They need careful implantation and 
cultivation in the environment”.408 Nevertheless, Teubner finds that the dichotomy between 
“repulsion” and “interaction” formulated by the scholarship on legal transplants is flawed and 
this notion is based on the misleading metaphor o f legal transplants.409 The core of his thesis 
is based on the idea that
“... ‘transplant’ creates the wrong impression that after a difficult surgical 
operation the transferred material will remain identical with itself laying its old 
role in the new organism. Accordingly, it comes down to the narrow alternative: 
repulsion or integration. However, when a foreign rule is imposed on domestic 
culture, I submit, something else is happening. It is not transplanted into another 
organism, rather it works as a fundamental irritation which triggers a whole series 
of new and unexpected events... They will unleash an evolutionary dynamic in 
which the external rule’s meaning will be reconstructed and the internal context 
will undergo fundamental change”.410
405 G. Teubner, "Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends Up in New 
Divergences”, in 61 The Modem Law Review, 1998, p. 15.
406 Ibidem, pp. 15-16.
407 W. Ewald, "Comparative Jurisprudence I: What Was It Like to Try a Rat”, in 143 University o f Pennsylvania 
Law Review, 1986.
408 Ibidem, p. 8.
409 Teubner, Legal Irritants, cit., p. 12.
410 Ibidem, p. 8. The inadequacy of the metaphor of legal transplants to represent the complexity of the effects 
which may ensue from legal transfers has also been highlighted by Feldman in his study on rights and Japanese
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In this respect, Teubner has provided a convincing framework to interpret the dynamics set in 
motion by the legal transfers. This framework is built on the idea that law and the social 
discourse are tied in a ‘binding arrangement’,411 develop along to different paths, however the 
evolutionary processes which they follow interact and lead to further changes. Consequently, 
legal transfers “irritate” these “co-evolutionary processes of separate trajectories”. On the 
legal side of the binding arrangement, the transferred rule is placed in the new legal context 
and, while maintaining its identity, it undergoes a legal reinterpretation. On the social side, if 
the transferred rule is recognised, it is re-conceptualised according to the language of the 
receiving social system and provokes changes. In turn, these changes act as irritants of the 
legal side of the binding institution “thus creating a circular co-evolutionary dynamic that 
comes to a preliminary equilibrium only once both the legal and the social discourse will have 
evolved relatively stable eigenvalues in their respective sphere”.412 According to Teubner, 
there are three possible outcomes of the legal transfer, i.e. the imported legal institution can be 
completely rejected; it can destroy the binding arrangement; or it can trigger the dynamic 
described above, thus producing a change in its own identity.
Teubner has drawn attention to the pluralistic fragmentation of the social ‘side’ of the 
two parts involved in legal transfers and Rodolfo Sacco has shown that also the legal ‘side’ is 
complex. The phenomenon o f legal transfers does not regard law as a unitary entity, but 
instead as an entity composed of different “legal formants”, which include statutory rules, 
scholarly formulations and decisions of judges 413 In addition to the legislative, judicial and 
scholarly models, legal formants may also be non legal statements, such as propositions about 
philosophy, politics, ideology or religion. Legal transplanting can affect each formant 
autonomously as legal formants can borrow from different models, which are usually (but not
legal culture. He has underscored how unlike legal transfers, the transplants of organs imply the removal and 
substitution o f an organ. In the case of legal transfers there is no replacement but rather an addition. For this 
reason, he finds the metaphor of grafts more accurate than that of transplants. “Grafting, the process of fusing 
the lives o f two different living organisms or the covering of one by the other, better captures many aspects of 
the exchange”. The metaphor of grafting suggests that legal transfers involve a contact between the imported 
institutions and existing ones. Moreover, it reveals that the effects of legal exchange are more complex than the 
alternative rejection/entrenchment o f the transferred institution; see E.A. Feldman, ‘‘Patients’ Rights, Citizens 
Movements and Japanese Legal Culture”, in D. Nelken, Comparing Legal Cultures, Aldershot, Dartmouth, 
1996, p. 220. For different views on the issue of legal transplants, see also Nelken and Feest, cit.
411 On the concept of law’s binding arrangement see G. Teubner, “The Two Faces of Janus: Rethinking Legal 
Pluralism”, in 13 Cardozo Law Review, 1992, pp. 1443-1462.
412 Teubner, Legal Irritants, cit, p. 27. The theory of legal irritants is linked to the theory o f autopoiesis, which 
sees the relation between unofficial and official legal discourses and between them and other social discourses 
not as causally influencing each other, but rather as using each other “as chocs exogènes, i.e. as perturbations to 
build up their own internal structures”, see Teubner, The Two Faces, cit., p. 1453.
413 Sacco, Legal Formants, cit, pp. 1-34.
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necessarily) homologous, and consequently, the various formants may not be in harmony with 
one another.
7.2 Has the Liberal Model of Human Rights Failed in Sub-Saharan Africa?
The analysis of Zambia and Benin has shown that, contrary to Watson’s assertions, legal 
transfers are not easy to realise. In this regard, terms such as ‘failure’ or ‘rejection’ have often 
been employed to describe the outcome of liberal constitutionalism in sub-Saharan Africa by 
constitutional lawyers as well as scholars using the metaphor of legal transplants or, in the 
case of French scholarship, the concept of 'mimetisme*. However, the notion of an outright 
failure or rejection is unsatisfactory as it gives a uniform and static picture of the import of the 
liberal pattern of human rights in the region. The theory of ‘legal irritants’ formulated by 
Teubner shows that legal transfers provoke processes which do not produce a simple outcome, 
instead, they set a complex dynamic in motion, between the different discourses within the 
recipient societies, and the dynamics of these different discourses do not necessarily converge. 
Moreover, this process may produce divergences even within the legal discourse, between 
what Sacco has defined as legal formants.
Thus by adopting this approach, the import of the liberal model of human rights in the 
sub-Saharan African region can be seen as “irritating” African societies and legal systems 
and, consequently, as triggering off different dynamics. The effects of the transfer can only be 
understood by analysing the impact of this model on the various discourses within African 
societies and on the various legal formants of the legal system.
As far as the legal discourse is concerned, we have seen that although the liberal bill of 
rights was formally retained in Zambia, it was largely ineffective due to the introduction of 
unipartism. However, the bill of rights did not simply have a symbolic value, as it allowed the 
judiciary to play a role in the enforcement of the rights and freedoms still protected by the 
constitution. The judiciary, albeit not constantly, demonstrated a willingness to give priority 
to individual rights over the public interest of national unity in opposition to the ideological 
discourse of the time. Therefore liberal values continued to have an impact on the judicial 
formant of the legal discourse.
The situation in Benin was different. In this case, the dynamic prompted by the 
transfer of the liberal human rights ideal led to an outright rejection on ideological grounds 
which was represented by the Marxist-Leninist shift. Moreover, unlike the case of Zambia,
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the judiciary lacked not only institutional autonomy but also ideological independence.414 
However, the legal profession retained its critical stance and was engaged in a reflection on 
the existing legal structures and on the future of Beninese constitutionalism since the 
1980s.415
As far as civil society is concerned, the impact of this transfer was scarcely visible 
and this turns out from the low level of human rights awareness manifested by the limited 
popular participation in the consultation phases of the constitution-making processes, the 
reduced number of human rights cases and the fact that political opposition was not based on 
a human rights discourse either in Zambia or Benin.416 However, a distinction should be 
made on the basis of the fundamental social differences in African society, i.e. the gap 
between rural and urban populations. The rural segments of African society remained outside 
the sphere of influence of liberal ideas for historical reasons (such as the illiberal and non- 
democratic experience of colonialism) and structural factors (such as geographical isolation, 
illiteracy and lack of knowledge of the official language of the law, which was introduced by 
the colonial power). The significance of this exclusion is huge considering that rural and 
illiterate population constituted the great majority of African societies. For example, in the 
1960s, 80 per cent of the population of Benin lived in rural areas and 92 percent were 
illiterate. However, the fact that the rural masses did not have a human rights consciousness 
or any familiarity with the idea of liberal constitutionalism does not mean that they willingly 
accepted the authoritarian systems. They often reacted through passive resistance. For 
example, these tactics led to the failure of the programme of ‘champs collectifs ’ established 
by the government of Maga in Benin in 1961-63,417 which reminded them of the corvées and 
the forced labour imposed by the French. This attitude should be highlighted as it shows that 
the so much emphasised African sense of duty and solidarity, which Maga’s programme was 
supposed to stimulate, was context-specific. The collective effort required by the modem 
state was not felt to be legitimate, while it would have been felt so if it had been asked within 
the traditional socio-political structures. As it has been argued in the previous chapter, 
African societies found themselves in a complex situation in the post-decolonisation period,
414 See for example the justification of the 1977 Constitution by the Président de chambre of the Cour Suprême; 
see A. Paraíso, La loi fondamentale, cit.
415 For example, The Revue Béninoise des sciences juridique et administratives provided space for doctrinal 
reflections on constitutionalism.
4,6 On political opposition in Zambia see M. Bratton, “Zambia Starts Over”, in 3 Journal o f Democracy, 1992, 
pp. 84-85 and M.B. Ndulo and R. Kent, “Constitutionalism in Zambia: Past, Present and Future”, in 40 Journal 
o f African Law, p. 268. On Benin, see R. Banégas, “Mobilisations sociales et oppositions sous Kérékou”, in 59 
Politique africaine, 1995, pp. 25-44.
417 Glelé, Naissance d’un état noir, cit. p. 311.
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where the legal, social, political, economic and cultural spheres were influenced by many 
different sources. On the one hand, the liberal conception of the relationship between the 
individual and community, based on the idea of rights that the former can enforce against the 
latter, did not have any impact on the mindset o f the rural masses. On the other hand, the 
import of the Western-modelled nation-state eroded the traditional understanding of this 
relationship. Recognising the ineffectiveness of the introduction of the liberal conception of 
rights without acknowledging the erosion of the traditional understanding of the relationship 
between the individual and the community, gives a flawed portrayal of post-colonial Africa 
and the extent to which it was ready to accept the liberal idea of human rights, at least in 
regard to the public sphere. In this way, the transfer of the liberal model of human rights 
cannot be separated from the introduction of the modem state political organisation into post­
colonial sub-Saharan Africa.
Unlike the rural populations, the urban and educated components of African society 
mobilised to defend their interests and to react to the abuses of the government in various 
ways throughout the region. Trade unionism in both Zambia and Benin and opposition 
against the military dictatorship of Kerekou are evidence of this. This mobilisation was a 
manifestation of the discontent within the existing regimes, but was not per se a sign of 
support for liberal constitutionalism. Nevertheless, it should be remembered that the 
existence of a bill of rights in Zambia drew the support of a small portion of society. During 
the popular consultation process preceding the adoption of the single party constitution, a 
stronger protection for the rights of citizens under preventive detention was one of the most 
pressing issues of concern. Moreover, the subsequent restrictive amendments to the 
provisions of the bill of rights concerning the rights of detainees and restrictees were strongly 
opposed by individual citizens, civil society organisations and MPs. The extent to which the 
freedom of association was valued was evident from the reactions provoked by the decision 
of the government to introduce unipartism. It is interesting to note that unipaitism was not 
only questioned by three-quarters of Zambians who participated in the consultation process, 
but it was also challenged through judicial recourse. The above reactions indicate that 
although it incorrect to speak of a general liberal political and legal culture during this phase 
of Zambian constitutional history, it should not be overlooked that a section of Zambian 
society felt protected by the bill of rights and was ready to use it not only as a rhetorical 
instrument of political struggle but also as a legal tool.
Finally, it is important to note that the most widespread resistances to liberal 
principles were encountered in the private sphere. In Zambia, like in the other former British
1 4 2
colonies’ constitutions, a derogation to the principle of non-discrimination was permitted in 
the private sphere and this exception was confirmed by the exemption of customary law from 
the scope of application of this principle. This provision was also retained after the 
constitutional revision following the introduction of unipartism. Moreover, even in countries 
where the principle of equality was constitutionally recognised without exemptions, 
discrimination, and in particular sex-based discrimination, was a common feature of the 
private sphere given the force of customary and religious law and practices. Despite its 
reference to the socialist model, even the 1977 Beninese Constitution, implicitly allowed for 
exceptions of the principle of gender equality.
7.3 Explaining the Obstacles to the Liberal Human Rights Model in Sub-Saharan 
Africa.
The following issue which needs to be addressed concerns the reasons underlying the 
obstacles described above to the entrenchment of the liberal model of human rights in sub- 
Saharan Africa.
7.3.1 Cultural Distance
Even Kahn-Freund and Teubner, who emphasise that the process of global integration has 
rendered (the regional or national) cultural differences less strong, recognise that they still 
condition legal transfers. This is even more true in relation to sub-Saharan Africa particularly 
in the first decade of the post-decolonisation period. As Friedman has stated, culture plays the 
role of a “kind of intervening variable” in regard to law and determine the impact of legal 
norms on society.418
As shown in the preceding chapter, the argument of African cultural diversity has 
been instrumentally used by African rulers to justify human rights violations. Nevertheless, it 
is true that the liberal human rights model is based on a perception of the relationship 
between the individual, society and power, as well as of the role of law and the meaning of 
justice, which is alien to traditional African legal and political culture and social organisation. 
The liberal human rights philosophy is based on the idea of entitlements o f the individual vis- 
à-vis society and the state. This contrasts with the traditional African communitarian 
perception of the self, under which “personhood, in contrast to individualism in the West, is
418 Friedman, Is There a Modem Legal Culture?, cit., p. 118.
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intelligible only in the group and not against it”.419 Furthermore, the traditional understanding 
of power as personalised, unified and strictly tied with the dimension of the sacred420 clashed 
with the idea of the individual challenge to the political power. The lack of 
institutionalisation and corresponding personalisation of power in post-colonial African 
political systems reinforced the feeling that any challenge to state acts was in fact a challenge 
against the personhood of the head of state.
A further element of cultural distance between the liberal human rights model and 
African legal culture concerns the conception of justice and the role of law. In traditional 
African culture, justice is conceived in terms of mediation and its function is not to determine 
who is right or wrong between the parties involved in the dispute on the basis of an abstract 
rule but rather to safeguard harmony between the social groups concerned by the dispute.421 
This conception of justice is at the heart of the scepticism that both rural and also urban 
African communities displayed towards the state courts system and, instead, have continued 
to rely on traditional modes of dispute settlement.422
Finally, the economic rationale behind the liberal model of human rights to protect a 
sphere of autonomy from the state in which individual accumulation can be freely pursued 
was foreign to the communitarianist culture and social organisation of African societies.
A caveat should be made here. When dealing with the alien nature of the liberal 
philosophy in African culture, this refers not only to the attitude of the average African 
citizen, but also to African leadership. As Zimba has pointed out, the Western education of 
African political leadership should not be confused with the Westernisation of their culture 
due to the fact that although “African leaders were Western-educated they were brought up in
4,9 J.R. Vincent, Human Rights and International Relations, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986, p. 
39. See also C. Mojecwu, “International Human Rights: The African Perspective”, in J. Nelson and V.M. Green 
(eds.), International Human Rights: Contemporary Issues, Human Rights Publishing Group, Strandfordville, 
N.Y., 1980.
420 See M  Kamto, Pouvoir et droit en Afrique Noire, in LGDJ, Paris, 1987.
421 Du J. Bois de Gaudusson, “Le statut de la justice dans les Etats d’Afrique francophone”, in G. Conac and J. 
Du Bois de Gaudusson (dir.), “La justice en Afrique”, in Afrique contemporaine, n° spécial 156, 1990, p. 11. 
See also E. Grande, “Transplanting Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Horn of Africa: Some Issues of Law 
and Power”, in L. Favali, E. Grande and M. Guadagni, New Law for New States. Politico del diritta in Eritrea, 
L’Harmattan Italia, Torino, 1998, p. 109 seq.
422 As Bockel wrote in 1971: “Quantitativement et surtout qualitativement, le juge est rarement saisi des litiges 
mettant l'Administration en cause” and referred to Senegal where the Supreme Court, the only body competent 
to hear appeals for action ultra vires, used to deliver not more than three or four decisions each year, see A. 
Bockel, “Le juge et rAdministration en Afrique Francophone”, in Année Africaine, Pèdone Ed., 1971, p. 27. 
See also I. Nguema, “Universalité et spécificité des droits de l’Homme en Afrique”, in 43 Revue Juridique et 
Politique Indépendance et Coopération, 1989, p. 343 and P.F. Gonidec, “L’Etat de droit en Afrique. Les sens 
des mots”, in 52 Revue Juridique et Politique. Indépendance et Coopération, 1998, p. 22; A. Moyrand, 
“Réflexions sur l’introduction de l’État de droit en Afrique noire francophone”, in 4 Revue internationale de 
droit comparé, 1991, p. 876.
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the traditional African way of life”.423 Consequently, on the one hand, due to their Western 
education it was easy for them to accept or even desire Western models for their “prestige”. 
On the other hand, however, their traditional upbringing had an impact on their commitment 
to these models. The overlap of these models is a characteristic which marks all spheres of 
post-colonial Africa. In this way, colonialism introduced cultural models in sub-Saharan 
Africa, as well as political, economic and social structures in which Westernisation and 
tradition coexisted and weakened each other’s force.
73.2  The Lack of Preparation: The Colonial Legacy of Authoritarianism
The authoritarian experience of government imposed by colonial powers on African societies 
certainly did not provide a basis for the effective observance of human rights. As Callaghy 
wrote with reference to Zaire, Africa obtained a dual legacy from the colonial power upon 
independence: “an authoritarian one (colonial practice), and one stressing participation and 
equity (the metropolitan values of the colonial power). The former was implanted during 
seventy-five years of imperial domination; the other was a last minute hypocritical legacy”.424 
This provides clear evidence that the “careful implantation and cultivation” of the transferred 
institution which Teubner spoke about as a condition for the success of legal transfers was 
absent in sub-Saharan Africa.
The colonial administration was characterised by two elements: the discrimination 
between Europeans and Africans and the denial of the basic constitutional guarantees.425 The 
governor had extensive powers and was subject to little control from the metropolitan 
parliaments. The district commissioner had an even wider set of powers, which also included 
summary justice. Democratic institutions were introduced late and only a minority of 
Africans possessed the right to vote. Thus, the authoritarian and personalised mode of 
government, which dominated sub-Saharan African political scene until the end of the 1980s, 
had already been experienced during the colonial domination. Political detention or 
deportation, laws of sedition, restriction of movement, forced labour, denial of the right to 
strike or join trade unions had already been a common practice under colonial rule.
The authoritarian colonial experience had repercussions on the political culture of 
Africans. As Ghai has observed, the nature of colonial laws and administration had a double
423 Zimba, The Zambian, cit., p. 202.
424 T.M. Callaghy, The State-Society Struggle: Zaire in Comparative Perspective, 1984, p. 411 quoted in F. 
Reyntjens, Authoritarianism in Francophone Africa from Colonial to Postcolonial State, Third World Legal 
Studies, 1988, p. 76.
425 M. Guadagni (ed.), II modellopluralista, Giappichelli, Torino, 1996, p. 48.
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impact on the understanding and, therefore, on the modalities of the exercise of political 
power. It “had fashioned official attitudes and behaviour and the submissiveness of the 
people to authority”.426 The colonial authoritarian legacy can also be found at the level of 
positive law as much of the illiberal legislation in force in the African states dated back to 
colonial times.
Finally, it should be taken into consideration that the nationalist leadership, which 
found themselves at the head of African states, did not have any experience of government. 
The small African educated élite was only formed and employed by the colonial powers to 
serve the colonial administration. Therefore, Africans achieved their independence, not only 
lacking any true experience of liberal-democratic government, but also without any direct 
experience of government tout court.
73 3  The Lack of Cultural Legitimacy and Commitment to the Liberal Model of Human 
Rights: Political, Economic and Cultural Dependence and the Role of Strategic 
Considerations
Although Watson has argued that legal change occurs independently from forces which are 
external to the legal sphere, the import of liberal-democratic constitutional models in sub- 
Saharan Africa was profoundly conditioned by non-legal actors and considerations. This has 
been clearly shown in the processes which led to the adoption of the constitutions of Zambia 
of 1964 and Benin of 1959 and 1960.
In Anglophone Africa, constitutions were the product of decisions taken by the 
colonial power with African nationalist leaders, neither of whom was concerned with 
designing a constitution to suit African needs and specificities. The former viewed the 
constitutions as a means to retain special links with the former colonies, to ensure the 
coexistence between all of the groups, interests and regions in the new states and above all, to 
provide the European minorities with sufficient guarantees at the end of the metropolitan 
rule.427 428The main concern of the nationalist leaders was the swift transition to independence.
Apart from the specific modalities of the constitution-making processes, the fact that 
most sub-Saharan African constitutions were adopted before independence increased the 
influence of the colonial states and put them in the position of “orienter, sinon dieter, les 
choix politiques des dirigeantes africains”.42* Therefore, Nwabueze's definition of the early
426 Y. Ghai, “The Kenyan Bill o f Rights: Theory and Practice”, in Alston, Promoting Human Rights, cit., p. 193.
427 See Fisher, La decolonisation, cit, pp. 806 and 822.
428 Gonidec, Les droits, cit, p. 78.
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constitutions in terms of “colonial creations’ seems to be a useful description of both 
English-speaking and French-speaking countries. In this case, he was referring to the colonial 
origin of the source of authority of the African constitutions, which was ‘direct’ in the case of 
the Anglophone countries and ‘indirect’ in the Francophone states. The definition of “colonial 
creations” can be used not only to describe the formal aspects of the constitution-making 
processes, as Nwabueze has done, but also the substantial conditions which influenced the 
contents o f the constitutions which were based on the strong dependency of African countries 
on the European colonial powers. It cannot be overlooked that although the transfer of the 
European models was influenced by the colonial states, this was certainly made easier by the 
“acculturation juridico-politique ”,429 30 which was due to the European education and, in certain 
cases, the political experience of the African nationalist leaderships. The political leaders of 
the former French colonies were usually intellectuals, often lawyers, whose educational and 
political training took place in Europe.431 Moreover, in some cases African leaders believed 
that the adoption of European models would confer a measure of prestige on the constitutional 
systems o f the new independent African States, that Sacco points to as one of the main causes 
for the transplants. For this reason, it has been observed how the mimétisme was a 
phenomenon “psyco-sociologique”.432 Models earlier imposed (with the colonisation) were 
then “desired” because perceived as synonymous of modernisation and dignity.
The constitution-making processes o f African constitutions have therefore shown that 
the import of the liberal-democratic model was a consequence of a political and cultural 
dependence of the African élites and also of an interaction of the strategies and goals of both 
the exporting and the importing actors.433 Along with the desire not to delay the independence 
or autonomy process, the other strategic consideration behind the constitutional protection of 
human rights lay in its legitimating function before the international community. This is 
confirmed by the fact that this model was retained in many countries even after the transition 
to authoritarianism.
429 B.O. Nwabueze, Constitutionalism in the Emergent States, C. Hurst, London, 1973, p. 23.
430 See J. Mbouendeu, “La brève et malheureuse expérience du régime parlementaire par les états africains”, in 
33 Revue juridique et politique indépendance et coopération, 1979, pp. 455-458.
431 In the ex-French territories all of the political leaders, except for the President of Togo Sylvanus Olimpio, 
had a French political training. They had been members of the territorial assemblies or the Assembly of /  'Union 
française or even ministers of the République such as F. Houphouët-Boigny, President of the Côte dTvoire. 
Lamine Gueye, Gabriel Lisette and Leopold Senghor had even participated in the Comité consultatif 
constitutionnel for the drafting of the French Constitution o f 1958. See Gonidec, Les droits, cit., pp. 42-43 and 
Mabileau, cit., p. 27.
432 G. Langrod, “Genèse et conséquence du mimétisme administratif en Afrique”, in 39 Revue internationale de 
science administrative. 1973, p. 119, quoted in Darbon, c it, p. 117.
433 See B. Badie, L État importé, Fayard, Paris, 1992.
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The logic of dependence, which was at the origin of African constitutions and which 
underlies the introduction of this model of human rights, had a negative impact on the 
effectiveness of these constitutions. In particular, it undermined the cultural legitimacy of 
human rights norms, which as An-Na’im has strongly argued, is a pre-condition for their 
implementation. As he stated, “[t]o be committed to carrying out human rights standards, 
people must hold these standards as emanating from their worldviews and values, not 
imposed on them by outsiders”.
As the case of sub-Saharan Africa reveals, once political independence was attained, 
cultural independence was also claimed and all of the symbols of dependence had to be 
demolished. The situation of Benin is emblematic of this phenomenon, as after independence, 
the students and graduated from the university of Paris and Dakar, (i.e. the allegedly 
‘Westernised’ elites), called for the establishment of a Marxist-Leninist system.
The modalities and the rationale for the transfer of the liberal human rights model 
undermined its (subjective) cultural legitimacy, in other words the way it was perceived by 
the recipient societies in Africa. The lack of cultural legitimacy prevented this model from 
being evaluated in sub-Saharan Africa in the light of the new threats to human dignity arising 
from the modem political organisation (the Western-modelled state) and also in the light of 
the ongoing changes to the traditional culture.
13.4 The Lack of Forces Supporting the Transferred Model: The Gap between the 
Formal and the ‘Material’ Constitution and the Weakness of African Civil Society
As shown above, Kahn-Freund has argued that “[t]he question in many cases is no longer how 
deeply [a transplanted institution] is embedded, how deep are its roots in the soil of its 
country, but who has planted the roots and who cultivates the garden”.43 35 This statement 
indicates that the success of the legal transfer depends on the presence of forces supporting it 
in the recipient systems. This observation corresponds to the ideas of the theorists of the 
“material constitution”, who explained that the effectiveness of a constitution depends on its 
legitimacy, meant as correspondence to the “material constitution”. The latter in turn 
encompasses the forces keeping a stable organisation together in a network of relations.436 
This correspondence between the formal and material constitutions was absent in sub-Saharan
434 An-Na*im, Conclusion, in Human Rights in a Cross-Cultural Perspective, cit., p. 431.
435 Kahn-Freund, c it, p. 13.
436 On the concept of “material constitution” see C. Mortati, La costituzione in senso materiale, list, with 
foreword by G. Zagebelsky, Giuffré, Milano, 1940 and voce Costituzione dello stato, Enciclopedia Del Diritto, 
Vol. XI, 1962.
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Africa. Constitutions were the product of forces (colonial actors and African nationalist 
parties) which did not represent the material constitution of African states at all, or they 
represented it only partially. This was the case of the colonial power and African nationalist 
parties respectively. The multiplicity of identities, socio-political organisations, personalities, 
interests and values, which were rooted in traditional norms and practices were not 
represented in these processes.
In this way, it could be argued that the gap between the formal and the material 
constitutions is one of the main reasons behind the weakness of the African state. The modem 
state was an artificial creation and an imposition on the African societies, not a reflection of 
them. The model imported presupposed an already established nation, however, nationhood 
was not a reality but rather a goal to be attained in sub-Saharan Africa. As it has been often 
shown, the sense of ethnic and regional allegiance was accentuated by colonial policies. The 
sense of loyalty of African populations towards state institutions was therefore very weak.437 438
The weakness of the African state had a double impact on the human rights performance. 
Firstly, it contributed to the authoritarian shift of African states, which was justified by the 
need to capture forces which were escaping from the their influence and even, in the situations 
o f  secessionist claims, which threatened their survival. Centrifugal (ethnic, regional or 
religious) strains contributed to the erosion of the constitutional human rights regimes in sub- 
Saharan Africa. Secondly, the sense of alienation of the state was also at the origin of the 
indifference of African masses to state politics and their endurance of its abuses. The 
sustainability of this attitude was linked to the level of protection ensured by a web of 
economic, legal and socio-political structures, which escaped the application of state law and
438power.
In this way, it is clear that the ineffectiveness of the constitutional protection of 
human rights resulted not only form the lack of commitment to human rights on the part of 
African governments but also an absence of human rights mobilisation on the part of African
437 See Hyden, The Challenges, cit., p. 271. On this phenomenon, see Guadagni, II modello pluralista, cit.
438 Gonidec referred to “te développement de l ’informer to designate the situation indicated above in which 
“[l]e système d ’État de droit, tel qu ’il est défini par la loi fondamentale de l ’État (Constitution), au lieu de régir 
la totalité de la société, ne règne plus que sur une partie de la société", see Gonidec, L’État de droit en Afrique, 
cit., p. 19. A caveat is needed here. The structures belonging to the domain of the “informai”, are not traditional 
strictu sensu, i.e. they do not mirror pre-colonial ones, but are an adaptation of traditional ways of handling 
economics, administration or justice in the post-colonial context Therefore there are elements of hybridisation. 
Moreover, if traditional law is applied in rural areas, in the outskirts of African cities a “spontaneous law” 
regulates interpersonal relations, above all in the fields of family and economic relation. This law may have a 
very limited scope of application varying even from one city district to another, but in other cases may even 
overcome state boundaries affecting people linked by ethnic or kinship ties, see Guadagni, II modello, cit, pp. 
31-33.
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civil society. The latter was due to the low level of human rights awareness, the existence of 
alternative forms of protection and also to the weakness o f African civil society. This 
weakness was the consequence of coercion and also a strategy of the African ruling classes, 
which “either attempt[ed] to integrate the various social forces into single movements or set 
up intermediary and indirect means of control”.439 Clientelism, administrative privileges and 
allocation of posts in the public sector on the basis o f a system of ethnic solidarity440 41was also 
an effective means to stifle popular discontent. The state compensated the denial of rights by 
distributing favours based on ethnic or regional membership. In this regard, Michalon has 
remarked how the greatest majority of African citizens, represented by the inhabitants of the 
rural areas of Africa, were indifferent towards the massive violations o f civil and political 
rights, which was linked to the fact that the “fonctionnement actuel de l ’État répond(ait), 
malgré les apparences, aux atteintes du plus grand nombre”^
The above quoted comment of Kahn-Freund also explains the hurdles encountered by 
liberal human rights in another respect. Drawing from the image used by this author, it could 
be argued that sub-Saharan Africa lacked the subject who “planted” and “cultivated” the 
liberal garden in the West, in other words the bourgeoisie. When civil and political rights 
were introduced in Western constitutional systems, their respect was guaranteed by the fact 
that the wielders of state power represented and were a reflection of the bourgeois class, 
which benefited from a sphere of autonomy from the state guaranteed by these rights. This 
was not the case in sub-Saharan Africa. Colonial economic policy did not create the 
conditions for the emergence of an African bourgeoisie and instead created dependent, 
“[flragile, unstable and vulnerable economies” throughout the continent.442 Therefore, the 
African ruling classes perceived the state as a source of accumulation of wealth and not as a 
possible obstacle to the enjoyment of the sphere o f freedom which was seen in the West after 
the bourgeois revolutions as essential to economic advancement. Again the ineffectiveness of 
the constitutional protection of liberal rights can be explained in terms of a fracture between 
the interests protected by the formal constitution and those held by the existing social forces 
at the level of the material constitution.
439 J.-F. Bayart, “Civil Society in Africa“, in P. Chabal (ed.), Political Domination in Africa, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1986, p. 112.
440 Moyrand, Réflexions, cit, p. 863.
441 T. Michalon, “Légitime malgré tout: 1’ État africain”, in Révolte et Société, Actes du IV Colloque d’histoire 
au présent, Publications de la Sorbonne, 1987, p. 107 quoted in ibidem, p. 864.
442 B. Munslow, “Why Has the Westminster Model Failed in Africa”, in 36 Parliamentary Affairs, 1983, p. 222.
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73.5 Ideological and International Relations-Linked Constraints
The critical economic situation in which African countries found themselves after the 
departure of the European colonial powers is at the origin of the ideology of 
developmentalism, which played a major role in the marginalisation of the human rights 
discourse in respect to the issue of development. This ideology “centres on the terrain of 
economics where both law and politics are superseded”443 and was not only used by rulers to 
justify human rights violations but was also at the basis of a long-standing underestimation of 
the relevance of human rights in relation to the issue of development, as seen in the preceding 
chapter.
Human rights concerns were also absent from international relations, which were 
dominated by a logic which was detrimental to human rights protection in sub-Saharan Africa. 
In the cold war context, human rights were not a factor which the world powers, including 
Western liberal-democracies, used in establishing economic and political relations with 
dependent African states. On the contrary, it even seemed more useful to them to have one 
strong interlocutor rather than dealing with the complexities of democratic procedures.444
Moreover, the ineffectiveness of human rights also depended on structural problems 
linked to underdevelopment: the ignorance of the law (the majority of the people were 
illiterate), the relatively high cost of the trials, the use of the language of the former colonial 
master, the concentration of courts in urban areas and the lack of adequate training for 
lawyers. These were the main factors that hindered or at least did not facilitate recourse to the 
state judicial for the enforcement of individual rights.445
7.4 What Prospects for the Liberal Human Rights Model in Sub-Saharan Africa?
What conclusions can be drawn from the experience of the liberal model o f human rights in 
sub-Saharan Africa? There are two opposing positions on this issue in African scholarship. 
The first one is expressed by Okoth-Ogendo, who argues that in order for Africa to “develop a 
tradition of constitutionalism... Africa is destined to experience straggles and 
disappointments similar to those through which the older political systems went before viable 
mechanisms for the control, supervision and accountability of power can be developed and 
internalized”.446
443 Ghai, The Kenyan, p. 385.
444 Ibidem, p. 239.
443 R. Degni-Segui, “L’accès à la justice et ses obstacles”, in 28 Verfassung und Recht in Übersee, 1995, pp. 
449467.
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Another position is advocated by Issa Shivji, who argues that it is necessary to apply a 
model alternative to the liberal-democratic one in sub-Saharan Africa, in which the right to 
self-determination and the right to culture are among the core elements. In particular, he 
argues for a conceptualisation of self-determination as a constitutional right of the 
nationalities within the post-colonial states. As far as the right to culture is concerned, Shivji 
stresses that this should be conceived as a collective right of nationalities “to pursue their own 
culture, language and the right of their children to be instructed in their own language”.447 
According to Shivji, the right to self-determination and culture are part of a model of “popular 
constitutionalism”, which rests on two pillars, namely accountable/responsive state and 
collective rights/freedoms.
Both Okoth-Ogendo and Shivij’s perspectives fall short of satisfactorily responding to 
the need to ensure the cross-cultural value of human dignity in sub-Saharan Africa. It is true 
that “liberal constitutionalism proved unable to accommodate the effects of the colonial and 
nationalistic activation of African society, which expressed itself in the assertion of ethnic, 
cultural, and religious distinctiveness, in the questioning of the terms of participation in the 
state and its spatial arrangements, and in associated demands for sectional sovereignty or 
autonomy”.448 However only by focussing on collective identities, Shivij underestimates the 
process of individualism fuelled by urbanisation, the migration, the market economy and also 
the exposure to Western culture. In the 1960s, Glélé observed the individualistic ambitions of 
the educated youth of Benin, which co-existed with a communitarian interpretation of their 
achievements in their communities of origin. Furthermore, a case study conducted in 1976 on 
the Yombe people of Zambia revealed that labour migrants returning to their traditional 
communities expressed discontent with the material conditions of their lives, and began 
looking for satisfaction outside of the community.449 Moreover, Shivij also underestimates the 
potential discriminatory impact of a model of constitutionalism, which is based solely on 
collective rights. He contends that the recognition of the right to culture is compatible with the 
prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of race, religion, nationality or ethnicity. 
However, he fails to see how the right to culture may actually impinge on the principle of non 
discrimination, not only on the grounds mentioned but also on the basis of sex. Adopting a
Paradox”, in Greenberg et al.s (eds.), Constitutionalism and Democracy: Transition in Contemporary World, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1993, p. 80.
447 Shivji, State, cit., p. 397.
448 E. Hutchful, “Reconstructing Political Space: Militarism and Constitutionalism in Africa”, in Greenberg et 
al., cit, p. 218.
449 See G.C. Bond, The Politics o f Change in a Zambian Community, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 
and London, 1976.
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holistic approach to culture, he fails to take into consideration the possibility of individual 
disagreement and the minorities existing within the groups who are the holders of collective 
rights. Therefore, his model may confront the same risks of assimilation that he denounced as 
one o f the faults of liberal democratic constitutionalism. He fails to consider that “[t]he 
modem age is intercultural rather than multicultural” and therefore “the experience of cultural 
difference is internal to culture”.450 Artificial state borders, migration and refugees flows are 
phenomena which affect the composition of African communities to a considerable extent and 
consequently, also the possibility of dealing with culture as an homogenous entity.451
Okoth-Ogendo’s perspective is valid as long as it points to the fact that, in order to 
flourish, constitutionalism needs to be understood as an expression of internal demand and 
also to have internal support. As argued in the previous section, the absence of this condition 
was one of the obstacles to the success of the liberal model in sub-Saharan Africa. However, 
similar to Shivij, Okoth-Ogendo seems to view Africa as an isolated continent, which is 
neither exposed nor affected by external values and events.
Moreover, a specific problem with Okoth-Ogendo ’ s stance is that it assumes that the 
same forms of constitutionalism experienced in Western liberal democracies should be 
applied in sub-Saharan Africa. He does not question whether there is an alternative to the 
liberal model of human rights or whether this model is capable of accommodating African 
specificities. This question appears even more obvious if one considers that this model has 
evolved both within the domestic constitutional orders of Western democracies and at the 
international level. Liberalism has constituted the original philosophical source of the human 
rights regime, however this has subsequently incorporated values and concerns that do not 
belong to this tradition. In fact, a paradox of African constitutional history is the emphasis 
upon the protection of civil and political rights at a time in which Western human rights 
norms had already been enriched by second-generation rights. Moreover, many Western 
theorists, such as feminists452 and multiculturalists,453 have highlighted the limits of the liberal
450 J. Tully, Strange Multiplicity. Constitutionalism in an Age o f Diversity, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1995.
451 On a questioning of the group rights approach in the light of this situation see M. Mamdani, “Social 
Movements and Constitutionalism: The African Context”, in Greenberg et al., cit, pp. 182-185.
452 See for an overview of the similarities of multiculturalist and feminist critique of liberalism, A. Phillips, 
Multiculturalism, Universalism, and the Claims o f Democracy. Prepared as part of UNRISD’s work for the 
Beijing + 5 review (June 2000): Gender Justice, Development and Rights: Substantiating Rights in a Disabling 
Environment and published in M. Molyneux and S. Razavi (ed.), Gender Justice, Development, and Rights, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002, pp. 115-138.
453 See C. Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition”, in A. Gutman (ed.), Multiculturalisme Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, 1994. For a multiculturalist position inserted in a liberal perspective see W. Kymlicka, 
Liberalism, Community and Culture, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1989.
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conception of human rights in its inadequacy to deal with diversity and pluralism and have 
also criticised the excessive individualism of the liberal rights discourse, which sacrifices 
personal, civic and collective responsibilities for the community.454
The two seemingly conflicting arguments, which have been developed in this chapter 
and the previous one, can be summarised as follows. On the one hand, it has been contended 
that the rejection of the liberal model of human rights is not well-founded in light of the 
presence of the modem state, and on the other hand, that the cultural and socio-political 
challenges of embedding liberal rights in sub-Saharan Africa in fact exist. These two 
arguments can be reconciled. As Bajart has argued this false dilemma needs to be overcome.
**[L]1alternative n ’est pas entre Vuniversalisme par uniformisation, au mépris de 
la diversité des “cultures”, et le relativisme par exacerbation des singularités 
“culturelles”, au prix de quelques valeurs fondamentales. L ’universalité équivaut 
à la réinvention de la différence et il n ’est nul besoin de faire de celle-ci le 
préalable de celle-là”?55
The need to provide some form of protection for human dignity which is suitable to the 
modem African context in light of African specificities, such as communitarian identities456 
and values, remain the most compelling challenge. Moreover, the recognition of African 
specificities should be provided through the adaptation of the model to the specific features of 
African recipient societies.457
Post-liberal constitutionalism, which is the concept used by Karl Klare to define the 
1996 South African Constitution, attempts to achieve this aim. This terni has very broad 
connotations, as it attempts to address a wide range of values and concerns. According to 
Klare, post-liberal constitutionalism combines collective self-determination with the liberal 
individual self-determination. It embraces “multiculturalism, close attention to gender and 
sexual identity, emphasis on participation and governmental transparency, environmentalism
454 This is the critique that Maiy Anne Glendon addresses to the US rights talk, see A.M. Glendon, Rights Talk. 
The Impoverishment o f Political Discourse, The Free Press, New York, 1991.
455 Bayart, Illusion, c it, p. 242.
456 There are several models which propose to recognise culture diversity. For a critical overview see R. 
Bellamy, “Dealing with Difference: Four Models of Pluralist Politics”, in 53 Parliamentary Affairs, 2000, pp. 
198-217. See also Y. Ghai, Autonomy and Ethnicity. Negotiating Competing Claims in Multi-Ethnic States, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000.
457 On the need to recognise “the specificity of every culture and the need for transformative strategies in 
different societies” as an essential condition for avoiding the failure of human rights domestic and international 
protection, see P. Alston, “A Framework for the Comparative Analysis of Bills of Rights”, in Alston, 
Promoting, cit., pp. 3-4. In 1960, Northrop stated that “in introducing foreign legal and political norms into 
society, those norms will become effective and take root only if they incorporate also a part at least of the norms 
and philosophy of the native society”, see F.S.C. Northrop “The Comparative Philosophy of Comparative Law”, 
in 45 Cornell Law Quarterly, 1960, p. 657, quoted in Legrand, The Impossibility, c it, ft. 22, p. 118.
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and the extension of democratic ideals into the ‘private sphere”*.458 In human rights terms, 
this means that along with the recognition of civil and political rights, this enriched version of 
constitutionalism, incorporates social and economic rights, affirmative duties on the state, 
cultural rights and the horizontal effects of the bill of rights. The accommodation of cultural 
specificities does not only relate to the content and the holders of rights, but also to the 
enforcement mechanisms.459 However, this accommodation is not unproblematic. As 
mentioned above and as it will be argued in more detail in Chapter 9, the recognition of 
multiculturalism in the form of collective rights poses serious questions for their 
reconciliation with individual rights, and particularly with the principle of non-discrimination.
458 K.E. Klare, “Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism”, in 14 South African Journal o f Human 
Rights, 1998, p. 4.
459 The South African Constitution includes the right to bring a human rights case before die judiciary not only 
to “anyone acting in their own interest”, but also to “anyone acting on behalf of another person who cannot act 
in their own name”, "anyone acting as a member of, or in the interest of, a group or class of persons”, “anyone 
acting in the public interest” and finally also “an association acting in the interest of its members” (Article 38). 
Moreover, it has enlarged the notion of enforcement beyond that of justiciability providing for a series of 
independent state institutions having powers of human rights promotion, investigation, monitoring, education, 
research, reporting and advice. They include the Human Rights Commission, the Commission for the Promotion 
and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities and the Commission for Gender 
Equality (Chapter 9). These provisions provide a response to the difficulty of individual citizens seeking judicial 
redress due to cultural reasons and also structural problems such as poverty and illiteracy.
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PART III: HUMAN
CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEMS
RIGHTS IN CONTEMPORARY
CHAPTER 8: Human Rights and the New Constitutions of the 1990s
8.1 The Constitutional Developments of the 1990s, African Struggles and Economic 
Conditionality
The beginning of the 1990s marked a new phase in the constitutional and political history of 
sub-Saharan Africa. This was due to the adoption of multipartism and organised elections in 
all o f  the countries which had been one-party or military states until then. This political 
change was constitutionally sanctioned. New constitutions were adopted or the existing ones 
were amended at such a rate that Glélé has described the region as affected by a “fièvre 
constitutionnel”.460 The main feature of this new constitutional phase is the renewed 
emphasis upon the principles and institutions of liberal democratic constitutionalism461 with 
the corresponding incorporation of legally enforceable provisions devoted to the protection of 
hum an rights.
What are the causes of this constitutional activism and above all of the revival of the 
liberal-democratic model? The factors underlying this development can be explained by both 
endogenous and exogenous forces. Differences exist in the scholarly interpretation of these 
factors as the study of the Zambia and Benin cases will show. External factors, in the form of 
economic and political conditionality, intervened when internal demand for change was 
already present.462 The constitutional developments o f the early 1990s were directly linked to 
the failure o f African political leaderships to accomplish the objectives which they had set out 
upon independence and which they also used to justify authoritarian regimes, such as the 
need to deal with under-development and to guarantee the coexistence of the diverse ethnic 
and religious groups within African society. The contrast between the poverty of the masses 
and the lifestyle and enormous fortunes of many African autocrats fuelled the rebellion of 
African masses, which expressed their resentment by not paying taxes, abstaining from 
elections and “withdrawing” in economic and political “informal” spaces. In the mid-1980s,
460 M. Glélé, “La constitution ou loi fondamentale”, in Encyclopédie juridique de l'Afrique, Tome I, cited in J. 
du Bois de Gaudusson, G. Conac and C. Desouches (eds.), Les Constitutions africaines publiés en langue 
française, Documentation française, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 1997, vol. 2, p. 9.
461 The only partial exception to this trend is the 1995 Constitution of Uganda, which does not recognise the 
right to form and join parties, having opted for a “movement” model which is subject to periodical revision 
through referendum. A referendum was held in 2000 and this confirmed the ‘no-party’ system.
462 See J.A. Wiseman, “Introduction: the Movement Towards Democracy”, in J.A. Wiseman, Democracy and 
Political Change in sub-Saharan Africa, Routledge, London and New York, 1995, p. 4.
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the economic crisis, which was also due to the fall in commodity prices, became more acute 
and unbearable, and this tacit rebellion began to assume more vocal forms. The delay of 
several months in the payments of salaries, unemployment and even famine hit many sub- 
Saharan African countries. As a result, sub-Saharan African states were placed under the 
observation of the Bretton Woods institutions, which demanded the adoption of austerity 
measures to redress the crisis. These measures, in turn, entailed even bigger sacrifices for the 
populations, in terms of price increases, salary decreases and, in addition, a cut in the number 
of posts in the public sector. The impact o f these policies on the population was dramatic, 
considering the fact that the public and parastatal sector absorbed between forty and sixty 
percent of the total workforce in sub-Saharan Africa. The dismissal of public employees 
without offering any safety nets for them and for their (extended) dependent families, in a 
situation of price increases, further undermined the legitimacy of African governments 
among their populations. In this way, citizens were paying a high price for the 
mismanagement of their government and the austerity measures laid down by the Bretton 
Woods institutions to redress it. The social and human costs were so high that by this stage, 
African citizens showed that they were not willing to bear the Structural Adjustment Policies 
(SAPs). SAP led to a climax in public outrage which had been simmering in recent years. 
Anti-SAPs protests took place in Nigeria, Ghana, Zaire, Zambia, Kenya and Benin. Students, 
trade unions, Christian churches and Islamic confréries were the most active actors in this 
mobilisation. An important role was also played by lawyers, including both professionals and 
academics. Support also came from the African Diaspora, which was composed of Africans 
exiled abroad. The inability of the regimes to sustain their clientelistic policies also ended up 
eroding the support they enjoyed within their own structures, including the party, the 
legislature and the army.
The opposition movement put forward a very simple, but ‘revolutionary* demand, 
namely multi-party democracy. African civil society made the instrumental link between 
development and civil and political liberties, which had been so contested by African leaders 
and also by some scholars. The political demand also had a socio-economic motivation as 
citizens called for employment opportunities and decent living conditions. They also realised 
that the right to freely choose an accountable government was an essential step in achieving 
these objectives.
The success of the demand for freedom and democracy was certainly helped by the 
dramatic changes which were taking place in the international geo-political scene since 1989. 
The perestroika introduced by Gorbachev in the USSR and the collapse of Communist
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regimes in Central and Eastern Europe had a strong impact in sub-Saharan Africa. The 
knowledge of the fall of European Communist autocrats boosted the morale of Africans and 
they also realised that their struggle was capable of succeeding. At the same time, African 
regimes belonging to the Soviet orbit lost not only their main financial and military supporter 
but also the ideological reference, which they had used until then to justify their regimes. It is 
not by chance that the first countries to reintroduce multipartism were the Marxist states. The 
collapse of Communist regimes in Eastern and Central Europe also had a further consequence 
as it drastically changed international relations. Western powers could no longer justify also 
to their domestic public opinion that their support for authoritarian regimes was necessary to 
block the ‘Communist risk’.463 A turning point in this respect was the meeting of the French 
President and the African Heads of States at La Baule in June 1990, when Mitterand declared 
that progress in démocratisation would be awarded with a stronger cooperation. Due to the 
critical economic and financial situation and the lack of alternatives, only the President of 
Chad Hissène Habré challenged this declaration as an interference with the domestic affairs 
o f his country. Following France, all of the other Western donors, including the UK, the 
USA, Germany, Canada, Belgium and the European Community started to use progress in 
political liberalisation as a condition to aid. The weight of this conditionality was extremely 
relevant, as African governments depended enormously upon external assistance. In parallel 
with donor countries, the Bretton Woods institutions also used political liberalisation as a 
condition for the continuation of their programs of structural adjustment. This modification in 
the international financial institutions’ policies was also due to the realisation that their 
traditional theory that growth was only a matter of economic and financial policy was flawed. 
The failure of the structural adjustment programs of the 1980s in sub-Saharan Africa and the 
inability of African governments to repay their debts to the World Bank provided inescapable 
evidence. For this reason, the World Bank introduced the concept of ‘good governance’ in its 
jargon in the late 1980s. The World Bank observed:
“A root cause of weak economic performance in the past has been the failure of 
public institutions. Private sector initiative and market mechanisms are important, 
but they must go hand in hand with good governance -  a public service that is
463 In fact, the terrorist attacks on the US on 11th September 2002 have had an impact on the attitude of Western, 
and in particular, US policy vis-à-vis human rights in sub-Saharan Africa. The ‘fight against terrorism’ has 
shaped US foreign policy. As before with the fight against the spread of the Soviet influence in sub-Saharan 
Africa, the Bush administration currently maintains good relations with states which have an appalling human 
rights performance and justify it with the priority of preventing international terrorism, see Human Rights 
Watch, African Overview 
at http://hm.org/wr2k2/africa.html
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efficient, a judicial system that is reliable, and an administration that is
accountable to the public”.464
Good governance certainly is a narrower concept than that of democracy and even more so 
than that of human rights, however it represented a significant evolution in the World Bank’s 
neo-liberal approach, which had neglected the role of rules and institutions for the efficient 
functioning of the market until then.
Upon careful observation, we can see that differences existed between African civil 
society’s demands and the content of political conditionality of the donor community. The 
claim for multiparty democracy by the former did not immediately correspond with the latter. 
Not all of the donors were willing to upset their African partners by introducing the issue of 
multi-party democracy. Douglas Hurd, the British Foreign Secretary, initially only spoke of 
good governance, as he believed that it was too soon to speak of democracy. Similarly, when 
the Minister for Overseas Development, Baroness Chalker, called for democracy, she 
justified it in mere economic terms, as in the case of the World Bank.465 In 1990, Jacques 
Chirac, the then mayor of Paris, bluntly stated during a trip to Benin that multipartism was 
not appropriate for Africa. However, the link between aid and democracy ultimately 
prevailed. Thus, Douglas Hurd, after initial hesitations, firmly indicated that democracy and 
human rights were a condition for aid: “Countries that tend towards pluralism, public 
accountability, respect for human rights, market principles, should be encouraged. 
Governments which persist with repressive policies, corrupt management, wasteful 
discredited economic systems should not expect us to support their folly with scarce aid 
resources which could be better used elsewhere”.466 This declaration clearly summarises the 
political and economic models which African governments had to comply with if they wished 
to continue to receiving aid: liberal-democracy and free market.
The combination of the internal demand and the external pressures forced incumbent 
African governments to reintroduce political pluralism and formally to recognise it in 
renewed constitutional frameworks which guaranteed civil and political liberties.
464 World Bank, Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth, 1989, Washington D.C., p. vii.
465 See R. Dowden, “Reflections on Democracy in Africa”, in 92 African Affairs, 1993, p. 609.
466 Transcript of speech given to the Overseas Development Institute in London on 6th June 1990 cited in P. 
Slinn, “A Fresh Start for Africa? New African Constitutional Perspectives for the 1990s”, in 35 Journal o f 
African Law, 1991, p. 3.
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8.2 Human Rights Constitutional Protection in Context
The position of human rights in the new constitutional systems of sub-Saharan African 
cannot be appreciated if the context in which they were adopted is not taken into account. In 
this respect, it should be highlighted that in the 1990s, human rights had a prominent moral 
and legal force, in contrast with the 1960s.
Firstly, African governments were no longer in a position to challenge the legitimacy 
and allege the cultural ‘foreignity’ of the international human rights system. Since 
decolonisation, many international human rights instruments had been adopted with the 
participation of African sovereign states, and the adoption and even conceptualisation of 
some of these instruments owe much to the African contribution. This was the case, for 
example, with the 1966ICESCR, the 1965 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination (CERD) and 1986 Declaration on the Right to Development.
Moreover, the adoption of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights in 1981 
represented a commitment on the part of African governments to a human rights model 
which, despite some concessions to African values and traditions, is grounded on the 
principles within UDHR. Although the power of the African Charter was underestimated by 
African leaders, it had a significant impact in spreading the idea of human rights throughout 
the region and in providing Africans with a tool for challenging authoritarianism and abuses. 
African lawyers used the Charter to set up organisations in defence of human rights and to 
sensitise the population on human rights issues.467
The prominence that human rights have gained is also due the work of international 
human rights organisations like Amnesty International, which have fostered a global human 
rights culture and also contributed to the emergence of the idea that states can be judged on 
the basis of their human rights record. In the 1960s, international legitimacy could be sought 
through formal acts of incorporating of human rights norms in the constitutional systems. In 
the 1990s, States were judged on the basis of human rights compliance. This does not mean 
that international relations are always informed by this criterion as the Cold War period has 
shown in the past and as the events following the terrorist attacks of 11th September 2002 
show today. However, dealing with states with a poor human rights record is perceived as a 
controversial issue and is often criticised by civil society around the world.
A further element which has conditioned the centrality of human rights is the 
flourishing of NGOs involved in international co-operation. They have often operated beyond
467 G. Conac, “Le processus de démocratisation en Afrique”, in G. Conac (dir.) L !Afrique en transition vers te 
pluralisme politique, Economica Ed., Paris, 1993, p. 30.
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the narrow development field and have been involved in human rights promotion by 
supporting African human rights associations or opposition parties. The 1990s also 
represented the decade of the blossoming of several African NGOs working on gender issues, 
environment, human rights and election monitoring. Until then, the few non-governmental 
organisations working in sub-Saharan Africa were branches of European-based NGOs, such 
as Amnesty International or la Fédération International des Droits de l ’Homme, and North 
American based non-governmental organisations.468 As the following chapter will show, 
African NGOs have played a fundamental role in fostering a human rights culture in the 
region and keeping a check on the action of the government. Among them, women’s groups 
have proved to be the most active and aware.
The 1990s were the decade in which several conferences concerning human rights 
were held with the result o f globalising the debate on human rights as well as giving human 
rights global visibility. The 1993 Vienna World Conference on Human Rights represented a 
crucial moment in the history of human rights in Africa because it marked the formal 
abandonment of any cultural relativist claim by African states. While Asian countries 
opposed the idea of universality of human rights 469 African countries supported the principle 
that “[a] 11 human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated”.470 This 
position also emerges from the Declaration adopted by the Ministers and representatives of 
the African States gathered at Tunis from 2nd to 6th November 1992 in preparation for the 
World Conference according to General Assembly Resolution 46/116 of 17 December 1991. 
This Declaration, known as the Tunis Declaration,471 472proclaims that “[t]he universal nature 
o f human rights is beyond question’A11 and that ‘f t]  heir protection and promotion are the 
duty o f all states, regardless o f their political, economic or cultural systems ”.473 In addition, 
it declares that ' f t] he principle o f the indivisibility o f human rights is sa cro sa n ctCertainly 
African predisposition to adhere to the idea of universality of human rights can be explained 
not only by internal developments, including the adoption of a regional Charter on Human
468 A. Aidoo, “Africa: Democracy without Human Rights?, in 15 Human Rights Quarterly, 1993, p. 71.
469 See C.M. Cema, “Universality of Human Rights and Cultural Diversity: Implementation of Human Rights in 
Different Socio-Cultural Contexts”, in 16 Human Rights Quarterly, 1994, p. 740; P. Van Dijk, “A Common 
Standard of Achievement About Universal Validity and Uniform Interpretation of International Human Rights 
Norms”, in 13 Netherlands Quarterly o f Human Rights, 1995, p. 105.
470 See World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna, 14-25 June 1993, Vienna Declaration and Programme o f 
Action, I para. 5, Distr. GENERAL A/CONF. 157/23 12 July 1993
at http:www.unhchr.ch/html/menu5/il/vienna.htm
471 See World Conference on Human Rights, Report o f the Regional Meeting for Africa o f the World Conference 
on Human Rights, Tunis, 2nd-6th November 1992, Distr. GENERAL A/CONF. 157/PC/57 2 November 1992, 
at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu5/wctunis.htm
472 Par. 2.
473 Ibidem.
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Rights, but also with the fact that African states enjoy a much weaker position than the Asian 
ones vis-à-vis Western countries. Having lost any alternative economic, military and 
ideological support, they had no real choice but to adhere to the ideals promoted by the 
West.474
These Conferences provided a valuable forum for discussion. For example, since the 
Fourth World Conference on Women held in Beijing in 1995, these conferences have been 
open to civil society organisations, thus, giving the opportunity to African NGOs to network 
with other African and non-African organisations. Although the ‘information revolution* has 
only affected sub-Saharan Africa to a limited extent in comparison to other regions, it has also 
helped sub-Saharan African civil society groups working in the field of human rights 
promotion or protection to exchange information and to build alliances. The contemporary era 
is characterised by the combination of actions, not necessarily operating in coordination. 
Western civil societies are increasingly aware o f events elsewhere and increasingly exert 
pressure on their governments not to support administrations violating human rights. 
Governments cannot ignore this pressure, not only because of its moral force, but above all 
for electoral and financial reasons (in the case for example of the customers’ action). This 
action reinforces the work done in parallel by non-Westem civil societies’ groups, which is 
addressed to their own governments.
In conclusion, as Wilson has stated: “[t]he past few decades have witnessed the 
inexorable rise of the application of international human rights law as well as the extension of 
a wider public discourse on human rights, to the point where human rights could be seen as 
one of the most globalised political values of our time”.475
The force of human rights rests on their effectiveness as a tool to articulate and 
communicate claims and to denounce injustice. Women, indigenous peoples, ethnic 
minorities express their claims before national or international institutions in terms of human
474 The only concession made to a distinctive African approach to human rights was the emphasis given to 
second generation rights and to the right to development: [p]olitical freedom when not accompanied by respect 
fo r economic, social and cultural rights is precarious. The right to development is inalienable. Human rights, 
development and international peace are interdependent. ”474 Furthermore, African countries reaffirmed their 
attachment to the right to self-determination and free choice of their political and economic systems and 
institutions. Moreover, they affirmed that the institutional means to translate the principles set out in the 
International Bill of Right and in the African Charter into practice are a matter of internal choice. After having 
stated that "[t]he observance and promotion o f human rights are undeniably a global concern and an objective 
to the realisation to which all States, without exception, are called upon to contribute ", they went on to add that 
"no ready-made model can be prescribed at the universal level since the historical and cultural realities o f each 
nation and the traditions, standards and values o f each people cannot be disregarded ” (para. 5). This latter 
principle was, however, also asserted by the Final Declaration of the Vienna Conference.
475 Wilson, Human Rights, Culture and Context, cit, in Wilson, Human Rights, Culture & Context, cit, p. 1.
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rights. Human rights have thus become a ‘cultural practice’,476 employed by different social 
actors for diverse aims.
The constitutions enacted in sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s reflect the prominence 
that human rights have gained both at international level and more specifically, at regional 
(African) level. Furthermore, they also express the dual function of human rights today. On 
the one hand, human rights are used as a criterion in the relationship between aid donors and 
recipients, and they are also used in the political discourse of African leaders, although this is 
often of a rhetorical nature. On the other hand, it is a ‘language of emancipation’.477 This 
language, which was created in another cultural context, has been subject to a process of 
appropriation by the African masses. The analysis of the processes which has led to the 
democratic transition, and which will be carried out in the next sections, will highlight the 
internalisation of the human rights language in the African civil societies’ discourses on 
political power. In the 1990s, the most vocal advocates of the universal validity of human 
rights are African civil society groups, which often accuse Western powers of being too 
tolerant towards African authoritarian states, along with applying a double human rights- 
standard, with one for the West and another for Africa. However, the universal discourse on 
human rights is more problematic when private relationships are involved. In this case, 
resistances still exist, even though an active and mature women movement is struggling for 
the advancement of women’s rights.
The following chapters will attempt a more detailed examination of the factors-and 
the actors which brought liberal civil and political rights back into African constitutional 
systems. Moreover, they will also specifically assess the approach which has been adopted 
towards human rights in the constitutional texts and in governments’ practices as well as civil 
societies’ reaction to such practices. The analysis of the human rights norms and practice and 
civil societies’ discourses will be conducted taking into account the influence of the dominant 
neo-liberal policies upon them. The neo-liberal economic agenda imposed by the Bretton 
Woods institutions and the Western donors has put a new dynamic in motion, and this has 
had contrasting results. This agenda conditions the liberal bias of contemporary African 
constitutionalism and governmental policies. However, at the same time this has provoked 
reactions from civil society who have moved from a mobilisation based on the claim for civil 
and political freedom, and have begun to claim social and economic rights. Interestingly, this
476 See Preis, Human Rights, cit., p. 286 et seq.
477 B. de Sousa Santos, ‘Toward a Multicultural Conception of Human Rights”, in 1 Sociologia del Diritto, 
1997, p. 27.
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rreaction can also be found in international human rights organisations such as Amnesty 
International, whose mandate was amended in 2001 to incorporate social and economic 
rights.
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CHAPTER 9: Anglophone Africa
If it is true that the constitutional renewal of the early 1990s affected the whole region, it is 
equally true that differences still remain between Anglophone and Francophone Africa. The 
latter includes common features both in terms of the constitution-making processes and the 
approach to the constitutional protection of human rights, while the former has displayed a
>1*70 A 7 Q  * i o A
more varied picture. Some countries, such as Zambia, Kenya, Botswana, Mauritius 
and Zimbabwe,478 9081 have opted for the revision of the constitutions in force, while others have 
adopted new constitutions. This is the case of Uganda,482 Sierra Leone,483 Gambia,484 
Ghana,485 Malawi,486 Lesotho487 and Nigeria488 Moreover, Tanzania’s Constitution of 1977 is 
still in force. In 1984, sections two and three on “Objective of Government Affairs” and 
“Rights and Obligations” were introduced with Act 15 of 1984. This amendment entered into 
force on 15th March 1988.
When dealing with Anglophone Africa, it is important to take into account that many 
one-party constitutions were in fact revised versions of the independence constitutions. When 
the constitutions in force were amended in the 1990s, in reality, the original text of the 1960s 
was retained with only a few changes. In this way, the limitations that those constitutions 
incorporated in relation to human rights ultimately re-appeared in the new constitutions. In 
particular, this refers to the exception clauses and the derogative provisions. It also indicates 
that these constitutions had a strictly liberal inspiration.
9.1 Zambia: The 1991 Constitution
9.1.1 Process and Actors which led to the Adoption of the 1991 Constitution
Recent constitutional developments in Zambia have been the outcome of the strong 
mobilisation of civil society against one-party rule. The popular dissatisfaction with regard to 
the government began soon after the introduction of unipartism and in particular, after the 
economic crisis in 1974. The opposition to the regime was carried out by highly politicised
478 Amended in 1991 to permit multipartism and then in 1997.
479 Amended in 1992 and then in 1997.
480 Amendments entered into effect in 1992.
481 Amended in 1993.
482 In 1995.
483 In 1991.
484
485
486
487
488
In 1995, entered into effect in 1997.
In 1992.
In 1995.
In 1993.
In 1999.
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civil society organisations,489 particularly the Christian churches, the business community, the 
legal profession, the universities and, above all, the trade unions.490 This opposition increased 
at the end the 1980s following the collapse of Communist regimes events in Eastern and 
Central Europe491 and the worsening of the economic situation since the early 1980s, which 
was due to a great extent to the fall in copper prices, which is the major export of Zambia. The 
structural adjustment measures imposed by the Bretton Woods institutions made the 
dissatisfaction with the regime even more acute. The demands for democracy were also an 
outcome of the opposition to the structural adjustment programs, which the government had 
to accept as a condition for receiving aid from the World Bank and the IMF. Kaunda 
implemented a structural adjustment programme in 1983, which encompassed, inter alias, the 
devaluation of the currency, the limitation of wage increases to five percent (later raised to ten 
per cent due to trade unions’ opposition), the removal of control of prices and subsidies on 
maize and fertilisers, as well as the adoption o f the foreign auction system. These measures 
benefited foreign enterprises, but they almost destroyed Zambian manufacturing firms in both 
the private and the public sectors, provoked a devaluation of the local currency and an 
increase of the prices of basic commodities and, above all, led to the loss of employment for 
thousands of people. By the end of 1993, 8,500 workers lost their jobs in the textile industry. 
This dramatic situation provoked protests, rallies and riots which convinced Kaunda to cancel 
the IMF agreement and to adopt an Interim New Economic Recovery Programme (INERP), 
which was based on a philosophy which was completely different to that underlying the 
structural adjustment programme. The exchange rate was fixed at Kwacha 8 to one dollar (this 
had previously been Kwacha twenty-one to one dollar), price controls, the limitation of debt 
service to ten percent of foreign exports receipt and the nationalisation of private milling 
companies were introduced. The implementation of INERP was followed by a growth of 6.2 
percent rate in real GDP. It should be recognised that, however, this was largely due to an 
exceptional maize harvest. Despite these results, INEPR was interrupted because both the
489 See G.F. Longu, “The Church, Labour and the Press in Zambia: The Role of Critical Observers in a One- 
Party State”, 85 African Affairs, 1986, p. 394.
490 The labour movement was strong. According to Zambian law (see section 15 o f the Industrial Relations Act, 
CAP. 517) each industry had its union. All unions composed the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) 
which represented 80 percent of the total labour force in formal employment. Its membership was wider than 
that of UNIP, in respect to which ZCTU was able to remain independent despite the efforts of the party to co-opt 
ZCTU leaders. The opposition to the politics of the Government even resulted in three months prison, without 
trial, for the chairman Chiluba and other three leaders o f the ZCTU. At the end of 1989 the ZCTU General 
Council decided to lead the struggle for the réintroduction of political pluralism; see A.W. Chanda, "Zambia’s 
Fledging Democracy: Prospects for the Future”, 25-28 Zambia Law Journal, 1993-1996, pp. 131-32.
491 In 1989 Chiluba declared: "If the owners o f socialism have withdrawn from the one-party system, who are 
Africans to continue with it? ", Times o f Zambia, 31 December 1989.
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Bretton Woods institutions and bilateral donors refused financial support. The government 
was thus compelled to re-enter an agreement with IMF and, in order to obtain a loan in 1989, 
to adopt a Policy Framework Paper, which laid down a plan for the economic reform to be 
implemented between 1990 and 1993 according to the IMF dictates. The conditions imposed 
by the IMF included the decrease of maize subsidies and the shrinking of social expenditure 
to reduce the budget deficit. In June 1990, the prices of high-grade maize meal increased by 
more than the double. This stirred up further riots, which led Kaunda to request the IMF for a 
temporary suspension of the planned reduction of maize mail subsides. The IMF rejected this 
demand and even suspended the financial payment to Zambia. Attention was not paid to the 
hardship that the implementation of the structural adjustment was inflicting upon the 
population, above all in terms of price increases and job losses. In 1975, twenty-six percent of 
the labour force was in wage employment compared to ten per cent in 1991.492 Despite the 
support for privatisation, the trade unions opposed the removal of maize subsidies, labour 
redundancies and privatisation in certain sectors which are considered as strategic, such as the 
mines. The discontent with the SAP also came from the business community, which largely 
was in favour of some of the measures of the structural adjustment package, such as 
privatisation and the liberalisation of the exchange rate. The import and trade liberalisation 
was only favoured by large firms, notably the foreign ones. Economic discontent turned into 
political protest. Together with the labour movement, part of the business community called 
for a democratic change. The response to the popular demand for multipartism was made by 
President Kaunda in March 1990 by promising to hold a referendum on this issue. The 
climate was such that Kaunda was forced to accept the réintroduction of political pluralism 
without resorting to the referendum. A climate of violence was heightened by an attempted 
coup d ’état at the end of June493 and massive popular rallies494 calling for the end of the 
regime. Thus, the government promised that elections would be held by the end of 1991, in 
other words, before the natural end of the term of the government. In July, a National 
Conference on the Multi-Party Option was held in Lusaka.495 The pro-democracy 
organisations led to the creation of the National Interim Committee for Multiparty Democracy
492 N. Simutanyi, "The Politics of Structural Adjustment in Zambia”, in 17 Third World Quarterly, p, 836.
493 Before the attempted coup, the situation was already critical. The government decision to raise the price of 
food, particularly that of maize meal, provoked three-days of riots in the capital and in other towns in June. 27 
people were killed by security-forces, a thousand were put under arrest and a curfew was raised.
494 See M. Bratton, “Zambia Starts Over”, in 3 Journal o f Democracy^ 1992, p. 81.
495 See The Hour Has Come, Proceedings of the National Conference on the Multi-Party Option, held in Lusaka, 
Zambia, 20th-21st July, 1990, edited by A. Mbikusita-Lewanika and D. Chitala, Zambia Research Foundation, 
Lusaka, 1990.
169
(NICMD). In December 1990, Article 4 of the 1973 Constitution was repealed and 
consequently political pluralism was reintroduced* This allowed NICMD to register itself as a 
political party in January 1991 with the name of Movement for Multiparty Democracy 
(MMD) under the chairmanship of Frederick Chiluba, the former President of the Zambian 
Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU).
Before adopting the constitutional amendment which opened the way to multipartism, 
the government had formed a Constitutional Review Commission on 8th October 1990 
chaired by the Solicitor-General Professor Patrick Mvunga with the task of drafting a new 
Constitution.496 The MMD reacted negatively to the establishment of the Mvunga 
Commission and the draft constitution as it advocated the réintroduction of the 1964 
Constitution with the necessary amendments. This was due to their distrust for a text 
elaborated by UNIP’s government, and one that would require approval by a Parliament still 
dominated by the single party. The situation of stalemate was overcome as a result of the 
churches’ efforts which resulted in a National Conference where agreement was reached on 
the review of the 1973 Constitution between the government and MMD. The new 
Constitution was enacted by the Parliament on 2nd August 1991 and approved by the 
President on 29th August 1991. This was followed by the holding of parliamentaiy and 
presidential elections on 31st October, which witnessed the overwhelming victory of the 
MMD. Chiluba was elected President with seventy-six percent o f votes and the MMD 
obtained one hundred twenty-five out of one hundred fifty seats in the National Assembly. 
Kenneth Kaunda, who had been President from 1964, gave up his position without putting up 
any resistance.
9.1.2 The Mvunga Constitutional Review Commission and the Constitutional Protection 
of Human Rights
The decision by the two opposing political forces in Zambia to merely reproduce the 
provisions on human rights contained in the 1964 Constitution, which was probably due at the 
time to the desire to hasten the formal end to the single-party rule, does not allow us to 
evaluate whether the approach to human rights has changed since then. However, the 
consultation process which preceded the adoption of the 1991 Constitution reveals the way in 
which contemporary Zambian civil society perceives the constitutional protection of 
fundamental rights and freedoms. As stated above, the adoption of the 1991 Constitution was
496 Statutory Instrument No. 135,1990.
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preceded by the appointment of a constitutional commission which toured the country 
gathering views on the future constitution by holding public hearings from 18th October 1990 
to 18th January 1990. The Mvunga Commission heard oral submissions from 586 petitioners 
including representatives of the UNIP, the MMD as well as other organisations and 
associations. It further received 401 written submissions. The activity of the Commission 
along with its recommendations were summarised in a Report presented to the government in 
April 1991,497 which, in turn, replied with a White Paper.498 Although the Commission’s work 
was not considered in the drafting of the 1991 Constitution because of the opposition of the 
MMD, it is useful to consider it as a testimony of the views of the Zambian citizens and civil 
society organisations upon the issue of the constitutional protection of fundamental rights. 
According to the Report, during its tour the Commission had the “impression” of the 
existence of “a mood o f anxiety, impatience and desperation among some Petitioners; some 
submissions reflected a resentment o f the One-Party Rule o f the past seventeen years”. Some 
petitioners translated these feelings into rather lucid proposals on the matter of human rights 
which had led to the overthrow of the single-party regime. The Report testifies that some 
petitioners were “greatly (emphasis added) concerned about the basic human rights and the 
place they should occupy in the new Constitution. The majority strongly recommended the 
inclusion o f a much more comprehensive Bill o f Rights and the ratification o f other 
recognised rights such as the International Bill o f Rights and the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples ’ Rights ”.499 Therefore, at least some segments of Zambian civil society seemed 
to possess a level of human rights awareness which the political leadership failed to 
acknowledge in the 1991 Constitution.
9.1.3 The BUI of Rights
The 1991 Constitution marked for Zambia the re-constitutionalisation of political pluralism 
and the re-adoption of the liberal-democratic model. Article 1 sanctions the end of the one- 
party era and the supremacy of the constitution: “this Constitution is the Supreme Law of 
Zambia and if any other law is inconsistent with this Constitution, that other law shall, to the 
extent of the inconsistency, be void”.
The 1991 Constitution reproduces most of the provisions of the 1964 document 
including the bill of rights which is contained in Part III entitled “Protection o f Fundamental
497 Report o f the Constitution Commission, Lusaka, April 1991.
498 Government Paper No. 2 of 1991.
499 These proposals, which were re-presented in 1996, will be analysed in the next section.
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Rights and Freedoms o f the Individual”. The rights safeguarded are: the right to life; the right 
to personal liberty; freedom from slavery and forced labour; freedom from inhuman 
treatment; the right to property and freedom from its deprivation; the right to privacy of home 
and other property; the right to protection of the law; freedom of conscience including 
freedom of thought and religion; freedom of expression; freedom of assembly and association; 
freedom of movement; freedom from discrimination on the grounds of race, tribe, sex, place 
of origin, marital status, political opinions, colour or creed. The only provisions, which were 
absent from the 1964 document, concern the protection of young persons from exploitation500 
and the addition of sex and marital status as prohibited grounds of discrimination.501 These 
two innovations already indicate the progress made in the human rights protection and the 
influence exerted by international human rights standards. As in the 1964 constitution, 
political rights are guaranteed by Part V in sections 64-65 dealing with the qualification for 
election to the National Assembly and section 75 on the right to vote. The independence of 
the judiciary is guaranteed by the Constitution and by the Judicature Administration Act.502 503
The 1991 Zambian Constitution still includes limitation clauses and derogative 
provisions which were present in the 1964 Constitution, and which, as referred to in Part I, are 
not in compliance with the International Bill of Rights. However, the right to personal 
property is subject to the same regime as provided in the 1973 Constitution. Article 16(2) of 
the 1991 Constitution lists some twenty-seven cases in which an individual can be deprived of 
his or her property. Moreover, the Constitution merely provides, in default of an agreement, 
that an Act of Parliament shall provide that the amount of compensation which shall be 
determined by a court. The 1964 Constitution was more precise on this point as it 
mentioned the “prompt payment of adequate compensation**.504
500 Article 24 declares that "(l) No young person shall be employed and shall in case be caused or permitted to 
engage in any occupation or employment which would prejudice his health or education or interfere with his 
physical, mental or moral development. Provided that an Act o f Parliament may provide for the employment o f 
a young person fo r  a wage under certain conditions. (2) A ll young persons shall be protected against physical 
or mental ill treatment, all form s o f neglect, cruelty or exploitation. (3) No young person shall be subject o f 
traffic in any form . " According to Article 24 “young persons” denotes persons under the age of fifteen years.
501 Article 23.
502 Chapter 24 of the Laws of Zambia. Other relevant instruments include the Judicial (Code of Conduct) Act, 
1999 and the Judges (Conditions of Service) Act No. 14 of 1996.
503 Article 16(3).
504 Article 18 (2).
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9.1.4 Seeking to Accommodate Domestic Traditional Norms within the Human Rights 
Constitutional Framework
One of the most controversial provisions included in the 1991 Zambian Constitution is 
embodied in Article 23(4), which allows for exceptions to the principle of non-discrimination 
sanctioned in paragraphs 1 to 3. The first “victims” of this clause are women. Despite the 
inclusion for protection against sex-based discrimination, for the first time in the Zambian 
Constitution, in response to the mobilisation of women’s groups, Article 23(4) was left 
unmodified in respect to the version contained in the 1964 Constitution.505 This provides that 
the clause which states that “no law shall make any provision that is discriminatory either of 
itself or in its effect”506 507does not apply “to any law so far as that law makes provision - (a) for 
the appropriation of the general revenues of the Republic; (b) with respect to persons who are 
not citizens of Zambia; (c) with respect to adoption, marriage; divorce; burial, devolution o f 
property on death or other matters o f personal law; (d) fo r the application in the case o f 
members o f a particular race or tribe, o f customary law with respect to any matter which is 
applicable in the case o f other persons; or (e) whereby persons of any such description as is
cm
mentioned in clause (3) may be subjected to any disability or restriction or may be accorded 
any privilege or advantage which, having regard to its nature and to special circumstances 
pertaining to those persons or to persons of any other such description, is reasonably 
justifiable in a democratic society” (emphasis added). The exceptions indicated in paragraphs 
(a), (c) and (d) provide the constitutional legitimisation for both statutory and customary laws 
which discriminate against women. This provision is not in compliance with the International 
Bill of Rights and the other human rights treaties ratified by Zambia,508 including a
505 The 1973 Constitution omitted sex as a ground of discrimination, even though the Chona Commission 
recommended its inclusion and the Government accepted this recommendation, see Zambia, Recommendations 
o f the Chona Commission, cit and Govt. Paper, No. 1, cit Even in 1991, the insertion of sex discrimination was 
not easy. Sex discrimination was only included “in a piecemeal manner after much agitation from women’s 
groups”, T. Kankasa-Mabula, “The Enforcement of Human Rights of Zambian Women: Sarah Longwe v 
Intercontinental Hotel Revisited, in 21-24 Zambia Law Journal, 1989-1992, p. 34.
506 Article 23(1).
507 Clause 3 contains the definition of the term “discrimination”.
508 These are the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women adopted 18th 
Dec., 1979, entered into force 3rd Sept., 1981, G.A. Res. 34/180, UN Doc. A/RES/34/180 (1980); the 
Convention on the Political Rights of Women, opened for signature Mar. 31, 1953, entered into force 7th July, 
1954, G.A. Res. 640 (VII), 27 U.S.T. 8389, T.I.A.S. No. 8289, 193 U.N.T.S. 135; the Convention for the 
Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others 1949, adopted 2nd Dec., 
1949, entered into force 25th July, 1951, G.A Res. 317 (IV), 96 U.N.T.S. 271; The Supplementary Convention 
on the Abolition of Slavery, The Slave Trade and Practices similar to Slavery concluded 7th September, 1956, 
entered into force 30th April, 1957, 266 UNTS 3; the Convention on the Nationality of Married Women, 
adopted 29th January, 1957, entered into force 11th August, 1958, 309 UNTS 65; the ILO Convention on Equal 
Pay for Work of Equal Value, 1951 (No. 100), ILO Convention on Discrimination (Employment and 
Occupation), 1958 (No. 111). Among die treaties concerning women, the only one which Zambia has not
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fundamental treaty in the field, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). Article 23(4) also contrasts with the recent stands 
that Africa as a continent has been taking in the last years as witnessed at the recent World 
Conference of Vienna on Human Rights and the Beijing Fourth World Conference on Women 
in 1995.
The exclusions of the “private” from the application of the principle of non­
discrimination contrasts with the Zambia’s obligations under CEDAW, which extends the 
prohibition of discrimination to the private sphere.509 However, in contradiction with this 
approach, the Zambian Constitution has excluded the “private” from the scope of application 
o f the principle of non-discrimination, including not only “private life” but also any 
relationships with private actors, even outside private life. The Zambian Constitution prohibits 
discrimination merely in relation to laws510 and treatment by persons acting by virtue of a 
written law or in performance of the functions of a public office or a public authority.511 
Nevertheless, a courageous step has been taken by the Zambian judiciary in 1993 in the case 
of Sarah Longwe v Intercontinental Hotel (1992/HP/765). In this case, the court gave
ratified is the Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration o f Marriages, 
opened for signature 10th Dec., 1962, entered into force 9th Dec., 1964, G.A. Res. 1763A (XVII), 521 U.N.T.S. 
31.
509 Traditionally, international human rights law and national Bills of Rights did not grant human rights 
protection in the private sphere. In human rights literature, the term “private” refers either to the “nature or 
character of the actor” committing a human rights violation (governmental or non-governmental), or to the 
“different spheres of life and action. The ‘private* is frequently associated with the home, family, domestic life: 
salaried employment, business, professions, the give and take of the market, being out of the world”; see Steiner 
and Alston, International Human Rights, cit., p. 945. Conversely CEDAW also applies to the private sphere. Its 
preamble states that “a change in the traditional role o f men as well as the role o f  women in society and in the 
fam ily is needed to achieve fu ll equality between men and women”. More importantly, under the terms of the 
Convention, discrimination consists of “any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis o f sex which 
has the effect or purpose o f  impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women 
irrespective o f their marital status, on a basis o f equality o f  men and women, o f human rights and fundamental 
freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other fie ld \  The definition, therefore, does not 
refer exclusively to state action or actions in pursuance o f a law and, by using the expression in “any other 
field”, also refers to the private sphere. Article 2 of the Convention also refers to private actors and it requires 
states to adopt appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women which may be carried out "by 
any person, organisation or enterprise ” (Article 2(e)). In international law, other steps towards widening the 
application of the human rights regime to private life has been taken; see the Declaration on the Elimination of 
Violence Against Women, adopted 23rd Feb. 1994, G.A. Res. 48/104, UN GAOR, 48th Sess., Agenda Item 111, 
UN Doc. A/Res/48/104 (1994) and the 1994 Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and 
Eradication of Violence Against Women (“Convention of Belédo Para”) adopted 9th June 1994, 
OAS/Ser.L.VyiI.92/doc. 31 rev. 3 (1994), not in force . In the same direction, within jurisprudence, see 
Velasquez Rodriguez v Honduras case, Judgement of 29th July 1988, Inter-Am. Court of Human Rights (Ser. 
C), No. 4, 9 Human Rights Law Journal, 1988, p. 212. The importance of this judgement lies in the clear 
definition of the state’s duty in relation to violations imputable to non-governmental subjects. The Court stated 
that “ƒa]n illegal act which violates human rights and which is initially not directly imputable to a State ... can 
lead to international responsibility o f the State, not because o f the act itself but because o f the lack o f due 
diligence to prevent violation or to respond to it as required by the Convention” (para. 172).
Sl° Article 23, para. 1.
511 Article 23, para. 2.
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horizontal effect to the principle of non-discrimination. The case concerned a practice carried 
out by Zambian hotels which prevented unaccompanied women from entering hotel bars. The 
court ruled against the Hotel and it found that this practice was discriminatory against women. 
The court, which was not able to refer to Article 23, based its ruling on Article 11, which 
provides that every person in Zambia is entitled to the fundamental rights and freedoms 
regardless of his or her race, place of origin, political opinions, colour, creed, sex or marital 
status.512
In a similar way that the private/public distinction is used to justify sex discrimination, 
the priority given to customary law in the constitution is in contradiction with CEDAW and 
the approach taken by Africa on this issue. CEDAW, indeed, affirms that states undertake "to 
modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute 
discrimination against women ”.513 This undertaking has been reaffirmed on the occasion of 
the UN Conferences in Vienna and Beijing, and unambiguously supported by African States. 
In the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, it is declared that *‘[t]he human rights of 
women and o f the girl-child are an inalienable, integral and indivisible part o f universal 
human rights. The full and equal participation o f women in political, civil, economic, social 
and cultural life, at the national, regional and international levels, and the eradication o f all 
form s o f discrimination on the grounds o f sex are priority objectives o f the international 
community” (para. 18). This position was taken also at the regional meeting for Africa held in 
Tunis in 1992 in preparation for the Vienna Conference. On this occasion, African States 
emphasised their commitment to "work fo r the rapid elimination o f all forms of 
discrimination against women”, and called upon "member States to take all appropriate 
measures in order to promote the rights o f women, to put an end to discrimination based on 
sex and to protect women from all forms o f violence and traditional practices o f intolerance 
and extremism, particularly religious extremism, affecting their rights and freedoms”,514 This 
position was confirmed at the Fifth Regional Conference on Women at Dakar in 1994, in 
preparation for the Beijing Conference. In the African Platform for Action515 *issued by the 
Regional Conference, it was noted that most African countries have included the principle of
5.2 For a review of this case see Kankasa-Mabula, The Enforcement, cit., pp. 30-47. This ruling will be further 
examined in the section concerning Zambian jurisprudence on human rights.
5.3 Article 2(f).
514 See Report of the Regional Meeting for Africa of the World Conference on Human Rights, cit.,. AFRM/13, 
para. 5.
515 African Platform for Action adopted by the Fifth Regional Conference on Women, held in Dakar from 16th 
to 23rd November 1994. Distr. GENERAL E/CN. 6/1995/5/Add., 29th December 1994
at gopher://gopher.undp.org: 70/00/eeosocdocs/sow/1995/1995—5.en2
175
equality between men and women in their constitutions and it is recognised that “in specific 
areas affecting women the changes have been made in a piecemeal and uncoordinated 
manner”S16 More importantly, it acknowledged the existence of “the problem of
constitutional rights being abrogated by negative customary and/or religious laws and 
practices",517 Therefore, the Platform, "[i]n line with the Vienna Declaration (para. 38), ... 
stresses the importance o f working towards ... the eradication o f any conflicts which may 
arise between the rights o f women and the harmful effects o f certain traditional or customary 
practices, cultural prejudices and religious extremism and armed conflict”.518 *To this end, the 
Platform urges the removal of discriminatory and oppressive laws and practices through 
legislative intervention.
In the above analysis of the regional approach to the status of women, it should not be 
overlooked that this is a recent development. As seen in Part II, although the African Charter 
adheres to the principle of non-discrimination in Article 18(3), it also stresses the importance 
of safeguarding African cultural values and traditions without addressing the question of the 
possible conflict of the principle of non-discrimination with the principle of equality. 
Moreover, the Preamble states that the Charter is adopted "taking into consideration the 
virtues o f their [of African countries] historical tradition and the values o f African 
civilization which should inspire and characterize their reflection on the concept o f human 
and peoples' rights”. Furthermore, it is declared that “ƒt]he promotion and protection o f 
morals and traditional values recognized by the community shall be the duty o f the State”.5X9 
The emphasis on the need to preserve African cultural identity can also be seen in Article 22 
according to which “a// peoples shall have the right to their economic, social and cultural 
development with due regard to their freedom and identity and in the equal enjoyment o f the 
common heritage o f mankind”. Article 18 is the clearest example of the ambiguous 
approach of the Charter, which, after asserting that "[t]he State shall ensure the elimination 
o f every discrimination against women and also ensure the protection o f the rights o f the 
women and the child as stipulated in international declarations and conventions” 
proclaims that “[tjhe state shall have the duty to assist the family which is the custodian of 
moral and traditional values recognized by the community”.522 These provisions have the
5.6 Para. 55 of the African Platform for Action.
5.7 Ibidem.
518 Para. 106.
519
520
521
522
Article 17(3).
Article 22(1).
Para. 3.
Para. 2.
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potential to render the proclamation of non-discrimination against women meaningless. This 
principle is, indeed, contradicted by the emphasis on “moral and traditional values”, which 
encompass “values” clashing with the principle of equality. The stress placed on the family 
further weakens this principle, given the fact that African women suffer from discrimination 
within the family more than others.523 However, it should be noted that the Charter 
acknowledges that “les valeurs africaines de civilisations n'ont pas toutes la même 
respectabilité”.524 Article 29(3) lays down the individual’s duty “to preserve and strengthen 
the positive African values in his relations with other members o f the society, in the spirit of 
tolerance, dialogue and consultation and, in general, to contribute to the promotion and 
well-being o f society”. Nevertheless, the definition of “positive” values is completely left 
open to interpretation. As a result, Khadija Elmadmad has written that the African Charter is 
characterised by a contradiction between modernism and traditionalism, as well as between 
universalism and regionalism and that it has placed the rights of women in a “coma 
juridique”?25
The constitutional policy adopted by Zambia mirrors the regional ‘schizophrenia’ vis- 
à-vis the issue of gender equality. It is not, however, an exception in the framework of 
constitutions in contemporary Anglophone Africa. Indeed, Zambia’s approach to the 
principle of non-discrimination is also codified in similar terms in the Constitutions of 
Gambia,526 Sierra Leone,527 Kenya,528 Botswana,529 and Lesotho.530 This similarity derives 
from the fact that all of the provisions dealing with non-discrimination in these constitutions 
are a legacy of the constitutional charters left behind by Britain in the sixties. As we have 
seen in Part I, these were all framed on the same model,531 532in which, apart from the specific 
case of the field of taxation, sex discrimination was legitimated by both using the
323 See R.T. Nhlapo, “International Protection of Human Rights and the Family: African Variations on a 
Common Theme”, in 3 International Journal o f African Law and the Family, 1989, p. 1.
524 See M’Baye, Les Droits, cit,, p. 162.
525 K. Elmadmad, “Les droits de la femme dans la Charte africaine des droits de l’homme et des peuples, in 14 
Afrique 2000,1993, p. 26.
526 See Article 25 (4). Gambia does not even include sex as a ground of discrimination.
527 See Article 27 (3)
528 See Article 82 (4). Kenya as well does not even feature sex as a ground of discrimination
529 See Article 15 (4).
530 See Article 18(4).
531 No exceptions to the principle o f non-discrimination are included in the recently adopted Constitutions of 
Malawi and Uganda, as well in those of Nigeria and Tanzania. The Constitutions of Malawi and Uganda show a 
strong commitment to the principle of equality between men and women. See Articles 13,20,22,24 and 30 of 
the Constitution of Malawi and Articles. XV, XXIV, 21, 33 of the Ugandan Constitution. This does not mean 
that women enjoy equality with men in these countries. Political, social, economic and cultural obstacles still 
exist The recognition of sharia law in the 1999 Nigerian constitution, however, raises serious questions 
regarding the extent to which Muslim Nigerian women can actually enjoy of the right to equality.
532 Article 23 of the Zambian Constitution provides constitutional legitimacy to the Income Tax Law (Chapter
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public/private distinction and by relying on the pluralistic character of Zambian legal 
system.
In order to analyse the possible derogations based on the public/private dichotomy and 
to understand the concrete impact of the exclusion of the “private” from the scope of 
application of the principle of non-discrimination on women, an examination of women’s 
position under statutory law is needed. In this regard, it should be recognised that, with regard 
to personal law, much of Zambian legislation grants women a position of equality with men. 
Unlike customary law, the Marriage Act provides that marriage can be only monogamous 
and the spouses have equal right to demand divorce in the case of adultery. Moreover, in the 
case of divorce, wives have the right to maintenance and custody of the children. Married 
women continue to autonomously acquire, hold and dispose property.* 535 Women also have the 
right to a share in the matrimonial property which encompasses the husband’s property, the 
property created jointly or with the contribution of either spouse. This gives courts a wide 
power in the distribution of the matrimonial property in the case o f divorce including the 
power to give one spouse the property of the other.536 However, it should be examined to what 
extent these provisions are applied by the judges “most of whom are Black Zambian men, 
themselves subject to customary law in many respects”; to what extent the courts’ orders for 
the division of property upon divorce are enforced and to what extent women are adequately
668 of Zambian Laws). This law discriminates against married women by not recognising their autonomous 
income in order to determine their tax liability; see section 19(2) of the law. The rate of tax to be applied to 
women’s income is the same as that of the husband. Furthermore, before the reform of 1987, women were 
denied any personal allowance in the form of marriage and child allowances, which under Zambian law, are set 
off against married persons before the assessment of tax. The reason for this provision rested on the fact that 
only subjects with a formal income are entitled to these allowances and, as stated above, only the husband has 
an income for taxation. Following the reform, the allowance is now equally distributed between the two spouses, 
unless one can demonstrate that the other does not earn any income. In this case, he or she is entitled to 60 
percent of the marriage allowance. See Income Tax (Amendment) Act (No. 14 of 1987), section 17.
333 Legal pluralism is a typical feature of African legal systems. It consists of the co-existence between European 
legal systems with African customary law. In the field of legal pluralism, the studies of Vanderlinden have been 
fundamental. He has defined legal pluralism as “l ’existence, au sein d ’une société déterminée, de mécanismes 
juridiques différents s ’appliquant à des situations id e n tiq u e ssee J. Vanderlinden, “Le pluralisme juridique. 
Essai de synthèse”, in J. Gillissen (cur.), Le pluralisme, Bruxelles, 1971, p. 19. While Vanderlinden has viewed 
legal pluralism in terms of mechanisms of conflict resolution, other authors have subsequently given a definition 
in terms of co-existence of different legal orders; see J. Griffiths, “What is Legal Pluralism”, 24 Journal o f  
Legal Pluralism, 1986, p. 1 and G.R. Woodman, “Legal Pluralism and the Search for Justice”, 2 Journal o f 
African Law, 1996, p. 152. For other studies on the subject see M.P. Hooker, Legal Pluralism: An Introduction 
to Colonial and Neo-Colonial Law, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1978; M.P. Galanter, “Justice in Many Rooms”, in 
19 Journal o f Legal Pluralism, 1981, p. 1; E. Grande (ed.), Transplants, Innovation and Legal Tradition in the 
Horn o f Africa, L’Harmattan-Italia, Torino, 1995.
534 Chapter 211 of Zambian Laws.
535 In this regard, see section 5 of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act (Chapter 74 of Zambian 
Laws) according to which a married woman is “capable o f acquiring, holding and disposing o f any property ... 
in all respect as she were a fem e sole”,
536 See P.M. Bromley, Family Law, Butterworths, London, 1981, pp. 523-570.
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advised and represented.537 Furthermore, with reference to inheritance, widows are entitled to 
inherit from the husband’s intestate estate under statutory law and unlike customary law. With 
regard to inheritance, English law, which is mainly entrenched in the Statutes of Distribution 
(1670-85) is applied and widows are also entitled to the husband’s benefits and rights to 
compensation.538 A discriminatory provision is, however, included in the Immigration and 
Deportation Act539 under which a married woman acquires the domicile of the husband.
Apart from personal law, discriminatory provisions still exist especially against 
married women. Among the most challenged, these concern citizenship, which is a matter 
regulated by both the Constitution540 and the Citizenship Act.541 Before the amendments of 
1996, the Zambian Constitution provided that foreign women married to Zambian men were 
only entitled to citizenship by registration, after a continuous three-year residence. 
Conversely, the ordinary procedure for obtaining citizenship by registration was applied to 
foreign men married to Zambian women.542 After the 1996 amendments, foreign women are 
also covered by the ordinary system. A continuing discriminatory provision lays down that 
children bom in Zambia to persons who are not citizens acquire Zambian citizenship only if 
their fathers were legally resident in Zambia at the time of their birth.
Another example of discrimination is the limitation on women’s freedom of 
movement outside Zambia. Unmarried women below the age of twenty-one must have the 
consent o f the father to be put on their mother’s passport, or to obtain their own passport. 
Furthermore, a woman who has the legal custody of her child must obtain a court order to 
give her consent to her child to receive their passport.543 The opposition of Zambian women to 
this practice is demonstrated by the fact that even on occasion of the consultations for the
537 See C.N. Himonga, K.A. Turner, C. Beyani, “An Outline of the Legal Status of Women in Zambia”, in J. 
Stewart and A. Armstrong (eds.), The Legal Situation o f Women in Southern Africa, Women and Law in 
Southern Africa, Vol. II, University of Zimbabwe Publications, Harare, p. 159.
538 In this area among the English acts, the National Provident Fund Act, 1970, the Workmen’s Compensation 
Act, 1977 and the Superannuation and Life Assurance Schemes Act, 1978 are applied.
539 Chapter 122 of the Laws of Zambia.
540 Article 6.
541 Chapter 121 of the Laws of Zambia.
542 This is subordinated to ten years of continuous residence.
543 See Form A, Application for a Passport In 1990, when pressure for a new constitution had already started, a 
protective ruling was given in the case Nawakwi v Attorney General 1990/HP/1724. This case dealt with the 
constitutionality of the administrative procedures of the passport office which required that children could be put 
on the mother’s passport only with their father’s consent while the mother's consent was not required for the 
children to be on the father’s passport The court found that this practise was in violation of Article 25(2) of the 
1973 Constitution which stated that “ ... no person shall be treated in a discriminatory manner by any person 
acting by virtue o f any written law or in the performance o f the functions o f any public office or any public 
authority”. The court judged the passport office and these administrative regulations to be discriminatory.
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1996 constitutional amendments, this practice was challenged by a number of petitioners as 
discriminatory.544
This overview of statutory discriminatory provisions is incomplete without taking into 
account a field where women traditionally enjoy a disadvantaged status compared to that of 
men, in other words, the workplace. In this respect, Zambian legislation545 has been amended 
since 1991 to guarantee equality of treatment between men and women workers. In 1991, the 
Employment of Women, Young Persons and Children’s Act546 was amended and all of the 
restrictions on the employment of women were repealed.547 With regard to wages, the 
Employment Act incorporated the ILO Convention Concerning Equal Remuneration for Men 
and Women Workers for Work of Equal Value o f 1951 (No. 100). With regard to pregnancy, 
as a result of the 1982 amendment, Zambian women are protected against dismissal. 
However, the Employment Act provides for paid maternity leave for twelve weeks every two 
years, and only when the woman has worked for the same employer for at least two years. 
Conversely, the ILO Maternity Protection Convention of 2000 (No. 183) provides for a period 
of maternity leave of not less than fourteen weeks without any conditions linked to the length 
of employment. A gender biased application o f neutrally formulated provisions concerning 
the conditions of service has also created a discriminatory conduct in relation to an 
employee’s entitlement to receive housing or housing allowances from their employers. The 
Employment Act obliged employers to either house or to pay a housing allowance to their 
employees who earn less than Kwacha 40 per month.548 While the Act did not contain any 
reference to whether this right would be vested upon women or men, the subsidiary 
Regulation 87(2) envisages that employers are not obliged to provide for housing for married 
women living with husbands who have an adequate house, or are receiving a house allowance. 
This created a discriminatory situation, which is even more serious for separated, but not yet 
divorced, women who need their husband’s consent to receive housing or an allowance from 
their employers.
Within the exceptions to the principle o f non-discrimination, the most complex relates
544 See Report of the Constitutional Review Commission, cit., p. 42.
545 The basic statute on the matter is the Employment Act (Chapter 512 of Zambian Laws). Other statutes 
relating to employment include the Industrial Relations Act (Chapter 517 of Zambian Laws), Minimum Wages 
and Conditions of Employment Act (Chapter 509 of Zambian Laws) and Zambia National Provident Fund Act 
(Chapter 513 of Zambian Laws).
546 Chapter 505 of Zambian Laws.
547 Before this amendment, the law prohibited the employment of women in industrial undertakings during the 
night, except in the case of a family undertaking or unless some specific conditions were present, where women 
were not engaged in physical labour or only for a limited period.
545 See the Employment Act, sections 41(1) and (2), and the Employment Regulations No. 7(i).
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to the application of customary law. This term549 is used to define “the system of norms which 
governs the lives of millions o f African people, particularly (but not exclusively) those in 
rural areas. It is a custom-based system and its legitimacy lies largely in its claim to a direct 
link with the past and with tradition”.550 The deep entrenchment of customary law in the 
social fabric of sub-Saharan Africa is independent from its formal, constitutional or statutory 
recognition,551 Its application is one of the most sensitive issues when dealing with human 
rights in Africa due to the fact that many customary norms and practices are not compatible 
with individual fundamental rights and freedoms, especially those of women. Under 
customary law, women tend to be accorded the status of perpetual minor subject to the 
authority and guardianship of their father and then of their husband. The constitutional 
recognition of customary law along with the inclusion of bills of rights clearly highlights this 
incompatibility. This question concerns not only Zambia, as in Anglophone Africa, the 
priority of individual fundamental rights and freedoms over customary law is only laid down 
in the constitutions of Malawi and Uganda.552
This issue can be framed in two different manners. Firstly, it can be presented as a
549 Some authors prefer to refer either to traditional or indigenous law.
550 T. Nhlapo, “Indigenous Law and Gender in South Africa: Taking Human Rights and Cultural Diversity 
Seriously”, in Third World Legal Studies 1994-95, p. 53.
i5i In fact, not all of the countries in English-speaking Africa have expressly recognised customary law in their 
constitutions. In the case of Ghana, Malawi, Nigeria and Uganda the recognition of customary law can be 
merely determined indirectly from die acknowledgment of the right to culture. In Article 26 of the Ghanaian 
Constitution: “Every person is entitled to enjoy, practise, profess, maintain and promote any culture, language, 
tradition or religion subject to the provisions o f this Constitution In Article 26 of the Constitution of Malawi: 
“Every person shall have the right to use the language and to participate in the cultural life o f his or her 
choice ", In Article 21 of the Constitution of Nigeria: “The State shall protect, preserve and promote die 
Nigerian cultures which enhance human dignity and are consistent with the fundamental objectives as provided 
in this Chapter", In Article 37 o f the Constitution of Uganda: “Every person has a right as applicable, to 
belong to, enjoy, practise, profess, maintain and promote any culture, cultural institutions, language, tradition, 
creed or religion in community with others
552 The Constitution of Malawi establishes in Article 22 that “[a]ll men and women have the right to marry and 
found a family” (para. 3); and that the disposal according to which “fn]o person shall be forced to enter into 
marriage (para. 4) regardless of whether it is a marriage “at law, custom and marriages by repute or by 
permanent cohabitation” (para, 5). Moreover, Article 26 (2) states that ” ... legislation shall be passed to 
eliminate customs and practices that discriminate against women, particularly practices such as -  (a) sexual 
abuse, harassment and violence; (b) discrimination in work, business and public affairs; and (c) deprivation o f 
property”. The Ugandan Constitution proclaims in Article 33(6) that “[IJaws, cultures, customs or traditions 
which are against the dignity, welfare or interest o f women or which undermine their status, are prohibited by 
this C onstitu tionThe Ghanaian and the Nigerian Constitutions also contain provisions limiting the scope of 
applicability of customary law, although they are formulated in much broader terms. See Article 26 of the 
Ghanaian Constitution: “All customary practices which dehumanise or are injurious to the physical and mental 
well-being o f a person are prohibited”. See Article 21 of the Nigerian Constitution, also supra ft. 202: “The 
State shall protect, preserve and promote the Nigerian cultures which enhance human dignity and are consistent 
with the fundamental objectives as provided in this Chapter” (this includes the prohibition of discrimination on 
the ground of sex, see Article 16(2)). The Constitution of Tanzania is silent on this issue. Section 5(1) of the 
Constitutional (Consequential, Transitional and Temporary Provisions) Act of 1984 vests in the courts the 
power, from March 1988, to apply the law including customary law “with such modifications, adoptions, 
qualifications, and exceptions as may be necessary to bring it in conformity with the provisions o f the Bill o f 
Rights".
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conflict between two modalities of perceiving the relationship between the individual and 
society, i.e. the communitarian view underlying African (legal) culture and the Western 
individualistic philosophy underlying Bills of Rights. In addition, the question can also be 
addressed within the framework of the human rights discourse by viewing it as a clash 
between rights: the collective right to culture and the rights o f the individual. The 
constitutional acknowledgement of the specificities of African own culture and legal tradition 
can, indeed, be perceived in terms of the exercise of the right to culture,553 which is included 
in the International Bill o f Rights.554 However, this interpretation is not unproblematic. On the
553 See L. Berat, “The Future o f Customary Law in Namibia: A Call for An Integration Model”, in 15 Hastings 
International and Comparative Law Review, 1991 (Lexis-Nexis).
554 See Article 15 o f the ICESCR: “The States parties to the present Covenant recognize the right o f everyone:
(a) to take part in cultural life”. See also the Universal Declaration, Article 27: “Everyone has the right freely to 
participate in the cultural life o f the community... In reality, the right to culture proclaimed by the ICESCR
has mainly been interpreted by referring either to Article 27 of the ICCPR which refers to the right to culture 
with specific reference to minorities C[i]n those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, 
persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members o f their 
group, to enjoy their own culture ...”) or to Article 2(1) o f the ICCPR, with reference to the principle of non­
discrimination or, finally, with reference to certain rights such as freedoms of expression, religion, and 
association and the right to “take part in the conduct of public affairs”; see Steiner and Alston, International, cit., 
p. 264. The interpretation of the right to culture as encompassing the right to apply customary law has been 
mainly discussed in relation to minorities or indigenous peoples; see also UN, Economic and Social Council, 
Report of the Second (Social) Committee, 2, 11-12, UN Doc. E/1982/59 (1982) (Adopting Report of Sub- 
Commission on Prevention o f Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, authorising the Sub-Commission to 
establish a working group on indigenous population) as well as the 1992 UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Persons Belonging to National, Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities and the ILO Conventions No. 107 
(Concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and semi-Tribal Populations in 
Independent Countries, 1957) and No. 169 (Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent 
Countries, 1989). Both of these Conventions mention the right of indigenous population to maintain their 
customaiy laws. However, as M. Venter has remarked with regard to Article 27 of the ICCPR, “[i]t seems 
inconceivable that a state can have obligations toward its minorities that it does not have toward its entire 
population. In this context, customary law appears to be a part o f a people’s culture”; see M. Venter, 
“Customary Law in a New South Africa: A Proposal”, in 15 Fordham International Law Journal, 1991-1992, p. 
96. The importance of safeguarding culture has been emphasised also by the UN General Assembly, which 
urged government in 1973 “to make cultural values, both material and spiritual, an integral part of development 
efforts”. Furthermore, a series of conferences organised under the auspices of UNESCO not only stressed the 
relevance of culture but also o f customary law as integral part of a people's culture. In 1965, the UNESCO 
Seminar on Multinational Society urged the “recognition of the importance o f maintaining permissible legal 
traditions in fields such as laws of succession, marriage, dietary law,...”; see UN Doc. ST/TAO/HR/23 (1965). 
On the necessity to preserve cultural identity, see the Declaration of Principles of International Co-operation 
adopted in 1966 by General Conference o f UNESCO. In 1970, the Intergovernmental Conference on 
Institutional, Administrative and Financial Aspects o f Cultural Policies emphasised that governments are 
responsible for financing and planning cultural institutions and programs; see UN Doc. SHC/MD/13 (1970), 
para. 51. In 1972, the Intergovernmental Conference on Cultural Policies in Europe stated that governments and 
the international community have a duty to ensure the participation of everyone in the “cultural life of his 
community”. In 1974, a seminar on the promotion and protection of the human rights of national, ethnic, and 
other minorities proclaimed “the responsibility of the authorities to guarantee in law and in practice the 
maintenance and preservation of such traditions and customs and to provide for their autonomous development, 
where necessary by public financing”; see UN Doc. ST/TAO/HR/49, paras. 10-13 (1974). In 1975, the 
Intergovernmental Conference on Cultural Polities in Africa organised jointly by UNESCO and die OUA at 
Accra declared at para. 32 and 33 that: “The assertion of cultural identity was considered to be an act of 
liberation, a weapon in the fight for effective independence and the best means of achieving the self-fulfilment 
of individuals and the harmonious development of societies. It was, moreover, the first pre-requisite for the 
advent of a new world order, based on the inalienable right of nations to dispose of themselves and on
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one hand, the safeguarding of customary law can be seen as instrumental for the preservation 
o f  African cultural values, 555 whilst, on the other hand, it could be challenged as also being 
instrumental for the maintenance a situation of inequality in the enjoyment of rights between 
m en and women. Therefore, as Venter has highlighted, “[t]he challenge confronting the 
legislator and the judiciary ... is reconciling the apparently conflicting, but arguably equally 
valid, legal premises”,556 that is women’s human rights557 and cultural rights. Moreover, it 
could be argued that a critical approach should be taken when linking customary norms with 
culture. The customary law which is referred to concerns the customary law as it was codified 
by  the colonial administrators,558 with the collaboration of the indigenous élite composed of 
traditional authorities and the heads of families. Women, together with young men, were 
excluded from this process,559 and as a consequence, they could not present their views on 
what constituted customary law. The male élite obviously emphasised the patriarchal features 
o f  African traditions. It was not only the processes that were traditionally subject to 
negotiations and compromises which were crystallised according to the views put forward by 
men, but new traditions were also “imagined into existence” if necessary by the colonial
recognition of the absolute equality and dignity of all cultures. However, the assertion of cultural identity 
presupposed resolution and deliberate action to remove the element of alienation inherent in forms of thought 
and action which were foreign to African reality, and the abandonment of undue susceptibility to outside 
influences which still too often characterised certain kinds of behaviour. There could be no genuine 
independence without cultural decolonisation”. In 1976, the General Conference of UNESCO held in Nairobi 
(nineteenth session) adopted a Recommendation on the Participation by the People at Large in Cultural Life and 
their Contribution, in which it recommended that states should guarantee cultural rights and equality of cultures.
555 W. Benedek, “The Role of International Law in the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights of Women in 
Africa”, in 49 Austrian Journal o f Public and International Law, 1995, p. 274.
556 CM. Venter, “The New South African Constitution: Facing the Challenges of Women’s Rights and Cultural 
Rights in Post-Apartheid South Africa”, in 21 Journal o f Legislation, 1995 (Lexis-Nexis). The author 
specifically refers here to South Africa, but her argument can be extended to the whole Sub-Saharan Africa.
5S? In this thesis, the expression “women’s human rights” is used instead of “women’s rights” in order to make 
reference to the impact of customary law on fundamental rights which women have as human beings and not as 
women. With the expression women's rights, scholars usually refer to rights specifically belonging to women; 
see H. Charlesworth, “What are “Women’s International Human Rights?”, in R. Cook (ed.), Human Rights o f 
Women: National and International Perspectives, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1994, ft. 4, p. 
77. For a critique of the category of “women’s rights” as construed on “motherhood” rather than “womanhood”, 
see K. Tomasevski (ed.), Women and Human Rights, Zed Books, London and New Jersey, 1993, p. ix.
558 This work of codification was carried out by using oral evidence of colonial officials and elders of the 
various ethnic groups as well as texts written by court officials, missionaries and anthropologists.
559 This collaboration was very useful for both actors. Tribal authorities and the heads of families needed the 
weight of state power in order to strengthen their position and to avoid that “the practices of young men and 
women, of divorcees and widows, all of whom struggled against aspects of the maintained patriarchy, would be 
clearly visible as custom”; see M. Chanock, “State, Law and Culture: Thinking about ‘Customary Law’ after 
Apartheid”, in Acta Juridica, 1991, p. 55. At the same time, the British needed strong indigenous local 
authorities for the system of indirect rule which they established in the colonies. To this end, colonial authorities 
used customary law as a means to enhance existing indigenous authorities or even invented “traditional” 
authorities; see M. Chanock, “The Law Market: British East and Central Africa”, in W.J. Mommsen and J.A. De 
Moor (eds.), European Expansion and Law. The Encounter o f European and Indigenous Law in 19th and 2(fk 
Century Africa and Asia, Berg, Oxford/New York, 1992, p. 279 et seq.
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power.560 Further, the interpretation given by European colonisers of African customs was 
carried out using European classifications, which contributed to the distortion of traditional 
customs. The official recognition of customary law, accompanied by the statutory 
establishment of special courts (called the Native Courts) also provoked changes in the nature 
of customary law. The “dynamism” and “adaptability” of African customs to social change 
was corrupted by this process of “positivisation” and “judicialisation”. In other words, the 
flexible African customs turned into rigid rules.561 Consequently, customary law was 
prevented from evolving and adapting to new socio-economic conditions, and possibly also to 
women’s status. In considering this background, the assumption that the preservation of 
customary law would protect African culture needs to be qualified as this protection only 
refers to the concept of African culture that was interpreted by a small section of African 
society and transformed in its nature by the European colonial powers. Moreover, in the 
sphere of the pure human rights discourse, it is incomplete to view the conflict between 
customary law and individual rights and freedoms in such dualistic terms: collective rights 
versus individual rights. Indeed, the clash is also internal to the category of collective rights. 
Women’s claims are also grounded on the right to development, which as Benedek has 
stressed, "calls for an advancement, if not liberation of women, elimination of all forms of 
discriminatory traditions and practices, equal participation in public life, equal access to 
education facilities and health services, equality with regard to property rights and civil 
status”.562
A critical approach should also be taken in relation to the other way of presenting the 
conflicting relationship between customary law and women’s human rights, that is 
communitarianism versus individualism. The classic portrayal of customary law as 
communitarian should, in fact, be seen in a broader perspective by taking into account that 
although rights relate to groups in traditional African culture, the actual exercise of some of 
these rights is vested in certain individuals acting on behalf of the group. Gender is a 
determinant factor in singling out the representatives of the community, as they usually are 
the men, who are at the head of the agnatic group.
Borrowing from Elmadmad’s image, it could be argued that the Zambian Constitution
360 See T. Ranger, “The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa”, in Hobsbawm and Ranger, The Invention of 
Tradition, cit., p. 211 et seq. and Chanock, Law, cit, p. 80.
561 On this process, see I. Currie, “The Future of Customary Law: Lessons from the Lobolo Debate”, Acta 
Juridica, 1994, p. 146; M. Chanock, State, Law and Culture, cit., p. 55 and with specific reference to Zambia, 
see M. Chanock, Law, Custom and Social Order: The Colonial Experience in Malawi and Zambia, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1985.
562 Bendedek, The Role, c it, p. 274.
184
has placed women’s human rights in a situation of “legal death”. An examination of the 
condition of women under the Zambian customary law will provide concrete evidence of the 
detrimental impact of the Zambian constitutional approach on women’s human rights. By 
extension, these reflections can also be applied to constitutions which do not expressly give 
priority to individual human rights over customary law.
The application of Zambian customary law is regulated by section 16 of the 
Subordinate Courts Act563 and, also implicitly, by the Local Courts Act,564 which have 
introduced a dual legal system in Zambia. The scope of application of the dual system is 
confined to personal law, including marriage, land rights, succession and inheritance. In more 
concrete terms, Zambians are, therefore, entitled to choose whether they wish to get married 
under customary law or the Marriage Act. This choice also determines the law that will 
regulate matters of matrimonial relief and property. Succession and inheritance are governed 
by customary law565 if the person is a Zambian citizen who dies intestate,566 or by statutory 
law in case of a testate death.567 The dual legal system corresponds with a dual judicial 
system, consisting of a parallel structure of courts, namely one which applies statutory law 
and another (the Local Courts), which applies customary law.568 Studies covering the period 
1960*1980 have shown that Zambians still prefer to make recourse to customary law,569 and
563 Chapter 45 of the Laws of Zambia. This Chapter recognises the applicability of customary law provided that 
this is “not repugnant to justice, equity or good conscience and is not incompatible, either in terms or by 
necessary implications with any written law in force in Zambia”. This is known as “repugnancy clause” and it 
dates back to colonial times. The application of customary law was subordinated to its conformity with 
European morality.
564 Chapter 54 of the Laws of Zambia. Section 12(1) provides that African customary law shall apply to any 
matter before Local Courts in so far as such law is “not repugnant to natural justice or morality or incompatible 
with provisions o f any written law".
565 See Subordinate Courts Act (Chapter 45 of Zambian Laws). In case of a marriage contracted under the 
Marriage Act, it is uncertain whether customary law or statutory law should be applied; see C.N. Himonga, 
“Property Dispute in Law and Practice: Dissolution of Marriage in Zambia”, in A. Armstrong and W. Cube 
(eds.), Women and Law in Southern Africax Publishing House, Harare, 1987, pp. 56-84 quoted in Himonga, 
Turner, Beyani, an Outline, cit, p. 140.
566 The majority of customary laws existing in Zambia follow the matrilineal system.
567 The Wills and Administration of Testate Estates Act of 1989 applies to testate succession. It is based on 
English law. Prior to its enactment, the English Will Act of 1837 was applied.
568 See Local Court Act of 1966 (s. 56(1)). Local Courts have replaced the Native Courts established by the 
British in Northern Rhodesia with the task of applying customary law to disputes among Africans in the field of 
personal law. Appeals against the decisions of the Local Courts could be presented to the magistrates courts. 
Every court is composed of three justices. These are appointed by the Judicial Service Commission from a list of 
candidates recommended by the local chief and generally on advice of the Provincial Local Courts Officer. 
There is no specific qualification required apart from the knowledge of the local customary law. The 
proceedings before the Local Courts are informal; see E.L. Hoover, J.C. Piper and J.O. Spalding, ‘“*One Nation, 
One Judiciary”; the Lower Courts of Zambia”, in Zambia Law Journal, 1970.
569 Africa Network for Human Rights and Development (AFRONET) has defined Local Courts as the “busiest 
courts in Zambia”. In 1998, they heard between 30 and 50 cases each day; see AFRONET, The Dilemma o f 
Local Courts in Zambia, 1998,
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in the case of litigation, to apply to the Local Courts.570 The vitality of customary law 
confirms that the issue of the contrast between women’s human rights as recognised in the 
Constitution and customary law is a cmcial and unavoidable question.
By starting the overview of Zambian customary law from the institution of marriage, it 
is immediately clear that the status of women is considered to be that of a perpetual minor. 
Upon, during, and at the dissolution of marriage, women do not have any right of individual 
self-determination. Their marriages depend upon the consent of their relatives. The need for 
their consent is strengthened by the fact that for the marriage to take place, the women’s 
parents have to receive and, therefore, previously accept a payment known as the lobolo from 
the future husband. This payment also makes divorce subordinate to the consent of the 
women’s relatives as, in most tribes, the lobolo has to be paid back in the case of divorce and, 
consequently, if a woman seeks a divorce, she needs the agreement of her parents to give back 
the lobolo. A further aspect which distinguishes the status of women and man is the fact that 
customary marriages may be polygamous. Moreover, while the husband is allowed to bring 
action for damages against a man who commits adultery to his wife, the same right is not 
recognised for the wife.571 In case of dissolution o f the marriage, customary law does not 
provide women with any form of maintenance.572 The wife is only entitled to receive 
maintenance from her husband’s relatives upon his deaths provided that she accepts to be 
“inherited” by them. Regarding the custody of the children, two different situations may 
arise.573 In the matrilineal societies where children belong to the mother’s kinship group, the 
children will be given to the mother, while in the patrilineal society they will be given to the 
father, provided that the lobolo had been repaid, (if this was required under the customary law 
of the tribes involved).574 *In the tribes where the payment of the lobolo is not contemplated,
at http://www.oneworld.org/afronet/reports/l_courts.htm Coldham reports that from 1963, when the possibility 
to get married under the Marriage Act was introduced, until the end of 1983, only a small number of couples 
married under the Marriage Act, as the majority preferred to contract customary marriage; see S. Coldham, 
“Customary Marriage and the Urban Local Courts in Zambia”, 34 Journal o f African Law, 1990, p 69. A 
demonstration of the attachment o f rural Zambians to customary law can be seen in the 1982 Report on the 
Reform of the customary succession presented by the Law Development Commission, which was charged with 
the task of formulating a draft reform in 1974. According to the Report “the majority of the people in the rural 
areas stated categorically that they were happy with their customs and saw nothing wrong with them”, see 
Report on the Law o f Succession, Government Printer, Lusaka, 1982, p. 1, quoted in S. Coldham, “The Law of 
Succession in Zambia, Recent Proposals for Reform”, in 27 Journal o f African Law, 1983, p. 164.
570 See Coldham, Customary Marriage, cit, pp. 67-75. He quotes figures from the Office of the Local Court 
Adviser dating back to 1982. Moreover, he reports that appeals were rare; see ibidem f t  3 and 4.
571 For the regime under the Marriage Act see ibidem, pp. 149-151.
372 See Mwiya v. Mwiya (1977) LR 113.
373 The issue of ‘legal’ custody, which gives the parent a set of rights, powers and duties over minor children, is
now discussed. The ‘actual’ custody may in fact be given to the mother even when she does not have legal
custody.
374 For example, this was the case with the tribes of the Tonga, Ngoni and the Lozi.
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the children are given to the mother.575
With regard to property rights, unmarried women can acquire, dispose and hold 
property under customary law. Upon marriage, they retain the property acquired before 
marriage and continue to have rights to property obtained by gift or succession in her 
relatives’ estate as well as to income derived from work traditionally carried out by women.576 
However, it remains uncertain whether they are entitled to keep their income from 
employment outside the household.577 Some scholars argue that women have the right to keep 
what they earn, and others, conversely, argue that when the lobolo has been paid, husbands 
obtain the property of their wives’ labour power. This interpretation seems to be supported by 
courts, which have, in fact, stressed that wives are required to contribute to the household in 
the form o f  work.578 Upon divorce, women can only keep their own property, but not what 
they may have contributed to through their work.
The position of women is also weaker in relation to succession and inheritance upon 
marriage. Before getting married, women have the right to inherit from their fathers or 
maternal relatives depending on whether they belong to a patrilineal or matrilineal tribe.579 
However, they are not entitled to inherit from their husbands, not even with respect to the 
property that they have contributed to. Once married, women do not become members of the 
husband’s line of descent, but remain part of their birth kin. However, according to some 
studies dating back to the 1970s, some moves have been made towards recognising the right 
to inherit o f women from the deceased husband, particularly when there are young children 
involved.580 581Given the manifest unfairness of this custom, after much lobbying by the 
women’s movements, the legislator intervened with the Intestate Succession Act in 1989, in 
order to provide the widow and the children with some form of protection.582 However, the
375 For example, the tribes of the Bemba, Luvale, Chewa and Nsenga.
376 Upon marriage, the spouses do not form a property-holding unity.
377 This is a relatively new phenomenon, as traditionally Zambian women only worked within and for the 
household. Studies on these issues either date back to the 1950s and 1960s or concern urban areas only. 
Therefore, there is no unequivocal answer, see Himonga, Turner, Beyani, An Outline, cit., p. 157.
378 See Himonga, Family, cit., p. 250-251.
379 On the different forms of succession in Zambia, see Allot et al., in M. Gluckman (ed.), Ideas and Procedures 
in African Customary Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1969, pp. 57-58.
580 See M.P. Mvunga, “Law and Change: A Case Study in the Customary Law of Inheritance in Zambia", in 28 
Africa Social Research, 1979, pp. 643-54.
581 No. 5 o f 1989. Proposals for reform of the customary law of succession have actually been presented since 
the early 1970s. The Parliament, nevertheless, has never proved to be particularly concerned about the impact of 
customary law on women. On the difficulties encountered by the reform to be approved, see M.M. Munalula, 
“Law as an Instrument of Social Change: The Constitution and Sexual Discrimination in Zambia", in 1 
International Journal o f Discrimination and the Law, 1995, p. 142.
382 This Act has replaced all laws on intestate inheritance and succession except for family and chieftainship 
property and land held under traditional tenure. It regulates intestate succession, therefore, it also includes 
customary succession and provides that children o f the deceased man equally share 50 percent of the estate; the
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law does not provide a sufficient means to grant women a share of the estate. “Property 
grabbing”583 584by the deceased’s relatives is frequent, also due to the support of Local Courts as 
well as to a widespread ignorance of the law. Moreover, the Intestate Act is not a real 
disincentive, as the fines for property grabbing are extremely low.
In analysing Zambian customary law, there are clear signs that the status of women is 
changing. Apart from legislative measures such as the Intestate Succession Act, there have 
been decisions by Local Courts which have interpreted customary norms in order to grant 
women some form of protection. Local Courts have been particularly progressive with regard 
to cases of divorce. In this field, urban Local Courts have granted divorce to women even in 
the absence of the agreement of their parents. Some Local Courts have even allowed women 
the right to compensation in urban areas.585 The reasons given by the courts for granting 
compensation is of great significance. Local Courts have grounded their decisions in the need 
to protect wives in the case of a divorce initiated by husbands without good cause. 
Furthermore, they have indicated that they are motivated by the necessity of providing 
women with the essential means for living considering that they had been dependent on the 
husbands during the marriage. Finally, the courts have pointed to the fairness of 
compensating women for the services that they provided to their husbands. However, this 
tendency has not become the rule. Resistance is visible even at the level of urban Local 
Courts, and above all, in the Subordinate Courts which decide on the appeals. Subordinate 
Courts have tended to quash decisions granting compensation on the basis that this is not 
provided for by customary law.
In addition, in relation to the issue of the custody of the children, Local Courts have 
adopted a flexible approach in the application of customary law. Claims for child custody are, 
thus, not decided in conformity with customary law, but on the basis of the best interest of the 
child. In the light of this principle, Local Courts tend to give custody to the mother, taking 
customary law into account, the parties’ conduct and the person who is currently taking care 
of the children. The position of the Subordinate Courts in the case of an appeal is clearer as
widow is entitled to 20 percent; the parents 20 percent; other relatives 10 percent. According to the 1996 reform 
o f the Act, the 20 percent which is granted to the widow must be shared with any other woman who can prove a 
marital relationship with the deceased man.
583 This expression defines the appropriation of all of the household property by the deceased’s heir(s). Property 
grabbing is not a custom in itself. It is a distortion of the customary practice according to which the widow was 
also ‘inherited’ and, as a consequence, she was maintained by the heirs of the husband.
584 See 1994 Report on the Law of Inheritance in Zambia, quoted in Munalula, Law, cit., ft. 22.
585 See C.N. Himonga, Family Property Disputes: The Predicament o f Women and Children in a Zambian 
Urban Community, Univ. of London, London, Ph.D. thesis, 1985, p. 286, quoted in Himonga, Turner, Beyani, 
an Outline, cit., p. 151.
1 8 8
rthey  tend to grant custody to the mother if the children are under six or seven years and to the 
father if they are above this age. Unlike the Local Courts, the Subordinate Courts take the 
decisions without taking customary law into account and without regard to the parents’ 
responsibility in the dissolution of the marriage as they believe that the father would satisfy 
the  needs of elder children better. The High Court has also given custody to the mother on the 
basis of the principle of the best interest of the child. Regarding High Court’s decisions, it 
should be noted that although they are binding lower courts do not necessarily follow them. 
Furthermore, only a few cases are appealed before the High Court. Therefore, High Court’s 
position is not crucial in the development of customary norms as applied by the judiciary.
With reference to property rights, in urban areas the Local Courts have began pursuing 
an  approach which promotes and safeguards women’s rights. Considering the relevance of the 
w ives’ contribution in terms of property and income, some courts have acknowledged joint 
ownership of property acquired upon marriage and ruled on the division of property upon 
divorce.586 Regarding succession, even before the adoption of the Succession Act, the 
customary regime was mitigated by decisions taken by Local Courts, which had even put the 
intestate estates of Africans under the administration of the Administrator-General, who is 
responsible for administrating the estates of testate or intestate persons. These decisions have 
been taken either when the court does not have the power to decide (e.g. leasehold land), or 
when the family of the deceased cannot reach agreement on the appointment of an 
administrator.587 Despite these developments, the courts continue to apply customary law 
without considering the hardship caused to women. The problem of the infringement of 
women’s human rights still exist because not all of the disputes are brought before the Local 
Courts. In certain cases, traditional dispute settlements588 are preferred. As Munalula has 
observed with regard to the Zambian situation, “in a pluralist legal system, law has a very 
limited place in regulating social relations and developments. Law reformists need to 
recognise this limitation in order to maximise the benefits of law reform and take measures
586 See Himonga, Property Disputes, cit, pp. 62-63.
587 When this occurs, the Administrator General does not distribute the land according to customary norms, but 
rather according to the principles established by the Minister of Legal Affairs which are included in a 
department circular, see Letter from the Minister of Legal Affairs to the Administrator-General of 14th February 
1984. This attributes 50 percent of the deceased’s estate to the children, 20 percent to the widow, 20 percent to 
the parents and 10 percent to the other relatives, see Coldham, The Law of Succession, c it, p. 163.
588 Senior relatives of the parties to the maniage, the family ‘council’ or traditional village headmen, may 
constitute these informal forums, which apply customary law. These traditional institutions for dispute 
settlement are recognised by the Local Court Act, s. 50(1); see C. Himonga, “The Dual Family Law System in 
Zambia: Co-Existence and Operation”, in Law and Anthropology, Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1994, p. 245.
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which will target structural social change”. 589
Moreover, it has only been the Local Courts in urban areas which have adopted these 
types of decisions. The situation in rural areas and small towns is still extremely serious for 
women, to the extent that “[t]here is also some evidence that many customary-law wives 
whose marriages end in divorce face destitution”.590 In this regard, it should be highlighted 
that the social and economic structure in which customary law evolved has also changed and 
the rationale behind certain institutions is no longer valid. For example, the traditional 
exclusion of widows from inheritance and the passing of the estate to the senior male 
descendants derived from the need not to divide the estate. The disappearance of the extended 
family and the arrival of the nuclear family structure in sub-Saharan Africa have eroded the 
value of this custom. Furthermore, within traditional African social organisation, women had 
a subordinate status, but were inserted in a network of mutual obligations which guaranteed 
them a certain level of protection. Conversely, from the time of colonial rule and, above all, 
with the introduction of capitalist economy and the consequent changes in the social structure, 
women have retained their subordinate status but have lost the traditional forms of protection. 
A clear example can be seen in the customary exclusion of wives from inheriting the 
husband’s estate. This exclusion was compensated by the practice of “women’s inheritance”, 
which allowed women to remain in the deceased husband’s household and to receive enough 
land to maintain themselves and their children.591 592This practice is now disappearing and heirs 
are either not willing or not able to provide maintenance for the widows. Therefore, widows 
are left with nothing. The unfairness of the exclusion from inheritance is more significant 
considering that as a consequence of industrialisation and the crisis of the economy of 
subsistence, women contribute to the estate from which they are completely excluded even by 
working outside the household. Social and economic changes have distorted customary norms 
as they have only been partially maintained and the practices which provided some form of 
protection for women have disappeared. In this framework, the constitutional legitimisation of 
discriminatory constitutional norms appears even more harmful to them.593
589 Munalula, Law as an Instrument, cit., p. 132.
590 Himonga, Turner, Beyani, An Outline, cit., p. 158.
591 If she was not ‘inherited’, she returned to her own kin until she remarried again.
592 This is the outcome of the research carried out by the Law Development Commission in 1976; see its Report, 
cit., p. 1 quoted in Munalula, Law as an Instrument, cit, p. 142.
393 On this point see R. Howard, “Women’s Rights in English-Speaking Sub-Saharan Africa”, in C. Welch and 
R.I. Meltzer (eds.), Human Rights and Development in Africa, State University of New York Press, Albany, p. 
64.
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9.2 The 1996 Constitutional Amendments
T he amendments adopted in 1996 seem to correspond to the commitment made by MMD 
during the 1991 election campaign, when it was declared that a new constitution would been 
enacted in order to strengthen democracy and human rights. In reality, the constitutional 
review of 1996 was not used for this purpose. On the contrary, it even marked a period of 
renewed human rights’ repression. If the amendments have any value, this can be found in the 
provision of a clearer understanding of the attitudes existing in contemporary Zambia with 
regard to human rights.
9.2.1 The Amendment Process: The Work of the Mwanakatwe Constitutional Review 
Commission and the Views of Zambian Civil Society
In  1992, the Minister for Legal Affairs established a taskforce composed of seven members 
which was chaired by the Attorney General, with the mandate of creating a draft for the 
amendment of the 1991 Constitution. In realising that the appointment of this group by the 
government could give rise to charges of bias, it was later decided to create a Constitutional 
Review Commission, which was appointed on 22nd November 1993 under the terms of 
Statutory Instrument No. 151/1993 as amended by Statutory Instrument 173/1993. Pressure 
from donor governments also played a role in this development.594
This Commission was composed of twenty-four members and was presided over by 
John M. Mwanakatwe. As a result of the modalities of appointment, it was considered broadly 
representative of Zambian society. Seven members were appointed directly by the President, 
while the remaining ones were appointed on the recommendations of political parties, 
religious organisations, professional associations and non-governmental organisations. Its 
scope of action was rather wide, especially when compared with the two previous 
constitutional commissions (i.e. the Commission for the establishment of a one-party system 
and the one of 1991). In the terms of reference, human rights were greatly emphasised. The 
Commission was called upon to collect views on what type of constitution Zambia should 
adopt "bearing in mind that the Constitution should exalt and effectively entrench and 
promote legal and institutional protection o f fundamental human rights and stand the test of
594 J.K. van Donge, “Reflections on Donors, Opposition and Popular Will in the 1996 Zambian General 
Elections”, in 36 The Journal o f Modem African Studies11998, p. 86.
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tim e”,595 and it was invited to recommend *'appropriate arrangements fo r the entrenchment 
and protection o f human rights, the rule o f law and good governance ” 596
The Commission began its work in December 1993597 and from March to September 
1994 it toured the country conducting forty-six public sittings in order to collect the views of 
the population on the 1991 Constitution. The participation of the population was extremely 
wide and represented all sections of Zambian society, such as politicians, traditional rulers, 
clergy-men, judges of the Supreme Court and Magistrates, representatives of associations, 
students, business-men, fanners, civil servants, diplomats, as well as the more disadvantaged 
and vulnerable members of society. Women, people with disabilities, and even children 
participated in the sittings of the Commission and they often travelled long distances to be 
present. From this tour, the Commission received 996 oral and 461 written submissions from 
individual citizens, in addition to written submissions from Members of Parliament (4), 
political parties (10), associations (25), the judiciary (5), Zambians residing abroad (9) and the 
loosely specified “other government institutions” (5).
The content of these submissions, as detailed in the Report, reveal that at least on the 
part of the individuals, and probably even more so of the associations who presented them, 
there was a sophisticated level of human rights awareness. Indeed, the proposals formulated 
were specific, covered all the aspects of the constitutional protection of fundamental rights 
and freedoms and showed that international human rights instruments and foreign 
constitutions were taken into consideration. There were three main concerns which emerged 
from the Report: the strengthening of the scope of human rights, the creation of appropriate 
enforcement machinery and the limitation of the possible restrictions and derogations to 
human rights. In regard to the first point, the enhancement and even reformulation of certain 
rights that were already constitutionally recognised as well as the addition of new sets of 
rights was requested. The core submissions continued to be dominated by civil and political 
rights even though a demand for a more adequate guarantee of social and economic rights also 
emerged. Women and children’s rights were strongly advocated, as the 1991 Constitution was 
silent on these issues. It was claimed that this protection was necessary to put an end to the 
discrimination and suffering caused by some customary practices.
With reference to the fundamental question of the enforcement of protective 
provisions, the majority of those who presented submissions argued for the need not only to
595 Statutory Instrument No. 151 of 1993. Term of Reference No. 1.
596 Ibid. Term of Reference No. 3.
597 The Commission visited also Scandinavian countries to study their constitutional models.
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reinforce the current system based on the recourse to the High Court but also to create new 
bodies such as a Human Rights Commission. The proposal for establishing a Human Rights 
Commission also followed the example of the Munyama Human Rights Commission created 
in 1993 to investigate the human rights violations which occurred not only during the single­
party regime (between 1972 and 1991) but also after the rise to power o f the MMD after 30th 
October 1991.
The final point of major concern, which emerged during the work of the Commission, 
relates to the curtailment of fundamental rights and freedoms through exceptions and 
derogations. In this regard, it was suggested that a limitation clause of general application 
should be devised in relation to all the rights and freedoms recognised. The petitioners 
expressed equal concern for the violation and restriction of human rights through the 
declaration of a state of emergency which Zambia has witnessed throughout its history. In this 
case, however, while the specific issues at stake were agreed by all of the petitioners, the 
proposed solutions varied among them.
During the tour, the issue of the domestic implementation of international human 
rights instruments arose and, in this regard, the principle of the universality of human rights 
was stressed. In concrete terms, the adherence to this principle was translated into the request 
that the Constitution would draw inspiration from the International Bill o f Rights and that the 
courts would recognise the international human rights documents ratified by Zambia.
These submissions were subsequently compiled in a Report issued on 16th June 1995 
containing the recommendations for the constitutional review and the Draft Constitution.598 
The Commission accepted most of the proposals formulated by the petitioners. It 
recommended the strengthening of some of the rights already constitutionally safeguarded as 
well as the inclusion of others. These included the respect for human dignity; the right to 
equality before the law; administrative justice, fair trial and due process of law; freedom of 
the press and media, the right of journalists not to be compelled to divulge their sources of 
information; academic and intellectual freedoms and the right to culture; freedom of 
demonstration and to petition, the right to receive a response thereof; the right to vote and to 
be elected in any organisations or political party; the right to strike and to lock-out; the right 
to equal pay for equal work, and the right to fair and just working conditions; the right to 
equal treatment, affirmative action for women and other disadvantaged persons; the right to 
found a family, protection for the family; special protection of children and persons with
598 Report o f the Constitutional Review Commission, Lusaka, 16th June 1995.
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disabilities; and the right to a clean environment. With regard to women, the Commission not 
only welcomed the idea of introducing affirmative action but also addressed the complex 
question of the potentially conflicting relationship between customary norms and practices 
with fundamental rights. As a result, it recommended that “all laws, customary practices, and 
stereotyped attitudes which are against the dignity, welfare or interest o f women or which 
otherwise adversely affect their physical and mental well-being be prohibited", In relation to 
the acquisition of citizenship by marriage, the Commission did not agree to the widespread 
demand by women’s groups for the extension o f the provisions concerning foreign women 
married to Zambian men to include foreign men married to Zambian women. Instead, they 
recommended to remove this provision to completely.
Some of the rights, including social and economic, were included in the “Directive 
Principles of State Policy”. These principles include a list of non-judicially enforceable 
principles which would play the role of guidelines for the activity of the legislature, the 
government and the judiciary.599 60
It is interesting to note that the Commission supported the human rights model 
inherited from independence, as civil and political rights continued to constitute the core of 
the constitutional human rights protection and this was explained by the Commission that they 
constitute a necessary pre-condition for democracy. There was no inspiration drawn from the 
African Charter and no particular attention was devoted to collective rights, whose centrality 
had been long advocated in sub-Saharan African human rights discourse. Evidence of this 
attitude can be seen by the comment on the right to development made by the Commission. 
After noting that this right is recognised in some African constitutions, the Commission stated 
that it found it “rather nebulous” and for this reason recommended that it should be merely 
included in the Directive Principles.
The Commission agreed with the petitioners on the issue of the constitutional limits to 
fundamental rights and freedoms and recommended the provision of a single limitation clause 
of general application, which was supposed to guarantee citizens greater clarity on the 
content of their rights and assist the judiciary in its assessment of the constitutionality of the 
restrictive measures. In the case of the declaration of a state o f emergency, apart from specific 
guarantees for individuals subjected to detention or restriction, it recommended that the 
constitution would indicate the specific circumstances which can justify this declaration, such
599 Ibid., Chapter 4, par. 4.0-4.3.7.
600 Restrictions would have to be necessary in the interest o f defence, public safety, public order, public morality 
or public health.
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as threats to the security of the country caused by invasion, general insurrection or national 
disaster.
With regard to enforcement, the Commission made a recommendation for the 
establishment of a Constitutional Court, which would have jurisdiction, amongst other 
matters, over any alleged violation of fundamental rights and any matter relating to the 
interpretation of the Constitution. An independent Human Rights Commission with 
pedagogical functions, investigative powers and the authority to bring proceedings in court on 
behalf of an aggrieved individual was also suggested.
Although the overall impression of the work of the Commission was positive, as it 
proved to be attentive to the comments of civil society aimed at enhancing human rights 
protection in the Zambian constitutional system, however there were two proposals which 
raise some questions. The Commission formulated some discriminatory recommendations 
with a clear political motive behind it. The first of these recommendations provided that in 
order to stand in presidential elections, it was necessary for the candidate to be a citizen of 
Zambia, bom in Zambia, of parents who are Zambian citizens and are also bom in Zambia.601 602
This provision was clearly aimed at preventing Kenneth Kaunda from participating in 
elections since both of his parents were bom in present-day Malawi. It also affected hundreds 
of thousands of other Zambian citizens. The second proposal envisaged that a traditional 
chief should renounce the chieftainship before becoming a candidate in any election or being 
appointed to any office in political party.603 This recommendation was most likely put forward 
to eliminate the UNIP’s Vice-President, Senior Chief Inyambo Yeta, from the political scene. 
Besides him, other political figures linked to the political institution of chieftaincy had 
emerged. The National Party was led by Dr. Inonge Mbikusita Lewanika, the daughter of the 
Litunga, i.e. the king of the Lozi ethnic group. After the fall of the Kaunda’s regime, ethnicity 
has become an issue. Kaunda dealt with it by using a technique of ethnic balancing within the 
structures of the single party and in the Cabinet. Chiefs were present in the Central Committee 
of UNIP and were accorded responsibilities in their regions. When Chiluba was elected in 
1991, the different ethnic groups, which overwhelmingly voted for him, expected to be 
rewarded, but Chiluba stopped the careful ethnic balancing of his predecessor. This provoked 
strong resentment, which in the case of the Lozi in the Western Province led to secessionist
601 Ibid., Chapter 11, para. 11.4.1.
602 Another provision which was aimed at the same objective was that “no person who has twice been elected as 
President shall be eligible for re-election to that office”. See ibid. Chapter 11, para. 11.5, 29. The 1991 
Constitution also prohibited the dual mandate but it did not have retroactive effect as it only referred to the 
elections carried out after 1991.
603 Ibid., Chapter 12, para. 12.6.36.
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iclaims in 1993. The Lozi claimed the formation of a separate state to be called with its 
original name Barotseland604 and governed by the Litunga. Others had less ambitious 
demands and demanded only the application of the 1964 Barotse agreement between Kaunda 
and the Litunga, which recognised the king a series of powers, including over land, forest and 
hunting. The recommendations of the Mwanakatwe Commission recognised the authority of 
the chiefs, but did not accord them any form of power sharing and even impede them to 
participate in politics.
9.2.2 The Governmental Position and the 1996 Amendments
The government responded to the Commission’s draft with a White Paper,605 in which most of 
the recommendations formulated for a stronger protection of human rights were rejected. In 
particular, it did not accept the inclusion of new rights, such as the provisions on women’s 
rights or the establishment of a Constitutional Court. Moreover, it refused that the separation 
between the State and the Church should be guaranteed by opting for a declaration in the 
preamble of the Constitution that Zambia is a Christian state.606 The only progressive 
recommendations accepted were those concerning the establishment of a Human Rights 
Commission and the inclusion in the Constitution of principles of state policy.607 
Unsurprisingly, consistent with its lack of concern for the enhancement of the constitutional 
safeguard of human rights, the government welcomed the two discriminatory proposals 
contained in the Mwanatkwe Commission’s Report. These included the limitation of the 
eligibility for presidential election and the incompatibility of the status of traditional chief 
with political activity.
The White Paper provoked strong criticism on the part of opposition parties, churches, 
university scholars, trade unions and a large part of the population.608 This discontent was 
intensified by the government’s rejection of the recommendations that the new constitution 
should have been adopted by a Constituent Assembly representative of all political parties as
604 The Barotseland enjoyed separate status under the British rule.
605 Government Paper, No. 1, 1995.
606 Ibid., para. 3.6.11. The Commission had expressed its opposition to this amendment. See Chapter 3, para. 
3.6.10. The churches also opposed this declaration. The Catholic Bishops Conference highlighted in an open 
letter to President Chiluba and to Members of Parliament on 26th April 1996 that this declaration would cause 
division and intolerance against the other religions in Zambia, such as Hinduism, Islam and the worship of 
ancestral spirits.
607 Ibid., par. 8.1.29.
608 A Conference was held from 1* to 10* March 1996, on initiative of the churches and NGOs to discuss and 
urge opposition by the population to the amendments; see Citizens’ “Green Paper” Summary o f Resolutions by 
the Citizens’ Convention on the Draft Constitution, 1-10 March, Lusaka, 1996.
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well as civil society,609 and ratified by a referendum.610 The government opted, conversely, 
for a parliamentary procedure for amendment. It could legally make recourse to such 
procedure due to having decided not to intervene directly on the bill of rights, which 
otherwise would have required the holding of a referendum under the terms of Article 79 of 
the 1991 Constitution. This response was met with strong reaction, for example submissions 
were presented before the High Court and the Supreme Court and three Ministers resigned.611 
International donors such as the United States, Britain, Japan and the Scandinavian countries 
reacted against both the content and the modalities of adoption of the amendments, by 
suspending and, in some cases, by withdrawing aid.
Despite the overwhelming condemnation of the government, the National Assembly 
approved the amendments to the 1991 Constitution along the lines of the White Paper.612 This 
occurred due to the fact that the Parliament was completely dominated by the MMD. This was 
also helped by the UNIP’s boycott of the proceedings. The 1996 amendments ultimately 
represented the betrayal of the political platform of MMD613 and the terms of reference of the 
Mwanakatwe Commission, both of which had presented the enhancement of human rights as 
one o f the main goals of the constitutional review. On the contrary, not only were most of the 
improvements proposed by the Mwanatakwe Commission rejected, but limitations to the 
rights of political participation, as well to the principle of equality and the freedom of religion 
were also introduced. Thus, the introduction of Article 34(3)(b) provides that one of the 
conditions for eligibility as a presidential candidate is that the parents of the candidate must be 
both Zambians by birth or descent and that the candidate has been domiciled in Zambia for 
twenty years.
The preamble was completely changed and this reflects the different influences 
affecting the amendment process. In particular, it reveals the influence of the Christian beliefs 
of Chiluba614 as it asserts that Zambia is “a Christian nation while upholding the right o f
609 The Report contained a list of the sectors that would be represented: professions, the labour movement, 
employers, women’s organisations, universities, etc.; see Report of 1995, c it, Chapter 27.
610 Ibid., Chapter 28.
611 See Derrick Chítala (Secretary of ZDC) v. Attorney General 1995/SCZ/14 and Derrick Chítala v. Attorney 
General (High Court, 1996).
6.2 Constitution of Zambia Amendment (Act) No. 18, 1996, cit. In particular see Article 34(3)(b): "Election o f 
President" and Article 65(3) and (4): “Disqualification fo r  Election in the National Assembly“.
6.3 In its revised manifesto published in August 1996, MMD stated that its commitment was “to institutionalise 
what has been achieved so as to make Zambia the haven o f human rights, not subject to disruption even in the 
change o f government. Moreover, it asserted its commitment to create a Human Rights Commission; to ratify 
international human rights treaties and to guarantee the protection of human rights as provided for in the 
constitution; see MMD Manifesto, full text printed in The Sun (Lusaka), September 2-8, 1996 referred to in 
Human Rights Watch Africa, Zambia. The Reality AmidstjContradictions, July 1997, Voi. 9, No. 3 (A).
614 Chiluba is born-again Christian.
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every person to enjoy that person's freedom o f conscience or religion”. It also makes a 
concession to women’s pressure for the recognition of women’ rights, by recognising “the 
equal worth o f men and women in their rights to participate, and freely determine and build a 
politicaleconomic and social system o f their own free choice”. Moreover, the gender-biased 
language which characterised the preamble of the 1991 text was eliminated. With respect to 
gender equality, a further sign of change came with the Directive Principles of State Policy, 
which provide that the “State shall take measures to promote the practice, enjoyment and 
development by any person of that person’s culture, tradition, custom and insofar as these are 
not inconsistent with this Constitution”. This provision seems again another concession. It 
recognises that there are certain traditions and customs, which may conflict with the principles 
established by the constitution, however the actual force of this provision is undermined by 
the mere guiding nature of the directive principles. The preamble also incorporates the key 
terms of the World Bank’s conditionality jargon by declaring that ' f t ]  he people o f Zambia ... 
resolve to uphold the values o f democracy; transparency, accountability and good 
governance”.
It is interesting to remark that after the amendment the preamble no longer 
incorporates any of the references to social and economic rights that were previously 
contained in the text. The 1991 preamble recognised the right to work, to the free choice of 
employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against 
unemployment, as well as the right to education. Moreover, it pledged “to all citizens the right 
to equal access to social, economic and cultural services and facilities provided by the State or 
by public authorities”. As seen before, the government refused to confer any protection on 
these rights in the bill of rights. However, the concern for the socio-economic conditions of 
citizens is expressed in the introduction of Part IX concerning “Directive Principles of State 
Policy and the Duties of a Citizen”. Article 110 indicates that these principles constitute a 
“guide” for the executive, the legislature and the judiciary in the development of national 
policies, implementation of national policies, making and enactment of laws, the application 
of the Constitution and any other law, and that these principles are not justiciable. Article 110 
(2) specifies that the application of these principles “may be observed only in so far as State 
resources are able to sustain their application, or if the general welfare of the public so 
unavoidably demands, as may be determined by Cabinet”. Article 112 lists the directives 
which constitute the principles of state policy. These include, among others, that the State 
“shall be based on democratic principles” and shall endeavour “to create the conditions under 
which all citizens shall be able to secure adequate means of livelihood and opportunity to
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obtain employment”, “to provide clean and safe water, adequate medical and health facilities 
and decent shelter for all persons, and take measures to constantly improve such facilities and 
amenities”, “to provide equal and adequate educational opportunities in all fields and at all 
levels for all”, “to provide persons with disabilities, the aged and other disadvantaged persons 
such social benefits and amenities as are suitable to their needs and are just and equitable”. 
Moreover “the State shall recognise the right of every person to fair labour practices and safe 
and healthy working conditions”. The preamble also includes a reference to collective rights, 
even though the terminology o f ‘rights’ is not used. Instead, it states that “the State shall strive 
to provide a clean and healthy environment for all”.
Article 113 lists the duties of the citizens. These encompass the duty to: (a) “be 
patriotic and loyal to Zambia and to promote its well-being”, (b) “contribute to the well-being 
of the community where the citizens live, including the observance of health controls”, (c) 
“foster national unity and live in harmony with the others”, (d) “promote democracy and the 
rule of law”, (e) “vote in national and local government elections”, (f) “provide defence and 
military service when called upon”, (g) “carry out with discipline and honesty legal public 
functions”, (h) “pay all taxes and duties legally due and owed to the State; and (i) “assist in 
the enforcement of the laws at all times”. It should be noted that none of the duty listed 
constitute a limitation on the rights protected in the bill of rights.
Another Part inserted with the 1996 amendment concerns the establishment of the 
Human Rights Commission. The Constitution devotes only two articles to this (Articles 125 
an 126) and provides that it shall be autonomous. It relies upon an Act of Parliament to define 
its functions, powers, composition, funding and administrative procedures.
The 1996 Constitution also reintroduces the House of Chiefs, which had been provided 
by the 1964 Constitution and maintained under the 1973 one-party Constitution, but 
eliminated from the 1991 Constitution. The new Part XII establishes the House of Chiefs as 
an advisory body on “traditional, customary or other matters referred to it by the President” 
(Article 130). Moreover, it has the power “consider and discuss any Bill with, or touching on, 
custom or tradition”, “initiate, discuss and decide on matters that relate to customary law and 
practice”, “consider and discuss any other matter referred to it for its consideration by the 
President or approved by the President for consideration by the House” (Article 131) The 
House of Chiefs is composed of twenty-seven members, elected by the Chiefs from each one 
of the nine Provinces o f the Republic (Article 132(1)). If  these provisions recognise the 
institution of chieftaincy, Article 133 shows the suspicion and fears such institution rises. 
Article 133 establishes that the office of member of the House of Chiefs becomes vacant if the
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9.23 The Human Rights Commission
The Commission was appointed in 1997 under the Human Rights Commission Act. Its 
creation was recommended by the Munyama Human Rights Commission that was set up by 
Chiluba between 1993 and 1995 to investigate prison conditions and human rights violations 
which took place from 1972 to 1993.615 It has very weak powers, even when compared with 
the principles concerning national human rights institutions set by the UN Commission on 
Human Rights in 1992 and endorsed by the UN General Assembly in 1993. The UN 
Principles relating to the status of National Institutions, known as the Paris Principles,616 
emphasise the need for the human rights institutions to have a constitutional or legislative 
statute as a guarantee for independence; a broad mandate; an independent appointment 
procedure with term of office specified by law; a pluralistic and representative composition; 
regular and effective functioning; independence from the executive branch and adequate 
funding. They should be entitled to consider any human rights issue on their own initiative, at 
the government’s suggestion or at the request of any petitioner. Its responsibilities should 
encompass reporting and making recommendations to the government on human rights 
matters, including the adoption or amendment of national legislation and the reporting of 
human rights violations; promoting conformity of national law and practice with international 
human rights standards; cooperating with national, regional and UN human right bodies, 
including contributions to country reports submitted to UN treaty bodies and committees and 
human rights education programs. Their powers should also include the possibility of making 
public statements on their work, in particular, through the media. Human Rights institutions 
should also be vested with powers which allow them to address and resolve specific cases of 
human rights’ violations. More specifically, they should be empowered to seek “amicable 
settlements”, or to adopt “binding decisions”, or finally, to pursue a settlement “where 
necessary, on the basis of confidentiality”. If complaints are not resolved by human rights 
institutions, they should be sent to the appropriate authority.
C hief becomes a candidate in any election or accepts any appointm ent in a political party.
615 The Munyama Commission had also recommended the creation of an independent Police Complaints 
Authority to investigate complaints against police officers as the Commission had assessed that these remained 
uninvestigated and that human rights abuses were still practised by the police in 1995.
616 These principles were endorsed by the U.N. Commission of Human Rights with Resolution 1992/54 and by 
the General Assembly with Resolution A/Res/134 of 20/12/1993. The Paris Principles define national human 
rights institutions as government bodies created by law or constitutions and are designed to protect and promote 
human rights.
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The Zambian Commission’s degree of independence, functions and powers are more 
limited than those described above. It can investigate human rights violations and 
maladministration of justice and propose effective measures to prevent human rights abuses 
(section 9 (a)-(f)). These investigative powers can be exercised either on the Commission’s 
own initiative or on receipt of a complaint Moreover, the Commission is entitled to issue 
summons or orders requiring the attendance of any authority before it, to recommend the 
release of a person from detention and to order the payment of compensation to a victim of 
human rights abuses. It can also recommend individuals, whose rights have been violated, to 
seek redress in a court of law (Sections 10(2) and (3)). Finally, it is vested with the power to 
send written reports of its findings to the parties concerned and to make the recommendations 
which it deems necessary to the appropriate authority (Section 13(1)). Its investigative 
functions are not complemented by the power to enforce the relevant findings and the 
Commission does not even have the right to seek settlements of human rights violations, as 
provided in the Paris Principles. The fact that the appointment of the Commission is vested in 
the President and the absence of any reference in the Act to the issue of funding constitute a 
potential threat to its independence.
For all of these reasons, the establishment of the Commission was received with great 
suspicion within Zambia. All of the main opposition parties and NGOs refused to recommend 
any names to the President for the appointment o f the Commissioners. The fact that the six 
members appointed by the President and then approved by a select parliamentary committee 
lacked any previous experience in the field of human rights reinforced the sense of 
disillusion. Despite the doubts surrounding the independence and competence of the 
Commissioners, the Zambian Human Rights Commission has addressed some of the abuses 
occurring in the country, including ill-treatment and torture by the police forces, even though 
it has not yet dealt with any issue with a high political profile. As a result of its work, it has 
gained increasing respect. Through press releases, the Commission has denounced human 
rights abuses and its major stand has been on the widespread recourse to torture by the police. 
In 1997, it denounced the cases of torture of detainees after the attempted coup. Although it 
recommended at first that those responsible should be brought to justice, in its report of 30th 
March 1998, it merely recommended that the officers concerned should retire in the public 
interest and did not call for the opening of criminal proceedings. Despite the caution shown 
by the Commission, the government ‘punished’ it for its stand on this issue, by refusing to
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give the Commission the premises that it had been promised. Nonetheless, the Commission 
has continued to deliver statements on human rights violations with many cases addressing 
employment-related complaints and prison conditions. From 1997 to 1999, it handled 960 
grievances, the majority of which did not concern civil rights abuses but rather complaints 
concerning social rights. Some 797 were employment-related complaints.
9.3 The Human Rights Situation after the Réintroduction of Multipartism617 18 
The human rights performance of the Chiluba government and the MMD ended up 
dramatically resembling the authoritarian Kaunda’s era.619 In 1991, one of the core elements 
of the MMD’s manifesto was the enhancement of human rights, including both civil and 
socio-economic rights. However, during the Chiluba government, civil liberties were violated, 
in particular by the police in an attempt to prevent any form of manifestation of opposition or 
mere criticism of the regime. Extra-judicial killings, torture, beating of suspects and detainees 
and arbitrary arrests were frequent in a general climate of impunity. Freedom of assembly and 
of the press was also severely limited.
The crisis in the human rights situation in Zambia became more acute with the 
parliamentary and presidential elections held after the adoption of the 1996 constitutional 
amendments. These elections witnessed the landslide victory for the MMD as it obtained 139 
seats in the National Assembly out of 159 (eight of them are of presidential appointment) and 
Chiluba was elected president with 68.9 percent of the votes. This victory, which made 
Zambia a predominant party system,620 was also due to the decision of the UNIP and six other 
parties to boycott the elections as a response to the conduct of the MMD during the 
constitutional amendment process and to its general unwillingness to engage in dialogue with 
the opposition. There were also many irregularities which contributed further. These
617 Human Rights Watch, Protectors or Pretenders? Government Human Rights Commissions in Africa, 
Overview, 2001 available at http//www.hrw.org/africa/overview/record.html On the Zambian Human Rights 
Commission see also Human Rights Watch, Protectors or Pretenders? Government Human Rights 
Commissions in Africa, Zambia, 2001
at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/africa/zambia/zambia.html
618 The thesis focuses on the Chiluba period as it is premature to formulate conclusive judgments on the post- 
Chiluba period, which started after the 2003 presidential elections.
619 R. Joseph, Africa, “1990-1997: From Abertura to Closure”, in 9 Journal o f Democracy, 1998, p. 6.
620 See P. Burnell, “The Party System and Party Politics in Zambia: Continuities Past, Present and Future”, in 
100 African Affairs, 2001, pp. 239-263.
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irregularities were denounced by independent electoral monitoring organisations621 and the 
international community.622
After the elections, the government made it clear that it was not serious about the 
actual implementation human rights, by showing that they were merely included in the 
electoral programme for rhetorical purposes in order to obtain legitimacy on the internal and 
international political arena. The MMD government did nothing to eliminate the oppressive 
laws in force since colonial times and conversely, it used to curb the opposition. For example, 
the government made extensive recourse to the provisions of the Penal Code,623 punishing the 
offence o f sedition,624 defamation of the President625 and criminal libel626 and empowering the 
President to ban publications. Moreover, the State Security Act627 628of 1969 was applied to 
prevent the publication of articles in the private-owned media alleging that it constituted a 
threat to public security due to the disclosure of confidential information. Another piece of 
legislation dating back to colonial times and with an equally illiberal nature is the Emergency 
Powers Act which reinforces the wide powers conferred on the executive by the 
constitution in the case of a state of emergency. It gives the President very broad and 
ambiguously defined powers. Section 3(3) recognises the power to make orders and rules for 
any purposes without any further specification. Section 4 establishes that state of emergency 
regulations as well as orders and rules enacted under this Act prevail over other enactments. 
In addition, the Emergency Powers Act provides that in the case of a declared state of 
emergency, the President is entitled to invoke the Preservation of Public Security Act and to 
adopt the Preservation of Public Security Regulations on the basis of which the police can 
detain a person for 28 days under a Police Detention Order. This order can be followed by a 
Presidential Detention Order which permits the detention of an individual for an indefinite 
period.
The Chiluba government not only took advantage of existing illiberal laws but it was 
also engaged in legislative activity aimed at creating restrictions for controlling or hindering 
the opposition. In March 1996, the Public Order (Amendment) Act, No.l was approved
621 The Zambian Independent Monitoring Team (ZIMT), the Forum for a Democratic Process (FODEP) and the 
Committee for a Clean Campaign (CCC).
622 The international community did not endorse the results, and countries such as South Africa and Zimbabwe 
did not recognise them either. Human Rights Watch also denounced many irregularities. On the 1996 elections, 
see Chanda, Zambia, cit., pp. 147-152.
623 Chapter 146 of the Laws of Zambia.
624 Sections 57,60,61.
625 Sections 69 and 71.
626 Sections 191-198.
627 Chapter 3 of the Laws of Zambia.
628 Chapter 108 of the Laws of Zambia.
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containing amendments to Chapter 4 of the Public Order Act. It provided that a fourteen days 
notice should be given to the police before any meetings, processions or demonstrations. 
Furthermore, according to this amendment, the police have discretionary power in deciding 
whether to allow the meeting or rally to take place, and this violation of the law is punishable 
with a maximum of sentence of seven years. Following wide criticism from the public and the 
Supreme Court ruling on the unconstitutionality of this provision,629 the government reduced 
the time of notice to seven days. The police frequently used this power to impede 
demonstrations and rallies organised by the opposition.
Apart from the freedom of assembly, the freedom of the press was also threatened by 
the executive. A vibrant independent private media exists in Zambia, which is not afraid to 
criticise government. The Post, which is the best-selling private daily newspaper, and the 
Monitor, the newspaper of the NGO Inter-Africa Network for Human Rights and 
Development (AFRONET), openly denounce abuses by the government and the MMD. It is 
in this context that the conclusions of the Media Reform Committee were disregarded, which 
was established after the 1991 election in conformity with the original MMD’s commitment 
to human rights. The Media Reform Committee singled out twenty-six laws as in 
contradiction with the freedom of expression, however no initiative was taken to repeal or 
amend these laws, and an attempt was made to introduce even more restrictive legislation. In 
April 1997, the government presented a Bill, known as the Media Council Bill, which would 
have serious implications for the freedom of the press.630 According to this bill, all journalists 
would need specific qualifications and a licence or “accreditation” by a media council 
appointed by the Minister o f Information. This would only been released after investigations 
and the payment of a fee. Journalists who lacked accreditation be subject to three months 
imprisonment, a fine or both. In addition, reprimand suspension or expulsion could be 
inflicted as disciplinary measure on those whose conduct is contrary to “the profession of 
journalist” or who are engaged “in any occupation which is inconsistent with the profession of 
a journalist”. Complaints from the public could be presented to the Media Council, which
629 People v. Christine Mulundika and six Others and the People v. Dr. Kenneth D. Kaunda, 1995/SCZ/25.
630 The motivation for this bill was clearly expressed by President Chiluba. The following quote conveys the 
way the president viewed the concept of the freedom of the press. He said: “Integrity demands that media 
practitioners adhere to a standard o f ethics that have respect fo r the truth and fairness ... it is a notorious fact 
that the nation and indeed the press itself has been brought into disrepute by a section o f the media that has 
chosen to betray the country by publishing and distributing false information about Zambia. This is regrettable 
and a matter o f great concern ". This is quoted from a speech delivered on the opening day of parliament, 
MISA, Alert, May 5, 1997 quoted in Human Rights Watch, Zambia. The Reality, cit., p. 23. In addition, 
according to deputy Minister of Information and Broadcasting, Ernest Mwansa in Parliament on 6th February : 
"This freedom seems to have gone slightly out o fc o u r s e see ibid., February 27,1997 quoted in ibid., p. 23.
2 0 4
would have the power to order an apology or compensation from journalists or the media, as 
well to take them off the register. As a result of the firm resistance from independent 
journalists, human rights groups and donor countries and also the state media itself, the 
government withdrew the bill.
Zambian NGOs have also been under threat of the executive. Chiluba challenged 
many of them as serving foreign interests.631 In August 1999, the government presented the 
State Security Bill to the Parliament, under which a suspect could be detained without charge 
for fourteen days and the detention could be prolonged without limit by a magistrate. Due to 
the firm opposition from NGOs and MPs, the bill, which would have created a permanent 
state of emergency as denounced by Human Rights Watch,632 was withdrawn.
Alongside these restrictive legislative measures, human rights have been curtailed in 
Zambia by a series of illegal acts directed at hindering any form of opposition. For example, 
police brutality and torture in detention centres has been widespread. Harassment and 
intimidation by the police or intelligence forces of independent journalists, editors,633 
members of civil society organisations,634 and political opponents635 have been extremely 
frequent in Zambia. On 23rd August 1997, the ex-President and UNIP’s leader Kaunda and 
the chairman of Opposition Alliance were shot and wounded by the police during a rally. The 
judiciary have also been among the targets of human rights abuses. In particular, the judges 
who displayed independence from the executive and the MMD were subject to personal 
attacks directed at destroying their reputation, consequently forcing them to resign.636
The mot serious human rights violations that have taken place in Zambia occurred in 
the aftermath of the attempted military coup on 28th October 1997. This led President Chiluba 
to declare a state of emergency the following day,637 consequently, suspending many of the
631 See Human Rights Watch, World Report. Zambia, 1998, p. 80.
632 Ibidem.
633 On 25th November 1996, the Zambia Information Service Acting Deputy Director Mundia Nalishebo and 
five other state media journalists were suspended for alleged collaboration with an electoral monitoring group 
which had judged the election to be irregular. Between 18th November, 1996 and the end of 1997, four 
independent journalists were imprisoned and six state-run television journalists were suspended and then 
dismissed; see Human Rights Watch, World Report Zambia, cit, 1998, p. 78.
634 In the aftermath of the 1996 elections, the Zambian Independent Monitoring Team (ZIMT), the National 
Committee for Clean Campaign (NCCC) and the Africa Network for Human Rights and Development 
(AFRONET) were targeted for having criticised the way in which the 1996 elections took place. The state 
security agencies made an incursion into their offices, confiscating their documents and the leaders were put in 
detention; see E. Gymah-Boadi, “The Rebirth of African Liberalism, in 9 Journal o f Democracy, 1997, p. 22 
and Chanda, cit., p. 139.
635 Before the 1996 elections, six leaders of UNIP were held in custody for around five months and were then 
acquitted of treason; see The People v. Senior Chief Inyambo Yeta and seven Others (1996)(unreported).
636 Chanda, cit., pp. 140-141.
637 Chiluba had already declared a state of emergency in 1993 on the ground of an alleged plot to overthrow the 
government by UNIP with the support of Iran and Iraq. On the extent of the human rights violations during the
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rights guaranteed by the constitution, as the constitution itself authorises. The right to personal 
liberty and the freedoms of expression, association and assembly were amongst the most 
affected. The latter was severely limited also as a result of the discretionary power given to 
the police to permit rallies under the Public Order (Amendment) Act adopted in the previous 
year. Harassment against lawyers, national and international journalists and political 
opponents became more intense. Extensive recourse was made to preventive detention against 
those suspected to have been involved in the attempted coup. The main opposition leaders 
were arrested on this charge, among whom included Kenneth Kaunda and the leader of the 
Zambia Democratic Congress (ZDC), Dean Mung’omba. Mung’omba was also subject to 
beating and torture. Through these means, the MMD government achieved their objective as 
Kaunda, the main political threat to MMD, retired definitely from politics in exchange to the 
dropping of the charges against him. This situation led to opposition not only in Zambia but 
also from Western donor countries, the EU and the World Bank. As a result of the reaction of 
the donors, the state o f emergency, which had been extended on 29th January 1998, was 
finally lifted on 17th March.638 39 Since then improvements in the human rights situation took 
place but political activity continued to be hindered and cases o f police brutality, illegal 
detentions, torture, killings and rape in custody and abduction by the police of persons, 
particularly women related to suspects, continued.640 In this regard, it is worth noting that in 
responding to pressures coming from the Human Rights Commission, donors, Zambian and 
international NGOs, Chiluba established a commission of inquiry in August 1998. The 
commission was appointed by the President and headed by the High Court Judge Japhet 
Banda and was given the task of assessing the alleged cases of torture committed by the police 
in 1997. The report, which was submitted in 2000, documented that torture was used and that 
a climate of impunity prevailed. It also recommended that the victims of torture should be 
compensated, the members of the police responsible should be subjected to disciplinary action 
and reforms of the administration of justice adopted. The government responded that it
state of emergency, see Amnesty International, Zambia. Misrule o f Law: Human Rights in a State o f Emergency, 
March 1998.
638 He announced his retirement to the UNIP Central Committee on 3rd July.
639 It has to be pointed out that apart from Norway, the Netherlands and Sweden, the other European countries, 
the EU, Japan and the World Bank did not express their concern for the human rights situation except for the 
threats to democracy and good governance; see Human Rights Watch, World Report. Zambia, 1997, pp. 69-70 
and World Report. Zambia, 1998, pp. 80-81.
640 See Human Rights Watch, Zambia No Model For Democracy, May 1998, Vol. 10, No. 2 (A) and World 
Report 1999, Zambia: Human Rights Developments
at http://www.hrw.org/hrw/worldreport99/africa/zambia.html and World Report 2001. Zambia: Human Rights 
Development at http://www.hrw.org/hr/wr2kl/africa/zambia.html, and Amnesty International, Amnesty 
International Report 2002, Zambia.
206
accepted the findings, but argued that the report had not taken the special circumstances in 
which torture was committed into account. Moreover, it decided neither to grant any 
compensation to the victims nor to adopt any disciplinaiy measure against the persons 
responsible of acts of torture. The persons responsible were even promoted.641 642The UN 
Committee against Torture also expressed its concern at the fact that even though the Zambian 
Constitution prohibits torture, the Zambian legal system has not fully incorporated the 
provisions of the UN Convention against torture, cruel and inhuman treatment and “at the 
continued allegations of widespread use of torture together with the apparent impunity 
enjoyed by its perpetrators”.643
However, the Chiluba government could not always disregard public criticism. In 
January 2000, the Ministry of Information forced the private-owned Radio Phoenix to stop a 
live phone-in programme called “let the people speak: the Doctor’s strike” sponsored by 
AFRONET. The public denouncement by AFRONET of the political pressures to which it 
was subjected led to the return of the programme, albeit under condition that it would be pre­
recorded and edited.
The most recent critical moment for civil rights in Zambia came with the 2002 
presidential, parliamentary and local elections. Civil liberties were widely violated,644 and in 
particular the freedom of assembly and expression were harshly repressed. Hundreds of 
people were arrested during rallies and the police continued to use force to break up 
demonstrations organised by the opposition. The judiciary, however, offered some protection, 
as seen in the two High Court rulings on two occasions that these police actions were 
unconstitutional and in “bad faith”.645
The freedom of expression was also controlled. The government and the MMD used 
the public media in their favour and Chiluba did not hesitate to utilize public resources to 
attempt to convince citizens, politicians, chiefs, NGOs and religious leaders to support the 
revision of the Constitution, which would have allowed him to run for a third term. These 
tactics, however, did not produce the intended results and he had to abandon this plan because 
of the hard opposition of NGOs and MPs and pressures coming from within his party. This 
decision was welcomed enthusiastically by Zambian society. The authoritarian face of the
641 A. Chanda, “Governance and Human Rights in Zambia”, in Observer, Vol. 5, September 2001, at 
http://afronet.org.za/hro_vol5/volume5_5.htm
642 G.A. Res. 38/46 of 10/12/1984, entered into force 26th June 1997.
643 Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee against Torture. Zambia. 23/11/2001. 
CAT/C/XXVn/Concl. 4, Twenty/seventh Session, 12th-23rd November 2001.
644 See Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report 2002, cit.
645 Ibidem.
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TChiluba’s government shown at the eve of the 2002 elections, however, did not affect the 
decision of the World Bank and the IMF to accord $2.5 billion within the framework of the 
Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) program.
The December 2002 elections themselves, which witnessed the victory of the MMD 
presidential candidate, were criticised as flawed. The irregularities were denounced not only 
by the Zambian opposition parties and civil society organisations but also by observers from 
the European Union. The Electoral Commission provided by Article 76 of the Constitution 
and established under the Electoral Commission Act of 1996 did not exert effective control 
over the fairness of the electoral process in application of the Electoral Code of Conduct 
Regulations. Certainly the way in which its members were appointed did little to help its 
impartiality and undermined the trust it should enjoy from civil society. The Electoral 
Commission is composed of a Chairperson and not more than four other members, who are 
appointed by the President, subject to ratification by the National Assembly.
Given the very poor human rights record of the Chiluba government and the manner in 
which elections were held, the first challenge for the new President Levy Mwanawasa is to 
gain internal and international credibility, particularly, as he was elected with only 28.7 
percent of votes. In this regard, it has to be remarked that his initiatives to fight corruption 
have lowered the suspicion with which he was looked at. He has started a campaign of fight 
against corruption, which has not spared Chiluba himself. Following the accusations by 
Mwanawasa, last year the Parliament lifted Chiluba’s immunity from prosecution. Chiluba 
appealed this decision before the Supreme Court, which in a historic decision ruled that the 
Parliament had acted according to the law, thus allowing the arrest and trial of Chiluba.
His credibility also depends on the outcome of the constitutional revision process 
initiated in 2003. The procedure provided in the Public Inquiries Act is the same as in the past 
constitution-making processes. The President has appointed a Constitutional Review 
Commission with the task of formulating and submitting recommendations to the Government 
on the basis of consultations with Zambian citizens in Zambia and abroad. According to the 
terms of references, the Commission should make recommendations for the adoption of a 
Constitution which would effectively entrench and promote, among other things, the 
protection of human rights, democracy, the rule of law, good governance, transparency, 
accountability, impartiality and independence of the judiciary and the access of the public to 
justice. The Commission is also expressly asked to examine and recommend upon the 
elimination of discriminatory provisions, including those relating to the right of traditional 
rulers to engage in active politics. The procedure of the constitutional review has raised strong
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criticism from opposition parties and, in particular, from civil society* organisations, who fear 
that this process will end up resembling the previous ones and, therefore, the Government will 
select the Commission’s recommendations at its own discretion. For this reason, civil 
society’s groups and opposition parties are demanding the adoption of the Constitution by a 
Constituent Assembly.
Internal credibility needs to be re-established also on the issue of social and economic 
rights. If  donor countries and international financial institutions have only demonstrated their 
concern for civil rights, Zambians are increasingly expressing their dissatisfaction with the 
status of socio-economic rights. The Constitution already contains a very narrow approach in 
this respect, in which they are recognised as mere guiding principles and their implementation 
is subordinated either to the obvious condition of availability of resources, or to the fact that 
the “general welfare of the public so unavoidably demands” (emphasis added). The Zambian 
Constitution, therefore, conveys the message that the principles of state policies are not a 
political priority and the Chiluba government has confirmed this approach through its action. 
The Directive Principles of State Policy include the State’s commitment to create the 
conditions for employment, to ensure fair labour practices, safe and healthy working 
conditions, adequate medical and health facilities, decent shelter and equal and adequate 
educational opportunities. These commitments have not been met in fact. Assessing the 
government policy against the ICSECR, of which Zambia is a state party, it is clear that the 
rights to work,646 social security,647 an adequate standard of living (including adequate food, 
clothing and housing),648 health649 and education650 have been denied to a large portion of the 
population. This has occurred in the context of mismanagement and appropriation of public 
resources. For example, in April 2001, two billion Kwacha was diverted from the National 
Assembly to fund the Convention of the MMD.651 With the creation of the Presidential 
Discretionary Fund (re-named by the people the “Presidential Slush Fund”), Chiluba endowed 
himself with resources taken away from the state budget. Every year the Auditor-General 
denounced the gross misuse and misappropriation in the Reports to the National Assembly of 
which the government was responsible. However, these reports received no follow-up.652
646 See Article 6 of the ICSECR.
647 See Article 9 of the ICSECR.
648 See Article 11 of the ICSECR.
649 See Article 12 of the ICSECR.
650 See Article 13 of the ICSECR.
651 Applying the Ministerial and Parliamentary (Code of Conduct) Act No. 35 of 1994, the Chief Justice set up a 
tribunal to judge the case, which involved three Ministers; see “Finance Ministry Violated Privatisation Act over 
PH r, The Post, 5th July, 2001.
652 Chanda, Governance and Human Rights, cit.
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The denial of social and economic rights is also due to the amount of foreign debt and 
the neo-liberal reforms imposed by the Bretton Woods institutions. As it has been stated, the 
external debt is “regularly serviced at the expense of vital social programmes” and “has 
already destroyed many of the social gains made in the 1960s and 1970s”.653 In 1992, the total 
external debt of Zambia was US$ 3.7 billion. In 1998, it increased to US$ 6.5 billion, 46 
percent of which was owed to the World Bank, the IMF and the African Development 
Bank 654 The repayment of the debt absorbs resources, which could be used to finance social 
services. Thus in 1991, US$ 107.8 million went to education and US$ 73.6 to health. In 1996, 
education and health respectively received to 88.4 and 67.7 million.655 The neo-liberal 
structural adjustment policies that the Bretton Woods institutions have imposed on Zambia 
and that the Chiluba government accepted without any question have contributed further to 
the denial of social and economic rights. A study published in 2000 and conducted for the UN 
Committee on Economic and Social Rights reached the conclusion that “economic and social 
rights are increasingly denied and actively violated in Zambia”656 and that this is the 
consequence of the policies of privatisation and liberalisation, which constitute a central part 
of the reforms required by the Bretton Woods institutions to financially support the 
government of Zambia in its effort to redress the critical economic and financial situation 
facing the country. In fact, the Chiluba government immediately developed a Policy 
Framework Paper (1992-1994), which set out the parameters of its economic policy. The 
content of the Policy Framework Paper was heavily conditioned by the Bretton Woods 
institutions as the reception of financial assistance from the World Bank and the IMF was 
subordinated to their approval of the document. This was followed by the implementation of a 
structural adjustment programme, which involved the revision of the existing institutional and 
legal framework, and a macroeconomic stabilisation programme. The core elements of the 
SAP were the liberalisation of trade and industry, the privatisation of the parastatal sector and 
the rationalisation of the public sector. The macroeconomic stabilisation programme had a 
financial nature and was aimed at the reduction of inflation, the achievement of a balance of 
the government’s accounts and the rationalisation and consolidation of the financial sector.
653 Joint Report o f the Independent Expert on the Effects o f Structural Adjustment Policies and the Special 
Rapporteur on the Effects o f Foreign Debt on the Full Enjoyment o f Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
E/CN. 4/2000.51,14th January 2000, para. 16.
654 Ibidem, para. 17.
655 M.J. Kelley, Primary Education in Heavily Indebted Poor Country: The Case o f Zambia in 1990s, Oxfam 
and UNICEF, Lusaka, cited in table 1, in ibidem.
656 T. Kenny, Zambia, Deregulation and the Denial o f Human Rights. Submission to the UN Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Rights, Accountability and Development (RAID), Queen Elisabeth 
House, Oxford 2000, summary report at http://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/textweb/rzambia.html
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These reforms continued after 1994 during the whole period of the Chiluba government. 
Liberalisation brought a dramatic transformation in contrast with the Kaunda’s era, as Zambia 
had previously been one of the most nationalised economies in Africa. The legal and 
institutional landmarks of the neo-liberal reforms introduced during the Chiluba government 
were the adoption of the Privatisation Act in 1992 and the creation of the Zambian 
Privatisation Agency (ZPA). The major outcome concerned the privatisation of the parastatal 
Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM), the core sector of Zambian economy, which 
was completed in 2000.
In fact the neo-liberal reforms introduced by the Chiluba government produced 
negative results also in economic and financial terms. While the domestic budget deficit has 
remarkably diminished, the amount of money owed to foreign banks, the World Bank and the 
IMF continue to be considerable. Moreover, the gross domestic product has not increased and 
foreign direct investment has been low, despite it being the goal of economic reform.657 The 
Zambian economy has clearly paid a high price. All forms of protection to Zambian goods 
have been curtailed to promote foreign trade. Subsidies, price controls and control on the 
quantity of imports allowed into the country have been removed and customs duties have been 
reduced. Moreover, foreign exchange regulations have been repealed in order for companies 
to freely introduce foreign money for investment and withdraw foreign exchange resulting 
from operations conducted in Zambia. Furthermore, in the same logic of attracting foreign 
investment, new legislation has been adopted to safeguard private assets against 
expropriation, individual and corporate taxes have been curtailed and capital allowance has 
increased. The local economy has been severely damaged by these policies. The level of 
imports overtook exports and the agricultural sector and the local manufacturing industry 
found themselves competing with foreign companies, whose products are cheaper and, unlike 
the Zambian ones, they can rely on subsidies and higher technology.
If one looks at the social costs of these measures, the picture is equally bleak. 
Privatisation and liberalisation have been carried out at the expense of Zambian economic 
activities and the balance in the domestic budget has also been pursued through drastic cuts in 
the social spending, which has worsened the health, education and housing conditions of 
Zambians.
The right to work has been seriously affected. Remaining in the framework of the 
Zambian Constitution, it could be argued that the directive principle (c) “to create conditions
657 Kenny, cit.
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under which all citizens shall be able to secure adequate opportunity to obtain employment” 
has not been effectively pursued. Deregulation, privatisation and the accompanying 
rationalisation of the parastatal sector have brought about an extremely high percentage of job 
losses. Many state companies have been liquidated and, between 1992 and 1994, 25,611 
workers, most of whom were employed in the public and parastatal sectors, were declared 
redundant.658 The decline in employment continued, in stark contradiction with the neo-liberal 
belief that the first necessary period of job losses would be followed by the creation of new 
employment by foreign investors. Between 1992 and 1998, 81,000 people lost their posts in 
the formal economy659 and the informal economy has grown as far as to absorb 85 percent of 
the economically active population.660 This means that the majority of workers in Zambia are 
outside the protection of the law, and therefore, the right to social security is also not 
guaranteed.
The situation generated by the implementation of the structural adjustment measures 
had a negative impact on the right of workers and their dependent families to “an adequate 
standard of living”, including adequate food, clothing and housing. The Zambian government 
has not created “the conditions under which all citizens shall be able to secure adequate means 
of livelihood” (directive principles (c)). Before the implementation of the structural 
adjustment reforms in 1991, 68 percent of Zambians lived in poverty. Today 85 percent of 
people live below the World Bank’s poverty threshold of one dollar a day.661 Life expectancy 
has decreased from 51 years in 1981 to 40 years and six months in 1998662 and in 2000, this 
dropped to 37 years,663also because of the spread of HIV/AIDS.664
Moreover, the measures adopted by the government do not seem to be in line with 
either the state’s commitment “to provide decent shelter for all persons” (directive principle 
(d)). Privatisation of the parastatal sector has also affected the right to housing, as it provoked 
the displacement of a large number of families from mine land. All state housing has been
658 Central Statistical Office, Quarterly Digest o f Statistic, First Quarter, Lusaka: CSO 1994 and Economic 
Report, National Commission for Development Planning, Lusaka, 1995. N. Simutanyi, “The Politics of 
Structural Adjustment in Zambia”, in 17 Third World Quarterly, 1996, p. 837.
659 EU Joint Service for the Management of the Community Aid to Non-Member Countries, Statistical 
Appendix, table 8, 1999 (data provided by the Government of Zambia’s Central Statistical Office), cited in 
Kenny, cit
660 ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, Individual 
Observation 1999 concerning ILO Employment Policy Convention 1964 (No. 122).
661 Central Statistical Office, The Evolution o f Poverty in Zambia, 1997, cited in Kenny, cit.
662 WHO, World Health Report, Statistical Appendix, Table 1, 1999, in ibidem.
663 See WHO data at http//www.who.int/country/zambia/en
664 Zambia is one of the countries most affected by the pandemic in sub-Saharan Africa. Around 20 per cent of 
the adults in Zambia are HIV positive. Data found in UNAIDS, Epistemiological Fact Sheets on HIV/AIDS and 
Sexually Transmitted Infections, 2002.
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sold and the tenants have been evicted. Furthermore, with the privatisation of ZCCM, 
employees of the copper sector and their families have lost access to the social services and 
facilities, including the housing that ZCCM provided, as well as the permission to establish 
squatter settlements in the mine land. Moreover, as a condition for aid the World Bank called 
for the repeal of the provisions from the Industrial and Labour Relations Act requiring private 
employers to supply housing or housing allowances. The rationale was that these provisions 
constituted a disincentive for labour mobility and private housing development. Although 
many Zambian citizens supported this revision, the speed with which the new regime was 
introduced and the fact that it was implemented in a period of economic crisis deprived many 
households of any security. Donors have also pushed the Zambian government to convert 
customary land to leasehold status. In this regard, two acts were adopted subsequently as a 
response to pressure from the World Bank. These were the Land Act of 1995 and the Mines 
and Mineral Act of 1993 (amended in 2000). The Mines and Mineral Act recognises the right 
of mining companies to acquire land in customary areas upon consent from the Chief. This 
implies that an entire community may lose their land without being consulted.
Neo-liberal policies are also inconsistent with the State’s undertaking “to provide 
equal and adequate educational opportunities in all fields and at all levels for all”. The loss of 
employment has had an impact on the conditions o f children and their right to education. The 
number of children enrolled in primary schools has dropped by_14 percent since 1986 and this 
is due in part to the fact that schooling is not free and many families cannot afford to send 
their children to school after having loss their jobs. The responsibility of the World Bank is 
considerable in this respect. The Bank has a very narrow approach vis-à-vis the right to 
education. It focuses on extreme poverty and it confines itself to promoting bursaries to 
reduce “cost barriers for the ultra-poor”. The official discourse does not push for a guarantee 
for compulsory primary education to everyone, as provided by international human rights 
law.665 In a country in which over 600,000 Zambian children are orphans,666 the fact that 
education is not free constitutes a clear impediment for them. In 1996, 68 percent of orphans 
in rural areas did not go to school. Apart from the right to education, some other children’s 
rights are violated including the right to an adequate standard of living and freedom from 
exploitation. The phenomenon of street children affects in Zambia at least 75,000 children
665 See the critique of the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education, Annual Report, E/CN.4/2001/52, 
11 January 2001, Commission on Human Rights, Fifty-Seventh Session, para. 35.
666 AFRONET, Zambia. Human Rights Report 2001, available at http://afronet.org.za/
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below the age of 18.667 Most of these children, the majority of whom are orphans, have never 
gone to school or have left it to make a living. In this regard, it should also be taken into 
account that the phenomenon of child labour is also widespread. There were approximately 
595,000 child labourers (between 5 and 17 years) in 1998 and approximately 85 percent were 
occupied in the worst forms of child labour.668 The government of Zambia has responsibilities 
towards children not only deriving from its ratification of the ILO Worst Forms of Child 
Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182) and the ILO Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (No. 138), 
the ICESCR669 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child,670 but also from its 
constitution. As seen above, a provision included in the bill of rights is devoted to “Protection 
of young persons671 672against exploitation”. Article 24 provides: “No young person shall be 
employed and shall in no case be caused or permitted to engage in any occupation or 
employment which would prejudice his health or education or interfere with his physical, 
mental or moral development, provided that an Act of Parliament may provide for the 
employment of a young person for a wage under certain conditions” (para. 1), Moreover “[a]ll 
young persons shall be protected against physical or mental ill-treatment, all forms of neglect, 
cruelty or exploitation” (para. 2).
In addition, structural adjustment measures also affected the enjoyment of the right to 
health and have hindered the fulfilment of the state’s commitment “to endeavour to provide 
clean and safe water, adequate medical and health facilities” (Directive principle (d)). These 
measures have included a reduction o f the funding of health institutions and the introduction 
of user fees. Combined with the high level of poverty, this has had a devastating effect on the 
health conditions of the population. Not only has average life expectancy dropped, but the 
incidence of infant mortality, stunted children, tuberculosis and HIV have also increased.
Another aspect of the lack of implementation of the right to health is the reduced 
access to safe water. While in the early 1970s, 86 percent of the urban population had access
667 G. Lugnwangwa and M. Macwan’gi, Street Children in Zambia: A Situation Analysis, pp. 22 seq., cited in 
Kelly, and UNDP, Zambia Human Development Report, 1998.
668 ILO-IPEC and Republic of Zambia, Central Statistical Office, Zambia 1999: Child Labour Survey, Lusaka, 
Zambia, 2002. According to the ILO Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No, 182) ratified by 
Zambia in 2001, the worst forms of child labour comprise all forms of slavery or similar practises; prostitution; 
pornography; illicit activities, in particular for the production and trafficking of drugs; work which is likely to 
harm the health, safety or morals of children. In 2001, Zambia also ratified the ILO Minimum Age Convention, 
1973 (No. 138).
669 Article 10 (3) states: “The State Parties to the present Covenant recognize that:... Special measures of 
protection and assistance should be taken on behalf o f all children and young persons without any 
discrimination for reasons of parentage or other conditions. Children and young persons should be protected 
from economic and social exploitation”.
670 G.A. Res. 44/25 of 20th November 1989, entered into force 2nd September 1990.
671 The term “young person” signifies an individual under the age of fifteen years.
672 See UNDP, Zambia Human Development Report 1999/2000.
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to safe water, in 1996 the proportion fell to 8 percent. In certain areas, such as Copperbelt, the 
percentage of households relying on unprotected water sources has risen to more than twice 
that of the early 1970s.673 In 1978, there were 2,000 cases of cholera, whilst in June 1999, this 
figure had risen to 11,327.674 675
The Chiluba government recognised some of these problems due to the increasing 
pressures of civil society. However, its response was limited due to the strict requirements 
imposed by the World Bank. The government acknowledged the need to address the HIV 
pandemic and the phenomenon of child labour. With regard to the latter, for instance, it set up 
an inter-ministerial working group (the National Steering Committee of the National Country 
Program on Child Labour) in 2000 to coordinate the relevant initiatives. Moreover, it started 
addressing the problem of poverty in accordance with the World Bank’s commitment to a 
“pro-poor growth”. To this end, the government developed a Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Paper (PRSP) in 2002. This combines activities to promote growth with improved access to 
social services, including education, health services and access to water. However, a 
consideration of the employment-dimension of poverty continues to be lacking. The preceding 
analysis has shown the way in which the denial of the right to work has impacted on the 
current levels of poverty and on the violation of other rights such as the right to education and 
freedom from child labour. The privatisation and liberalisation policies carried out to date 
have not been questioned by the adoption of the PRSP’s approach. With regard to the Interim 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (I-PRSP), it was observed that it featured stringent macro- 
economic goals, “which are normally inserted in conventional structural adjustment
675programmes .
9.3.2 Civil Society and the Donor Community's Role and Approach vis-à-vis Human 
Rights Promotion
Zambian civil society groups and donors, including the World Bank, have played an 
important role in the promotion of human rights in Zambia. However, significant differences 
exist regarding their respective approach to human rights and the Zambian government’s 
reaction to the pressures coming from them. Zambian human rights NGOs have been very 
active in denouncing human rights abuses committed by the government. Their activities have
673 Living Conditions Monitoring Survey, 1996, table 14.7 quoted in Kenny, cit
674 WHO, World Health Report 1999, quoted in Kenny, c it
675 Report submitted by the Independent Expert on the effects of structural adjustment policies and foreign debt 
on the full enjoyment of all human rights, particularly economic, social and cultural rights. E/CN.4/2001/56,18 
January 2001, Commission on Human Rights, Fifty-seventh session, para. 42.
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ranged from election monitoring, civic education and human rights promotion. Their presence 
on the Internet through their web-sites, support from and collaboration with international 
human rights organisations is an important component of their force and their ability to inform 
the public about the human rights situation in Zambia and to work towards its improvement. 
There are two key results achieved by Zambian NGOs (together with the media). The first 
involves drawing attention to the human rights violations occurring in Zambia both at home 
and abroad. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, for example, use AFRONET’s 
reports as a source for their own reports on Zambia. The other result has been to curb the 
action of the government. Zambian NGOs actually play the role which has been traditionally 
played by opposition parties in liberal-democracies. Despite the repressive politics of the 
Chiluba government, NGOs have proved to be influential particularly when their action was 
supported by international pressure. For example, the withdrawal of the Media Council Bill 
and later, of the State Security Bill were due to the combination of internal and international 
action.
Donors have also exerted pressures on the government to end the restriction of 
individual liberties. However, donors and Zambian civil society concerns, however, do not 
always coincide and their influence over the government varies. The former have focused 
their attention merely on civil rights, while the latter have increasingly devoted their work to 
the status of economic and social rights. Donors, and also the media and international NGOs 
have disregarded the impact that the transition to a market economy has had to the enjoyment 
of social and economic rights.
Moreover, the Chiluba government has proved to be more sensitive to donors’ 
pressures than to its own society’s opinions. There are several examples in which donors’ 
reactions have been a determining factor in influencing the government decisions. The 1997 
state of emergency was lifted and a Commission of Inquiry on the cases of torture committed 
in that period was established to respond to donor pressure, in particular, the World Bank. The 
World Bank decided to postpone its Consultative Group Meeting676 in December, making it 
subject to the conclusion of the state of emergency and, later, conditioned the allocation of 
additional funds to the findings of a commission of inquiry. The appointment of the Human 
Rights Commission in 1997 was also a move taken to please the donors. The appointment of 
the members of the Commission took place on 4th April in order for the government to 
announce some news at the Consultative Donor Group Meeting in London on 25th April,
676 This includes governmental representatives and external aid partners.
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which would have lowered donors’ criticism of the 1996 elections, and to ensure the renewal 
of aid. The meeting was aimed at evaluating the status of the political reform and the human 
rights record of Zambia. The timing of the creation of the Commission and the fact that 
documents on the newly established Commission were distributed to donors but denied to 
Zambian human rights groups demonstrate that the appointment of the Commission was a 
political move addressed to foreign interlocutors and was not motivated by a genuine attempt 
to implement the constitutional provisions. The Commission was not even provided with its 
own premises or funds. What is interesting to recall is that these institutional and structural 
weaknesses have not prevented the Commission from exercising the role conferred on it by 
the law. In this way, institutions created only to respond symbolically to donors’ concerns, 
may ultimately display an independence which was neither foreseen nor desired by the 
government.
The Chiluba government took other initiatives directed at meeting bilateral and 
multilateral donors’ requests. After the lifting of the state of emergency, the World Bank 
Consultative Group has continued to call upon the Zambian government to take action on 
alleged human rights violations by the police. However, the continuation of financial support 
was only made conditional with regard to governance and macroeconomic reforms, with 
privatisation remaining the core condition. Progress in the sphere of human rights, democracy 
and governance appeared as conditions for future support.677 678As a result, the government 
developed a National Capacity Building Programme for Good Governance and committed 
itself to improving human rights. It was certainly not a coincidence that the relevant document 
was only made public at the World Bank Consultative Group meeting in May 1999, where the 
Group announced its plan to make at least US$ 240 million available in balance payment 
support and US$390 million in project assistance conditional upon satisfactory economic and 
governance performance. During the meeting, reference was made to good governance, 
human rights and, in particular, freedom of the press. Moreover, the partners agreed that a 
“more coordinated, comprehensive framework and approach to development was needed”. 
However, the privatisation of the ZCCM "in whatever way it could" and the implementation
677 See World Bank, Zambia * s Aid Programme Linked to Performance: Further Progress in Economic Reform 
and Governance Could Boost Support at
http://web.worldbank.Org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0, contentMDK:20014734-menuPK:34466-pagePK:3 
437O~piPK:34424~theSitePK:46O7,O0.htmi
678 World Bank, Zambia \s Future Prosperity Linked to Continuing Reforms and Development o f a Long-Term 
Vision, News Release, at
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERN AL/NEWS/0„contentMDK:20015I42~menuPK:34466~pagePK:3 
4370~piPK:34424~theSitePK:4607,OO.html
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of the economic reform program were the only concrete indications which emerged from the 
meeting. The core concern was the implementation of economic reforms regardless of the 
social implications they might have. Also the additional debt relief under the HIPC Initiative 
was subordinated to the realization of the economic reform programme. Only Scandinavian 
countries refused to release balance of payment support unless human rights and governance 
performance improved.
However, step towards the protection of civil rights was taken at the 1999 
Consultative Group meeting. The Zambian government agreed to hold four pre-meetings with 
stakeholders before the meeting due to be held in Lusaka in May 2000. These four meetings 
should have been devoted to evaluating the implementation of the National Capacity Building 
Programme for Good Governance. After the meeting, however, it was clear that the openness 
shown by the government was in fact over. After returning from Paris, the Minister of 
Finance, Edith Nawakwi, and the government-controlled media attacked NGOs such as 
AFRONET and ZIMT for urging the donors to apply human rights conditionality to the 
balance of payment support. The same NGOs were also threatened with deregistration by the 
MMD chairperson for information and publicity, Vemin Mwaanga. However, when it became 
necessary again to satisfy donor concerns the government took up its previous commitments. 
In May 2000, the Minister for Legal Affairs, Vincent Malambo, convened a meeting with 
donors to provide feedback on the progress in the implementation of the National Capacity 
Building Programme for Good Governance, which had been partially revised. With the ten- 
year National Capacity Building Programme for Good Governance of 2000, the government 
committed itself to the principles of constitutional legitimacy, accountability, transparent 
decision-making procedures, participatory development, democracy, respect for human rights, 
gender equality and the rule of law. All of the fundamental key words of development 
agencies were included. The government also submitted the findings of the pre-consultative 
meeting with stakeholders on the National Capacity Building Programme.679 On the eve of the 
meeting with the Consultative Group, which was due to be held on 17th and 18th July, the 
government took other steps which were aimed at showing its commitment to human rights 
and good governance. For example, the Minister for Legal Affairs met with a few NGOs to 
decide upon their participation in the meeting with the Consultative Group.680
679 Many of the points raised concerned the strengthening of the Human Rights Commission, see Report o f the 
Consultative Process with Stakeholders held on the National Capacity Building Programme fo r Good 
Governance fo r  Zambia, Lusaka, Ministry of Legal Affairs, 8th October 1999.
680 As they were permitted to attend the meeting, a Steering Committee decided to produce papers on a wide 
range of subjects, including debt, poverty, governance and gender. The final version of these papers was then
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However, human rights continued to be treated as an instrument in the relationships 
with the donors rather than a constitutionally binding commitment. This attitude was clearly 
manifested. On 16th July 2000 the government invited Zambian NGOs and Human Rights 
Watch to participate in a consultative group meeting on human rights and governance issues 
with bilateral donors in Lusaka. The same day, the police arrested a MP of the United Party 
for National Development (UPND) and nine constituency officials upon the charge of having 
held an unlawful meeting two days earlier.
In brief, donors played a crucial role in promoting human rights in Zambia. However, 
apart from situations of crisis, such as in 1997 when the state of emergency was declared, 
they did not make recourse to conditionality. In fact, the tolerance demonstrated by Western 
donors has been condemned by Zambian NGOs, which also demanded the withdrawal of 
financial support for the Government in 1998. For example, the Zambian Legal Resource 
Foundation (LRF) commented upon the commitment of over US$500 million at the Paris 
World Bank Consultative Group meeting in 1998 and declared that “the donor countries are
I
not helping Zambia to democratise or move steadily towards democracy”.
Other critiques concerned the content of the reforms promoted in Zambia. AFRONET 
denounced Zambia for its “continued implementation of neo-liberal structural adjustment 
policies” which “ran counter to the prospects of enhanced provision of economic, social and 
cultural rights”.681 82 683
In respect to this stand, it should be noted how the discourse and action concerning 
human rights has developed within civil society since 1991. Zambian civil society, including 
human rights organisations, civic associations, trade unions and business groups, has enlarged 
the scope of their human rights-related claims. The movement, which provoked the fall of the 
Kaunda’s regime, built its demand for change around the concept of democracy. Their 
demand had a social and economic rationale, however it was expressed with a request for civil 
and political rights only. A fieldwork study conducted in the early 1990s in a suburb of 
Lusaka showed that, at that time, the population equated democracy with the improvement of 
the existing living conditions. The author of this study remarked that for the population of this 
suburb the term democracy signifies food. Democracy “c ’est d ’abord, pour les gens du 
quartier, des magasins qui ne sont plus vides”.6*3 The second meaning attached to the concept
agreed upon in a National Forum of NGOs which was convened in Lusaka on 10th July.
681 “Paris Club Meet: Who Is the Villain?”, in Newsletter o f the Legal Resource Foundation in Zambia, Number 
2, May-June 1998.
682 AFRONET, Zambia. Human Rights Report 2001, cit
683 J.P. Daloz, “Can We Eat Democracy?” Perceptions de la démocratisation zambienne dans un quartier
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of democracy was the freedom of movement and expression. This conveys the expectation 
that through freedom, including economic freedom, the living conditions would improve, 
however, this has not yet been achieved. As argued in the preceding sections, this is partially 
due to the lack of good governance. However, this is also due to the fact that the MMD 
government has pursued neo-liberal policies without taking their social impact into account. 
As a reaction, civil society has begun to raise the issue of social and economic rights, which 
has been absent from the language used to make political claims in the late 1980s and early 
1990s. In addition, during the consultation processes, which led to the amendment of the 1964 
and 1991 constitutions, the proposals concerning socio-economic rights were marginal to the 
overall discussion. However, groups such as AFRONET, Women for Change, Transparency 
Intemational-Zambia, Integrity Foundation, the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace 
(CCJP), the Jesuit Centre for Theological Reflection (JCTR) and the Zambian Association for 
Research and Development (ZARD) are currently active in lobbying the government and 
raising awareness among the population with regard to socio-economic rights. In light of this 
recent development, all o f  the political parties, including the MMD, felt obliged to undertake 
commitments in this respect during the latest electoral campaign. All of the political 
manifestos contained promises for the free provision of social services, in particular in the 
sphere of health and education, and employment creation. Despite its weaknesses, the 
preparation of the PRSP by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development gave a 
further boost to the concern about the social deficits of the policies carried out by the 
government until this point. A common criticism of the civil society groups relates to the 
social impact o f the structural adjustment policies imposed by the World Bank and the IMF. 
The donor-driven nature of Zambia’s policies is also questioned.684 The demand for the 
government to distance itself from the IMF has been expressed not only by the trade union 
movement, but also by the business community. For example, the executive secretary of the 
Zambia Chambers of Small and Medium Business Association, Maxwell Sichula, has 
attributed massive job losses and the growth of the informal sector to the hasty 
implementation of liberalisation and privatisation.685 Recently the proposed privatisation of
populaire de Lusaka'*, in J.P. Daloz and P. Quantin (eds.), Transitions démocratiques africaines: Dynamiques et 
contraintes (¡990-1994), Ed. Karthala, Paris, 1996, p. 250.
684 AFRONET, Zambia Human Rights Report 2001, c it Recently, the President of the University of Zambia 
Lecturers and Researchers Unions (UNZALARU) has also taken position against donor-driven policies, see 
“Zambians should be firm in order to succumb to outside pressure”, in The Monitor, Friday, 20th December 
2002. For a similar position by the Zambia Congress of Trade Union (ZCTU) Deputy Secretary Ian 
Mkandawire, see “ZANACO sale bid on course-IMF”, in Times o f Zambia, Friday, 20th December 2002.
685 “Ills of privatisation, liberalisation cited”, in The Monitor, Tuesday, 24th December 2002.
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the Zambia National Commercial Bank (ZNCB), the Zambia Telecommunications Company 
(ZAMTEL) and the Zambia Electricity Supply Corporation (ZESCO) was criticised by 
NGOs, the Church, MPs and the labour movement in the light of the hardship that the 
previous privatisations have created* Responding to this widespread opposition, the 
Parliament turned down a motion to privatise these companies in December 2002. President 
Mwanawasa confirmed this decision and said to the IMF that in light of the high levels of 
poverty, asset stripping and job losses that privatisation has caused in Zambia, he wanted to 
re-consider the privatisation programme of ZNCB, ZAMTEL and ZESCO. This would have 
represented a substantial change in the government’s attitude towards international financial 
institutions, if the President had maintained this position. Conversely, later, he did not oppose 
the continuation of the privatisation programme also given the pressures from the IMF, which 
had subordinated the cancellation of almost half of the country’s debt to the implementation 
of the agreed privatisation programme. However, the fact that the policy line of the IMF was 
questioned not only by the Parliament but also by the Government and that the President was 
severely criticised by the Media, politicians and civil society’s groups for not having behaved 
consistently with his previous declarations show that Africa is starting developing a less 
passive approach to external conditionalities which have human rights costs.
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CHAPTER 10: Francophone Africa
In contrast with English-speaking Africa, this new constitutional phase presents some clear 
patterns in Francophone Africa. Firstly, almost all of the French-speaking countries adopted 
new constitutions.686 Secondly, it is possible to identify two specific processes through which 
constitutional change was brought about. In certain countries, political liberalisation and the 
process of constitutional renewal started on the initiative of the heads of the states themselves, 
who realised that it was the only way to ensure their political survival in light of the a popular 
discontent which needed to be addressed. This was the case of Côte d’Ivoire,687 Mauritania, 
Burkina Faso, Comoros,688 Cameroon and Madagascar. In other countries, the political 
renewal was realised through the holding of National Conferences, in which the various 
political, social, professional and religious voices met and discussed the transition to 
democracy. Most of these Conferences declared themselves as sovereign and adopted new 
constitutions. This model was inaugurated by Benin and was then imitated, with different 
results,689 by some of the other former French colonies, including Gabon (March-April 1990), 
Congo (February-June 1991), Togo (July-August 1991), Niger (July-November 1991),690 
Mali (July-August 1991) and Chad (January-April 1993).691 692
In all of these conferences, the discussion of the constitutionalisation of fundamental 
rights and freedoms was a central concern. This was reflected in the texts of the constitutions, 
which contain a very detailed list of rights drawn from the International Bill of Rights and the 
African Charter. Unlike the independence constitutions, those adopted in the 1990s ensure the 
enforceability of human rights either through the inclusion of protective provisions in the 
body of the Constitution or, when human rights are incorporated in the preamble, it is 
specified that this is an integral part of the constitution.693 Another difference relates to the 
sources of the constitutional protection of human rights. These no longer refer to the 1789 
French Declaration or the preamble to the 1946 French Constitution, but rather to the
686 Burkina Faso in 1991, Capo Verde in 1992, Central African Republic in 1995, Chad in 1997, Republic of 
Congo in 2002, Djibouti in 1992, Equatorial Guinea in 1991 (amended in 1995), Gabon in 1991, Guinea in 
1991, Madagascar in 1992 (amended in 1998), Mali in 1992, Mauritania in 1991, Niger in 1999, Seychelles in 
1996 and Togo in 1992.
687 After the revision of the 1960 constitution in 1990, a new constitution was adopted in 2000.
688 Comoros achieved independence in 1975.
689 See D. Bormaud et P. Quantin, “Le modèle et ses doubles : les conférences nationales en Afrique Noire 
(1990-1991) ”, in I. Mény, Les politiques du mimétisme institutionnel La greffe et le rejet, L’Harmattan, Paris, 
1993, p. 163 seq.
690 A new constitution was subsequently adopted in 1999.
691A new constitution was subsequently adopted in 1997.
692 See for example Title 2 of the Constitution of Benin (1990), the Preliminary Titles o f the Constitutions of 
Niger (1992), and Gabon (1991), or Title 2 of the Constitution of Madagascar (1992).
698 For example, the Constitution of Congo of 1992.
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international human rights regime and the African Charter and more generally to the 
developments which occurred in the international discourse on human rights, as expressed not 
only through legal instruments but through the broader spectrum of international conferences 
and civil society action on human rights. Thus, these new constitutions protect not only civil 
and political rights, together with social, economic and cultural rights, but also ‘third 
generation* rights such as the right to a healthy environment and even the rights of special 
groups, including people with disabilities or the elderly, similarly to the Beninese constitution. 
Moreover, in some constitutions such as the ones of Benin and Burkina Faso, which followed 
the Beninese model, provision is made for a Constitutional Court with the task of checking 
the constitutionality o f laws. Many of these constitutions also include Human Rights 
Commissions as well as administrative authorities charged with the task of guaranteeing the 
respect for the freedom of the press.
10.1 Benin: the 1990 Constitution
10.1.1 Processes and Actors Heading to the Adoption of the 1990 Constitution
The fall of the Kérékou regime, which preceded the adoption of the 1990 Constitution, was 
the outcome of the mobilisation of Beninese civil society and later supported by external 
actors, including the World Bank, IMF and France. The international context characterised by 
the reforms introduced by Gorbachev in the Soviet Union also contributed indirectly to the 
democratic shift by depriving the regime of its political and ideological reference and 
encouraging the Beninese to continue their struggle for democracy. The term ‘perestroika* 
was even employed by the Beninese movement to define its demands for change.
The factor which sparked the process of change was the serious crisis of the regime, 
whose roots lay in its inability to guarantee acceptable living conditions for its population. 
From 1979, the country faced a bleak financial and economic situation characterised by trade 
and budgetary deficits and decreasing exports, which was similar to the pre-coup period. Even 
though external causes contributed to this situation, much of the responsibility was due to the 
widespread corruption, a growing and unproductive public sector694 and the crisis of the 
banking system determined by the transfer o f a considerable amount of funds abroad, which 
culminated in the failure of the Central Bank of Benin in 1989. This situation was placed in a 
context of systematic and brutal repression of any opposition. The “institutionalisation**695 of
694 C. Allen, Democratic Renewal in A f r i c a T w o  Essays on Benin”, Occasional Paper No. 40, Centre of 
African Studies, Edinburgh University, 1992, p. 5.
695 F. Laloupo, “La Conférence nationale du Bénin: Un concept nouveau de changement de régime politique”, in
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imprisonment and torture was a striking feature of the pre-1990 Kerekou era.
The economic and financial condition of the country increasingly worsened. The 
cautious reforms introduced in the 1980s proved ineffective especially given the international 
terms of trade which penalised African producers, and the refusal of the IMF to provide a 
structural adjustment loan. If the late 1970s witnessed a fall in the real income of workers and 
peasants, in 1986, the salaries of public sector workers were paid late and many jobs were 
lost. In 1988, salaries and student grants went unpaid at all and the accounts of thousands of 
civil servants and teachers were frozen. Finally, these events culminated in a widespread 
revolt.
However, seeds of this revolt can be found at the end of the 1970s, when protests 
against the regime began to be organised although the majority of the population tended to 
manifest its opposition through forms of passive resistance, such abstaining from voting. Only 
unofficial student organisations and unions, which were mainly connected with the 
Communist Party of Dahomey (PCD) dared to take overt action against the regime, and this 
opposition was brutally oppressed with arrests, torture and murders. In the mid 1980s, 
opposition became increasingly overt. This was due to the fact that the state could not use the 
methods employed to calm the discontent such as clientelism, co-optation and patronage. 
Notably, since the beginning of the 1980s, the regime was no longer capable of replicating 
this system, therefore it lost the support of those who once relied upon it. In 1986, the 
situation was so critical that the practice of offering public employment to each graduate had 
to be stopped. At the same time, the size of the mass of people who were co-opted was so 
great that they tended to escape from the control of the regime and to claim new means of 
access to power and accumulation.
The year 1985 marked the beginning of the end for the regime. In this year, the 
students organised protests demanding jobs and an independent student union. Other 
demonstrations were held in 1987 and 1989 despite the brutal repression that they faced. 
However, it was from 1988 and above all in the period from 1988-1989 that opposition to the 
regime took the form of a real popular mobilisation. This was also due to the worsening of the 
economic situation. Austere measures such as the halving of the indemnities to teachers in 
1987 and the delay of the payment and reduction of the salaries between 1987 and 1988 
further intensified the anger of the people. In January 1989, students organised a strike which 
lasted for one week in the university campus of Cotonou as the grants for the previous term
Annee africaine, 1992-1993, p. 90.
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had not been paid. By mid-January, most high schools were closed and for the first time, the 
teachers joined the students in the struggle. They even refused to go back to school when they 
received two months salary and they demanded the full amount that was due to them. The 
strike ended only when the Council of Ministers announced that all of those who were not at 
work by 31st January would be dismissed. In the meantime, the ministerial civil servants also 
went on strike. A situation dominated by banking scandals, the freezing of bank accounts, the 
persistent block of the payment of salaries and trials for the attempted coups in 1988 
encouraged other groups to mobilise. In the months from March to July 1988, teachers, 
plantation workers, medical workers in Porto Novo and civil servants went on strike for the 
payment of salary arrears. The demands became more forthright when they saw that the 
government reacted with repressive measures, instead of engaging in a dialogue. It was only 
rural masses that did not participate in the mobilisation against the regime and this was due to 
the fact that they found alternative means to survive by turning the production into food 
production and by making recourse to smuggling with Nigeria.
In parallel to the urban demonstrations, the IMF, the World Bank and France pressed 
the regime to introduce political reforms, allegedly urging the government to introduce 
multipartism, reject Marxism and respect human rights.696 The “interest” of the Bretton 
Woods institutions in Benin dated back to 1985 as the government had refused to agree on a 
structural adjustment programme with the IMF at this time. Nevertheless, to meet the 
demands of the international community it decided, to partially liberalise the system by 
allowing the private press to exist, even though it was subjected to censorship. It is at this time 
that the Gazette du Golfe, Tam-Tam Express and VOpinion appeared. The regime also 
accepted to strengthen the practice of the *concertation * with the trade unions. Under the 
pressures from the World Bank and the IMF, the regime also agreed to start an inquiry on the 
funds transferred abroad from the Banque Commerciale du Bénin by Beninese and French 
officials of the judicial administration. Some 80,884,000 French Francs were transferred to 
European banks and the charges were addressed to a Minister who was very close to Kérékou, 
Mohamed Cissé. In 1988, the World Bank encouraged further steps towards liberalisation and 
France conditioned its aid to Benin on the consultation with the World Bank and the IMF. The 
appointment of the attorney and law professor Robert Dossou was a concession made by the 
regime to the requests for the liberalisation of the system. Finally, in June 1989, the regime 
gave in and signed an IMF structural adjustment programme. In the same year, an amnesty for
696 Allen, Goodbye, cit., p. 11.
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all political prisoners was voted upon and Kérékou undertook to liberalise various sectors of 
the economy, justifying these steps as “une étape indispensable dans le parcours de la 
révolution*\697 698In the meantime, France continued to sustain the regime by supplying aid in 
order to allow it to pay the salary arrears of public officials and the army. The French attitude 
provoked the opposition of the Beninese people. In September 1989, several letters were sent 
to the Elysée protesting against the policy of France towards the regime of Kérékou. In the 
meantime, the events taking place in Eastern Europe reinforced the struggle of the Beninese. 
In Paris, several meetings were organised by the Diaspora, to which the heads of state were 
invited, and various “clubs de réflexions” were formed. The impact of the events taking place 
in Europe was clearly evident from one of the publications (Bulletin d’Etudes Perspectives et 
Projets) of these clubs. Furthermore, as the sociologist Cosme Zinsou Quénum wrote: “En
/A f t
quoi la crise romaine, par exemple, diffère-t-elle de la situation béninoise
This overview shows that the factors which undermined the regime were the economic
£OQand financial crisis, which led to the regime’s “politics of the belly” and the resurgence of 
civil society. Most analysts recognise that civil society played a major role in the fall of the 
regime. There are two salient features of this popular mobilisation, namely the breadth of the 
social actors involved and the evolution of its discourse. This mobilisation included various 
social groups and developed a political consciousness which was not apparent from the onset. 
As argued above, Benin’s civil society activism in the years between 1989 and 1990 was not a 
sudden phenomenon.700 The actors which led the protests in this period had also opposed the 
regime in the previous years. In this way, these movements should be seen in a historical 
perspective, and over the years, and even in that period, Benin witnessed a political evolution 
of its civil society.
If we look more closely at the different segments of the Beninese civil society, that 
were opposed to the regime, we can see that the leading role was played by the PCD, the 
students movement, the trade unions in the public service sector, the Catholic Church and 
catholic intellectuals and, finally, by the Diaspora and the opposition in exile. The PCD, 
which operated clandestinely until 1991, was the only movement until 1990 to overtly oppose 
the regime in the rural areas. It organised forms of passive resistance of the population such as 
the non-payment of taxes, it removed local representatives by force and organised elections to
697 Laloupo, La Conférence nationale du Bénin, cit., p. 97.
698 Ibidem, p. 99.
699 J.-F. Bayart, L'État en Afrique. La politique du ventre, Paris, Fayard, 1989 (English translation, Longman, 
1993).
700 See Banégas, Mobilisations sociales, cit, pp. 25-44.
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replace them. The PCD also had a few leaders in the state apparatus and activists in the 
university and thus, it could also exert its weight in the public sector strikes and in the protests 
in the university campuses.
The student movement has also had a long history. Since the 1970s, students had 
manifested their discontent against the regime. The student mobilisation was transformed in 
the mid 1980s due to a new political awareness. After an initial period of support for the 
regime in the aftermath of the coup of 1972, when the regime allocated posts in ministries and 
legalised the Union générale des étudiants et élèves du Dahomey (UGEED), students 
organised strikes and rallies, in which the most radical groups demanded a “véritable 
révo lu tio n Behind this mobilisation there was disagreement with certain decisions of the 
regime, which included the reorganisation of the schooling system and the frustration caused 
by the failure to pay salaries and grants. After the brutal repression of 1974, student 
mobilisation reappeared in 1979, albeit to a rather limited degree. The non-payment of 
salaries and grants was again the cause of these protests. However, once the salaries began to 
be regularly paid, the demonstrations ceased. According to Béatrice Gbado, a teacher who 
participated in the mobilisation against the regime, the turning point came on the 6th May of 
1985, when students demanded better school services and the réintroduction of the automatic 
grants.701 702The situation remained tense for at least a month as the regime responded with the 
closure of the schools, the arrest of the leaders of the protest and the revocation of the 
Minister of the Education who attempted to engage in dialogue. The rest of population, 
however, remained indifferent to these events because salaries were being paid at the time. 
With the strike of 6th May 1985, nevertheless, some changes appeared in respect to previous 
demonstrations. Firstly, there were more students involved than in the past. Secondly, the new 
leaders of the Bureau exécutif national de la coopérative universitaire composed of the 
leaders of the 1979 movements, who had been released from prison, broadened their 
traditional scope of action and claims. They adopted a programme of reform of the university 
and organised meetings. These new initiatives were accompanied by a previously lacking 
political awareness. The concept of rights and pluralism emerged and for the first time an 
alternative system was demanded. Students affirmed that they realised that “on peut mettre en 
œuvre des principes différentes pour gérer Uuniversité et, au de-là, la société toute entière” 
and praised the principle of pluralism, thus distancing themselves not only from the regime 
but also from the only organised opposition force, i.e. the Communist Party. At the elections
701 B. Gbado, En marche vers la liberté, Tome 1, Cotonou, 1990.
702 Quoted in Banégas, Mobilisations sociales, cit., p. 33.
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of 18th June 1989, students openly stated their rejection of the PRPB candidates.
A similar evolution took place within the trade union movement of the civil servants, 
which was another crucial actor in the collapse of the regime. As in the case of students, trade 
unions also supported the regime in the immediate aftermath of the coup. However, in the 
years between 1988 and 1989, trade unions, such as the Syndicat National de l ’Enseignement 
Supérieur (SNES) and the Syndicat National des Postes et Télécommunications 
(SYSAPOSTEL), began putting forward not only salary claims but also demanding more 
autonomy and even the ending of their affiliation with the single trade union, i.e. the Union 
nationale des syndicats des travailleurs du Bénin (UNSTB). They actually managed to make 
the majority of trade unions autonomous, starting with the teachers* unions, and, in 1990, they 
set up the Confédération des syndicats autonomes (CSA-Bénin). Its establishment was 
preceded by the organisation of structures parallel to the official one such as the “bureau de 
liaison” and the “comités d ’action” and networks of unions. Therefore, the teachers* unions 
went through an experience similar to that of students. The experience of self-organisation 
triggered off a process of awareness raising. Workers began to appreciate the value of 
pluralism and the need to reform the political system.703 704According to Beatrice Gbado in 1989 
“à la lutte matérielle venait s ’ajouter le combat moral"?04 The struggle was not only for the 
payment of their salaries but also to put an end to an unjust system that offered privileges to a 
few and hardship, arrests, killings and torture for the others. From this point, the cessation of 
all measures of repression and also the freedom to organise became an integral part of the 
package of workers* claims.
Challenges to the regime came also from within the state apparatus. During a meeting 
on 28th July 1989 with Kérékou, two university professors, one of whom was Robert Dossou 
Dean of Law of the National University and member of the Assembly, advocated that a pre­
condition for sorting out of the dramatic economic situation was political liberalisation. They 
argued that citizens would only accept sacrifices to improve the economic situation of the 
country, if they felt free. Even dissent emerged within the army and corruption, 
authoritarianism and clientelism were denounced. A two-party system was demanded by army 
representatives in the PRPB.
Concepts such as freedom, injustice, human rights became key words in the citizens’ 
mobilisation. In an open letter of the Collectif des professeurs des enseignements moyens
703 C. Allen, “Restructuring an Authoritarian State. Democratic Renewal in Bénin”, in 54 Review o f African 
Political Economy, 1992, p. 48.
704 Gbado, cit, Tome 1, p. 11.
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général technique et professionnel (EMGTP) des provinces de VAtlantique, de VOuerne et du 
Mono, addressed to Kérékou on 28th July 1989, it was stated that a “vive protestation contre 
ces arrestations, illégales, arbitraires et injuste qui constituent une violation flagrante des 
Droits de l'homme”105 had been put forward. In this letter, they also denounced the limits 
imposed on the free movement in the country. These limitations were defined as “un grave 
atteint aux libertés individuelles”. In addition, they subordinated the resumption of their work 
to the government’s fulfilment of a series of requests, which were organised under two 
categories: “exigences morales” and “exigences matérielles”. The former included the 
liberation of all o f those illegally arrested, the guarantee of the freedom of speech, press, 
correspondence, assembly, association and manifestation as indicated by Article 134 of the 
Constitution. By the end of the year, mass rallies were held in several towns and the key 
claims concerned human rights and economic sovereignty.705 06
The Communiqué of the SYNESTP of 24th February 1990 should be noted as it 
displays a sophistication of language and thought, which was previously absent. This time, the 
requests were defined in terms of social and political claims. Moreover, the document made a 
strong claim that Africans had the right to enjoy democracy and human rights to the same 
extent as other continents in the world. The fact that this claim was put forward in opposition 
to what was judged as a tolerant position of Europe in respect to the Kérékou’s regime marked 
a turning point in the history of Benin. A document widely circulated among the population 
had shown that France had recommended that Kérékou should simply revise the Constitution 
and open the Party to “toutes les sensïblités politiques du pays'*. Teachers denounced these 
recommendations as a violation of the right to self-determination of the people of Benin.707 It 
is important to emphasise that the right to self-determination was not invoked to claim an 
African right to pursue a political path different from the West. Conversely, the teachers 
objected to the French government’s perception that democracy should not be the same in the 
West and in developing countries. The Beninese people demanded a universalistic 
interpretation of democracy. The conclusion of the SYNESTP’s document is clear in relation 
to the state model they wanted. It culminated with the declaration that the deep aspiration of 
the people of Benin is freedom and democracy. The document specified that this involved the 
establishment of a society in which political pluralism is ensured immediately and the right to
705 Quoted in ibidem, p. 72.
706 C. Allen, ‘Goodbye to All That': The Short and Sad Story o f Socialism in Benin, Occasional Paper, Centre of 
African Studies, Edinburgh University, 1992, p. 10.
707 At the same time students did not favour the signature of the structural adjustment programme with the IMF 
because it was interpreted as a transfer of sovereignty.
education, health and work would be guaranteed later on. In sum, the most politically 
sensitive section of Beninese civil society clearly and strongly affirmed that African 
distinctiveness should not be alleged to avoid the implementation of civil and political rights 
and that once liberal-democracy had been firmly introduced, social rights would also to have 
be guaranteed in order to ensure “la survie prolongée de notre peuple
The Catholic Church also played a role in the démocratisation process of the country, 
albeit to a smaller extent than students and trade unions. In the aftermath of the coup, the 
Catholic Church was subject to a harsh repression to which it reacted with passive resistance. 
It attempted to provide the population with structures alternative to those of the regime, 
including dioceses, developmental NGOs, vocational centres and centres for the promotion of 
women. However, until the 1980s, the Catholic Church never directly challenged the regime. 
It was only after the Pope’s visit to Benin in 1982 that Archbishop De Souza began to openly 
criticise the regime in his sermons. This gave him a political role. In 1985 following the 
student protest, De Souza was received by the President as a mediator. However, it was only 
in 1989 that the Church took on a political position with the publication of the first of a series 
of pastoral letters. The language used in the letters is very cautious, referring to 
responsibilities shared by everyone, but they nevertheless highlighted corruption, clientelism 
and demanded democratic change. The voice of the Church, albeit prudent, added further 
weight to the opposition movement. Behind the position of the Church, the inspiration of 
catholic intellectuals was also present, who had increased their initiatives from the mid 1980s. 
Several religious organisations were created, where political discontent was increasingly 
manifested. The turning point came with the formation of the Group Syrius, then re­
denominated Club Perspective 21 (CP 21), which was composed of high cadres also engaged 
in other groups, such as political parties, NGOs and trade unions. Trade unionism, structural 
adjustment, human rights and démocratisation were among the subjects discussed.
In parallel to the Church, the press also contributed to the awareness raising of the 
population on the responsibilities of the regime for all of the sufferings that they had been 
going through. As seen above, in order to obtain international aid, Kérékou liberalized the 
press in 1988 and newspapers such as La Gazette du Golfe and Tam-Tam Express appeared 
and did not hesitate to attack the government particularly over instances of corruption. The 
tradition of a free and critical press that the country enjoyed during the colonial era along with 
the articles by the nationalist leaders reappeared in Benin.
Finally, the opposition in exile also played a role in the transition to democracy and 
published various materials and organised networks and committees in African countries,
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including Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal and Gambia. However, their influence was weak and they 
did not receive much attention in Benin. The Diaspora was more influential through its 
financial contribution to the opposition movements. It was not until the formation of the new 
government that the exiled received a more prominent role.
10.1.2 La Conférence des Force Vives
By the end of 1989 the regime found itself under growing pressure from the population and 
also under the requirements imposed by the SAP. Against this background, the Central 
Committee of the PRPB, the Permanent Committee of the National Assembly and the 
National Executive Council met on 7th and 8th December and decided to abandon Marxist- 
Leninism as the official ideology of the country and gave the President the responsibility of 
convening a national conference “regroupant les représentants authentiques de toutes les 
forces vives de la nation, quelles que soient leur sensibilités politiques, afin qu 'ils apportent 
leur contribution, dans Vavènement d'un renouveau démocratique et au développement d'une 
saine ambiance politique nouvelle dans notre pays”.10* According to the final communiqué, 
the results of this Conference would have been used to draft a new constitution. The decision 
to convene a national conference was also conditioned by a 'note9 from France, which was 
communicated by the Director of the Civil Cabinet of the President to Kérékou. This note 
contained a series of ‘indications’ relating to the reforms to be carried out. These included the 
revision of the Constitution; the summoning of a “convention nationale ou d'états généraux, 
ou d'assises n a tio n a le san express reference of the separation of the Party and the State in 
the framework of constitutional revision; the holding of a party congress, “qui à déterminer 
des modalités nouvelles devant permettre d'accueillir au sein de ses structures toutes les 
sensibilités politiques du pays”; the determination of the modalities of convening and 
functioning of the “Commission nationale de vérification des biens " in respect of which the 
assistance of the World Bank was defined as “une excellente chose”. Finally, France 
expressed its willingness to provide aid to fund the political activities linked to the 
implementation of these reforms, in particular, to the holding of the national conference.
Unexpectedly copies of this document were freely circulated and were published in the 
newspapers. The public and the PCD in particular, reacted badly to what was perceived as an 
act of interference by France, which simply suggested the creation of a more open regime, but 
did not question the regime itself. In fact, France did not even make reference to issues such 708
708 Cited in R. Dossu, “Le Bénin: du monolithisme â la démocratie pluraliste, un témoignage”, in Conac, 
L’Afrique en transition, c it, p. 185.
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as multipartism or democracy.
With Decree No. 89-434 of 18th December, the President established a Comité 
nationale préparatoire de la Conférence nationale composed of eight members, only one of 
whom was a member of the single party. This Committee had the task of organising the 
Conference, devising the programme and elaborating on the basic document. The first task 
consisted of the determination of the “sensibilités politiques ”, in order to decide who should 
be invited to the Conference. In order to make the Conference truly representative, the 
Committee decided to invite all of the known organisation. Almost five hundred persons from 
different social strata and organisations participated in the Conference, including peasants, 
workers, civil servants, political parties, NGOs, women’s organisations, the army, trade 
unions, Beninese diplomatic missions abroad, religious leaders, the Beninese Diaspora, 
individuals who had held prominent positions at domestic or international level, including all 
of the former heads of states. The PRBP had the same number of delegates as the other 
political organisations. The PCD only refused to participate.
The Conférence des forces vives was held from 19th to 28th February, lasting three 
days more than what was originally envisaged. Before the start of the Conference, the 
Committee received various documents from both within the country and abroad, containing 
an analysis of the present political, economic, social and cultural organisation of Benin and 
suggestions for the future. These documents were collected by the Committee and made 
available to the Conference. Moreover, they were used by the Committee to prepare four 
documents on education, economy, justice and human rights, and national political life since 
1960. The opportunity given to everyone to transmit their documentation had a twofold 
advantage. Firstly, it informed Kérékou of the opinion of the people of Benin. In addition, it 
had the value of allowing the delegates “de se «défouler»” before the Conference started, as 
Dossou, the chairman of the Committee, has stated.709 This was the first occasion in which the 
people could freely express themselves without fear of repression. Hundreds of letters from 
individuals and organisations were received, the majority of whom were calling for liberal- 
democracy.
The delegates elected a presidium which was chaired by Isidore de Souza, whose 
contribution to the success of the Conference was recognised by everyone. He was 
distinguished for his balanced approach and spirit of conciliation. Furthermore, he gave the 
Conference a sense of spirituality, which emphasised the historic mission that all of the
709 Ibidem, p. 193.
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participants had undertaken. Three commissions were formed, for the following areas: 
**affaires constitutionnelles”, “affaires économiques et sociales” and “éducation, sciences, 
cultures, sport et environment”. The work of the Conference was consistently reported in the 
media and followed with great interest by the population.
In the beginning all of the participants were quite sceptical regarding the outcome of 
the Conference, also remembering the failure o f the Conférence des Cadres of 1979 when the 
conclusions reached in favour of the réintroduction of a liberal democratic system were not 
applied. This scepticism was well-founded because the intention of Kérékou was to merely 
discuss the economic and social situation and to find a solution to the problems which were 
gripping the country. He declared that the task of the Conference was to reach a consensus 
that would be expressed in a national charter, and would constitute the basis of a future 
constitution grounded on democratic principles. The national charter was supposed to 
conform to the principles of economic liberalism included in the programme of structural 
adjustment of the IMF.
The atmosphere at the Conference was tense. Members of the regime tried harshly to 
resist the requests of the delegates and more generally to prevent the abuses and failures of the 
regimes from being discussed. Foreign interventions did not help the development of the 
Conference. The third day of the Conference, during a trip to Benin, Jacques Chirac declared: 
“Le multipartisme, rien à voir avec l'Afrique”. Despite this internal and foreign resistance to 
change and the threatened coup d’état by Maurice Kouandété, the leader of a coup in the 
1960s, the delegates continued to work and became even braver in their requests. Seeing how 
the regime was willing to cede to the international pressures for economic liberalisation, but 
was unwilling to accept political liberalisation, the Conference challenged the President and 
obtained the recognition that the Conference and not the government was sovereign and 
entitled to adopt both binding decisions and remove the government from office. The 
proclamation of the sovereignty of the Conference was included in the Déclaration sur les 
objectifs et les compétences de la Conférence, which was adopted on 25th Februaiy. This 
document contained two important recommendations. The first related to the nature of the 
state that the delegates wished to establish, which would be founded on the values of 
democracy and human rights. The Declaration proclaimed its “volonté d'instaurer la 
démocratie et le respect des Droits de l'Homme et des libertés fondamentales et de 
promouvoir le progrès économique et sociat'.710 The second recommendation was that the
710 Published in Les Forces Vives de la Nation. Documents fondamentaux, ONEPI, Cotonou, 1990, pp. 15-18.
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Conference would adopt a “charte d'union naiionaT\ which would constitute the basis for the 
elaboration of a new constitution. Unlike the suggestion of Kérékou, this would be drafted by 
a commission appointed by the Conference working “en toute indépendance vis-à-vis des 
structures de l ’Etat” and the constitution would be submitted to referendum. Finally the 
Conference would appoint an “organisme nationale de suivi9 charged with supervising the 
transition process and the establishment of the institutions of the new Republic.
Kérékou appeared decided not to recognise the decisions of the Conference and to 
declare that the Conference was null and void. However, after a conversation with de Souza, 
Kérékou unexpectedly agreed to implement all of the decisions of the Conference. Thus, on 
28th Febmaiy the Conference elected Nicephore Soglo, a former World Bank officiai and 
former Minister of Finance (1965-66), as prime minister against Kérékou’s preference for the 
appointment of Adrien Houngbedji. The whole government was deposed, however Kérékou 
remained President for the transitional period which was supposed to last for eleven months, 
although he was deprived of many of his powers.
The following section will examine some of the reasons for the success of the National 
Conference. This was due to the strong presence of civil society, which remained alert despite 
the repression of the regime. As Heilbrunn has underlined, an important element was the 
associational activism of Benin’s civil society in the form of trade unions, students 
associations, organisations of retailers.711 This played a twofold role. In the first place, it 
provided the Conference with organised groups who already had defined platforms for their 
political claims. In the second place, it provided the Conference with people who were already 
familiar with what Heilbrunn has defined as “bargaining in an organisational context”. Similar 
to all developments that occurred in sub-Saharan Africa in the early 1990s, the transition to 
democracy in Benin is also linked to external factors and Kérékou found himself completely 
isolated. France did not provide him with any support, unlike what it had done with Eyadéma 
in Togo. Furthermore, international donors did not supply him with aid because the scarce 
natural resources of the country did not make Benin an “interesting” country for them. The 
success of the Conference was, therefore, due to both the political maturity of Beninese civil 
society and the lack of any external (political or financial) support to the regime, which could 
have helped it to perpetuate itself or at least attempt to do so.712 In the absence of external 
assistance, the regime could not expect to survive.
711J. Heilbrunn, “Social Origins of the National Conference in Benin and Togo”, in 31 The Journal o f Modem 
African Studies, 1993, pp. 277-299.
7i2 See K. Nwajiaku, “The National Conferences in Benin and Togo Revisited”, in 32 The Journal o f Modem 
African Studies* 1994, pp. 49-447.
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10.13 The Interim Government and the Constitution-Making Process
A Commission charged with drafting the constitution was soon appointed. Moreover, a Haut 
Conseil de la République (HCR) headed by Archbishop de Souza and composed of the former 
Presidents of States and Conference delegates was set up with the task of controlling the 
follow-up of the decisions of the Conference, exercising the legislative function, controlling 
the executive, studying the amendments received after the popularisation of the draft of the 
constitution, supervising the legislative and presidential elections, approving the draft of the 
constitution, ensuring the equitable access o f political parties to mass media and guaranteeing 
the defence and promotion of human rights as laid down in the African Charter of Human and 
People’s Rights.713 Finally, the name of the republic was changed from People’s Republic of 
Benin to Republic of Benin and the Conference declared the birth of the “Rénouveau 
D ém ocratiqueOn 1st March four Acts were enacted implementing the decisions of the 
Conference and delineating the institutional organisation of the transitional period. These 
were the Ordonnance No. 90-001 repealing the 1977 Basic Law, the Ordonnance No. 90-004 
establishing the Haut Conseil de la République, the Decree No. 90-043 appointing Soglo as 
Prime Minister, and finally, Decree No. 90-044 setting up the Commission des lois et des 
affaires constitutionnelles. The Constitutional Commission was composed of fifteen 
members, including thirteen lawyers (five judges, three lawyers, six university professors, 
four of whom were professors in law), and two diplomats. Five of them were former members 
of the Commission des affaires constitutionnelles at the Conference, seven were appointed as 
experts, one was delegated by the judiciary, one came from the Association des Juristes 
africains and the only woman was a representative of the Association des Femmes Juristes du 
Bénin. The Commission was presided over by Professor Maurice Glélé and was charged with 
producing a draft constitution by 11th April on the basis of the work of the Conference and to 
draw up the Charte des partis and an electoral act. The Commission suggested a presidential 
form of government with a single-house legislature. A multiparty system would be regulated 
by a Charte d'union nationale, une Charte des partis and a Code électoral. Moreover, apart 
from a Haut Conseil de la République and a Conseil Economique et Social, the Commission 
envisaged the creation of a Constitutional Court charged with the control of the 
constitutionality of laws, to which individual citizens would also have recourse to in order to 
submit a complaint. The Commission also expressly stated that the chapters of the new 
constitution on the rights and duties of citizens and on the judiciary “prendront en compte les
713 See Rapport Général de la Conférence présenté par M. Albert Tévoédjre, rapporteur général. Published in 
ibidem, pp. 19-33.
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fpréoccupations des délégués au sujet des libertés publiques et des droits de l ’homme” and 
would draw inspiration from the UDHR and the African Charter on People’s and Human 
Rights. Furthermore, the Commission provided for the establishment of appropriate organs to 
control the respect of human rights and punish all violations under the supervision of judicial 
authorities. It also maintained that the State had to compensate the victims of human rights 
violations.714 Finally, the Commission, submitted a motion on human rights to the 
Conference, which was later approved.715 This motion started by affirming that “le respect de 
l ’homme et de ses droits fondamentaux est une des conditions essentielles de la paix sociale et 
du développement”. On the basis of this premise, it invited the Ministry of Justice to establish 
the Commission Béninoise des Droits de l ’Homme before 31th March 1990 and it decided to 
create a Comité National de Lutte contre la torture et les sévices corporelles, that would be 
responsible before the Haute Conseil de la République. The Committee was charged with 
identifying the state actors responsible for acts of torture or murder in the exercise of their 
functions as well as their superiors, inflicting disciplinary sanctions and determining the 
compensation to the victims in consultation with the Ministry of Finance and the other bodies 
concerned. The motion specified that disciplinary sanctions were not an alternative to judicial 
ones.
The interim period was regulated by the Loi No. 90-008 portant organisation et 
attributions des circonscriptions administratives durant la période transitoire and the Loi 
Constitutionnelle No. 90-022 portant organisations des Pouvoirs de la période transitoire 
approved by the HCR on 20th July 1990, by the Loi No. 90-023 portant charte des partis 
politiques. The Act 90-022 codified an already existing constitutional order delineated by the 
National Conference. This Act defined the Republic of Benin as an “Etat de droit”, sovereign 
and independent, indivisible, secular, democratic and social. Article 3 recognised the 
pluralism of political parties, which “concourent à l ’expression du suffrage”, Title II entitled 
“Des droits et des devoirs du citoyen” protected the freedoms of movement, opinion, religion, 
expression, press, association, assembly and demonstration (Article 4), the inviolability of 
domicile and secrecy of correspondence (Article 8), equality of all before the law without any 
distinction on the basis of origin, race, sex and religion (Article 9). It severely prohibited any 
act of torture, inhumane and degrading treatment as well as arbitrary arrests and detention and 
established the principle of the presumption of innocence and defined the judiciary as the
714 See Les Actes de la Conférence Nationale published by Fondation F. Naumann, ONEPI Edition, 1990, pp. 
50-52.
7,5 See in ibidem, pp. 38-40.
237
**gardienne de la liberté individuelle” (Article 7). However, the recognition of second- 
generation rights is more limited. Article 5 recognised the right to work and provided that the 
state strives to create the conditions to make its enjoyment effective. Article 6 acknowledged 
the right to strike and to organise under the conditions established by law. As far as duties are 
concerned, the Constitution provided the duty to pay taxes (Article 11), to respect and protect 
public goods (Article 12) and to respect the discipline of work, public order and the rules of 
life in society (Article 13).
The remaining titles regulated the institutions of the President of the Republic, the 
Prime Minister (Title III), the Government (Title IV) and the Haut Conseil de la République 
(Title V). The Prime Minister carried out the function of head of government, while the Haut 
Conseil exercised that of the legislature. The Haut Conseil was composed of the members of 
the Presidium of the Assembly of the National Conference, the former Presidents of State, the 
Presidents of the Commissions of the National Conference and representatives of the 
provinces. The principle of *concertation ’ dominated the relationships between the three 
powers and this represented the major legacy of the Conference to the period of 
transition.71 According to Article 29, the President of the Republic, the Haut Conseil de la 
République (HCR) and the government periodically held sessions of * concertation1 on 
national politics. The recommendations and the decisions of the HCR adopted on occasion of 
these sessions were executive.
The interim government appointed by Soglo on the HCR’s advice was composed of 
civil servants, academics and former politicians, respecting a geographical balance. There 
were three main points of the programme presented by Soglo in its speech of inauguration on 
12th March. The first point related to human rights. Soglo indicated that the consolidation of 
democracy, which “suppose le respect des Droits de l 'Homme” was a primary goal of its 
government. The second goal was a “reasonable” implementation of the Programme of 
Structural Adjustment.716 17
There were several acts which confirmed the widespread concern regarding human 
rights. The first was the establishment of the Commission Nationale des Droits de VHomme 
on 30th March 1990. On 2nd May the Minister of Justice met the associations of former 
political detainees and endorsed the creation of a national committee to combat torture. 
Gradually, former political detainees were given back their properties and jobs. In addition,
716 See A.D. Adamon, Le Renouveau démocratique au Bénin. La Conférence Nationale de Forces Vives et la 
période de Transition, L’Harmattan, Paris, 1995, p. 144-145.
717 Ministère de l’Information et des Communications, Les grandes orientations du gouvernement de transition, 
ONEPI, Cotonou, April 1990, pp. 12-25.
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the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was being read in the schools and reforms of both 
the police and the army later took place.
Unlike in Zambia, the government of Benin adopted a participatory approach. 
Meetings, largely reported by the mass media, were held between the ministers and workers 
concerned to discuss and negotiate social issues. However, the financial situation continued to 
be critical and, therefore, any discussion of the terms of the SAP was avoided. Nevertheless, 
some improvements were introduced. Salaries started to be paid as a result of donors’ aid, 
which also led to to a strengthened relationship of dependence.
The constitution-making process also continued. A draft constitution was subjected to 
a consultation process of the population. Conferences were held in towns (in French) and in 
rural areas (in the different national languages) throughout the country. During these 
conferences the notions of constitutional law, democratic institutions and procedures were 
explained to the citizens. Moreover, people were allowed to express their opinion on the draft 
constitution. All of the amendments proposed by citizens were collected and submitted to the 
Haut Conseil, which, in turn, transmitted its recommendations to the Constitutional 
Commission. The latter drafted the constitution on the basis of these. On 9th August 1990 the 
Haut Conseil unanimously approved the Constitution, leaving the issue of the age limit of 
candidates to the Presidency of the Republic open.
The next step of the process of the consolidation of democracy involved the holding of 
elections. The first elections held were the elections of the chefs de villages et quartiers de 
ville on 10th November 1990 followed by those of the maires de communes. The participation 
rate was 62.37 per cent in the former and 61.13 per cent in the latter and almost all of those in 
charge under the previous regime were not re-elected.
On 2nd December, the referendum on the Constitution was held. The participation rate 
was high, amounting to 63.8 per cent. Citizens had three options, they could either accept or 
reject the constitution as a whole, or reject the age limit provided. In reality, the entire 
constitutional debate was monopolised by two issues, namely, the form of the government and 
the age limit of the presidential candidates. At the Conference, the Constitutional Commission 
proposed a presidential system, however, the majority of the Conference was in favour of a 
semi-presidential system, and voted in that direction.718 Both within the Constitutional 
Commission and among the public, the issue was intensely debated and provoked the first
m  J. Gaudusson du Bois, "Quel statut constitutionnel pour le chef d’État en Afrique”, in J.-C. Colliard et Y. 
Jegouzo (dir.), Le nouveau constitutionnalisme. Mélanges en l'honneur de Gérard Conac, Economica Ed., 
Paris, 2001, p. 335.
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post-Conference political division. The government represented by Soglo, and the head of the 
Haut Conseil expressed their support for the semi-presidential system, making the vote appear 
as a referendum on the government and the démocratisation process. The issue of the age limit 
was even more controversial. The draft Constitution provided a minimum age of 40 years and 
a maximum of 70 years for the presidential candidates. This provision was confirmed during 
the popularisation campaign of the draft constitution. However, it was opposed by the former 
presidents Maga, Ahomadegbe and Zinsou, who would have been excluded from the 
presidential race, if this provision had been approved. At the referendum, 73,3 per cent voted 
for the inclusion of the age limit. 19.9 per cent voted for the constitution without the age limit. 
Therefore, overall 96.9 per cent voted to accept the draft constitution.
After the referendum, legislative elections were held in February 1991 under a 
proportional electoral system. Fourteen parties and groups participated in the elections. The 
regionalist logic that dominated the country’s politics in the 1960s re-appeared. In fact, only a 
small number of parties received votes in more than one region. With the presidential 
elections, which were held in March, the situation became tense. As in the 1960s, violence 
marked the electoral campaign. In particular, in the North, people who were originally from 
the South became victims of aggression and fled to the South. It was indicated that Kérékou 
was behind these acts of intimidation.
At the presidential elections, Soglo, Kérékou and Tévoédjre (a former ILO Deputy 
Director General) were the most eminent figures among the fourteen candidates and Soglo 
and Kérékou passed to the second round. The regionalist divisions that had already appeared 
in the legislative elections manifested themselves in an even clearer manner. Soglo, who is 
from the South, received 80 percent of his votes from the regions of the Southeast and the 
Centre and he received hardly any votes from the North. Kérékou, who is from the North, 
obtained 80 percent of his votes from the North. More surprising than the re-emergence of 
regionalism, was the passing of Kérékou to the second round of these elections. This was due 
to a combination of several factors. In the first place, the new political forces were divided 
between many parties and conducted political campaigns against each other, rather than 
against Kérékou, who was not believed to be a dangerous adversary. In the second place, the 
areas outside the capital had been excluded from politics. The lack of infrastructure, the 
difficulty in receiving broadcasts on the radio or television prevented these areas from 
receiving any information on the abuses of the regimes, the protests and the transitional 
process. Moreover, a section of the population, directly or indirectly, had taken part in the 
patrimonialistic management of the state of Kérékou and did not want to lose the privileges
240
Jthe had enjoyed until then. In particular, the proposals relating to a verification of goods was a 
concrete threat to their position. Soglo, despite being ill during the second round of the 
elections, obtained 67.6 per cent of votes against the 32.4 per cent of Kerekou. On 31st March 
1991, Kerekou conceded his defeat.
The post-Conference period was characterised by signs of different and contrasting 
nature. On the one hand, the Conference promoted a sense of freedom, which manifested 
itself in the proliferation of political parties and various organisations, including women’s and 
human rights groups and organisations of victims of Kerekou's regime. Moreover, several 
private newspapers were founded and added their voice to the existing ones. In October 1990, 
forty-one newspapers were published and they turned out to be extremely critical and even 
forthright in their denunciation of illegal activities and past human rights abuses. The people 
kept up their interest in public life, and despite the high price of newspapers, citizens were 
eager to read them. Moreover, in spite of the succession of elections organised since the 
Conference, popular participation remained high. On the other hand, the 1960s style political 
behaviour re-appeared, particularly in the form of regionalism and clientelism. There were 
only three parties, the liberal democrats, the social democrats and the radicals that sought a 
nation-wide support, obtaining nine seats altogether out of a total of sixty four. Candidates 
were voted for on the basis of their regional origin and the vagueness and similarity of 
political programmes clearly did not provide the citizens with political criteria upon which to 
base their vote. Moreover, money and goods were promised to individuals and entire 
communities in order to convince them to vote for or join the political parties.
Civil society, which was the main actor of the renewed political process, did not play 
an important role in the post-Conference period. Students, teachers and the other public sector 
workers who set this change in motion, were not involved in a significant way in the creation 
of the new parties or in the election processes.
The post-Conference period was also characterised by the measures of structural 
adjustment, which included the closure and privatisation of several parastatal structures, 
dismissals of public servants and the distribution of limited resources to welfare and education 
(even for West African standards). Donors and the IMF provided the government with 
relatively little aid, which meant that the government was unable to continue to pay the salary 
arrears after some initial payments were made upon the receipt of some grants and loans. 
This situation led to a new wave of strikes of students, teachers and other public servants, 
despite the government’s willingness to meet with them to discuss the crisis. Strikes were 
already held during the presidential elections and subsequently, in July, September and April.
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10.1.4 The New Constitution
The new constitution delineates a presidential form of government with several aspects 
shaped on the French model. In order to guarantee stability whilst simultaneously avoiding 
the risks of presidentialism, this arrangement is tempered by the elements of parliamentarism. 
The President of the republic is elected for five years and can only be re-elected once. The 
Constitution specifies that no one can stand for more than two presidential mandates (Article 
42). The President of the Republic is the head of government and, after “avis consultatif ’ 
with the National Assembly, he can appoint the members of the government, who are 
responsible to him (Article 54). He also appoints three of the seven judges of the 
Constitutional Court as well as the Presidents o f the Supreme Court, of the High Authority of 
the Audio-Visuals and Communications, after consultation of the President of the National 
Assembly, (Article 56). He holds regulatory power, legislative initiative (Article 57) as well 
as the power of constitutional revision, after a decision taken in the Council of Ministers, 
concurrently with the members of the National Assembly (Article 154). Moreover, after 
consultation of the Presidents of the National Assembly and the Constitutional Court, the 
President can take the initiative to hold a referendum on any issue relating to the promotion 
and reinforcement of human rights, sub-regional and regional integration and the organization 
of public powers (Article 58). The President also holds veto on legislation. Moreover, the 
President can request the National Assembly to deliberate a second time on a particular Act 
or specific articles. If the text is approved by an absolute majority of the members of the 
Assembly and the President refuses to promulgate the law, the President of the National 
Assembly appeals to the Constitutional Court, which declares the Act effective if it is in 
conformity with the Constitution (Article 57).
The President has also the power of pardon, along with being head of the armed 
forces and has the same exceptional powers as the French President according to Article 16 
of the 1958 French Constitution. According to Article 68, the President of the Republic can 
take exceptional measures in the Council of Ministers that are required in a situation where 
the republican institutions, the independence of the nation, the integrity of the national 
territory or the execution of the international engagements are threatened in a serious and 
immediate manner and the regular functioning of the public and constitutional powers are 
threatened or interrupted. These measures can only be taken after consultation with the 
Presidents of the National Assembly and the Constitutional Court. While the conditions are 
identical to those in the French Constitution, the Constitution of Benin establishes a barrier to 
the otherwise unlimited powers of the President by specifying that these measures shall be
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adopted without suspending the rights of citizens guaranteed by the Constitution. 
Furthermore, the Assembly shall meet in extraordinary session and establish a time limit 
beyond which the President cannot take exceptional measures.
The President has also the power to address messages on the state of the nation, not 
only in the case provided in Article 68, but also on annual basis (Article 72,1). Similar to the 
French constitutional system, the President can also address messages to the Assembly, 
which shall not be followed by any debate (Article 72(2)
The President as well as the members of government are suspended from their 
functions in cases of impeachment for “haute trahison ”, “outrage à l 'Assemblée nationale " 
and “toute atteinte à l'honneur et à la probité” . If found guilty, “ils ont déchus de leurs 
charges” (Article 138). The impeachment before the Haut Cour is decided by the National 
Assembly and has to be approved by the majority of two-thirds o f the members of the 
Assembly. L’Haute Cour is composed of the members of the Constitutional Court, apart from 
its President, six members of the National Assembly who are elected by the Assembly itself 
and the President of the Supreme Court.
The National Assembly is elected every four years. It exercises the legislative power 
and keeps a control on the action of the government (Article 79(2). With regard to the former 
function, the Constitution establishes the matters which are reserved to the law. These include 
civil rights and the fundamental guarantees accorded to citizens for the exercise of public 
liberties (Article 98). The others are left to the regulatory power of the President. The 
Constitution also envisages the adoption of ordonnances by the government in matters 
reserved to the law with legislative authorisation of the Assembly (Article 102). The most 
important way in which the Assembly can control government action relates to its power to 
vote on the finance bill (Article 109) and the budget (Article 110).
The Constitution also contains original elements which reflect the past history of 
Benin and which aim to avoid the repetition of the events which have undermined democracy 
and human rights. The first concern addressed by the Constitution is represented by the risk 
of coups d’état. In this regard, the Constitution embodies a series of provisions explicitly 
addressing the prevention of future coup d’états. Firstly, “toute tentative de renversement du 
régime constitutionnel* by members of the armed forces or the public security is considered 
as a crime against the nation and the State (Article 65). Secondly, each member of a 
constitutional organ has the right and duty “de faire appel à tous les moyens pour rétablir le 
légitimité constitutionnelle” (Article 66(1)). Disobeying and organising against an illegitimate 
authority is defined as “the most sacred of rights and the most imperative of duties” for
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citizens (Article 66(2)). Moreover, Article 67 authorises the President “à faire appel" to the 
armed forces or foreign police and request their intervention.
Another concern addressed by the Constitution is represented by the risk of personal 
and authoritarian rule. In order to prevent this risk, the function of the President is declared 
incompatible with any elective mandate, public employment, military and any professional 
activity (Article 51). This is confirmed by Article 64, which stipulates that any member of the 
armed forces or public security who desires to be a candidate to the presidency of the 
Republic must resign. As in the case of the President, the Constitution establishes an 
incompatibility between the candidacy for membership of the Assembly and membership of 
the armed forces or public security (Article 81(3)). Also the provision of the case of 'outrage 
à rassemblée " as a ground for presidential impeachment can be read as a limitation against 
the risk of authoritarian rule. This arises when the President of the Republic does not provide 
any answers to the questions posed by the Assembly on the activity of the government within 
thirty days (Article 76). In this case, the President of the Assembly appeals to the 
Constitutional Court, which rules within thirty days, and the President of the Republic is 
required to provide responses to the Assembly before the end of the session. If this does not 
occur, the President of the Republic is referred to the High Court of Justice (Article 77).
The other main concern underlying the Constitution of 1990 is the phenomenon of 
corruption. The Constitution envisages that the President is personally responsible for the 
manifestation of a personal behaviour contrary to morals, as well as embezzlement, 
corruption and illicit enrichment (Article 75).
As far as the judiciary is concerned, its power shall be independent from the 
legislative and executive (Article 125). However, as in the 1977 Constitution, the guarantee 
of the independence of the judiciary is vested with the President of the Republic, who is 
assisted by the Conseil supérieur de la magistrature (Article 127). The composition, 
competencies, organisation and functioning of the Conseil are determined by law. The 
judiciary is appointed by the President of the Republic on the Minister of Justice’s 
recommendation, upon the advice of the Conseil supérieur de la magistrature (Article 129).
A fundamental organ for the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms is the 
Cour Constitutionnelle. The Constitutional Court is the “highest jurisdiction of the State in 
constitutional matters” and judges of the constitutionality of the law and “shall guarantee the 
fundamental human rights and the public liberties” (Article 114). It is composed of seven 
members, three of whom are appointed by the bureau of the National Assembly and three by
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the President of the Republic for five years. Their mandate can only be renewed once (Article 
115).
In addition, the Constitution provides for two more organs, namely the Conseil 
économique et social (Title VII) and the Haute Autorité de l ’audiovisuel et de la 
communication (Title VIII). The former is a consultative body, which must be consulted on 
the “projets de loi de programme à caractère économique et sociaF* and any other bill which 
is submitted to it by the government. It can also be consulted by the President of the Republic 
on any problem of economic, social, cultural, scientific and technical nature and, on its own 
initiative, can formulate recommendations on economic and social reform (Article 139). As it 
will be shown in the following section, the Haute Autorité de l ’audiovisuel et de la 
communication plays a role in guaranteeing of the freedom of press.
10.1.5 Human Rights in the New Constitution
The detailed way in which human rights are protected in the new constitution of Benin has 
been noted by Conac, who also points out that this even indicates the specific practices which 
are prohibited, thus indicating that “[vjisiblement c ’est l ’expérience plus que le mimétisme qui 
a inspiré cette précaution.”719 In fact, the constitutional provisions concerning human rights 
clearly reflect the history of Benin and attempt to create a human rights culture and 
institutional mechanisms, often having original traits, in order to prevent the abuses of the past 
from occurring again. Unlike the 1960 Constitution, the transplant of the model of liberal 
constitutionalism has not been effected in a mechanic manner in the one of 1990. This model 
has been adopted in order to pursue a specific aim of the constitution makers, i.e. the 
limitation of political power. This aim has emerged from the experience of oppression and 
repression suffered by the Beninese people. Glélé, the chairman of the Constitutional 
Commission, has written: “La population exprime plusieurs idées, parfois contradictoires, 
qu’il faut mettre ensemble; mais une chose est certaine, on sent un besoin profond de liberté 
dans la population, une volonté de participer désormais à la gestion de la chose publique, de 
limiter l ’omnipotence des pouvoirs publics et le souhait d ’un développement pour tous avec 
une moralisation de la vie politique, car il y  a eu trop de corruption, d ’arbitraire et d ’autres 
abus”.720
Moreover, the Constitution features elements of originality in respect to Western 
liberal constitutionalism. For example, original features include the absence of a quorum for
719 Conac, L'Afrique en transition, cit, p. 37.
720 Glélé, Bénin, in ibidem, p. 174.
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the recourse by the legislature to the Constitutional Court and the right of the Court to rule ex 
officio on the constitutionality of laws and regulations allegedly violating fundamental rights 
and freedoms.721 In addition, the reference and even incorporation of the African Charter 
provides the Beninese Constitution with a distinct African perspective, characterised by the 
attempt to reconcile the individualistic and the communitarian perspectives on human rights. 
In this respect, the Beninese Constitution has the value of being less ambiguous than the 
African Charter on how to solve the often problematic relationship between the two.
The preamble of the Constitution “reaffirms” the attachment of the people of Benin to 
the principles of democracy and human rights as they have been defined by the Charter of the 
United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. The African Charter is even considered to be an 
“integral part” of the Constitution and has a “value superior of the internal law” (Article 7 of 
the Constitution). This is confirmed by Article 147, which establishes that all treaties and 
agreements ratified by Benin shall have an authority superior to that of laws.
Title II is entitled “Des droits et des devoirs de la personne humaine”. The first rights 
to be recognised are socio-economic and cultural rights. Article 8 protects the rights to health, 
education, culture, information, vocational training, and work. Article 9 recognises the right 
of every human being to the “development and full expansion of his person in his material, 
personal and intellectual dimensions”. Articles 10 and 11 protect the right to culture in its 
individual and collective dimensions. Article 10 acknowledges the right to culture of every 
person, while article 11 protects the right of “all communities comprising the Beninese nation 
...to  enjoy the freedom to use their spoken and written languages and to develop their own 
culture while respecting those of others”. The Constitution provides that “collectivités 
territoriales” are created by law (Article 150).
Articles 12 and 13 relate to the right to education. Article 13 establishes that primary 
education shall be obligatory and the State shall assure progressively free public education. 
Article 30 recognises the right to work, for the effective enjoyment of which the State shall 
strive to create the conditions, and to just retribution. The right to strike and to defend 
workers’ rights and interests individually or collectively or by trade union action is provided 
in Article 31.
Articles 15 to 26 cover civil and political rights. Political rights are also implicitly
721 See R. Degni-Segui, Les droits de l ’homme en Afrique Noire francophone (Théories et réalitésj, Abidjan, 
1998 and A. Diarra, “La protection constitutionnelle des droits et libertés en Afrique Noire francophone depuis 
1990. Les cas du Mali et du Bénin”, in Afrilex, 2000, at www.afrilex.u-bordeaux.fr, p. 22.
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recognised in Articles 2 and 3, which confirm adherence to democratic principles. Moreover, 
Article 5 expressly mentions political parties, which “concourent à l ’expression du suffrage” 
and are formed and freely exert their activities under the conditions determined by the Charter 
of Political Parties. The right to life, liberty, security and the integrity of the person are 
guaranteed by Article 15. The Constitution further provides that no one shall be arrested or 
accused except by virtue of a law promulgated prior to the charges against him and no citizen 
shall be forced into exile (Article 16). This latter provision is clearly envisaged as a way to 
address one of the injustices of the past. The presumption of innocence and the prohibition of 
convictions for acts or omissions and penalties not provided by law at the time when the 
offence was committed are established (Article 17). The Constitution also prohibits torture, 
maltreatment, cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment and declares that no one may be 
detained in a penal institution unless this is in compliance with a penal law which is in force. 
The Constitution also establishes that no one may be detained for more than forty-eight hours 
except by decision of a magistrate. This delay may be prolonged only in circumstances 
exceptionally provided for by law and may not exceed eight days (Article 18). In light of the 
abuses of the past, the Constitution provides that any individual or agent of the State found 
responsible for an act of torture, maltreatment or cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment in 
the exercise or at the time of the exercise of his duties shall be punished in accordance with 
the law. This provision applies both in the case that the act has been committed on his own 
initiative or under instruction. The Constitution goes even further stating that any individual 
or agent of the state is not required to comply with the duty of obedience when the orders 
received constitute a “serious and manifest infringement with respect to human rights and 
public liberties” (Article 19).
The remaining provisions guarantee the inviolability of domicile (Article 20), the 
secrecy of correspondence and communication (Article 21), the right to property including a 
“just and prerequisite compensation” in the case of the deprivation of property for “state- 
approved uses” (Article 22), freedom of thought, conscience, religion, creed, opinion, 
expression in respect for the public order established by law and regulations (Article 23), 
freedom of the press (Article 24), freedoms of movement, association, assembly, procession 
and demonstration (Article 25), equality before the law without distinction of origin, race, sex, 
religion, political opinion or social position (Article 26). The principle of gender equality is 
confirmed in paragraph 2 of Article 26, which specifies that men and women are equal under 
the law. It then adds that “the State shall protect the family and particularly the mother and the 
child”. The Constitution provides for the principle of equality and the protection of the family
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in the same article (Article 26(2)), however, unlike the 1977 Constitution, the protection of 
the family is not presented as a value against which the principle of equality should be 
interpreted. However, according to the African Charter, which is integral part of the 
Constitution, the State “shall have the duty to assist the family which is the custodian of 
morals and traditional values recognized by the Community” (Article 18(1)) and at the same 
time, “ensure the elimination of every discrimination against women and also ensure the 
protection of the rights of the woman and the child as stipulated in international declarations 
and conventions” (Article 18(2)). While the combination of these two provisions seems to 
give prevalence to the right of women not to be discriminated against over the values 
embodied by the family, a different interpretation may ensue from Article 27722 and from 
Article 29, which imposes on every individual the duty “[t]o preserve the harmonious 
development of the family and to work for the cohesion and respect of the family” (paragraph 
1) and also “[t]o preserve and strengthen positive African cultural values in his relations with 
other members of the society, in the spirit o f tolerance, dialogue and consultation and, in 
general, to contribute to the promotion of the moral well-being of society” (paragraph 7). As 
already noted, the attempt made by the Charter to accommodate traditional values with 
individual rights, through the imposition of specific duties, fails to resolve the question of 
their relationship. The balance between African values, particularly those linked to family, 
and the principle of equality between men and women is therefore left to the interpretation of 
the legislature and the judiciary. A first indication on its interpretation comes from Article 98 
of the Beninese Constitution, which provides that the procedure through which customs are 
assessed and harmonised with the fundamental principles of the Constitution shall be reserved 
to the competence of the law. Implicitly, the Constitution states that customs, which also 
regulate family relationships, should be made consistent with the principle of gender equality. 
Following the example of the African Charter, the Constitution devotes a specific provision to 
people with disabilities and the elderly. It provides that they “shall have the right to special 
measures of protection in keeping with their physical or moral needs” (Article 18(4)).
The Constitution also embodies third generation rights. It recognises the right to a 
“healthy, satisfying and lasting environment”, which is accompanied by the duty of every 
person to defend it (Article 27). The wording of this article recalls that of Article 24 of the 
African Charter, with the distinction that in the Beninese Constitution, it is envisaged as an
722 Ait. 27 states: “ 1. Every individual shall have duties towards his family and society, the State and other 
legally recognized communities and the international community. 2. The rights and freedoms of every 
individual shall be exercised with due regard to the rights of others, collective security, morality and common 
interest”.
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individual right, while in the African Charter it is presented as a collective right Articles 28 
and 29 regulate the problem of toxic waste imported in Africa and provides that the 
transportation, importation, storage, burying and the discharging on the national territory of 
toxic wastes or foreign pollutants and any agreement relating to it shall constitute a crime 
against the nation (Article 29).
In conformity with the African Charter, the Constitution also establishes a range of 
duties for the citizens. These include the duty to work for the common good, to fulfil all civic 
and professional obligations, to pay fiscal contributions (Article 32), to respect the 
Constitution, the established constitutional order and the laws and regulations (Article 34) and 
to respect and consider one’s own kin without any discrimination (Article 37).
The effective protection of human rights requires adequate enforcement mechanisms. 
In this regards, the Beninese constitution has accorded a central role to the Constitutional 
Court. The Constitution recognises the citizen’s right to appeal to the Constitutional Court 
against allegedly unconstitutional laws, texts and acts (Article 3). The individual right to 
appeal had also been provided in the 1968 Constitution, but it had never been applied because 
the Constitution as a whole was never implemented. According to the present constitution, 
appeals can be made directly to the Constitutional Court or by procedure of exception of 
unconstitutionality in relation to any matter which concerns the appellant before a court of law 
(Article 122). The Constitutional Court can also be requested by the President of the Republic 
or any member of the National Assembly to give its opinion on the constitutionality of laws 
before their promulgation. This opinion shall be given ex officio on laws and any regulatory 
text deemed to infringe on fundamental human rights and public liberties (Article 121). 
Furthermore, both organic laws and the Rules o f Procedure of the National Assembly, the 
High Authority of Audio-Visuals and Communications and the Economic and Social Council, 
before their promulgation and enforcement respectively, must be submitted to the 
Constitutional Court, which shall decide on their conformity with the Constitution (Article 
123). The Constitutional Court must rule within a period of fifteen days from when it has been 
informed of a text of a bill or a complaint. If there is an emergency, the period can be reduced 
to eight days upon government’s request (Article 120). Any provision declared 
unconstitutional cannot be promulgated or enforced (Article 124). A further competence of 
the Constitutional Court which has a bearing on the respect of the constitutional provisions on 
human rights is envisaged in Article 146. This provision establishes that if the Constitutional 
Court declares, upon recourse of the President of the Republic or of the President of the 
National Assembly, that an international instrument includes a clause which is contrary to the
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Constitution, its ratification can only be authorised after the revision of the Constitution.
The Constitution also envisages other enforcement mechanisms. With regard to the 
freedom of the press, the Constitution provides for the creation of the Haute Autorité de 
Vaudiovisuel et de la communication (High Authority of Audio-Visuals and 
Communications). Article 142 establishes that its mission consists of guaranteeing and 
ensuring the freedom of the press, as well as all the media in conformity with the law. More 
specifically, it monitors the respect of the professional code of conduct and the equitable 
access of political parties, associations and citizens to the official means of information and 
communication. This Authority was set up by loi organique n. 92-021 of 21st August 1992, 
which defined it as “une institution indépendante de tout pouvoir politique, association ou 
groupe de pression de quelque nature que ce soit According to the law, the Authority is 
charged with ensuring the respect of “ƒ'expression pluraliste des courants de pensée et 
d'opinion dans la presse et la communication audiovisuelle, notamment pour les émissions 
d'information p o litiq u e Furthermore, it is endowed with the power to address observations 
and impose sanctions on the relevant body in the case of “manquement grave aux 
obligations " (Article 13). Its decisions, with the exception of disciplinary decisions, can be 
appealed before the Chambre administrative of the Supreme Court.
The authority is composed of nine persons, three of whom are designated by the 
bureau of the National Assembly, three by the President of the Republic, three by professional 
journalists and technicians of the audiovisual, communication and telecommunications. Its 
mandate lasts five years and cannot be either renewed or revoked. Contrary to the aim of 
reinforcing the autonomy of this authority, the President is appointed by decree adopted in the 
Council of Ministers, after consultation with the President of the National Assembly (loi 
organique of 1992 and Article 143 of the Constitution).
A final protection for human rights relates to the modalities for the revision of the 
Constitution. The right of initiative is held by the President of the Republic, on the basis of a 
decision taken in the Council of Ministers, as well as by the members of the National 
Assembly (Article 154). The draft or proposal of revision must receive the vote of a three- 
quarters majority of the members of the National Assembly and unless it is approved by four- 
fifths majority of the members, it must be then approved by referendum (Article 155). Apart 
from prohibiting that the integrity of the State can be undermined trough revision, the 
Constitution stipulates that the republican form and the secularity of the State cannot be 
subject to revision (Article 156).
Further provisions relevant to human rights are contained in Title III on the executive
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power. Article 58 provides that the President of the Republic, after consultation with the 
President of the National Assembly and the President of the Constitutional Court, shall be 
able to take the initiative of the referendum on any question relating to the promotion and 
reinforcement of human rights. In addition, Article 66 states that in the case of a coup d’état, 
putsch, aggression by mercenaries or any action of force, “the most sacred of rights and the 
most imperatives of duties” is for any Beninese to disobey and organise themselves “pour 
faire échec a” the illegitimate authority.723 Finally, apart from the cases referred to above, the 
President is personally responsible in the case of high treason, which occurs when the 
President violates his oath or is recognised as agent, co-agent or accomplice of “violations 
graves et caractérisées de droits de Vhomme ”.724
The drafters of the Constitution were aware that it is not sufficient to guarantee rights 
and freedoms in the constitution, without creating a human rights culture. Glélé has referred to 
the necessity of “m e education civique, une pédagogie de la démocratie pluraliste fondée sur 
VÉtat de droit, d ’un droit qui garantisse la liberté et le respect des Droits de Vhomme”.725 
Consistent with this approach, the Constitution obliges the State to ensure the circulation and 
the teaching of the Constitution, the UDHR, the African Charter as well as all of the other 
international instruments on human rights ratified by Benin. Moreover, the State is called 
upon to integrate the rights of the individual into the programmes of schools and universities 
as well as into the educational programs of the Armed Forces, the Public Security Forces and 
comparable categories. In addition, the State must assure the diffusion and teaching of human 
rights in the national languages especially by radio and television.
Beyond the Constitution, Benin has shown a commitment to creating institutions, 
which ensure the effectiveness of the democratic principle and of the liberties provided by the 
Constitution. In 1995, the National Assembly adopted the Loi portant regles générales pour 
les elections du président de la République et des membres de VAssemblée nationale, which 
has established a Commission électorale nationale autonome (CENA). This commission is set 
up on the occasion of each election and is composed of seventeen members, seven of whom 
are chosen by the government, seven by the National Assembly, two by the Commission 
béninoise des droits de Vhomme and one by the Assemblée générale des magistrats (Article 
36). The CENA is represented in each department by a Commission électorale
723 This provision recalls the natural right of resistance to oppression in the 1789 French Declaration.
724 Other cases of personal responsibility of the President include the concession of a part of the national 
territory or an "acte attentatoire au maintien d ’un environnement sain, satisfaisant, durable et favorable au 
développement ” (Article 74).
725 Glélé, Bénin, cit., p. 177.
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départementale formed of nine persons, four of which are chosen by the government, four by 
the National Assembly and one by the Assemblée générale des magistrats. At the level of 
each constituency, a Commission électorale locale is appointed by the CENA on the proposal 
of the Commission électorale départementale.
The task of the CENA consists of preparing, organising, following and supervising the 
elections and the centralisation of results, which are then made available to the Ministry of 
Interior and then transmitted to the Constitutional Court. It has also investigative powers in 
order to ensure “la sincérité du vote” (Article 37(2)).
Independent authorities are present in other countries of francophone Africa, such as 
Mali and Senegal,726 with the common aim of reinforcing the protection of fundamental rights 
and freedoms in respect of administrative action. 727 This is clearly spelled out by the 
Constitutional Court of Benin which, upon an appeal by the President of the Republic over the 
constitutionality of CENA, stated that its establishment “se fonde sur les exigences de I 'Etat 
de droit et de la démocratie pluraliste affirmées dans le préambule de la constitution du i l  
décembre 199(F (Decision DCC 34-94 of 22 and 23 December 1994). As far as the legal 
nature of these authorities is concerned, the Court clarified this in the above decision by 
defining CENA as “une autorité administrative autonome et indépendante du pouvoir 
législatif et du pouvoir exécutif *. In reality, the independence of CENA from the executive is 
reduced not only by the presence of government appointees, but also by the fact that the 
Commission carries out its functions in collaboration with the Minister designated by the 
Government, on which it also depends for the means necessary to fulfil its mission.728
726 The Constitution of Mali of 1992 provided the Comité National de l ’Egal Accès aux Médias d ’Etat (Article 
7), which was established by the Act No. 93-001 of 6th January 1993. Moreover, with the Act No. 97-008 of 
14th January 1997 the Commission Electorale Nationale Indépendante (CENI) was set up. In Senegal the Act 
No. 97-15 of 8th September 1997 instituted the Observatoire Nationale des Elections (ONEL) and with the Loi 
n. 91-14 of 11th February 1991 created the médiateur de la République, an “independent authority” competent 
to receive complaints concerning the functioning of the administration of any organ “investi d ’une mission de 
service public”.
727 A. Diana, “Les autorités administratives indépendantes dans les Etats francophones d’Afrique Noire. Cas du 
Mali, du Sénégal et du Bénin”, in Afiilex. 2000, pp. 1-25.
728 In a following decision (DCC 96-002 of 4th and 5th January 1996) the Constitutional Court specified that the 
competence in case of electoral dispute lies with the Constitutional Court, confirming the administrative nature 
of CENA.
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10.2 Human Rights in Practice
10.2.1 The Human Rights Situation in Benin
Benin’s transition to liberal-democracy has had a promising start which has been successfully 
confirmed thus far, although this is one of the rare examples in sub-Saharan Africa. Benin has 
been the first country in sub-Saharan Africa to have a President, who left power without 
putting up any resistance after having lost in the democratically elections. Since then, 
elections have been held regularly and have been largely peaceful. Legislative elections were 
held in 1991,1995,1999 and March 2003. What is interesting to remark is how the political 
platforms of all of the parties included a commitment to the following principles: human 
rights, democracy, political pluralism, separation of powers and a system of checks and 
balance.729 By now, these principles have become indispensable components of any political 
program and are an integral part of the political rhetoric.
Presidential elections were held in 1991, 1996 and 2001 and, for the first time after 
the réintroduction of multipartism, municipal elections were held in December 2002.730 
Parties, which are at the opposition in the national parliament, prevailed in these elections. 
Notably, Renaissance du Bénin (RB) and the the Parti du Renouveau Démocratique (PRD) 
obtained positive results. Strong participation was witnessed at both parliamentary and 
presidential elections, despite the large number of political parties and the cumbersome 
voting procedures.731 This shows the weakness of the argument that multiparty politics is not 
compatible with “African culture”. Nevertheless, the positive image of Beninese democracy 
was tarnished by episodes of violence during the 2001 presidential elections, and the fairness 
of these elections was strongly questioned. Despite passing to the second round, Soglo 
withdrew his candidature and this was followed by Amoussou, who came third, thus 
facilitating Kérékou’s election. He was elected with 84 per cent of the votes. Nine members 
of the Electoral Commission resigned in protest.
The definition of Benin as “one of Africa’s few success stories”732 is also linked to the 
fact that civil liberties, including the freedoms of the press and expression, are widely 
respected.733 In Benin more than 50 newspapers and periodicals are issued. Since 1997, the
729 For the programmes of the Beninese political parties see Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Les programmes des 
partis politiques au Bénin, Docum. 7, Colloque National, 10th March 1994, Cotonou, Benin, p. 75.
730 Previously mayors and municipal councillors were designated by the government.
731 Given the large criteria established by the Charter of Political Parties, almost a hundred political parties are 
recorded at the Ministry of Domestic Affairs.
732 B. Magnusson, “Benin: Legitimating Democracy. New Institutions and the Historical Problem of Economic 
Crisis”, in CEAN, L 1Afrique politique: Démocratisation: Arrêts sur images, Karthala, Paris, 1996, p. 33.
733 The only legal threat to the free exercise of the press that still exist is Act No. 60-12 of 30th June 1962 on the 
freedom of the press, which envisages the imprisonment, involving also compulsory labour, for various acts or
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private press has received financial aid from the State. Moreover, the audio-visual scene 
underwent a process of liberalisation as the High Authority of the Audio-Visuals and 
Communication has given authorisation for private radios and televisions.734 More 
importantly, this quantitative pluralism is strengthened by the fact that radio and TV, 
including the state-owned ones, openly criticise the government without being subjected to 
any interference.
Civil society also has other means of expression such as the churches and NGOs, 
which also shows that freedom of assembly and association are both respected. In Benin, 
approximately a hundred non-governmental organisations operate and they have 
demonstrated that they play a significant role in the defence of human rights. For instance, 
the investigative function exercised by the Benin League for the Defence of Human Rights 
was fundamental with respect to the allegations that hundreds of people were extra-judicially 
executed in Togo after the controversial 1998 presidential elections. Among all of the civil 
society organisations, women’s groups are doing impressive work in furthering women’s 
human rights in Benin as in several other African countries. One of the most significant 
results of their action achieved so far, together with the election of female MPs, has been the 
approval of the new Family Code in 2002.
The most symbolic feature of the “new” Benin is the role of the rule of the law. This 
is significant in a country like Benin, where violence has been used for long as the 
mechanism through which conflicts were solved. The positive evaluation of Benin’s 
transition to democracy is also linked to the willingness demonstrated by the Beninese 
government to deal with past and present human rights abuses. Under the impulse of the 
National Conference, trials were initiated against the persons responsible of the most serious 
violations during the era of the military regime. The Amnesty International’s 2000 report 
observed that “[t]he trend towards greater respect for human rights continued” despite cases 
of excessive use of force by the security forces, detention without charge and prosecution of 
asylum seekers. These events were counterbalanced by the fact that they were not left 
unaddressed. The President set up a commission of enquiry into the former cases and released 
the asylum seekers. On this latter case, the outcry of Amnesty International and other human
activities realised in the exercise of freedom of expression. This Act has not been repealed by Act No. 97-010. 
The ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations has expressed its 
concern at this provision, which is in conflict with the ILO Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 
105), which has been ratified by Benin. Moreover, it is not in compliance with Articles 8, 18 and 30 of the 
Beninese Constitution and, even more specifically, with Article 3 of the Labour Code which prohibits forced 
labour “de façon absolue”.
734 Audiovisual communications were liberalised by law through Act No. 97-010 of 20th August 1997.
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rights organizations was a key factor in provoking the reaction of the Government. This also 
shows the weight that external criticism of the human rights performance plays in 
contemporary African politics and in turn, the political force of human rights. African 
governments, certainly to various degrees, believe that they cannot afford to be criticised for 
their human rights records, due to the cost in terms of financial aid from Western countries.
Despite the positive image concerning the rule of law and the implementation of civil 
and political rights, problems still exist as far as their enforcement is concerned. Arbitrary 
arrests, detention in custody for the periods longer than the maximum provided by law and 
brutal and inhuman detention conditions still occur. The major problem is the fact that the 
police still lacks a human rights culture and the judiciary is not well equipped to effectively 
enforce the law. In addition, the number of judges is very low with only approximately 150 
judges in a country with a population of around six million people. Furthermore, low salaries 
make judges prone to corruption. There are other factors which hinder the population 
(especially in rural areas) from making recourse to the state judicial system. For example, the 
Court of Appeal is based in the capital and the French is used throughout the procedure, 
which 90 percent of the population can neither read nor speak. Furthermore, cultural 
obstacles still exist for people to appeal to the state court, which relate to the adversary nature 
of the model of justice applied. Therefore it is still frequent the recourse to traditional 
arrangements.
Another issue which detracts from the positive human rights record of Benin relates to 
the realisation of women and children’s rights as well as social and economic rights of both 
men and women as provided by the Constitution, the African Charter of Human and People’s 
Rights and the human rights instruments ratified by Benin. The evaluation of the human 
rights performance of many countries, especially those in transition from autocratic regimes 
is often focussed exclusively upon progress made with regard to civil and political rights. In 
this way, the traditional work of international human rights NGOs has tended to focus on first 
generation rights. Donors’ policies have an even narrower scope of concern, often being 
satisfied with the implementation of the procedural aspect of democracy.
Unfortunately Benin is no exception in sub-Saharan Africa on the status of women 
and girls and the fulfilment of socio-economic rights. It should be noted that since 1990, 
important measures have been taken to ensure legal equality. Apart from the Constitution, the 
new Labour Code adopted with Act No. 98-004 of 27th January 1998 guarantees equality at 
work. This introduces the principles included in the ILO Discrimination (Employment and 
Occupation), Convention 1958 (No. I l l )  and the ILO Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951
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(N. 100) into the Beninese legal system. This is an important first step to addressing the 
situation of widespread discrimination against women in both the private and public sectors 
in relation to access to employment and treatment at work. However, in reality, women still 
do not enjoy equal enjoyment of social and economic rights, notably in the spheres of 
education and work. In 1995, primary education rates among women stood at 44 per cent, 
while that of boys was at 88 percent.735 736This also affects their ability to exercise civil and 
political rights and participate in the political life of the country. The discrimination faced by 
women has long established roots. The first of these is common to all forms of human rights’ 
violations and is linked to a lack of knowledge of the law by the population, 80 percent of 
which is illiterate. Secondly, it is difficult to overcome the deeply embedded cultural norms 
and practices, which do not recognise the equality of men and women. Furthermore 
stereotypes, which we find also in the West, relegate women to certain positions at work and 
to occupational levels which do not involve any authority. Moreover, according to Beninese 
customs, women have a sacred role to perform which consists of taking care of their husband 
in order to allow them to fulfil their role of liaison with the ancestors. This tradition acts as a 
compelling obstacle to women’s equal opportunities in respect to social and economic 
rights. Other customs impinge on women’s equal opportunity both in education and at 
work. This includes the phenomenon of early and forced marriages. Under the 1931 
Dahomey Code of Customary Code, women can marry at the age of 14. Moreover, as women 
are considered as minors under the guardianship of men (either the father, the husband or the 
brother) under customary law, they do not have access to credit and land, including through 
inheritance. This, in turn, constitutes another compelling barrier for women to take part in 
gainful economic activities.
However, the perceived difficulty in overcoming challenges posed by traditional 
beliefs should not be used as a justification for inaction in the area of human rights. For 
example, in 1993 when the government abolished school fees for girls to encourage education 
in rural areas, this resulted in the increase of enrolment rates which was higher for girls than 
for boys.737
In 2002 a meaningful step was taken towards the realisation of women’s rights. Due 
to pressure from women’s groups and the commitment of women MPs, a “Code des
735 United Nations Population Fund, The State o f World Population, 1997.
736 B.C. Amoussou, Etude nationale pour l ’identification des obstacles à la mise en œuvre effective des 
principes et droits fondamentaux au travail au Bénin, WP. 3, ILO, Geneva, August 2001, Ch. 4.
737 The Centre for Reproductive Law and Policy and the Association des Femmes Juristes du Bénin, 
Reproductive Rights ofYoung Girls and Adolescents in Bénin, 1999, p. 9 available at http://www.crlp.org
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1personnes et de la famille” was adopted. This code had been blocked in Parliament since 
1995, because the male deputies put up strong resistance to its adoption. These resistances 
were evident even on the occasion of the approval of the Code in 2002. It was approved with 
44 votes in favour, one against and no abstentions, however at the time of the vote, almost 
half of the deputies were absent. The important changes introduced with the new Personal 
and Family Code include the prohibition of forced marriage and the practice of lévirat, which 
consists of the marriage between a widow and the brother of the deceased spouse. In addition, 
the Code establishes that women can only marry at the age of 16 and men at the age of 18. 
Moreover, it recognises the right of women to keep their family name as well as that of her 
husband in all official documents. However, other provisions, which were included in the 
Draft Code, were not approved, provoking strong condemnation from women MPs. The bill 
established that monogamy was ‘7cprincipe” and polygamy “l ’e x c e p tio n Under the Code 
as approved in 2002, the two forms of marriage are equally recognised. The president of the 
opposition party, Renaissance du Bénin, Rosine Soglo, announced that she would bring a 
case to the Constitutional Court against this provision. Another provision included in the 
Draft Code, which was not approved, stipulated that only civil marriages produce legal 
effects and that religious marriages could be celebrated only upon the presentation of a 
certificate of civil marriage. This provision was envisaged as a means to prevent early and 
forced marriages.738
Female genital mutilation constitutes another traditional practice which undermines 
the right of women to equality and to health, as well as children right not to be exposed to 
sexual and physical violence as provided by Articles 19 and 34 of the Convention on the 
Right of the Child.739 According to WHO data, it affects a half of the female population. 
However, these are declining trends. The Ministry of Health, Social Welfare, and the Status 
of Women presented a draft law to the Parliament in April 1998 expressly prohibiting it. 
Theoretically, its prohibition could be already derived from the Constitution as Article 15 
provides that “[e]very individual has the right to life, liberty, security, and the integrity of his 
person ... no one shall be subject to torture, nor to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment”, as 
well as from Article 4 of the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, which 
establishes that “human beings are inviolable. Every human being shall be entitled to respect 
for his life and the integrity of his person. No one may be arbitrarily deprived of this right”.
738 Idrissou-Touré, BENIN: Les députés votent le Code de la famille malgré certaines dispositions controversées 
at http://www.famafrique.org/nouv2002-00140.html
739 Ratified in Benin in 1990.
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Moreover, the Penal Code punishes voluntary injuries and wounds,740 and heavier 
punishment is sanctioned when acts of violence are committed against female children under 
the age of 15 and those who commit the act are the parents of the child.741
Other progress has been made on the issue of gender equality, even though they 
concern a limited élite. Since its establishment, the Constitutional Court has been presided 
over by a woman742 and, in 2001, for the first time in the history of Benin, a woman, Marie- 
Elise Akouavi Gbèdo, was a presidential candidate. Moreover, the government has 
undertaken various initiatives to promote equality between men and women. A ministry 
dealing with Health, Social Welfare and the Status of Women has also been created. 
Moreover, measures have been taken to increase the level of girls’ education, including the 
establishment of the National Network for the Promotion of Girls’ Education by the Ministry 
of Education with the support of the Ministry of Social Welfare and the Status of Women. 
The Ministry of Education has also awarded scholarships to students receiving Certificates of 
Primary Studies, with preference to female students. Advertisements have been broadcast on 
television and radio, and educational kits have been developed to promote girls* education. 
These activities form part of Benin’s initiative for the promotion of the decade of the child as 
a follow-up to the 1990 World Summit on Children, which set specific targets concerning 
girls.
However, the situation of children in Benin remains worrying. Apart from the practice 
of genital mutilation, child labour and trafficking are widespread phenomena. De iure child 
labour is banned in Benin through the ratification of the ICESCR,743 the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child,744 the African Charter,745 and above all the ILO Conventions No. 138 and 
182. Moreover, the Labour Code establishes a minimum age of 14 years and prohibits night 
work for people under the age of 18. In addition, a decree was adopted in November 2000, 
which bans children from certain difficult and hazardous jobs. In the public sector, the Statut 
des agents permanents de VEtat746 provides that the minimum age for employment is 18. 
However, in Benin, there are almost 500,000 child labourers.747 There are many explanations 
for this phenomenon, including economic, as well as cultural and religious reasons. Poverty is
740 Penal Code, Article 309, para. 3 and 4.
741 Ibidem, Article 312, para. 6 ,8  and 9.
742 This was firstly carried out by Ms. Elisabeth Pognon and then by Ms. Conceptia Ouinsou.
743 Article 10,3.
744 Article 32,1.
745 Article 18,2.
746 Act 86-013 o f 26 February 1986.
747 Amoussou, Etude nationale, cit., p. xxvii.
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the main reason which induces parents to send their children to work in order to guarantee 
them some economic security. Moreover, the fact that primary education is not free 
encourages child labour. Traditional beliefs and practices reinforce this economic rationale. 
Traditionally, sending children to work is considered to be an appropriate educational tool. 
The system of vidomègon applied in Benin reflects this belief. This consists of placing the 
children in domestic service in more wealthy families in Benin or in other countries of 
Western and Central Africa. Girls constitute 90-95 percent of the children affected by this 
practice. They are often subject to exploitation, abuse and violence. In the North, the 
phenomenon of child labour is also linked to the practice of placing children in Koranic 
schools. Children talibè in the Koranic schools called Alfa are forced to work to pay for their 
education and food.
Poverty is also a factor behind the trafficking of children. Parents believe that giving 
their children away can ensure better prospects for them. However, this practice is old-rooted. 
Benin has been affected by since the monitarisation of trade. Today, trafficking has taken 
international dimensions and involves the whole Western and Central Africa. Many children 
are sent to Nigeria, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon and Cameroon, where they are used and exploited 
in plantations, as itinerant traders or domestic workers.748 The phenomenon has increased in 
the recent years. In 1995, the number of trafficked children that were stopped at the Benin 
border was 117, 413 in 1996 and 802 in 1997.749 Child Labour News Service released a 
report in July 2000 according to which 49,000 Beninese children victims of trafficking were 
living abroad, of which 61 percent were boys and 39 percent were girls. Most of these 
children were working on plantations in Côte d’Ivoire or as domestic workers in Gabon. A 
study carried out by Anti-Slavery International in 1999 reveals that girls are more affected by 
trafficking than boys because the demand for domestic workers and market traders is higher 
and also it is assumed that they would be more docile as they become older. Moreover, the 
cost of a wedding for daughters has been identified as a possible factor in the parents’ 
decision to send their daughters away instead of their sons.
Various measures have been devised to deal with the problem of child labour, 
including a cooperation agreement with the ILO in 1996 for the implementation of the 
International Programme for the Elimination of Child Labour (IPEC). The government is also 
taking part in an ILO project on trafficking, which involves other eight countries and has
748 Report Combating Trafficking in Children for Labour Exploitation in West and Central Africa, IPEC, ILO, 
Geneva, 2001.
749 Anti-Slavery International, Synopsis o f1999 Report on the Trafficking o f Children between Benin and Gabon 
at http://www.antislaveiy.org/archive/other/trafficking-benin-synopsis.htm
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concluded bilateral agreements with Gabon, Togo and Nigeria to reinforce border control and 
to repatriate trafficked children. Furthermore, a proposal to review all legislation relating to 
children rights and to draft a comprehensive children’s code has been presented. Moreover, 
as a result of the NGOs* sensitisation, the government started a formal investigation into the 
arrival of Etireno on the coast of Benin on 17th April, which was allegedly carrying trafficked 
children. This report was subsequently given to UNICEF and the NGO Terre des hommes. In 
addition, the National Commission on Children’s Rights developed an action plan to prevent 
child trafficking, however, in March 2002, it was still waiting for funding from the 
Government.
The structural adjustment policies introduced since 1989 have had a negative impact 
on the enjoyment of social and economic rights, similar to the case of in Zambia. Since 1996, 
structural adjustment measures have led to an increase of the GDP of 5.5 percent, limited the 
inflation rate to 3 - 3.5 percent and reduced the budget deficit. However, they have also had 
negative repercussions in terms of living conditions of Beninese people. The privatisation and 
liquidation of public enterprises have provoked huge redundancies. Between 1982 and 1994, 
6,659 posts were lost. In the public service, the number of employees has decreased from 
50,000 in 1989 to 32,241 in 1997.750 A reduction in the number of posts in the public and 
parastatal sectors have in turn determined a growth of the informal economy and a decline of 
wages in rural areas, due to the excess of labour supply as a result of the downsizing of the 
public and parastatal employment. Today, more than 90 percent o f the non-agricultural labour 
force works in the informal economy, which absorbs around 40 percent of the entire labour 
force. In 1979, the informal economy employed 34 percent o f the economically active 
population. In 1992, this had reached 41 percent.751 Structural adjustment policies have 
therefore impinged upon the right to work, restricting employment opportunities, as well as 
rights at work, which are easily denied to informal workers. Moreover, the right to health and 
education are often sacrificed in a political economy based on the reduction of public 
expenses. Primary education is not free and, in recent years, the overall allocation to health 
has diminished.752
Although the Constitution is extremely detailed as far as the protection of social and 
economic rights is concerned, the government o f Benin has little room to manoeuvre in order
750 Amoussou, Etude nationale, ciL, pp. ii-iii.
751 The Labor Market in Benin, sumbitted by CORCEDO (Centre d’Orientation de Recherche en Compétitivité, 
Economie et Décisions Organisationnelles), Institut National d’Economie, Cotonou, Bénin available at 
http://www.globalpolicynetwork.org
732 Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Benin, 24/08/99 CRC/C/15/Add. 106, 
para. 24.
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to freely decide its policies. With a total external debt accounting for more than 60 percent of 
its GDP and an annual budget deficit completely financed by external resources, the 
government of Benin is left with very limited scope to independently decide on how to deal 
with poverty reduction and to meet the social needs and constitutionally recognised rights of 
its population.
10.2.2 The Role of the Constitutional Court and the Beninese Human Rights 
Commission in the Protection of Human Rights 
i) The Constitutional Court
The work performed by the Constitutional Court is one of the main indicators that the notion 
of rights and freedoms and more generally, the rule of law regulate both the relationship 
among political and institutional actors as well as the relationship between the state and its 
citizens. The Constitutional Court was established in 1993 and is regulated by Act No. 91- 
009 of 4th March 1991, portantLoi organique sur la Cour Constitutionnelle, and by Decrees 
No. 94-11 and 12 of 26th January 1994, as well as by internal regulations. From 1991, when 
the functions of the Constitutional Court were exercised by the Haute Conseil until 31st 
December 1999, three hundred and eighty one cases were brought before the Constitutional 
Court. One hundred and eleven were brought by public actors (legislature, MPs, an executive 
body or a public institution), some two hundred and seventy were presented by private actors 
(such as individuals, associations, trade unions).753 The reason for the relatively high number 
of cases, which have increased over the years, is linked to the ease with which appeals can be 
made to the Court and the broad range of individuals entitled to bring a case. The procedure 
is simplified and is free to appellants, who include individual citizens and non-citizens,754 and 
they do not have to demonstrate an interest in order to make a claim.
As a result of the independence demonstrated in its decisions,755 the Court has rapidly 
gained the confidence of public and private institutions and has thus indirectly encouraged 
the submission of appeals. As a result, it has become the most respected institution in the
753 Rapport de la Cour Constitutionnelle du Bêniny March 2000 available at www.accpuf.org/congres2/II- 
RA PPO /rapport_ben.pdf
754 In 1997, the Constitutional Court overruled a previous decision of the Haut Conseil de la République of 
1992, which had declared that it could not receive requests from non-citizens. With the decision DCC 97-045 of 
13th August 1997, the Court declared that it could receive a case presented by a Danish citizen on the basis of 
Article 39 of the Constitution, which states that11 Les étrangers bénéficient sur le territoire de la République du 
Bénin des même droits et liberté que les citoyens béninois
755 One example of this independence are the decisions to annul the election of Soglo’s wife as a parliamentary 
deputy and, in 1996, to require Kérékou to re-take his oath of office because he had not pronounced several 
words.
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country. The judgements concerning fundamental rights and freedoms delivered between 
1991 and 9th March 1999 concerned an extremely wide range of human rights and freedoms, 
including the right to integrity of the human person, the right not to be subjected to cruel, 
inhumane or degrading treatment, freedom of movement, the right to defence (in particular, 
the right to be heard), the right to be judged within a reasonable time limit, the right to 
property, the freedoms of assembly and association, the freedom of religion, the principle of 
equality before the law and the inviolability of domicile. An interesting decision is DCC lb- 
94, as the African Charter was applied against the government for the first time in Benin and 
probably in the whole of sub-Saharan Africa.756 The case concerned an arrêté of the Ministry 
of Interior of 22nd November 1993 concerning the conditions and modalities of registration 
of the associations. This provided that only one development association could be registered 
for each administrative entity, that the registration was subordinated to an investigation on 
morality, and finally, if the application for registration was rejected or rescinded, the relevant 
associations were immediately obliged to cease their activities and to liquidate their assets 
within one month. The Court judged this decree to be unconstitutional, because, the limitation 
of the exercise of the freedom of association, violated not only Articles 25 and 98 of the 
Constitution, but also Article 10 of the African Charter.
On several instances, the Court has ruled in favour of individual citizens. An 
interesting example, due its political weight, can be found in the decision DCC 95-029 of 
17th August 1995. This related to the challenge by Colonel Soulé Dankoro to the 
constitutionality of the decisions taken by the President of the Republic on the resignation he 
had submitted in order to present his candidature in the legislative elections of March 1995 ex 
Article 81(3) o f the Constitution and the subsequent disciplinary measures. The President of 
the Republic had not replied to the appellant’s resignation by 1st March 1995 when he 
presented an appeal to the Court. It was only on 8th March that a decision was communicated 
to Mr. Dakoro according to which his resignation was accepted starting from July 1995. 
Basing its decision on Article 81(3) o f the Constitution, the Court declared that the decisions 
of the President of the Republic were not in conformity with the Constitution. The reasoning 
of the Court was based on the consideration that the appellant inferred that his resignation 
was implicitly rejected from the silence of the President and that the President’s successive 
acceptance “prive de son objet cette démission", since its effect would only begin after the 
elections had taken place. The delay with which the President responded to the appellant’s
756 Magnusson, Legitimating, c it, p. 39.
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resignation showed the intention to prevent the appellant from presenting his candidature and 
this constitutes a violation of Article 13(1) of the African Charter and Article 81(3) of the 
Constitution. The former provides for the right of all citizens to freely participate in the 
government o f their country either directly or through freely chosen representatives. The 
latter recognises the right of the members of the armed forces and public security to resign if 
they wish to become a candidate in the elections.
The Constitutional Court has also played a significant role in solving conflicts 
between state institutions. This represents an extraordinary change in respect to the past when 
institutional conflicts were solved by the army and, after the coup d’état of 1974, by the 
Central Committee of the Party. Since 1990, institutional conflicts, involving both substantial 
and procedural issues, have been solved by the Constitutional Court and the relevant 
decisions have been respected by all of the institutions involved. The first of these decisions 
dates back to 23rd December 1994 when the Constitutional Court ruled on a dispute opposing 
the government and the Assembly on the establishment of the CENA for the organisation of 
the legislative elections of 1995 and the presidential elections of 1996. The apex of the 
institutional crisis was reached in the same year on the issue of the budget. The question 
related to the respective competences of the legislature and the executive and the crises began 
when the government presented the budget after the beginning of the fiscal year. For its part, 
the Assembly voted for an increase of civil servants’ salaries, pensions and scholarships 
higher than that provided by the government, which in turn, adopted its own budget on 2nd 
August by ordonnance on the basis of Articles 41, 147 and 68 of the Constitution. In 
particular, it made use of the emergency powers conferred by the Constitution under Article 
68, justifying it by the non-compliance with the international commitments taken under the 
SAP, to which it is bound to respect by virtue of Article 147, with the risk that the 
Assembly’s budget could cause the funding of a series of development projects to be lost. 
Moreover, it argued that salaries, pensions and scholarships were subject to regulatory and 
not to legislative discipline and that the budget voted by the Assembly violated Article 107 of 
the Constitution, which establishes that the balancing of the budget must be ensured (Article 
110). The Assembly set the date of 5th August as the deadline for the exercise of the 
emergency powers and asked the Constitutional Court to declare the unconstitutionality of the 
exercise of these powers and the effectiveness of the budget that it had voted. After a series of 
decisions, the Court confirmed the new deadline of 24th September and that the budget voted 
by the Assembly was unconstitutional because salaries, pensions and scholarships fall under 
the regulatory sphere. However, it affirmed that it did not violate either the constitutional
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provision imposing the balancing of the budget or international agreements. These decisions 
put an end to a serious crisis, similar to those which would have been resolved by the army in 
the past. Moreover, it gave a clear indication to the government of the necessity to involve the 
legislature in the conclusion of international economic agreements.
In this regard, it has to be taken into account that several decisions were delivered 
against measures taken in application of the Structural Adjustment Programme. One decision 
was DCC 18-94 concerning the interministerial arrêté no. 93-068/MFPRA/MFC/DC of 4th 
August 1993 portant fixation des modalités et programmes du test de sélection des Préposés 
des Douanes. The appellant, Mr. Ahossi Comían Basile, challenged the constitutionality of 
this arrêté, which only granted the officials of the Ministry o f Finance the possibility of 
participating in the relevant test for hiring. In particular he claimed that this decree violated 
Article 8(2) of the Constitution and Article 13(2) of the African Charter, which sanction the 
equal right of all individuals to access public functions. The Court stated that even if the 
exigencies o f the Structural Adjustment Programme and the “plethoric” number of agents in 
the Ministry of Finance can justify why the relevant test is not open to all citizens, this test 
must be accessible to all the Permanent State Agents of the relevant category. Therefore, the 
limitation to the agents in service at the Ministry of Finance was judged as a discriminatory 
measure.
In at least three decisions, the Court applied the constitutional provisions concerning 
citizens’ duties. In this regard, the President of the Supreme Court of Benin, Mr. Abraham 
Zinzindohoué wrote: “Nous mettons généralement Vaccent sur les droits de la personne 
uniquement. Mais les droits et les devoirs sont intimement liés; en tous cas, les uns sont les 
pendants des autres. De sorte que l ’on ne saurait parler des droits humains sans évoquer les 
devoirs. A preuve, le titre II de la Constitution du I I  Décembre 1990, qui proclame les droits 
et libertés publiques, est intitulé: “Des Droits et Des Devoirs de la Personne Humaine”. 
The relevant decisions are DCC 96-025, 96-034 and 96-070. The first of these decisions 
related to a complaint made by two “élèves agents des forces de sécurité publique”, who were 
struck off with a decision of the Ministry of Defence in 1984 and were reinstated after 
presenting an administrative case. They applied to the Constitutional Court because their 
reinstatement was not implemented. The Court ruled that the refusal by the General Director 
of the National Police to reinstate the two appellants was contrary to Article 35 of the 75
757 Quoted from the letter of 15th March 1999, which accompanied the Constitutional Court’s decisions 
covering the period January 1997-9th March 1999, which were sent to me through the Italian Ambassador for 
Benin and Nigeria.
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Constitution, which states that “Les citoyens chargés d ’une fonction publique ou élus à une 
fonction politique, ont le devoir de l ’accomplir avec conscience, compétence, probité, 
dévouement et loyalté dans l ’intérêt et le respect du bien commun*\ The second decision 
related to the refusal o f the Director General of the Office of Post and Telecommunications to 
implement the directives of the Ministry of Culture and Communications concerning the 
reinstatement following the amnesty of a person, who had lost his job for political reasons 
and was exiled. As in the preceding case, the Constitutional Court declared that this refusal 
was a violation of the duties imposed on the Administration by Article 35 of the 
Constitution.758 A similar conclusion was reached in the third case, which arose from a claim 
of unconstitutionality against a letter of the Director General of the Société Béninoise 
d ’Electricité et d ’Eau, in which the reinstatement of Mr. Amah Arouna was refused after his 
suspension was raised with decision of the Council of Ministries.
These decisions reveal that despite the rhetoric, in reality, there is no particular 
African notion of “duty” in the Beninese constitutional system. The reference made to the 
concept of duty in Article 35 and in these judicial cases has nothing to do with the discourse 
on African communitarian social organisation and the complementary emphasis on the duties 
that individuals owe to the community. In fact, what was at stake in these three cases was the 
violation by the Administration of the duty to implement decisions taken by a higher 
authority. Duties, like rights, are often exploited as rhetorical tools and they are employed for 
their evocative force.
ii) The Beninese Human Rights Commission
Another organ vested with the task of human rights protection is the Commission Béninoise 
des Droits de l ’Homme (CBDH). This is a governmental organisation set up with the Act No. 
89-004 of 12th May 1989, which is endowed with its own funding and administration. The 
creation of this Commission is due to a large extent to the lawyers from the Benin Bar 
Association, who proposed the creation of a mechanism to implement the African Charter of 
Human and People’s Rights, which was ratified in 1986. The establishment of a national 
body, as required by Article 26 of the African Charter, was formally recommended during an 
international conference on human rights held in April 1988 under the auspices of the African
758 In this case the decision was also based on Article 34 of the Constitution, which provides that "Tout citoyen 
béninois, civil ou militaire, a le devoir sacré de respecter, en toutes circonstances, la Constitution et l'ordre 
constitutionnel établi ainsi que les lois et règlements de la République".
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Jurists Association. The Bar Association even created a committee with the task of drafting a 
proposal and lobbying with the MPs to persuade the Assembly to pass a law in this respect.759
The composition of the Commission reflects the guidelines contained in the Paris 
Principles according to which human rights national institutions shall ensure the “pluralist 
representation of the social forces (of civilian society) involved in the promotion and 
protection of human rights”. The Beninese Commission is composed of forty-five members, 
three of whom are members by right: a magistrate, a representative of the Bar Association 
and a representative of the Organisation of Doctors. One third are representatives of NGOs 
and the remaining two-thirds are individual members. These include lawyers, doctors, 
magistrates and teachers. All of the Commissioners work on a volunteer basis. In conformity 
with the Paris principles, the independence of the Commission is also ensured by the system 
of funding, which is based on members’ shares, revenues deriving from the Commission’s 
activities, gifts, legacies and subsidies (Article 13).
The Commission has the task o f‘‘promoting and safeguarding human rights” (Article 
4). To this end, the law provides that the Commission’s activities shall consist of teaching 
and making human rights instruments known among the population, proposing measures to 
public authorities to promote and protect human rights, assisting in the ratification of human 
and peoples* rights international instruments, assisting the authorities in the elaboration of 
reports to be submitted according to the international instruments to which Benin is a party 
and making recommendations to the Government to enact the deliberations of the UN and the 
OUA organs or any international governmental or non-governmental human rights 
institution. Its educational activities include radio broadcasts and seminars. Finally, as also 
provided by the Paris principles, the Beninese Commission is also entrusted with what the 
Principles define as a “quasi jurisdictional competence”. The Commission receives 
complaints by individual citizens as well as NGOs and works as a conciliator between the 
citizen and public powers (Article 4(b)). In collaboration with the concerned administration, 
it can pursue the means through which to put an end to the violation and/or obtain a “fair and 
equitable reparation”. It can conciliate between the administration and the claimant. If the 
conciliation fails, it can suggest measures, including judicial appeal in which case it can act 
as a civil party. It can also bring a case before the judicial authority on behalf of the 
complainant (Article 12). In fact, upon receipt of a complaint, the Commission appoints one 
of its members, who carries out an investigation. The Commission enjoys broad investigative
759 Human Rights Watch, Protectors or Pretenders, Government Human Rights Commission in Africa, Benin, at 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/africa/benin/benin.html
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powers, which allow it to have unrestricted access to reports, registrars, official documents 
and premises. It subsequently drafts a report. The agent of the human rights violation is then 
contacted in writing and, if this person does not respond, it issues a press release or organises 
a media campaign.
In spite of its broad powers, the record of the Commission is rather disappointing. The 
CBDH was only set up in March 1990 by Soglo, the newly elected Prime Minister of the 
transitional government following the National Conference. Despite the presence of 
representatives of human rights NGOs in the Commission, the fact that it enjoys a high 
degree of independence, the breadth of its powers and a conducive political climate, the 
Commission has confined itself to educational activities and in electoral monitoring. Act No. 
98-034 of 1999 establishing general rules for elections in the Republic of Benin provides that 
one member of the Commission must be also a member of the CENA and that a CBDH 
representative must participate in each Provincial Electoral Commission, which represents 
CENA at the provincial level. It is likely that the presence of a very active and efficient 
Constitutional Court has eroded the significance of the Commission. Only two cases have 
been reported recently in which the CBDH has intervened to protect and not only to promote 
human rights. In December 1997, the Commission presented a complaint before the judiciary 
on behalf of Tohon Evariste, a mechanic who was beaten and wounded by his employer, and 
was also a party to his complaint. In January 1998, it protested against the prospected 
expulsion of forty refugees from Congo. As a result of its intervention, the expulsion was 
suspended. However, paradoxically, the most important stand on human rights violations 
remains the support given to the government of Togo in 1999 in its attacks against Amnesty 
International, which had reported on political killings in Togo.760 This stand was contradicted 
by the report presented by a joint UN-OUA Commission, which investigated the allegations 
that hundreds of bodies of victims of the Togolese security forces were carried off on Benin’s 
beaches in February 1998. The report ascertained the existence of a systematic violation of 
human rights in Togo.
760 Human Rights Watch, Protectors or Pretenders, Benin, cit.
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10.2.3 The Vitality of Civil Society
The place that human rights have in contemporary Benin also depends to a large extent also 
on the attachment demonstrated by Beninese civil society to the values enshrined in the 
Constitution. The press, despite the disappearance of a certain number of titles and the 
irregular appearance of others, has continued to be very critical and avidly read by the 
population. The interest of the Beninese in politics is also expressed by their readiness to 
exercise civil and political rights, which they had not been in a position to exercise until 
1990. Observers have remarked a peacefulness of the voting process and the high turn-out of 
voters (in the latest legislative elections it amounted to 73.62 per cent of those having the 
right to vote). However, a deeper reading o f the working of Benin democracy shows that the 
rationale, which moves the different actors, from ordinary citizens to politicians, resembles 
that of the past. In particular, as Banégas has remarked, ula consolidation démocratique et la 
subjectivation citoyenne s'opère paradoxalement au Bénin dans le creuset des logiques 
clientélaires et dans la matrice plus générale de la «politique du ventre»” ™1 The “politics of 
the belly”, which characterised the authoritarian period, is the form through which democracy 
express itself today. Political candidates visit their constituency distributing and promising 
money and are welcomed by villagers. This could be seen as a sign of a malfunctioning of 
democracy. However, it could be argued, as Banégas does, that in fact this is a path that 
initiates to the rules of political pluralism and a modality of appropriation 4tpar les bas" of 
democracy. Political competition is perceived as an occasion for citizens to reverse the power 
relations with politicians. The material advantage which can be derived from democratic 
competition is actually seen as corresponding to a politicians’ moral duty to redistribute 
wealth and to redress the enrichment of a few. The citizens then vote regardless of the money 
received by the different candidates and on the basis of considerations other than the material 
benefits. The regional origins of the candidates and their perceived religious and moral 
qualities761 62 are determining factors. Moreover, Beninese citizens have proved to be very
761 R. Banégas, “Marchandise du vote, citoyenneté et consolidation démocratique au Bénin”, in 69 Politique 
africaine, 1998, p. 75.
762 The moral qualities are linked to concepts which are specific to Beninese culture and which relate to the 
xomé of citizens, i.e. to their belly meant as innemess, see ibidem, pp. 83-86. Modesty is a quality which is 
valued and this also explains the election of Kérékou in 1996, who redeemed himself with his act of public 
humiliation at the National Conference. Religion expresses itself not only in the status of religious personalities 
such as voodoo priests in villages and which is one o f the reasons for the rehabilitation of their cults in 1989 but 
also in the force of persuasion that the religious language used in the political discourse has on citizens; see K. 
Elwert-Kretshmer, uVodoun et contrôle social au village”, in 59 Politique Africaine 1995, pp. 102-119. This is a 
characteristic that Benin shares with Zambia and with other African countries. Kérékou like Chiluba makes 
recourse to religious images, which in the case o f Kérékou have Pentecostal references. Kérékou exalted 
Christianity against voodoo, which he presented as a dangerous heritage of the military rule and his adversary
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critical of candidates. In 1995, only seventeen MPs were re-elected. However, regionalism is 
the basic criterion used to vote. The “fils du pays” is the candidate chosen, independent of the 
origins of the head of the party.
The vitality of Beninese civil society is demonstrated by the number of trade union 
organisations and NGOs. From the existing five confederations, four were set up after the 
réintroduction of democracy. However, trade unions are largely confined to the public sector. 
The success of the human rights discourse is further witnessed by the number of Beninese 
NGOs formed during the transition period, which are devoted to human rights promotion and 
education.763 Their efforts are combined with the action of the government, which has 
introduced human rights courses at school. Special courses on human rights have also been 
set up by local NGOs and seminars are held for local officials and for the populations in 
towns and villages using the different national languages. Human rights education is also 
pursued through radio broadcasts and publications. Moreover, people are trained at local level 
to become legal trainers. Human rights NGOs have played a major role during the elections 
o f 1995 promoting legality and tolerance, together with Archbishop de Souza and other 
religious personalities.764 They have organised seminars, conferences and workshops on the 
exercise of the right to vote. The Institut des droits de VHomme et de promotion de la 
démocratie, La démocratie au quotidien of Maurice Glélé Ahanhanzo and Archibishop de 
Souza organised a national seminar on the “Electoral Process”, which was broadcast on the 
radio in the different national languages and its acts (“X *education des populations en matière 
de vote,r) were published.765
Two Beninese NGOs also investigate on human rights violations, mediate and bring 
actions to court. This is the case of the Ligue Béninoise des Droits de VHomme, which is 
close to the Communist Party, and the Association pour le Développement des Initiatives 
Villageoises (ASSODIV). Finally, the freedom in which these organisations operate and the 
collaboration which takes place with the government should not be overlooked, particularly
Soglo, who rehabilitated the cults voodoo which were prohibited under the military rule. Moreover, he 
emphasises his double conversion, Le. to religion and to democracy, and makes parallels between God and 
democracy. Again, the functioning of democracy in Benin develops according to its own forms where different 
languages, in this case that of democracy and religion, co-exist. On the link between religion and political 
power, see C. Strandsbjerg, “Kérékou, God and the ancestors: Religion and the Conception of Political Power in 
Benin”, in 99 African Affairs, 2000, pp. 395-414.
763 See The Status o f Human Rights Organizations in sub-Saharan Africa. Benin 
at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrgts/africa/benin.htm
764 See C. Mayrargue, “Les religieux et les élections législatives du mars 1995 au Bénin”, in 58 Politique 
africaine, 1995, pp. 157-162.
765 On the 1995 elections, see Gbégnonvi R., “Les législatives de mars 1995”, in 59 Politique africaine, 1995, 
pp. 59-69.
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as the latter is often willing to provide information of alleged cases of human rights violations 
and to take the necessary measures as well.
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CONCLUSIONS
The study carried out on the constitutional history of Zambia and Benin has shown that, 
despite some relevant similarities with the constitutional experience of the 1960s, the 
constitutionalisation of human rights in the 1990s presents some significantly new features. 
Resemblances and differences can be identified with regard to the actors and dynamics of 
interests and values, which underlie the renewed protection of individual liberties according 
to the principles of constitutionalism, as well as to the typology of rights protected and the 
mechanisms aimed at guaranteeing their implementation. What has certainly changed is the 
global context in which the constitutions of the 1990s were adopted. The increasing 
interconnection of markets, peoples and institutions, as well as a set of ideas and values 
dispersed widely due to this interconnection, are all aspects of globalisation, which have 
influenced both the re-introduction of liberal-democratic constitutions and also the degree of 
which constitutionally protected rights are implemented.
In the light of these findings, it should now be possible to respond to the first question 
raised in the Introduction of this thesis, namely whether or not the renewed 
constitutionalisation of individual (liberal) rights and freedoms is explicable in terms of 
“m im étism e In Part I and in Chapter 7, it was shown how the constitutional protection of 
civil and political rights in the independence constitutions was a result of this process, which 
was an expression of a relationship of (cultural, political and economic) dependence between 
the colonial powers and the African nationalist leaders. The constitutional developments of 
the 1990s can still be described to a certain extent in these terms. Current constitutions are 
linked to a situation of dependence of sub-Saharan Africa on non-African actors. In the 
1960s, these actors were the colonial powers, whereas today they are the Bretton Woods 
institutions and Western donor countries.766 As seen in the preceding chapters, since the late 
1980s, the community of donors and international financial institutions has started condition 
aid with respect to démocratisation and good governance. The inability of African states to 
survive without the economic and financial support of the IMF, the World Bank and Western 
countries has made it virtually impossible for African leaders not to pledge its adherence to 
the principles of liberal-democracy. The fall of the Soviet system has reinforced the weight of 
this conditionality also from a strictly legal point of view. Scholars have used the image of 
the market to describe legal change.767 If we apply this metaphor to sub-Saharan African
766 In practice, however, the actors have not necessarily changed. In particular, in the case of Francophone 
Africa, the major donor is the former colonial power.
767 See U. Mattei, “Efficiency in Legal Transplants: An Essay in Comparative Law and Economics”, in 14
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constitutional changes, it could be argued that these changes have taken place in the context 
of a monopoly of constitutional cultures. With the decay of communist regimes in Eastern 
Europe, no alternative models exist to the universalistic claims of the liberal democratic 
paradigm. An undeniably positive record of liberal-democracies in terms of internal cohesion, 
peace, stability and development has strengthened these claims. Therefore, given the 
international context, sub-Saharan African states find themselves in a situation where 
allegiance to the liberal-democratic model is a condition for being recognised as legitimate by 
the international community or, more precisely, by the group of countries and institutions 
which wield political, economic and financial power within the international community. As 
in the 1960s, the constitution has played the role of a sort of “carte de visite”, used according 
to a strategy of “marketing constitutionner.768
Nevertheless, the dynamics underlying the constitutions of the 1990s cannot be 
interpreted exclusively, as a manifestation of African political and economic dependence and, 
therefore, the concept of “mimétisme” only partially reveals the nature of the current 
constitutional phase. The continued employment of this notion to explain African 
constitutionalism is often linked to the tendency not to consider or underestimate the changes 
occurred within African societies since decolonisation and to recognise their impact on 
African constitutional developments. The return to liberal-democratic constitutionalism is 
also the outcome of a long process (beginning with colonisation), in which African civil 
society have been protagonists. The role of civil society in the constitutional changes of the 
1990s constitutes the major difference with the processes that led to the adoption of the 
independence constitutions. In Chapter 9 and 10 it was shown how the 1991 Zambian and the 
1990 Beninese Constitutions were a response to demands for democracy and rights put 
forward by civil society. These claims were the result of a process of “appropriation” of the 
human rights language, which started with the fight against colonisation when the rights- 
discourse was instrumental to liberation from colonial domination. This process continued in 
the aftermath of decolonisation. In the early 1960s, some voices, albeit a minority, were 
already raised in the defence of human rights. In 1961, African lawyers, convened in Lagos 
demanded African governments to adopt an African human rights convention and to 
constitutionally entrench fundamental rights. In the 1970s, the African Bar Association, often 
in collaboration with the ICJ, organised various seminars on human rights, the first human
American Journal o f Comparative Law, 1994, p. 8 and U. Mattel, Comparative Law and Economics, The 
University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1997, p. 26.
768 L. Sindjoun, “Les nouvelles constitutions africaines et la politique internationale: contribution à une 
économie des biens politico-constitutionnels”, in Afrique 2000,1995, p. 39.
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rights groups were formed and the idea of elaborating an African instrument on human rights 
was submitted to the OUA.769 The case studies of this thesis have also shown that human 
rights concerns did not appear in the late 1980s for the first time. The Zambian constitution­
making process of 1972, which led to the constitutionalisation of unipartism, witnessed the 
expression of a popular concern for individual liberties. In Benin, the Conférence des Cadres 
in 1979 demanded the réintroduction of a liberal democratic system and since the 1980s, the 
legal profession has asked for the establishment of a Human Rights Commission. It is true, 
however, that until the mid-1980s and early 1990s only a small section of society put forward 
claims for rights. It is only since the late 1980s, that trade unions, students and churches have 
expressed their discontent and opposition in human rights terms. This evolution bears upon 
the growth of the international human rights regime and movement, in which Africa played 
its part. The adoption of the African Charter and the initiatives o f African lawyers gave a 
significant boost to the ‘domestication’770 of the idea of human rights. The fact that the 
vehicles through which the relevant idea was being introduced were African or, in the case of 
international human rights standards, were instruments which witnessed the participation of 
African countries, gave human rights the cultural legitimacy that was absent in the 1960s and 
which was one of the obstacles to their incorporation. It is symptomatic that when human 
rights were discussed (and claimed) during the constitution-making processes of both Zambia 
and Benin, reference was always made to both the African Charter and international human 
rights instruments.
The increasing integration of Africa in the transnational exchange of ideas and 
information has been the latest contribution to this process of incorporating human rights in 
the set of concepts, through which African civil societies interpret and express their 
relationship with political power. This integration did not exist in the 1960s when exposure to 
events occurring abroad was limited to a small élite of individuals, who had the opportunity 
to travel to Europe as students or political leaders. Transnational migration, the development 
o f mass media, the reception of foreign radios, Western tourism771 have exposed a growing 
number of Africans to a set of value-systems and ideas, including human rights, which they 
were not necessarily acquainted with. Information about the political and socio-economic 
conditions of other peoples, as well about political events occurring in other countries has
769 Hyden, The Challenges, cit., pp. 263-264.
770 The term domestication signifies the integration of human rights in the culture of a given society in such a 
way to condition individual practices and institutional actions.
771 See J.-P. Daloz, “Le temps mondial au sud du Sahara. Des representations à la ressource politique”, in Z. 
Laïdi, Le Temps mondial, Editions Complexe, Bruxelles, 1997, pp. 147-149.
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also increased since the 1960s. The consequent awareness of the injustices suffered in other 
parts of the world and the knowledge of the victories that other peoples had obtaining from 
their struggle against oppression and misrule has enhanced a sentiment of universally shared 
values. This explains the reaction of the Beninese against the “minimalist” approach of 
France to democratisation in their country. As we have seen in Chapter 10, French policy 
towards Kérékou was harshly criticised by the Beninese in the name of the universality of the 
principle of democracy.
The metaphor of “legal irritants” (adapted to a situation in which legal change is 
influenced by international law and not foreign national law) can help us to understand the 
process described so far. The liberal idea of human rights has continued to ‘irritate’ African 
societies even during the Kaunda and Kérékou’s regimes and this irritation has been 
reinforced by the developments that occurred in the international and regional legal regimes 
on human rights and the growth of a transnational human rights movement with an increasing 
number of international and national NGOs working in the field of human rights promotion in 
Africa. These processes have ensued in the conceptualisation by the most politically aware 
sections of African civil societies, of human rights as a universally valid instrument of 
emancipation from oppressive and inefficient governments. In turn, the legal space has been 
‘irritated* by the developments that have occurred in the political discourse of civil society 
and such ‘irritation’, coupled with the pressures exerted by foreign actors on African 
governments, has led to the adoption of liberal-democratic constitutions in the early 1990s.
It should be noted that the perception by civil society (beyond the circles of human 
rights activists) of human rights as a valid instrument of emancipation was certainly 
conditioned by the spread of the concept of human rights through the various channels seen 
above. However, material conditions and interests determined the actual impact of the idea o f 
human rights on Zambian and Beninese civil societies and notably the perception of human 
rights as a universal value. The incorporation of human rights in their political discourse is 
linked to the worsening of socio-economic conditions and the failure of the state to guarantee 
material security. In fact, in Zambia and Benin, opposition to the state and rights-claims came 
from those sections of civil societies which were more economically dependent on the state, 
such as unionised workers of the public and parastatal sectors and students. The claim for 
rights was determined by the recognition of the empowering and mobilising force of the 
language of human rights, as well as the instrumental value of civil and political freedoms to 
obtain the level of development, which African states had always promised but never 
achieved.
2 7 4
In conclusion, if the majority of the independence Constitutions were constitutions 
“extroyees'\ the constitutions of the 1990s were “negociees et conquises”, 772 and the 
constitutional protection of individual liberties was manifestly a core demand in the 
constitution-making processes of both Zambia and Benin.773 As argued in Chapter 7, the 
effectiveness of a constitutional system depends largely on the fact that it is built and 
supported by the different socio-political forces existing in a country. This was not the case in 
the 1960s when the constitutions were drafted by colonial powers and the leaders of the 
independence movements. Conversely, the constitutions in force today are, to a great extent, 
an expression of democratic processes, which witnessed a consensus on the liberal- 
democratic form of state. In particular, the Beninese constitution-making process has 
provided the constitution with a solid foundation constituted by a “deal” reached by an 
extremely wide range of forces and interests. The strength of this deal also rests on the fact 
that it was achieved through forms (the Conference-modem version of a community’s 
gathering and discussion), symbols (the humility displayed by Kerekou) and an atmosphere 
(the spiritual dimension brought by Archbishop de Souza), which had also a meaning 
according to traditional political categories.
Therefore, the link existing between current formal constitutions and the ‘material’ 
constitutions explains the level of effectiveness of liberal-democratic principles and 
institutions today. In both Zambia and Benin parliaments exert their function of control on 
the executive and do not hesitate to oppose governmental decisions, including in then- 
reaction to attempts to restrict individual liberties even in a context like that of Zambia under 
Chiluba, which was certainly not conducive to the expression of any form of opposition. 
Furthermore, the judiciary has provided evidence of its independence by ruling against the 
executive both in Zambia and Benin, and against the President himself in Benin (both Soglo 
and Kerekou). Popular participation in the elections, the flourishing of the mass media, which 
are not afraid to harshly criticise the government and the creation of various NGOs 
demonstrate that civil society value the exercise of political and civil liberties and in 
particular, the right to vote, expression, association and the press,774 even though it is true that
772 L. Sindjoun, “Dynamiques de civilisation de l’Etat et de la production du politique baroque en Afrique 
Noire”, in 27 Verfassung und Recht in Übersee, 1994, p. 207.
773 A different question is that of the involvement of Western experts in the constitution-making processes, 
which show that a relation of cultural dependence still exists. Even in this respect changes have occurred 
Within Africa, African institutions, like the Conférence Nationale of Benin, have been borrowed and African 
experts are invited to provide their advice on constitution-making and institution-building.
774 See the survey carried out on a number of African countries in M. Bratton and R. Mattes, “Africans’ 
Surprising Universalism”, in 12 Journal o f Democracy, 2001, p. 107.
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behind these phenomena economic interests can also be found. For example, the spread of 
NGOs is also due to the funding they obtain from Western NGOs and foundations.
We see that in Benin the government has generally demonstrated its respect for 
individual civil liberties and has even taken proactive measures to foster a human rights 
culture among the population, as requested by the Constitution, and to redress human rights 
abuses. However, the extent to which civil liberties were violated under the Chiluba 
government shows that African constitutionalism still faces some difficulties. The Chiluba 
period cautions against being overly optimistic about the domestication of the notion of 
human rights. The entitlement aspect of human rights seems to have been more easily 
internalised than the obligation aspect, particularly when this challenges a position of power. 
A personalised conception of power still exists and the personalisation of the démocratisation 
processes has helped to preserve this political culture. Several sub-Saharan African countries 
have passed from the President-father of the nation to the President-champion o f 
démocratisation and the passage from Kaunda to Chiluba in Zambia is exemplary of this 
phenomenon.
Political culture does not change rapidly. We have already seen “Westernised” 
independence leaders, who used a political language drawn from the vocabulary of Western 
democracies, either changed this language or did not behave consistently once they achieved 
the responsibility of ruling their countries. Nevertheless, there is an important difference 
between the current situation and that of the post-decolonisation period. Political behaviours 
resembling the patrimonialist and authoritarian conception of the state of past leaders are not 
in fact a replication of this conception, but rather an adaptation of it in the face of a two-fold 
constraint. These include, on the one hand, a working system of check and balances and, on 
the other, the international and domestic reactions that human rights violations may endanger. 
In this regard, it needs be underlined that decades of oppression and injustice have lowered 
the level of endurance of the populations. The work that is being done by civil society groups 
to denounce abuses and to sensitise citizens to human rights, nurtures the democratic and 
human rights culture of African people and is destined to lower their degree of tolerance of 
illiberal practices. The question is to what extent all of the different components of African 
societies are actually reached by the spread of this culture, in particular, the rural populations, 
who have been at the margins of the movement that triggered the démocratisation process in 
both Zambia and Benin, and the older generations who remain attached to traditional
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logics.775 Ethnic allegiance is one of them. We have seen how voting is conditioned by ethnic 
allegiances and how even secessionist claims have even appeared in Zambia. However, the 
Zambian and Beninese constitutions do not deal with the political implications of these 
sentiments of ethnic membership and have avoided the recognition of any collective rights in 
the form of power-sharing mechanisms,776 with the only partial exception being the restored 
House of Chiefs in Zambia. The failure to recognise these sentiments may constitute a risk 
for human rights. Ethnic tensions may make governments feel compelled or may be used 
instrumentally by governments to limit individual liberties. The question of whether and how 
to acknowledge ethnic allegiances is certainly not an easy one because the recognition of 
traditional institutions can legitimise the exercise of power or norms which are not 
compatible with liberal rights. In any case, the approaches to the question of ethnic identity 
should vary according to the specific circumstances and nature of this identity in each 
country. It is certain, however, that this issue cannot be neglected.
Traditional culture also continues to constitute an obstacle to the effectiveness of the 
liberal concept of human rights in another respect, namely when rights should be applied in 
the private sphere. From this perspective, we have seen that the subjects whose rights are 
more vulnerable are women and children and the greatest cultural resistances concern the 
principle of gender equality. The underpinning tenets of the liberal model of human rights, 
i.e. autonomy and equality of all individuals, clash with a vital communitarian perception of 
gender relations. The introduction of the market economy, the commodisation of labour and 
land, urbanization and migration are among the factors that have eroded communitarian ties 
and put a process of individualisation in motion. Women and young people most clearly 
demonstrate their aspiration to liberate themselves from the communitarian structures that 
force them into a position of subordination. However, this process is not complete. The 
communitarian culture co-exists with the emergence of the person as an autonomous 
individual.777 Despite the pressures exerted by modernity, solidarity among the members of 
the group and the sense of the responsibility of the individual towards the group, which 
includes the respect for the norms that keep the community together, have not vanished.
775 According to Daloz, the level of political awareness is not really linked to the urban or rural residence but 
rather to age. The youth, independent of their educational level, show a greater concern regarding domestic 
malpractices and world politics than the elderly, who are still linked to regionalist logics and rivalries, see 
Daloz, Le Temps mondial, cit., 150.
776 On this issue, see M. Owusu, “Domesticating Democracy: Culture, Civil Society and Constitutionalism in 
Africa”, in 39 Comparative Studies in Society and History, 1997, p. 120 seq.
777 A. Marie (ed), L 'Afrique des individus, Karthala Ed., Paris, 1999, p. 412.
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Despite the progressive recommendations of the 1996 Constitutional Review 
Commission, the force of the communitarian culture, which is strongly defended by those 
who are guaranteed positions of privilege by it, explains how the Zambian Constitution only 
pays lip service to the principle of gender equality and still allows for the application of 
customary law as an exception to the principle of non-discrimination. Even in Benin, where 
the constitution sanctions the principle of equality between men and women, the latter do not 
enjoy an equal status as men due to traditional norms, practices and beliefs. Furthermore, 
African societies are not culturally monolithic. Women, or more precisely the most socially 
and economically advantaged ones,778 are actively combating to change aspects of the 
traditional culture and norms that impinge on the equal enjoyment of individual rights by 
women and men alike. Their action has already produced some results. The enactment of the 
new Family Code in Benin in 2002 represents a victory, albeit partial, of Beninese women. 
Arguably, the “irritation” exerted by the global discourse on women’s rights and the 
mobilisation of African women’s groups for gender equality will find a positive response 
when African societies at large acknowledge the socio-economic rationality of the principle 
of gender equality. As argued in Chapter 9, the growing number of women as heads o f 
households and breadwinners challenge the assumptions behind the perceptions and norms, 
which accord women a subordinate status in respect to men.
The impact of culture on the effectiveness of the constitutional protection of human 
rights can also been identified with regard to the conception of justice introduced in the 
constitutional systems. Human rights are less culturally alien today than in the 1960s. A 
greater number of people express claims in human rights terms, value the exercise of 
individual liberties and demand their respect. Nevertheless, if one observes the level o f 
‘domestication’ o f the system of justice imported with the notion of individual liberties, the 
picture is different. The inspiration of foreign procedures and the use of a foreign language, 
which is that of the former colonial power, makes the state system of justice a distant entity 
for the majority of people, who are neither acquainted with the former nor with the latter.779 
The provision of a simplified (and cost-free) procedure in the Beninese Constitutional Court 
can be considered as a positive development in respect to the 1960 constitution. The high 
number of cases before the Constitutional Court of Benin has confirmed that the adaptation o f
778 Certain scholars have accused the African women’s movement of poor representation, being mainly 
composed of African middle and high-class women linked to Western feminist groups, see Munalula, Law as an 
Instrument, c it, p. 133.
779 See N. Mvondo, "La crise de la justice de l’État en Afrique noire francophone. Études des causes du 
"divorce" entre la justice et les justiciables", in 107 Penant, 1994, p. 208 seq.
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borrowed institutions to local conditions is an effective way to ensure the functioning of the 
institution itself.
The ineffectiveness of the state system of justice in ensuring the implementation of 
rights also lies in the fact that it is culturally alien to a certain section of society because of 
its individual-centred and adversarial nature. This is confirmed by the vitality of traditional 
dispute settling mechanisms. In order for human rights to be implemented» this situation 
should be recognised and the question of how to make human rights concerns permeate the 
traditional conflict resolution mechanisms should be tackled. In light of the difficulties that 
individuals may face in demanding the judicial enforcement of their rights, the institution of 
human rights commissions is a positive innovation. Potentially, they can play an important 
role not only as institutions fostering a human rights culture, helping the process of 
implementation of international human rights standards, complementing the domestic system 
of checks and balances, but also by ensuring the implementation of individual rights. Human 
rights commissions not only have investigative powers which can be used on their own 
initiative, but they also have dispute settlement functions, whose procedures and techniques 
do not discourage individuals from presenting a complaint to courts, including obstacles 
which may arise due to their traditional legal culture.780 In order for this potential to be 
translated into a reality, human rights commissions need to have a broad range of 
competences (as laid down in the Paris principles) and to be guaranteed independence and 
adequate funding.
We have focussed thus far upon liberal rights and freedoms. However, a major 
difference between current Beninese and Zambian constitutions with those of the 1960s lies 
in the broader scope of the rights protected in the former. While the independence 
constitutions had a strictly liberal character, confining human rights protection to civil and 
political rights, the inspiration of the current constitutions goes beyond liberalism and mirrors 
the evolution which occurred in the international regime and discourse on human rights. This 
is particularly the case of the Constitution of Benin, which has an extremely wide spectrum of 
rights and freedoms protected ranging from first to third generation rights. The impact of the 
international human rights regime is even more evident from the preamble to the Constitution
780 We have seen, for example, how the Human Rights Commission in Benin can receive complaints by NGOs; 
it can conciliate and, in the case of failure of the conciliation, it may bring a complaint on behalf of the 
individual.
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of Benin, which makes explicit reference to the African Charter and the UDHR and 
establishes not only that the African Charter is an “integral part” of the Constitution, but also 
that both the African Charter and international treaties and agreements shall have an authority 
superior to that of the laws. We have seen that the Constitutional Court has already used this 
provision and applied the African Charter in one of its decisions. It will be interesting to see 
whether it will also apply international human rights instruments in the future.
Upon closer inspection of the Zambian and Beninese Constitutions, we see that the 
extent to which the international human rights regime was actually used as a source varies 
and depends on the features o f the relevant constitution-making processes. The 1990 
Beninese Constitution was written ex novo in a context, like that of the Conférence des Force 
Vives, where there was a prevailing desire on the part of the participants to mark the end of a 
long period of oppression. A robust and broad protection of human rights was the most 
obvious way of turning that page of the nation's history.
A caveat is however necessary. Despite the fact that the Beninese Constitution 
recognises second-generation rights and the Zambian Constitution has introduced Directive 
Principles of State Policy, the model followed by Zambia and Benin is that of a liberal state 
with limited obligations in the socio-economic field. Liberalism not only in the political arena 
but also in the economic sphere is the prevailing global paradigm, which African states have 
explicitly been required to follow as laid down by international financial institutions and 
donor countries.781 This paradigm has had very clear human rights implications.782 The neo- 
liberal policies implemented in Zambia and Benin negatively impacted upon the effectiveness 
of the Beninese provisions on second-generation rights and the Zambian Directive Principles 
of State Policy. The structural adjustment policies imposed by the Bretton Woods institutions 
have made the social and economic conditions of people worse, as seen in Chapters 9 and 10. 
Nevertheless, these policies have provoked the emergence of a domestic discourse and claim 
for social and economic rights. If one compares the consultation process for the constitutional 
revision in Zambia in 1996 with the other similar processes which occurred in the previous 
years, one can see the rise in demand for a better guarantee o f social and economic rights. 
Moreover, in both Zambia and Benin, African civil societies have started to express their 
opposition against Bretton Woods policies in the name of socio-economic rights. In Benin,
781 See Y. Ghai, Human Rights and Social Development. Toward Democratization and Social Justice, 
Democracy, Governance and Human Rights Programme Paper Number 5, UNRISD, Geneva, October 2001.
782 On the impact of economic processes linked with globalisation on rights, see Y. Ghai, “Rights, Social 
Justice, and Globalization in East Asia”, in J.R. Bauer and D.A. Bell (ed.), The East Asian Challenge for Human 
Rights, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999, p. 241 seq.
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even the Constitutional Court has been asked to rule on SAP measures affecting the rights 
guaranteed by the Constitution. The growing attention to socio-economic rights in sub- 
Saharan Africa is evolving in parallel and is interlinked with an emerging attention to these 
rights among international NGOs, which have focussed for decades on civil and political 
rights.783 Interestingly, social concerns in Zambia are going beyond the civil society sphere 
and are also starting to affect state policies with the Parliament and the President starting 
questioning the privatisation programme requested by the IMF due to its high social costs. As 
in the case of civil and political rights, the degree to which second generation rights are 
implemented in the future will, arguably, be determined by the positions taken with regard to 
them by the State, civil society and the forces leading the economic processes of 
globalisation, and the power relations between these three.
783 Amnesty International has even changed its mandate, which now encompasses “all human rights".
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ANNEXES
CONSTITUTION OF ZAMBIA 
PREAMBLE
(As amended by Act No, 18 o f1996)
WE, THE PEOPLE OF ZAMBIA by our representatives, assembled in our Parliament, 
having solemnly resolved to maintain Zambia as a Sovereign Democratic Republic; 
DETERMINED to uphold and exercise our inherent and inviolable right as a people to 
decide, appoint and proclaim the means and style to govern ourselves;
RECOGNISE the equal worth of men and women in their rights to participate, and freely 
determine and build a political, economic and social system of their own free choice; 
PLEDGE to ourselves that we shall ensure that the State shall respect the rights and dignity of 
the human family, uphold the laws of the State and conduct the affairs of the State in such 
manner as to preserve, develop, and utilise its resources for this and future generations; 
DECLARE the Republic a Christian nation while upholding the right of every person to 
enjoy that person's freedom of conscience or religion;
RESOLVE to uphold the values of democracy, transparency, accountability and good 
governance;
AND FURTHER RESOLVE that Zambia shall forever remain a unitary, indivisible, multi­
party and democratic sovereign state;
DO HEREBY ENACT AND GIVE TO OURSELVES THIS CONSTITUTION.
PA RTI
NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND STATE
(As amended by Act No. 18 o f1996)
Article
1. [Declaration of Republic, sovereignty of people, supreme law and official language]
(1) Zambia is a unitary, indivisible, multi-party and democratic sovereign State.
(2) All power resides in the people who shall exercise their sovereignty through the 
democratic institutions of the State in accordance with the Constitution.
(3) This Constitution is the supreme law of Zambia and if any other law is inconsistent with 
this constitution that other law shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void.
(4) This Constitution shall bind all persons in the Republic of Zambia and all Legislative, 
Executive and Judicial organs of the State at all levels.
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(5) The official language of Zambia shall be English.
2. [Public Seal]
The Public Seal of the Republic shall be such as may be prescribed by or under an Act of 
Parliament.
3. [National Anthem, National Flag, National Emblem and National Motto]
The National Anthem, the National Flag, the National Emblem and the National Motto shall 
be such as may be prescribed by or under an Act of Parliament.
PART II 
CITIZENSHIP
(As amended by Act No. 18 o f1996)
Article
4. [Citizens of Zambia]
(1) Every person who immediately before the commencement o f this Constitution was a 
citizen of Zambia shall continue to be a citizen of Zambia after the commencement of this 
Constitution.
(2) A person who was entitled to citizenship of Zambia before the commencement of this 
Constitution subject to the performance of any conditions following the happening of a future 
event, shall become a citizen upon the performance of such conditions.
5. [Children of citizens of Zambia]
A person bom in or outside Zambia after the commencement of this Constitution shall 
become a citizen of Zambia at the date of his birth if on that date at least one of his parents is 
a citizen of Zambia.
6. [Persons entitled to apply to be registered as Citizens]
(1) Any person who —
(a) has attained the age of twenty-one years; or
(b) has been ordinarily resident in Zambia for a continuous period of not less than ten years 
immediately preceding that person's application for registration;
shall be entitled to apply to the Citizenship Board, in such manner as may be prescribed by or 
under an Act of Parliament, to be registered as a citizen of Zambia.
(2) An application for registration as a citizen under this Article shall not be made by or on 
behalf of any person who, under any law in force in Zambia, is adjudged or otherwise 
declared to be of unsound mind.
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(3) Parliament may provide that any period during which a person has the right to reside in 
Zambia by virtue of a permit issued under the authority of any law relating to immigration 
shall not be taken into account in computing the period of ten years referred to in paragraph
(b) of clause (1).
7. [Powers of Parliament]
Parliament may make provision for —
(a) the acquisition of citizenship of Zambia by persons who are not eligible to become 
citizens of Zambia under this Part;
(b) depriving any person of his citizenship of Zambia: 
Provided that a person shall not be deprived of their citizenship except on the grounds that -
(i) that person is a citizen of a country other than Zambia; or
(ii) that person obtained such citizen by fraud.
8. [Citizenship Board]
Parliament may make provision for the establishment of a Citizenship Board to deal with any 
of the matters falling under the provisions of Articles 7.
9. [Cesser of citizenship]
(1) A person shall cease to be a citizen of Zambia if that person —
(a) acquires the citizenship of a country other than Zambia by a voluntary act, other than 
marriage; or
(b) does any act indicating that person’s intention to adopt or make use of any other 
citizenship.
(2) A person who —
(a) becomes a citizen of Zambia by registration; and
(b) immediately after becoming a citizen of Zambia, is also a citizen of some other countiy; 
shall, subject to clause (4), cease to be a citizen of Zambia at the expiration of three months 
after such person becomes a citizen of Zambia unless such person has renounced the 
citizenship of that other countiy, taken the oath of allegiance and made and registered such 
declaration of their intention concerning residence as may be prescribed by or under an Act 
of Parliament.
(3) For the purpose of this Article, where, under the law of a country other than Zambia, a 
person cannot renounce his citizenship of that other country that person need not make such 
renunciation but may instead be required to make such declaration concerning that citizenship 
as may be prescribed by or under an Act of Parliament.
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(4) Provision may be made by or under an Act of Parliament for extending the period within 
which any person may make a renunciation of citizenship, take oath or make or register a 
declaration for the purpose of this Article, and if such provision is made that person shall 
cease to be a citizen of Zambia only if at the expiration of the extended period that person has 
not then made the renunciation, taken the oath or made or registered the declaration, as the 
case may be. v? .>
10. [Interpretation]
(1) For the purpose of this Part, a person bom aboard a registered ship or aircraft, or aboard
an unregistered ship or aircraft of the Government of any country, shall be deemed to have 
been bom in the place in which the ship or aircraft was registered or in that country, as the 
case may be. • v
(2) Any reference in this Part to the national status of the parent of a person at the time of the 
birth of that person shall, in relation to a person bom after the death of his parent, be 
construed as a reference to the national status of the parent at the time of the parent’s death.
(3) For the avoidance of doubt, it is hereby declared that a person bom in Zambia before the 
1st of April, 1986, whose father was an established resident shall continue to enjoy the rights 
and privileges, under, and shall remain subject to, the law prevailing immediately before that 
date.
PART III
PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND FREEDOM OF THE 
INDIVIDUAL
Article
11. [Fundamental rights and freedoms]
It is recognised and declared that every person in Zambia has been and shall continue to be 
entitled to the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual, that is to say, the right, 
whatever his race, place of origin, political opinions, colour, creed, sex or marital status, but 
subject to the limitations contained in this Part, to each and all of the following, namely:
(a) life, liberty, security of the person and the protection of the law;
(b) freedom of conscience, expression, assembly, movement and association;
(c) protection of young persons from exploitation;
(d) protection for the privacy of his home and other property and from deprivation of 
property without compensation;
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and the provisions o f this Part shall have effect for the purpose of affording protection to 
those rights and freedoms subject to such limitations designed to ensure that the enjoyment of 
the said rights and freedoms by any individual does not prejudice the rights and freedoms of 
others or the public interest.
12. [Protection of right to life]
(1) No person shall be deprived of his life intentionally except in execution of the sentence of 
a court in respect of a criminal offence under the law in force in Zambia of which he has been 
convicted.
(2) No person shall deprive an unborn child of life by termination of pregnancy except in 
accordance with the conditions laid down by an Act of Parliament for that purpose.
(3) Without prejudice to any liability for a contravention of any other law with respect to the 
use of force in such cases; as are hereinafter mentioned, a person shall not be regarded as 
having been deprived of his life in contravention of this Article if he dies as a result of the use 
of force to such extent as is reasonably justifiable in the circumstances of the case —
(a) for the defence of any person from violence or for the defence of property;
(b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained;
(c) for the purpose of suppressing a riot, insurrection, mutiny or if he dies as a result of a 
lawful act of war,
(d) in order to prevent the commission by that person of a criminal offence.
13. [Protection of right to personal liberty]
(1) No person shall be deprived of his personal liberty except as may be authorised by law in 
any of the following cases:
(a) in execution of a sentence or order of a court, whether established for Zambia or some 
other country, in respect of a criminal offence or which he has been convicted;
(b) in execution of an order of a court of record punishing him for contempt of that court or 
of a court inferior to it;
(c) in execution of an order of a court made to secure the fulfilment of any obligation 
imposed on him by law;
(d) for the purpose of bringing him before a court in execution of an order of a court;
(e) upon reasonable suspicion of his having committed, or being about to commit, a criminal 
offence under the law in force in Zambia;
(f) under an order of a court or with the consent of his parent or guardian, for his education or 
welfare during any period ending not later than the date when he attains the age of eighteen 
years;
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(g) for the purpose of preventing the spread of an infectious or contagious disease;
(h) in the case of a person who is, or is reasonably suspected to be, of unsound mind, addicted 
to drugs or alcohol, or a vagrant, for the purpose of this care or treatment or the protection of 
the community;
(i) for the purpose of preventing the unlawful entry of that person into Zambia, or for the 
purpose of effecting the expulsion, extradition or other lawful removal of that person from 
Zambia or for the purpose of restricting that person while he is being conveyed through 
Zambia in the course of his extradition or removal as a convicted prisoner from one country 
to another; or
(j) to such extent as may be necessary in the execution of a lawful order requiring that person 
to remain within a specified area within Zambia or prohibiting him from being within such 
area, or to such extent as may be reasonably justifiable for the taking of proceedings against 
that person relating to the making of any such order, or to such extent as may be reasonably 
justifiable for restraining that person during any visit that he is permitted to make to any part 
of Zambia in which, in consequence of any such order, his presence would otherwise be 
unlawful.
(2) any person who is arrested or detained shall be informed as soon as reasonably 
practicable, in a language that he understands, of the reasons for his anest or detention.
(3) Any person who is arrested or detained — i v
(a) for the purpose of bringing him before a court in execution of an order of a court; or
(b) upon reasonable suspicion of his having committed, or being about to commit, a criminal
offence under the law in force in Zambia; 5
and who is not released, shall be brought without undue delay before a court; and if any 
person arrested or detained under paragraph (b) is not tried within a reasonable time, then, 
without prejudice to any further proceedings that may be brought against him, he shall be 
released either unconditionally or upon reasonable conditions, including in particular such 
conditions as are reasonably necessary to ensure that the appears at a later date for trial or for 
proceedings preliminary to trial.
(4) Any person who is unlawfully arrested or detained by any other person shall be entitled to 
compensation therefor from that other person.
14. [Protection from slavery and forced labour]
(1) No person shall be held in slavery or servitude.
(2) No person shall be required to perform forced labour.
(3) For the purpose of this Article, the expression "force labour" does not include—
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(a) any labour required in consequence of a sentence or order of a court;
(b) labour required of any person while he is lawfully detained that, though not required in 
consequence of a sentence or order of a court, is reasonably necessary in the interests of 
hygiene or for the maintenance of the place at which he is detained;
(c) any labour required of a member of a disciplined force in pursuance of his duties as such 
or, in the case of a person who has conscientious objections to service as a member of a 
naval, military or air force, any labour that that person is required by law to perform in place 
of such service;
(d) any labour required during any period when the Republic is at war or a declaration under 
Article 30 or 31 is in force or in the event of any other emergency or calamity that threatens 
the life and well-being of the community, to the extent that the requiring of such labour is 
reasonably justifiable in the circumstances of any situation arising or existing during that 
period, or as a result of that other emergency or calamity, for the purpose of dealing with that 
situation; or
(e) any labour reasonably required as part of reasonable and normal communal or other civic 
obligation.
15. [Protection from inhuman treatment]
No person shall be subjected to torture, or to inhuman or degrading punishment or other like 
treatment.
16. [Protection from deprivation of property]
(1) Except as provided in this Article, no property of any description shall be compulsorily 
taken possession of, and no interest in or right over property of any description shall be 
compulsorily acquired, unless by or under the authority of an Act of Parliament which 
provides for payment of adequate compensation for the property or interest or right to be 
taken possession of or acquired.
(2) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be held to be 
inconsistent with or in contravention of clause (1) to the extent that it is shown that such law 
provides for the taking possession or acquisition of any property or interest therein or right 
thereover-
(a) in satisfaction of any tax, rate or due;
(b) by way of penalty for breach of any law, whether under civil process or after conviction 
of an offence;
(c) in execution of judgements or orders of courts;
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(d) upon the attempted removal of the property in question out of or into Zambia in 
contravention of any law;
(e) as an incident of a contract including a lease, tenancy, mortgage, charge, pledge or billof 
sale or of a title deed to land;
(f) for the purpose of its administration, care or custody on behalf o f and for the benefit of the 
person entitled to the beneficial interest therein;
(g) by way of the vesting of enemy property or for the purpose o f the administration of such 
property;
(h) for the purpose o f—
(i) the administration of the property of a deceased person, a person of unsound mind or a 
person who has not attained the age of eighteen years, for the benefit of the persons entitled 
to the beneficial interest therein;
(ii) the administration of the property of a person adjudged bankrupt or a body corporate in 
liquidation, for the benefit of the creditors o f such bankrupt or body corporate and, subject 
thereto, for the benefit of other persons entitled to the beneficial interest in the property;
(iii) the administration of the property of a person who has entered into a deed of arrangement 
for the benefit of his creditors; or
(iv) vesting any property subject to a trust in persons appointed as trustees under the 
instrument creating the trust or by a court or, by order of a court, for the purpose of giving 
effect to the trust;
(i) in consequence of any law relating to the limitation of actions;
(j) in terms of any law relating to abandoned, unoccupied, unutilised or undeveloped land, as 
defined in such law;
(k) in terms of any law relating to absent or non-resident owners, as defined in such law, of 
any property;
(l) in terms of any law relating to trusts or settlements;
(m) by reason of the property in question being in a dangerous state or prejudicial to the 
health or safety of human beings, animals or plants;
(n) as a condition in connection with the granting of permission for the utilisation of that or 
other property in any particular manner;
(o) for the purpose of or in connection with the prospecting for. or exploitation of, minerals 
belonging to the Republic on terms which provide for the respective interests of the persons 
affected;
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(p) in pursuance of a provision of the marketing of property o f that description in the 
common interests of the various persons otherwise entitled to dispose of that property;
(q) by way of the taking of a sample for the purposes of any law;
(r) by way of acquisition of the shares, or a class of shares, in a body corporate on terms 
agreed to by the holders of not less than nine-tenths in value of those shares or that class of 
shares;
(s) where the property consists of an animal, upon its being found trespassing or straying;
(t) for so long as may be necessary for the purpose of any examination, investigation, trial or 
inquiry or, in the case of the land, the carrying out thereon —
(i) of work for the purpose of the conservation of natural resources or any description; or
(ii) of agricultural development or improvement which the owner or occupier of the land has 
been required, and has without reasonable and lawful excuse refused or failed, to carry out;
(u) where the property consists of any licence or permit;
(v) where the property consists of wild animals existing in their natural habitat or the 
carcasses of wild animals;
(w) where the property is held by a body corporate established by law for public purposes and 
in which no moneys have been invested other than moneys provided by Parliament;
(x) where the property is any mineral, mineral oil or natural gases or any rights accruing by 
virtue of any title or licence for the purpose of searching for or mining any mineral, mineral 
oil or natural gases --
(i) upon failure to comply with any provision of such law relating to the title or licence or to 
the exercise of the rights accruing or to the development or exploitation of any mineral, 
mineral oil or natural gases; or
(ii) in terms of any law vesting any such property or rights in the President;
(y) for the purpose of the administration or disposition of such property or interest or right by 
the President in implementation of a comprehensive land policy or of a policy designed to 
ensure that the statute law, the Common Law and the doctrines of equity relating to or 
affecting the interest in or rights over land, or any other interests or right enjoyed by Chiefs 
and persons claiming through and under them, shall apply with substantial uniformity 
throughout Zambia;
(z) in terms of any law providing for the conversion of titles to land from freehold to 
leasehold and the imposition of any restriction on subdivision, assignment or sub-letting;
(aa) in terms of any law relating to -
331
(i) the forfeiture or confiscation of the property of a person who has left Zambia for the
purpose or apparent purpose, of defeating the ends of justice; 1
(ii) the imposition of a fine on, and the forfeiture or confiscation of the property of, a person 
who admits a contravention of any law relating to the imposition or collection of any duty or 
tax or to the prohibition or control of dealing or transactions in gold, currencies, or securities.
(3) An Act of Parliament such as is referred to in clause (1) shall provide that in default of 
agreement, the amount of compensation shall be determined by a court of competent 
jurisdiction.
17. [Protection for privacy of home and other property]
(1) Except with his own consent, no person shall be subjected to the search of his person or 
his property or the entry by others on his premises.
(2) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be held to be 
inconsistent with or in contravention of this Article to the extent that it is shown that the law 
in question makes provision —
(a) that is reasonably required in the interests of defence, public safety, public order, public 
morality, public health, town and country planning, the development and utilisation of 
mineral resources, or in order to secure the development or utilisation of any property for a 
purpose beneficial to the community;
(b) that is reasonably required for the purpose of protecting the rights or freedoms of other 
persons;
(c) that authorises an officer or agent of the Government, a local government authority or a 
body corporate established by law for a public purpose to enter on the premises or anything 
thereon for the purpose of any tax, rate or due or in order to carry out work connected with 
any property that is lawfully on those premises and that belongs to that Government, 
authority, or body corporate, as the case may be; or
(d) that authorises, for the purpose of enforcing the judgement or order of a court in any civil 
proceedings, the search of any person or property by order of a court or entry upon any 
premises by such order;
and except so far as that provision or, as the case may be, anything done under the authority 
thereof is shown not to be reasonably justified in a democratic society.
18. [Provisions to secure protection of law]
(1) If any person is charged with a criminal offence, then, unless the charge is withdrawn, the 
case shall be afforded a fair hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial 
court established by law.
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(2) Every person who is charged with a criminal offence —
(a) shall be presumed to be innocent until he is proved or has pleaded guilty;
(b) shall be informed as soon as reasonably practicable, in a language that he understands and 
in detail, of the nature of the offence charged;
(c) shall be given adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence;
(d) shall unless legal aid is granted him in accordance with the law enacted by Parliament for 
such purpose be permitted to defend himself before the court in person, or at his own 
expense, by a legal representative of his own choice;
(e) shall be afforded facilities to examine in person or by his legal representative the 
witnesses called by the prosecution before the court, and to obtain the attendance and cany 
out the examination of witnesses to testify on his behalf before the court on the same 
conditions as those applying to witnesses called by the prosecution; and
(f) shall be permitted to have without payment the assistance of an interpreter if he cannot 
understand the language used at the trial of the charge;
and except with his own consent the trial shall not take place in his absence unless he so 
conducts himself as to render the continuance of the proceedings in his presence 
impracticable and the court has ordered him to be removed and the trial to proceed in his 
absence.
(3) When a person is tried for any criminal offence, the accused person or any person 
authorized by him in that behalf shall, if he so requires and subject to payment of such 
reasonable fee as may be prescribed by law, be given within a reasonable time after judgment 
a copy for the use of the accused person of any record of the proceedings made by or on 
behalf of the court.
(4) No person shall be held to be guilty of a criminal offence on account of any act or 
omission that did not, at the time it took place, constitute such an offence, and no penalty 
shall be imposed for any criminal offence that is severer in degree or description that the 
maximum penalty that might have been imposed for that offence at the time it was 
committed.
(5) No person who shows that he has been tried by a competent court for a criminal offence 
and either convicted or acquitted shall again be tried for that offence or for any other criminal 
offence of which he could have been convicted at the trial for that offence, except upon the 
order of a superior court in the course of appeal or review proceedings relating to the 
conviction or acquittal.
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(6) No person shall be tried for a criminal offence if he shows that he has been pardoned for 
that offence.
(7) No person who is tried for a criminal offence shall be compelled to give evidence at the 
trial.
(8) No person shall be convicted of a criminal offence unless that offence is defined and the 
penalty is prescribed in a written law:
Provided that nothing in this clause shall prevent a court of record from punishing any person 
for contempt of itself notwithstanding that the act or omission constituting the contempt is not 
defined in written law and the penalty therefore is not so prescribed.
(9) Any court or other adjudicating authority prescribed by law for the determination of the 
existence or extent of any civil right or obligation shall be established by law and shall be 
independent and impartial; and where proceedings for such a determination are instituted by 
any person before such a court or other adjudicating authority, the case shall be given a fair 
hearing within a reasonable time.
(10) Except with the agreement of all the parties thereto, all proceedings of every court and 
proceedings for the determination of the existence or extent o f any civil right or obligation 
before any other adjudicating authority, including the announcement of the decision of the 
court or other authority, shall be held in public.
(11) Nothing in clause (10) shall prevent the court or other adjudicating authority from 
excluding from the proceedings persons other than the parties thereto and their legal 
representatives to such extent as the court or other authority --
(a) may consider necessary or expedient in circumstances where publicity would prejudice 
the interest of justice or in interlocutory proceedings; or
(b) may be empowered by law to do in the interest of defence, public safety, public order, 
public morality, the welfare of persons under the age of eighteen years or the protection of 
the private lives of persons concerned in the proceedings.
(12) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be held to be 
inconsistent with or in contravention o f—
(a) paragraph (a) of clause (2) to the extent that it is shown that the law in question imposes 
upon any person charged with a criminal offence the burden of proving particular facts;
(b) paragraph (d) of clause (2) to the extent that it is shown that the law in question prohibits 
legal representation before a subordinate court in proceedings for an offence under Zambian 
customary law, being proceedings against any person who, under that law, is subject to that 
law;
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(c) paragraph (e) of clause (2) to the extent that it is shown that the law in question imposes 
reasonable conditions that must be satisfied if witnesses called to testify on behalf of an 
accused person are to be paid their expenses out of public funds;
(d) clause (2) to the extent that it is shown that the law provides that —
(i) where the trial of any person for any offence prescribed by or under the law has been 
adjourned and the accused, having pleaded to the charge, fails to appear at the time fixed by 
the court for the resumption of his trial after the adjournment, the proceedings may continue 
notwithstanding the absence of the accused if the court, being satisfied that, having regard to 
all the circumstances of the case, it is just and reasonable so to do, so orders; and
(ii) the court shall set aside any conviction or sentence pronounced in the absence of the 
accused in respect of that offence if the accused satisfies the court without undue delay that 
the cause of his absence was reasonable and that he had a valid defence to the charge;
(e) clause (2) to the extent that it is shown that the law provides that a trial of a body 
corporate may take place in the absence of any representative of the body corporate upon a 
charge in respect of which a plea of not guilty has been entered by the court;
(f) clause (5) to the extent that it is shown that the law in question authorises a court to try a 
member of a disciplined forced for a criminal offence notwithstanding any trial and 
conviction or acquittal of that member under the disciplinary law of that force, so, however, 
that any court so trying such a member and convicting him shall in sentencing him to any 
punishment take into account any punishment awarded him under that disciplinary law.
(13) In the case of any person who is held in lawful detention, clause (1), paragraphs (d) and
(e) of clause (2) and clause (3) shall not apply in relation to his trial for a criminal offence 
under the law regulating the discipline of persons held in detention.
(14) In its application to a body corporate clause (2) shall have effect as if the words "in 
person or” were omitted from paragraph (d) and (e).
(15) In this Article "criminal offence" means a criminal offence under the law in force in 
Zambia.
19. [Protection of freedom of conscience]
(1) Except with his own consent, no person shall be hindered in the enjoyment of his freedom 
of conscience, and for the purposes of this Article the said freedom includes freedom of 
thought and religion, freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in 
community with others, and both in public and in private, to manifest and propagate his 
religion or belief in worship, teaching, practice and observance.
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(2) Except with his own consent, or, if  he is a minor, the consent of his guardian, no person 
attending any place o f education shall be required to receive religious instruction or to take 
part in or attend any religious ceremony or observance if that instruction, ceremony or 
observance relates to a religion other than his own.
(3) No religious community or denomination shall be prevented from providing religious 
instruction for persons of that community or denomination in the course of any education 
provided by the community or denomination or from establishing and maintaining 
institutions to provide social services for such persons.
(4) No person shall be compelled to take any oath which is contrary to his religion or belief or 
to take any oath in a manner which is contrary to his religion or belief.
(5) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be held to be 
inconsistent with or in contravention of this Article to the extent that it is shown that the law 
in question makes provision which is reasonably required —
(a) in the interests of defence, public safety, public order, public morality or public health; or
(b) for the purpose of protecting the rights and freedoms of other persons, including the right 
to observe and practice any religion without the unsolicited intervention of members of any 
other religion:
and except so far as that provision or, the thing done under the authority thereof as the case 
may be, is shown not to be reasonably justified in a democratic society.
20. [Protection of freedom of expression]
(1) Except with his own consent, no person shall be hindered in the enjoyment of his freedom 
of expression, that is to say, freedom to hold opinions without interference, freedom to 
receive ideas and information without interference, freedom to impart and communicate ideas 
and information without interference, whether the communication be to the public generally 
or to any person or class of persons, and freedom from interference with his correspondence.
(2) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution no law shall make any provision that 
derogates from freedom of the press.
(3) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be held to be 
inconsistent with or in contravention of this Article to the extent that it is shown that the law 
in question makes provision —
(a) that is reasonably required in the interests of defence, public safety, public order, public 
morality or public health; or
(b) that is reasonably required for the purpose of protecting the reputations, rights and 
freedoms of other persons or the private lives of persons concerned in legal proceedings,
336
preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, maintaining the authority 
and independence of the courts, regulating educational institutions in the interests of persons 
receiving instruction therein, or the registration of, or regulating the technical administration 
or the technical operation of, newspapers and other publications, telephony, telegraphy, posts, 
wireless broadcasting or television; or
(c) that imposes restrictions on public officers;
and except so far as that provision or, the thing done under the authority thereof as the case 
may be, is shown not to be reasonably justifiable in a democratic society.
21. [Protection of freedom of assembly and association]
(1) Except with his own consent, no person shall be hindered in the enjoyment of his freedom 
of assembly and association, that is to say, his right to assemble freely and associate with 
other persons and in particular to form or belong to any political party, trade union or other 
association for the protection of his interests.
(2) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be held to be 
inconsistent with or in contravention of this Article to the extent that it is shown that the law 
in question makes provision —
(a) that is reasonably required in the interests of defence, public safety, public order, public 
morality or public health;
(b) that is reasonably required for the purpose of protecting the rights or freedoms of other 
persons;
(c) that imposes restrictions upon public officers; or
(d) for the registration of political parties or trade unions in a register established by or under 
a law and for imposing reasonable conditions relating to the procedure for entry on such 
register including conditions as to the minimum number of persons necessary to constitute a 
trade union qualified for registration;
and except so far as that provision or, the thing done under the authority thereof as the case 
may be, is shown not to be reasonably justifiable in a democratic society.
22. [Protection of freedom of movement]
(1) Subject to the other provision of this Article and except in accordance with any other 
written law, no citizen shall be deprived of his freedom of movement, and for the purposes of 
this Article freedom of movement means —
(a) the right to move freely throughout Zambia;
(b) the right to reside in any part of Zambia; and
(c) the right to leave Zambia and to return to Zambia.
337
(2) Any restrictions on a person's freedom of movement that relates to his lawful detention 
shall not be held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of this Article.
(3) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be held to be 
inconsistent with or in contravention of this Article to the extent that it is shown that the law 
in question makes provision —
(a) for the imposition of restrictions that are reasonably required in the interests of defence,
public safety, public order, public morality or public health or the imposition or restrictions 
on the acquisition or use by any person of land or other property in Zambia, and except so far 
as that provision or, the thing done under the authority thereof, as the case may be, is shown 
not be reasonably justifiable in a democratic society; *
(b) for the imposition of restrictions on the freedom of movement o f any person who is not a 
citizen of Zambia;
(c) for the imposition of restrictions upon the movement or residence within Zambia of public 
officers; or
(d) for the removal of a person from Zambia to be tried outside Zambia for a criminal offence 
or to undergo imprisonment in some other country in execution of the sentence of a court in 
respect of a criminal offence under the law in force in Zambia of which he has been 
convicted.
23. [Protection from discrimination on the ground of race,etc.]
(1) Subject to clauses (4), (5) and (7), no law shall make any provision that is discriminatory 
either of itself or in its effect.
(2) Subject to clauses (6), (7) and (8), no person shall be treated in a discriminatory maimer 
by any person acting by virtue of any written law or in the performance of the functions of 
any public office or any public authority.
(3) In this Article the expression "discriminatory" mean, affording different treatment to 
different persons attributable, wholly or mainly to their respective descriptions by race, tribe, 
sex, place of origin, marital status, political opinions colour or creed whereby persons of one 
such description are subjected to disabilities or restrictions to which persons of another such 
description are not made subject or are accorded privileges or advantages which are not 
accorded to persons of another such description.
(4) Clause (1) shall not apply to any law so far as that law makes provision --
(a) for the appropriation of the general revenues of the Republic;
(b) with respect to persons who are not citizens of Zambia;
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(c) with respect to adoption, marriage, divorce, burial, devolution of property on death or 
other matters of personal law;
(d) for the application in the case of members of a particular race or tribe, of customary law 
with respect to any matter to the exclusion of any law with respect to that matter which is 
applicable in the case of other persons; or
(e) whereby persons of any such description as is mentioned in clause (3) may be subjected to 
any disability or restriction or may be accorded any privilege or advantage which, having 
regard to its nature and to special circumstances pertaining to those persons or to persons of 
any other such description, is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society.
(5) Nothing contained in any law shall be held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of 
clause (1) to the extent that it is shown that it makes reasonable provision with respect to 
qualifications for service as a public officer or as a member of a disciplined force or for the 
service of a local government authority or a body corporate established directly by any law.
(6) Clause (2) shall not apply to anything which is expressly or by necessary implication 
authorized to be done by any such provision or law as is referred to in clause (4) or (5).
(7) No thing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be held to be 
inconsistent with or in contravention of this Article to the extent that it is shown that the law 
in question makes provision whereby persons of any such description as is mentioned in 
clause (3) may be subjected to any restriction on the rights and freedoms guaranteed by 
Articles 17,19,20,21 and 22, being such a restriction as is authorised by clause (2) of Article 
17, clause (5) of Article 19, clause (2) of Article 20, clause (2) of Article 21 or clause (3) of 
Article 22, as the case may be.
(8) Nothing in clause (2) shall affect any discretion relating to the institution, conduct or 
discontinuance of civil or criminal proceedings in any court that is vested in any person by or 
under this Constitution or any other law.
24. [Protection of young persons from exploitation]
(1) No young person shall be employed and shall and shall in no case be caused or permitted 
to engage in any occupation or employment which would prejudice his health or education or 
interfere with his physical, mental or moral development:
Provided that an Act of Parliament may provide for the employment of a young person for a 
wage under certain conditions.
(2) All young persons shall be protected against physical or mental ill-treatment, all forms of 
neglect, cruelty or exploitation.
(3) No young person shall be the subject of traffic in any form.
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(4) In this Article "young person" means any person under the age of fifteen years.
25. [Derogation from fundamental rights and detention]
Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be held to be inconsistent 
with or in contravention of Articles 13,16,17, 19,20,21,22,23, or 24 to the extent that it is 
shown that the law in question authorises the taking, during any period when the Republic is 
at war or when a declaration under Article 30 is in force, or measures for the puipose of 
dealing with any situation existing or arising during that period; and nothing done by any 
person under the authority of any such law shall be held to be in contravention of any of the 
said provisions if it is shown that the measures taken were, having due regard to the 
circumstances prevailing at the time, reasonably required for the purpose of dealing with the 
situation in question.
26. [Provisions relating to restriction and detention]
(1) where a person's freedom of movement is restricted, or he is detained, under the authority 
of any such law as is referred to in Article 22 or 25, as the case may be, the following 
provisions shall apply —
(a) he shall, as soon as reasonably practicable and in any case not more than fourteen days 
after the commencement of his detention or restriction, be furnished with a statement in 
writing in a language that he understands specifying in detail the grounds upon which he is 
restricted or detained;
(b) not more than fourteen days after the commencement of his restriction or detention a 
notification shall be published in the Gazette stating that he has been restricted or detained 
and giving particulars of the place of detention and the provision of law under which his 
restriction or detention is authorised;
(c) if he so requests at any time during the period of such restriction or detention not earlier 
than three months after the commencement thereof or after he last made such a request during 
that period, as the case may be, his case shall be reviewed by an independent and impartial 
tribunal established by law and presided over by a person, appointed by the Chief Justice, 
who is or is qualified to be a judge of the High Court;
(d) he shall be afforded reasonable facilities to consult a legal representative of his own 
choice who shall be permitted to make representations to the authority by which the 
restriction or detention was ordered or to any tribunal established for the review of his case; 
and
(e) at the hearing of his case by such tribunal he shall be permitted to appear in person or by a 
legal representative of his own choice.
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(2) On any review by a tribunal under this Article, the tribunal shall advise the authority by 
which it was ordered on the necessity or expediency of continuing his restriction or detention 
and that authority shall be obliged to act in accordance with any such advice.
(3) The President may at any time refer to the tribunal the case of any person who has been or 
is being restricted or detained pursuant to any restriction or detention order.
(4) Nothing contained in paragraph (d) or (e) of clause (1) shall be construed as entitling a 
person to legal representation at public expense.
(5) Parliament may make or provide for the making of rules to regulate the proceedings of 
any such tribunal including but without derogating from the generality of the foregoing, rules 
as to evidence and the admissibility thereof, the receipt of evidence including written reports 
in the absence of the restricted or detained person and his legal representative, and the 
exclusion of the public from the whole or any portion of the proceedings.
(6) Clauses (11) and (12) or Article 18 shall be read and construed subject to the provisions 
of this Article.
27. [Reference of certain matters to Special Tribunal]
(1) Whenever —
(a) a request is made in accordance with clause (2) for a report on a billow statutory 
instrument; or
(b) the Chief Justice considers it necessary for the purpose of determining claims for legal aid 
in respect of proceedings under Article 30 or 31;
the Chief Justice shall appoint a tribunal which shall consist of two persons selected by him 
from amongst persons who hold or have held the office of a judge of the Supreme Court or 
the High Court.
(2) A request for a report on a billow a statutory instrument may be made by not less than 
thirty members of the National Assembly by notice in writing delivered --
(a) in the case of a bill, to the Speaker within three days after the final reading of the bill in 
the Assembly.
(b) in the case of a statutory instrument, to the authority having power to make the instrument 
within fourteen days of the publication of the instrument in the Gazette.
(3) Where a tribunal is appointed under this Article for the purpose of reporting on a bill or a 
statutory instrument, the tribunal shall, within the prescribed period, submit a report to the 
President and to the Speaker of the National Assembly stating —
(a) in the case of a bill, whether or not in the opinion of the tribunal any, and if so which, 
provisions of the bill are inconsistent with this Constitution;
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(b) in the case of a statutory instrument, whether or not in the opinion of the tribunal any, and 
if so which, provisions of the instrument are inconsistent with this Constitution; 
and, if the tribunal reports that any provision would be or is inconsistent with this 
Constitution, the grounds upon which the tribunal has reached that conclusion.
Provided that if the tribunal considers that the request for a report on a bill or statutory 
instrument is merely frivolous or vexatious, it may so report to the President without entering 
further upon the question whether the bill or statutory instrument would be or is inconsistent 
with this Constitution.
(4) In determining any claim for legal aid as referred to in clause (2), the tribunal may grant 
to any person who satisfies it that —
(a) he intends to bring or is an applicant in proceedings under clause (1) or (4) of Article 28;
(b) he has reasonable grounds for bringing the application; and
(c) he cannot afford to pay for the cost of the application;
a certificate that the application is a proper case to be determined at public expenses:
Provided that paragraph (c) shall not apply in any case where the application relates to the 
validity or a provision of law in respect of which the tribunal has reported that it would be or 
is inconsistent with this Constitution or where it appears to the tribunal that issues are or will 
be raised in the application which are of general importance.
(5) Where a certificate is granted to any person by the tribunal in pursuance of clause (4), 
there shall be paid to that person out of the general revenues of the Republic such amount as 
the tribunal, when hearing the application, may assess as the costs incurred by that person in 
connection with the application; and the sums required for making such payment shall be a 
charge on the general revenue of the Republic.
(6) For the purposes of clause (5) --
(a) the costs incurred in an application shall include the cost of obtaining the advice of a legal 
representative and, if necessary, the cost of representation by a legal representative in any 
court in steps preliminary or incidental to the application;
(b) in assessing the costs reasonably incurred by a person in an application regard shall be 
had to costs awarded against that person or recovered by him in those proceedings.
(7) In this Article, "prescribed period" means --
(a) in relation to a bill, the period commencing from the appointment of the tribunal to report 
upon the bill and ending thirty days thereafter or if the Speaker, on the application of the 
tribunal considers that owing to the length or complexity of the bill thirty days is insufficient 
for consideration of the bill, ending on such later day as the Speaker may determine;
342
(b) in relation to a statutory instrument, the period of forty days commencing with the day on 
which the instrument is published in the Gazette.
(8) Nothing in clause (1), (2) or (3) shall apply to a bill for the appropriation of the general 
revenues of the Republic or a bill containing only proposals for expressly altering this 
Constitution or the Constitution of Zambia Act, 1991.
28. [Enforcement of protective provisions]
(1) Subject to clause (5), if any person alleges that any of the provisions of Articles 11 to 26 
inclusive has been, is being or is likely to be contravened in relation to him, then, without 
prejudice to any other action with respect to the same matter which is lawfully available, that 
person may apply for redress to the High Court which shall —
(a) hear and determine any such application;
(b) determine any question arising in the case of any person which is referred to it in 
pursuance of clause (2);
and which may, make such order, issue such writs and give such directions as it may consider 
appropriate for the purpose of enforcing, or securing the enforcement of, any of the 
provisions of Articles 11 to 26 inclusive.
(2)
(a) If in any proceedings in any subordinate court any question arises as to the contravention 
of any of the provisions of Articles 11 to 26 inclusive, the person presiding in that court may, 
and shall if any party to the proceedings so requests, refer the question to the High Court 
unless, in his opinion the raising of the question is merely frivolous or vexatious.
(b) Any person aggrieved by any determination of the High Court under this Article may 
appeal there from to the Supreme Court:
Provided that no appeal shall lie from a determination of the High Court under this Article 
dismissing an application on the ground that it is frivolous and vexatious.
(3) No application shall be brought under clause (1) on the grounds that the provisions of 
Articles 11 to 26 (inclusive) are likely to be contravened by reason of proposals contained in 
any bill which, at the date of the application, has not become a law.
(4) Parliament may confer upon the Supreme Court or High Court such jurisdiction or powers 
in addition to those conferred by this Article as may appear to be necessary or desirable of the 
purpose of enabling that Court more effectively to exercise the jurisdiction conferred upon it 
by this Article or of enabling any application for redress to be more speedily determined.
29. [Declaration of war]
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(1) The President may, in consultation with Cabinet, at any time, by Proclamation published 
in the Gazette declare war.
(2) A declaration made under clause (1) shall continue in force until the cessation of 
hostilities.
(3) An Act of Parliament shall provide for the conditions and circumstances under which a 
declaration may be made under clause (1).
30. [Declaration of public emergency]
(1) The President may, in consultation with Cabinet, at any time, by Proclamation published 
in the Gazette declare that a State of public emergency exists.
(2) A declaration made under clause (1) o f this Article shall cease to have effect on the 
expiration of a period of seven days commencing with the day on which the declaration is 
made unless, before the expiration of such period, it has been approved by a resolution of the 
National Assembly supported by a majority of all the members thereof not counting the 
Speaker.
(3) In reckoning any period of seven days for the purposes of clause (2) no account shall be 
taken of any time during which Parliament is dissolved.
(4) A declaration made under clause (1) may, at any time before it has been approved by a 
resolution of the National Assembly, be revoked by the President by Proclamation published 
in the Gazette.
(5) Subject to clause (6) a resolution of the National Assembly under clause (2) will continue 
in force until the expiration of a period o f three months commencing with the date of its 
being approved or until revoked at such earlier date of its being so approved or until such 
earlier date as may be specified in the resolution.
Provided that the National Assembly may, by majority of all the members thereof, not 
counting the Speaker extend the approval o f the declaration for periods of not more than three 
months at a time.
(6) The National Assembly may, by resolution, at any time revoke a resolution made by it 
under this Article.
(7) Whenever an election to the office o f President results in a change of the holder of that 
office, any declaration made under this Article and in force immediately before the day on 
which the President assumes office shall cease to have effect on the expiration of seven days 
commencing with that day.
(8) The expiration or revocation of any declaration or resolution made under this Article shall 
not affect the validity of anything previously done in reliance on such declaration.
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31. [Declaration relating to threatened emergency]
(1) The President may at any time by the Proclamation published in the Gazette declare that a 
situation exists which, if it is allowed to continue may lead to a state of public emergency.
(2) A declaration made under clause (1) of this Article shall cease to have effect on the 
expiration of a period of seven days commencing with the day on which the declaration is 
made unless, before the expiration of such period, it has been approved by a resolution of the 
National Assembly supported by a majority of all the members thereof not counting the 
Speaker.
(3) In reckoning any period of seven days for the purpose of clause (2) no account shall be 
taken of any time during which Parliament is dissolved.
(4) A declaration made under clause (1), may, at any time before it has been approved by a 
resolution of the National Assembly, be revoked by the President by Proclamation published 
in the Gazette.
(5) Subject to clause (6) a resolution of the National Assembly under clause (2) shall continue 
in force until the expiration of a period of three months commencing with the date of its 
being approved or until revoked on an earlier date of its being so approved or until such 
earlier date as may be specified in the resolution.
(6) The National Assembly may by resolution, at any time revoke a resolution made by it 
under this Article.
(7) Whenever an election to the office of President results in a change in the holder of that 
office, any declaration made under this Article and in force immediately before the day on 
which the President assumes office, shall cease to have effect on the expiration of seven days 
commencing with that day.
(8) The expiration or revocation of any declaration or resolution made under this Article shall 
not affect the validity of anything previously done in reliance on such declaration.
32. [Interpretation and Savings]
(1) In this Part, unless the context otherwise requires -
"contravention”, in relation to any requirement, includes a failure to comply with that 
requirement and cognate expressions shall be construed accordingly;
"court" means any court of law having jurisdiction in Zambia, other than a court established 
by a disciplinary law, and in Articles 12 and 14 includes a court established by a disciplinary 
law;
"disciplinary law" means a law regulating the disciplined force;
"disciplined force" means —
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(a) a naval, military or air force;
(b) the Zambia Police Force; or
(c) any other force established by or under an Act of Parliament;
"legal representative" means a person entitled to practise in Zambia as an advocate;
"member", in relation to a disciplined force, includes any person who, under the law 
regulating the discipline of that force is subject to that discipline.
(2) In relation to any person who is a member of a disciplined force raised under the law of 
Zambia, nothing contained in or done under the authority of the disciplinary law of that force 
shall be held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of any of the provisions of this Part 
other than Articles 12,14, and 15.
(3) In relation to any person who is a member of a disciplinary force raised otherwise than as 
aforesaid and lawfully present in Zambia, nothing contained in or done under the authority of 
the disciplinary law of that force shall be held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of 
any of the provisions of this Article
PART IV
THE EXECUTIVE
(As amended by Act No. 18 o f1996)
Article
33. [The office of President]
(1) There shall be a President of the Republic of Zambia who shall be the Head of State and 
of the Government and the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Force.
(2) The executive power of the Republic of Zambia shall vest in the President and, subject to 
the other provisions of this Constitution, shall be exercised by him either directly or through 
officers subordinate to him.
34. [Election of President]
(1) The election o f the President shall be direct by universal adult suffrage and by secret 
ballot and shall be conducted in accordance with this Article and as may be prescribed by or 
under an Act of Parliament.
(2) An election to the office of President shall be held whenever the National Assembly is 
dissolved and otherwise as provided by Article 38.
(3) A person shall be qualified to be a candidate for election as President i f—
(a) he is a citizen o f Zambia;
(b) both his parents are Zambians by birth or descent;
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(c) he has attained the age of thirty-five years;
(d) he is a member of, or is sponsored by, a political party;
(e) he is qualified to be elected as a member of the National Assembly; and
(f) he has been domiciled in Zambia for a period of at least twenty years.
(4) A candidate for election as President (hereinafter referred to as a Presidential candidate) 
shall deliver his nomination papers to the returning officer in such manner, on such day, at 
such time and at such place as may be prescribed by or under an Act of Parliament.
(5) A Presidential candidate shall not be entitled to take part in an election unless —
(a) he has paid such election fee as may be prescribed by or under an Act of Parliament on or 
before the date fixed by the Electoral Commission in that behalf;
(b) he makes, a statutory declaration, of his assets and liabilities, which shall be open to 
public inspection at such time and at such place as may be prescribed by or under an Act of 
Parliament; and
(c) his nomination is supported by not less than 200 registered voters.
(6) At an election to the office of President --
(a) all persons registered in Zambia as voters for the purposes of elections to the National 
Assembly shall be entitled to vote in the election;
(b) the poll shall be taken by a secret ballot on such day, at such time, in such places and in 
such manner as may be prescribed by or under an Act of Parliament;
(c) after the expiration of the time fixed for polling, the votes cast shall be counted and the 
returning officer shall declare the result.
(7) Where there is only one qualified Presidential candidate nominated for election, that 
candidate shall be declared as elected without an election taking place.
(8) The Returning Officer shall declare the candidate who receives the highest numbers of the 
total votes cast to have been duly elected as President.
(9) A person elected as President under this Article shall be sworn in and assume office 
immediately but not later than twenty-four hours from the time of declaring the election.
(10) The person who has held office of President shall immediately hand over the office of 
President to the person elected as President and shall complete the procedural and 
administrative handing over process within fourteen days from the date the person elected as 
President is sworn in.
(11) The person who has held office as President shall not, within the period referred to in 
clause (10), perform any functions of the office of President under this Constitution or any 
other law.
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35. [Tenure of office of President]
(1) Subject to clause (2) and (4) every President shall hold office for a period of five years.
(2) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Constitution or any other Law 
no person who has twice been elected as President shall be eligible for re-election to that 
office.
(3) The President may, at any time by writing under his hand addressed to the Speaker of the 
National Assembly, resign his office.
(4) A person assuming the office of the President in accordance with this Constitution shall, 
unless -
(a) he resigns his office; *
(b) he ceases to hold office by virtue of Article 36 or 37; or
(c) the National Assembly is dissolved;
continue in office until the person elected at the next election to the office of President 
assumes office.
36. [Removal of President on grounds of incapacity]
(1) If it is resolved by a majority of all the members o f the Cabinet that the question of the 
physical or mental capacity of the President to discharge the functions of his office ought to 
be investigated, and they so inform the Chief Justice, then the Chief Justice shall appoint a 
board consisting of not less than three persons selected by him from among persons who are 
qualified as medical practitioners under the law of Zambia or under the law of any other 
country in the Commonwealth, and the board shall inquire into the matter and report to the 
Chief Justice on whether or not the President is, by reason of any infirmity of body or mind, 
incapable of discharging the functions of his office.
(2) If the board reports that the President is incapable of discharging the functions of his 
office, the Chief Justice shall certify in writing accordingly and shall table such certificate, 
with the report of the board before the National Assembly who shall on a motion, passed by a 
two thirds majority —
(a) ratify the decision of the board, and thereupon the President shall cease to hold office; or
(b) reject the decision of the board and cause a further inquiry into whether or not the 
President is incapable of discharging the functions of his office and shall thereafter decide on 
such questions by a two-thirds majority vote, which decision shall be final.
(3) Where the Cabinet resolve that the question of the physical or mental capacity of the 
President to discharge the functions of his office shall be investigated, the President shall, 
until another person assumes the office of President or the Board appointed under clause (1)
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reports that the President is not incapable of discharging the functions of his office, 
whichever is earlier, cease to perform the functions of his office and those functions shall be 
performed by —
(a) the Vice-President; or
(b) in the absence of the Vice-President or if the Vice-President is unable, by reason of 
physical or mental infirmity, to discharge the functions of his office, by such member of the 
Cabinet as the Cabinet shall elect:
Provided that any person performing the functions of the office of President under this clause 
shall not dissolve the National Assembly nor, except on the advice of the Cabinet, revoke any 
appointment made by the President.
(4) A motion for the purposes of clause (1) may be proposed at any meeting of the Cabinet.
37. [Impeachment of President for violation of Constitution]
(1) If notice in writing is given to the Speaker of the National Assembly signed by not less 
than one-third of all the members of the Assembly of a motion alleging that the President has 
committed any violation of the Constitution or any gross misconduct and specifying the 
particulars of the allegations and proposing that a tribunal be established under this Article to 
investigate those allegations, the Speaker shall —
(a) if Parliament is then sitting or has been summoned to meet within five days, cause the 
motion to be considered by the National Assembly within seven days of the notice;
(b) if  Parliament is not then sitting (and notwithstanding that it may be prorogued) summon 
the National Assembly to meet within twenty-one days of the notice and cause the motion to 
be considered at that meeting.
(2) Where a motion under this Article is proposed for consideration by the National 
Assembly, the National Assembly shall debate the motion and if the motion is supported by 
the votes of not less than two thirds of all the members of the National Assembly, the mostion 
shall be passed.
(3) If the motion is declared to be passed under clause (2) --
(a) the Chief Justice shall appoint a tribunal which shall consist of a Chairman and not less 
than two other members selected by the Chief Justice from among persons who hold or have 
held high judicial office;
(b) the tribunal shall investigate the matter and shall report to the National Assembly whether 
it finds the particulars of the allegations specified in the motion to have been substantiated; 
and
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(c) the President shall have the right to appear and be represented before the tribunal during 
its investigation of the allegations against him.
(4) If the tribunal reports to the National Assembly that the tribunal finds that the particulars 
of any allegation against the President specified in the motion have not been substantiated no 
further proceedings shall be taken under this Article in respect of that allegation.
(5) If the tribunal reports to the National Assembly that the tribunal finds that the particulars 
of any allegation specified in the motion have been substantiated, the National Assembly 
may, on a motion supported by the votes of not less than three quarters of all members of the 
National Assembly, resolve that the President has been guilty of such violation of the 
Constitution or, as the case may be, such gross misconduct as is incompatible with his 
continuance in office as President and, if the National Assembly so resolves, the President 
shall cease to hold office upon the third day following the passage of the resolution.
(6) No proceedings shall be taken or continued under this Article at any time when 
Parliament is dissolved.
38. [Vacancy in office of President]
(1) If the office of the President becomes vacant by reason of his death or resignation or by 
reason of his ceasing to hold office by virtue of Article 36,37, or 88, an election to the office 
of President shall be held in accordance with Article 34 within ninety days from the date of 
the office becoming vacant.
(2) Whenever the office of President becomes vacant, the Vice-President or, in the absence of 
the Vice-President or if the Vice-President is unable, by reason of physical or mental 
infirmity, to discharge the functions of his office, a member of the Cabinet elected by the 
Cabinet shall perform the functions of the office of President until a person elected as 
President in accordance with Article 34 assumes office.
(3) The Vice-President or, the member of the Cabinet as the case may be, performing the 
functions of the office of the President under clause (2) shall not dissolve the National 
Assembly nor, except on the advice of the Cabinet, revoke any appointment made by the 
President.
39. [Discharge of functions of President during absence, illness, etc.]
(1) Whenever the President is absent from Zambia or considers it desirable so to do by reason 
of illness or for any other cause, he may by direction in writing, authorise the Vice-President, 
or where the Vice-President is absent from Zambia or incapable o f discharging the functions 
of the office of President, any other person, to discharge such functions of the office of
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President as he may specify, and the Vice-President or such other person may discharge those 
functions until his authority is revoked by the President.
(2) If the President is incapable by reason of physical or mental infirmity of discharging the 
functions of his office and the infirmity is of such a nature that the President is unable to 
authorize another person under this Article to perform those functions --
(a) the Vice-President; or
(b) during any period when the Vice-President is absent from Zambia or is himself, by reason 
of physical or mental infirmity, unable to perform the functions of his office, such member of 
the Cabinet as the Cabinet shall elect;
shall perform the functions of the office of President:
Provided that any person performing the functions of the office of President under this clause 
shall not dissolve the National Assembly nor, except on the advice of the Cabinet, revoke any 
appointment made by the President.
(3) Any person performing the functions of the office of President by virtue of clause (2) 
shall cease to perform those functions if he is notified by the Speaker that the President is 
about to resume those functions or if another person is elected as, and assumes the office of, 
President.
(4) For the purpose of clause (2), a certificate of the Chief Justice that —
(a) the President is incapable by reason of physical or mental infirmity of discharging the 
functions of his office and that the infirmity is of such a nature that the President is unable to 
authorise another person under this Article to perform those functions; or
(b) the Vice-President is by reason of physical or mental infirmity unable to discharge the 
functions of his office:
shall be of no effect until such certificate is verified by the National Assembly:
Provided that any such certificate as is referred to in paragraph (a) shall cease to have effect if 
the President notifies any person under clause (3) that he is about to resume the functions of 
the office of the President or if another person is elected as, and assumes the office of, 
President.
40. [Oath of President]
A person assuming the office of President shall, before entering the office, take and subscribe 
to such oaths as may be prescribed by or under an Act of Parliament.
41. [Returning Officer; questions relating to elections]
(1) The Chief Justice shall be the Returning Officer for the purpose of elections to the office 
of President.
351
(2) Any question which may arise as to whether —
(a) any provisions of this Constitution or any law relating to the election of a President has 
been complied with;
(b) any person has been validly elected as President under Article 34; 
shall be referred to and determined by the full bench of the Supreme Court.
42. [Salary and allowances of President]
(1) The President shall receive such salary and allowances as may be prescribed by an Act of 
Parliament; and they shall be a charge on the general revenues of the Republic.
(2) The salary and allowances of the President shall not be altered to his disadvantage during 
his term of office.
(3) A person who has held the office of President shall receive such pension and such gratuity 
as may be prescribed by an Act of Parliament, and that pension and gratuity shall be a charge 
on the general revenues of the Republic.
43. [Protection of President in respect of legal proceedings]
(1) No civil proceedings shall be instituted or continued against the person holding the office 
of President or performing the functions o f that office in respect of which relief is claimed 
against him in respect of which relief is claimed against him in respect of anything done or 
omitted to be done in his private capacity.
(2) A person holding the office of President or performing the functions of that office shall 
not be charged with any criminal offence or be amenable to the criminal jurisdiction of any 
court in respect of any act done or omitted to be done during his tenure of that office or, as 
the case may be, during his performance of the functions of that office.
(3) A person who has held, but no longer holds, the office of President shall not be charged 
with a criminal offence or be amenable to the criminal jurisdiction of any court, in respect of 
any act done or omitted to be done by him in his personal capacity while he held office of 
President, unless the National Assembly has, by resolution, determined that such proceedings 
would not be contrary to the interests of the State.
(4) Where provision is made by law limiting the time within which proceedings of any 
description may be brought against any person, the term of any person in the office of 
President shall not be taken into account in calculating any period of time prescribed by that 
law which determines whether any such proceedings as are mentioned in clause (1) and (3) 
may be brought against that person.
44. [Functions of President]
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(1) As the Head of the State, the President shall perform with dignity and leadership all acts 
necessary or expedient for, or reasonably incidental to, the discharge of the executive 
functions of government subject to the overriding terms of this Constitution and the Laws of 
Zambia which he is constitutionally obliged to protect, administer and execute.
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of clause (1), the President may preside over meetings 
of the Cabinet and shall have the power, subject to this Constitution to —
(a) dissolve the National Assembly as provided in Article 88;
(b) accredit, receive and recognise ambassadors, and to appoint ambassadors, 
plenipotentiaries, diplomatic representatives and consuls;
(c) pardon or reprieve offenders, either unconditionally or subject to such conditions as he 
may consider fit;
(d) negotiate and sign international agreements and to delegate the power to do so;
(e) establish and dissolve such Government Ministries and Departments subject to the 
approval of the National Assembly;
(f) confer such honours as he considers appropriate on citizens, residents and friends of 
Zambia in consultation with interested and relevant persons and institutions; and
(g) appoint such persons as are required by this Constitution or any other law to be appointed 
by him.
(3) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution dealing with assent to laws passed by 
Parliament and the promulgation and publication of such laws in the Gazette, the President 
shall have power to —
(a) sign and promulgate any proclamation which by law he is entitled to proclaim as 
President; and
(b) initiate, in so far as he considers it necessary and expedient, laws for submission and 
consideration by the National Assembly.
(4) When any appointment to an office to be made by the President is expressed by any 
provision of this Constitution to be subject to ratification by the National Assembly —
(a) the National Assembly shall not unreasonably refuse or delay such ratification but the 
question whether the Assembly has so acted unreasonably shall not be enquired into by any 
court;
(b) if such ratification is refused the President may appoint another person to the office in 
question and shall submit the appointment for ratification; or
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(c) if the National Assembly refused to ratify the second appointment it shall be invited to 
ratify an appointment for the third time but the third appointment shall take effect irrespective 
of whether such ratification is refused, or is delayed for a period of more than fourteen days.
(5) Subject to the other provisions of this Constitution and any other law, any person 
appointed by the President under this Constitution or that other law may be removed by the 
President.
(6) In the exercise of any functions conferred upon him under this Article, the President shall, 
unless he otherwise obliges, act in his own deliberate judgment and shall not be obliged to 
follow the advice tendered by any other person or authority.
(7) Nothing in this Article shall prevent Parliament from conferring functions on persons or 
authorities other than the President.
45. [Vice-President]
(1) There shall be an office of Vice-President of the Republic.
(2) The Vice-President shall be appointed by the President from among the members of the 
National Assembly.
(3) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution the Vice-President shall vacate that office 
upon the assumption by any person of the office of President.
(4) In addition to the powers and functions of the Vice-President specified in this Constitution 
or under any other law, the Vice-President shall perform such functions as shall be assigned 
to him by the President.
(5) The salary and allowances of the Vice-President shall be such as may be prescribed by an 
Act of Parliament, and shall be a charge on the general revenues of the Republic.
46. [Ministers]
(1) There shall be such Ministers as may be appointed by the President.
(2) Appointment to the office of Minister shall be made from among the members of the 
National Assembly.
(3) A Minister shall be responsible, under the directions of the President, for such business of 
the Government including the administration of any Ministry or Department of Government 
as the President may assign to such Minister.
(4) The salaries and allowances of a Minister shall be such as may be prescribed by an Act of 
Parliament, and shall be a charge on the general revenues of the Republic.
47. [Deputy Ministers]
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(1) The President may appoint such Deputy Ministers as he may consider necessary to assist 
Ministers in the performance of their functions and to exercise or perform on behalf of 
Ministers such of the Ministers' functions as the President may authorise in that behalf.
(2) A Provincial Deputy Minister shall be responsible for the administration of any province 
as the President may assign to such Provincial Deputy Minister.
(3) Appointment to the office of Provincial Deputy Minister and Deputy Minister shall be 
made from amongst members of the National Assembly.
(4) The salaries and allowances of Provincial Deputy Minister and Deputy Ministers shall be 
such as may be prescribed by an Act of Parliament, and shall be a charge on the general 
revenues of the Republic.
48. [Oath of Vice-President, Minister and Deputy Ministers]
A Vice-President, Minister or Deputy Ministers shall not enter upon the duties of his office 
unless he has taken and subscribed the oath of allegiance and such oath for the due execution 
of his office as may be prescribed by or under an Act of Parliament.
49. [Cabinet]
(1) There shall be a Cabinet which shall consist of the President, the Vice-President and the 
Ministers.
(2) There shall preside at meetings of the Cabinet —
(a) the President; or
(b) in the absence of the President, the Vice-President.
(3) The Cabinet may act notwithstanding any vacancy in its membership.
50. [Functions of Cabinet]
The Cabinet shall formulate the policy of the Government and shall be responsible for 
advising the President with respect to the policy of the Government and with respect to such 
other matters as may be referred to it by the President.
51. [Accountability of Cabinet]
The Cabinet and Deputy Ministers shall be accountable collectively to the National 
Assembly.
52. [Code of Conduct]
All ministers and Deputy Ministers shall conduct themselves, during their tenure of office, in 
accordance with a code of conduct promulgated by Parliament.
53. [Secretary to Cabinet]
(1) There shall be a Secretary to the Cabinet whose office shall be a public office and who 
shall, subject to ratification by the National Assembly, be appointed by the President.
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(2) The Secretary to the Cabinet shall —
(a) be the Head of the Public Service and shall be responsible to the President for securing the 
general efficiency of the public service;
(b) have charge of the Cabinet Office and be responsible in accordance with the instructions 
given to him by the President, for arranging the business for, and keeping the minutes of the 
Cabinet and for conveying decisions made in Cabinet to the appropriate authorities; and
(c) have such other functions as may be prescribed by or under an Act of Parliament or as the 
President may direct.
54. [Attorney-General]
(1) There shall be an Attorney-General of the Republic who shall, subject to ratification by 
the National Assembly, be appointed by the President and shall be —
(a) an ex-officio member of the Cabinet; and
(b) the principal legal adviser to the Government.
(2) Without prejudice to the general functions under clause (1), the functions of the Attorney- 
General shall be to --
(a) cause the drafting of, and sign, all Government Bills to be presented to Parliament;
(b) draw and peruse agreements, contracts, treaties, conventions and documents, by whatever 
name called, to which the Government is a party or in respect of which the Government has
an interest;
(c) represent the Government in courts or any other legal proceedings to which Government 
is a party; and
(d) perform such other functions as may be assigned to him by the President or by law.
(3) Subject to the other provisions of this Constitution, no agreement, contract, treaty, 
convention or document by whatever named called, to which Government is a party or in 
respect of which the Government has an interest, shall be concluded without the legal advice 
of the Attorney-General, except in such cases and subject to such conditions as Parliament 
may by law prescribe.
(4) A person shall not be qualified to be appointed to the office of Attorney-General unless he 
is qualified for appointment as Judge of the High Court.
(5) The office of the Attorney-General shall become vacant if  the holder of the office is 
removed from office by the President
(6) The person holding the office of Attorney-General may resign upon giving three months 
notice to the President.
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(7) In the exercise of the power to give directions to the Director of Public Prosecutions 
conferred by clause (7) of Article 56, the Attorney-General shall not be subject to the 
direction or control of any other person or authority.
55. [Solicitor-General]
(1) There shall be a Solicitor-General of the Republic whose office shall be a public office 
and who shall, subject, to ratification by the National Assembly, be appointed by the 
President.
(2) A person shall not be qualified to be appointed to the office o f Solicitor-General unless he 
is qualified for appointment as a Judge of the High Court.
(3) The office of Solicitor-General shall become vacant if the holder of the office is removed 
from office by the President.
(4) The person holding the office of Solicitor-General may resign upon giving three months 
notice to the President.
(5) Any power or duty imposed on the Attorney-General by this Constitution or any other 
written law may be exercised or performed by the Solicitor General —
(a) whenever the Attorney-General is unable to act owing to illness or absence; and
(b) in any case where the Attorney-General has authorised the Solicitor-General to do so.
56. [Director of Public Prosecutions]
(1) There shall be a Director of Public Prosecutions and who shall, subject to ratification by 
the National Assembly, be appointed by the President.
(2) A person shall not be qualified to be appointed to the office of Director of Public 
Prosecutions unless he is qualified for appointment as Judge of the High Court with 
experience biased towards criminal law.
(3) The Director of Public Prosecutions shall have power in any case which he considers it 
desirable so to do ~
(a) to institute and undertake criminal proceedings against any person before any court, other 
than a court martial, in respect of any offence alleged to have been committed by that person;
(b) to take over and continue any such criminal proceedings as have been instituted or 
undertaken by any other person or authority; and
(c) to discontinue, at any stage before judgement is delivered, any such criminal proceedings 
instituted or undertaken by himself or any other person or authority.
(4) The powers of the Director of Public Prosecutions under clause (3) may be exercised by 
him in person or by such public officer or class of public officers as may be specified by him, 
acting in accordance with his general or special instructions:
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Provided that nothing in this clause shall preclude the representation of the Director of Public 
Prosecutions before any court by a legal practitioner.
(5) The powers conferred on the Director of Public Prosecutions by paragraphs (b) and (c) of 
clause (3) shall be vested in him to the exclusion of any other person or authority.
(6) For the purposes of this Article, any appeal from any judgement in any criminal 
proceedings before any court, or any case stated or question of law reserved for the purposes 
of any such proceedings, to any other court in Zambia shall be deemed to be part of those 
proceedings:
Provided that the power conferred on the Director of Public Prosecutions by paragraph (c) of 
clause (3) shall not be exercised in relation to any appeal by a person convicted in any 
criminal proceedings or to any case stated or question of law reserved at the instance of such 
person.
(7) In the exercise of the powers conferred on him by this Article, the Director of Public 
Prosecutions shall not be subject to the direction or control of any other person or authority: 
Provided that where the exercise of any such power in any case may, in the judgement of the 
Director of Public Prosecutions, involve general considerations of public policy, the Director 
of Public Prosecutions shall bring the case to the notice of the Attorney-General and shall in 
the exercise of his powers in relation to that case, act in accordance with any directions of the 
Attorney-General.
57. [Discharge of functions of Director of Public Prosecutions during absence, illness, etc.] 
Whenever the Director of Public Prosecutions is absent from Zambia or the President 
considers it desirable so to do by reason of the illness of the Director of Public Prosecutions 
or for any other cause, he may on the advice of the Judicial Service Commission appoint any 
person to discharge the functions of the Director of Public Prosecutions until such 
appointment is revoked.
58. [Tenure of office of Director of Public Prosecutions]
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Article, a person holding the office of Director of Public 
Prosecutions shall vacate his office when he attains the age of sixty years.
(2) A person holding the office of Director of Public Prosecutions may be removed from 
office only for incompetence or inability to perform the functions of his office whether 
arising from infirmity of body or mind or misbehaviour and shall not be so removed except in 
accordance with the provisions of this Article.
(3) If the President considers that the question of removing a person holding the office of 
Director of Public Prosecution from office ought to be investigated, then —
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(a) he shall appoint a tribunal which shall consist of a Chairman and not less than tw o other 
members, who hold or have held high judicial office;
(b) the tribunal shall inquire into the matter and report on the facts thereof to the President 
and advise the President whether the person holding the office of Director of Public 
Prosecutions ought to be removed from office under this Article for incompetence or inability 
or for misbehavior.
(4) Where a tribunal appointed under clause (3) advises the President that a person holding 
the office of Director of Public Prosecutions ought to be removed from office for 
incompetence or inability or for misbehaviour, the President shall remove such person from 
office.
(5) If the question of removing a person holding the office of Director of Public Prosecutions 
from office has been referred to a tribunal under this Article, the President may suspend that 
person from performing the functions of his office, and any such suspension may at any time 
be revoked by the President and shall in any case cease to have effect if the tribunal advises 
the President that the person ought not to be removed from office.
59. [Prerogative of mercy]
The President may —
(a) grant to any person convicted of any offence a pardon, either free or subject to lawful 
conditions;
(b) grant to any person a respite, either indefinite or for a specified period, of the execution of 
any punishment imposed on that person for any offence;
(c) substitute a less severe form of punishment for any punishment imposed on any person for 
any offence; and
(d) remit the whole or part of any punishment imposed on any person for any offence or any 
penalty or forfeiture or confiscation otherwise due to the Government on account of any 
offence.
60. [Advisory committee]
(1) There shall be an advisory committee on the prerogative of mercy which shall consist of 
such persons as may be appointed by the President.
(2) The President may appoint different persons to the advisory committee for the purposes of 
advising him in relation to persons convicted by courts-martial and for purposes of advising 
him in relation to persons convicted by other courts.
(3) A member of the advisory committee shall hold office at the pleasure of the President.
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(4) Where any person has been sentenced to death for any offence the President shall cause 
the question of the exercise in relation to that person of the powers conferred by Article 59 to 
be considered at a meeting of the advisory committee.
(5) Subject to the provisions of clause (4), the President may refer to the advisory committee 
any questions as to the exercise of the powers conferred upon him by Article 59.
(6) The President, if present, shall preside at any meeting of the advisory committee.
(7) The President may determine the procedure of the advisory committee.
61. [Offices for Republic]
(1) Subject to the other provisions of this Constitution and any other law, the power to 
constitute offices for the Republic and the power to abolish any such office shall vest in the 
President.
(2) Subject to the other provisions of this Constitution and any other law, the power to 
appoint persons to hold or act in offices constituted for the Republic of Zambia, to confirm 
appointments, to exercise disciplinary control over persons holding or acting in such offices 
and to remove any such person from office shall vest in the President.
PART V
THE LEGISLATURE
Article
62. [Legislative power and membership of Parliament]
The legislative power of the Republic of Zambia shall vest in Parliament which shall consist 
of the President and the National Assembly.
(As amended by Act No. 18 o f1996)
63. [Composition of, and election to, National Assembly]
(1) The National Assembly shall consist of --
(a) one hundred and fifty elected members;
(b) not more than eight nominated members; and
(c) the Speaker of the National Assembly.
(2) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the election of members of the National 
Assembly shall be direct, by universal adult suffrage and by secret ballot and shall be 
conducted in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution and as may be prescribed by 
or under an Act of Parliament.
(As amended by Act No. 18 o f1996)
64. [Qualification for election to National Assembly]
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Subject to Article 65, a person shall be qualified to be elected as a member of the National 
Assembly if—
(a) he is a citizen of Zambia;
(b) he has attained the age of twenty-one years; and
(c) he is literate and conversant with the official language of Zambia.
(As amended by Act No. 18 o f1996)
65. [Disqualification for election to National Assembly]
(1) No person shall not be qualified to be elected as a member of the National Assembly if -
(a) that person is under a declaration of allegiance to some country other than Zambia;
(b) that person is under any law in force in Zambia, adjudged or otherwise declared to be of 
unsound mind;
(c) that person is under a sentence of death imposed on him by a court in Zambia or a 
sentence of imprisonment, by whatever name called, imposed on him by such a court or 
substituted by a competent authority for some other sentence imposed on him by such court;
(d) that person is an undischarged bankrupt, having been adjudged or otherwise declared 
bankrupt under any law in force in Zambia;
(e) that person’s freedom of movement is restricted, or that person is detained under the 
authority of law; or
(f) that person, within a period of five years before his nomination for election, has served a 
sentence of imprisonment for a criminal offence
(2) A person who holds, or is a validly nominated candidate in an election for, the office of 
the President shall not be qualified for election as a member of the National Assembly.
(3) A Chief shall not be qualified for election as a member of the National Assembly.
(4) A Chief who intends to stand for elections to the National Assembly shall abdicate his 
chieftaincy before lodging his nomination.
(5) Parliament may provide that a person who holds or is acting in any office that is specified 
by Parliament and the functions of which involve responsibility for, or in connection with, the 
conduct of any election to the National Assembly or the compilation of any register of voters 
for the purposes of such an election shall not be qualified to be elected as a member of the 
National Assembly.
(6) Parliament may provide that a person who is convicted by any court of any offence that is 
prescribed by Parliament and that is connected with election of the members of the National 
Assembly or who is reported guilty of such offence by the court trying an election petition 
shall not be qualified to be elected as a member of the National Assembly for such period, not
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exceeding five years following his conviction or the report of the court, as the case may be, as 
may be so prescribed.
(7) A person holding or acting in any post, office or appointment —
(a) in the Zambia Defence Force as defined in the Defence Act, the Combined Cadet Force, 
the Zambia National Service, or any other force or service established for the preservation of 
security in Zambia;
(b) in the Zambia Police Force, the Zambia Police Reserve, the Zambia Security Intelligence 
Service, the Anti-Corruption Commission, the Drug Enforcement Commission, the Zambia 
Prison Service or in any other force or service established for the preservation of security in 
Zambia;
(c) in the Public Service including an office to which Article 61 applies;
(d) in the Teaching Service; or
(e) in any statutory body or any company or institution in which the Government has any 
interest; or
(f) prescribed in that behalf or under an Act of Parliament;
shall not be qualified for election as a member of the National Assembly.
(6) In this Article, the reference to a sentence of imprisonment shall be construed as not 
including a sentence of imprisonment the execution of which is suspended or a sentence of 
imprisonment in default of payment of a fine.
(As amended by Act No. 18 o f1996)
66. [Nomination for election to National Assembly]
(1) Nominations for election to the National Assembly shall be delivered to the Returning 
Officer appointed by the Electoral Commission on such day and at such time and at such 
place as may be prescribed by the Electoral Commission.
(2) Any nomination for election to the National Assembly shall not be valid unless --
(a) the candidate has paid the election fee prescribed by or under an Act of Parliament; and
(b) the nomination is supported by not less than nine persons registered in the constituency in 
which the candidate is standing for the purpose of elections to the National Assembly.
(As amended by Act No. 18 o f1996)
67. [By-elections for the National Assembly]
(1) When a vacancy occurs in the seat of a member of the National Assembly as a result of 
the death or resignation of the member or by virtue of Article 71, a by-election shall be held 
within ninety days after the occurrence of the vacancy.
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(2) Parliament may by an Act of Parliament prescribe the maimer in which a by-election shall 
be held.
(As amended by Act No. 18 o f1996)
68. [Nominated members]
(1) The President may, at any time after a general election to the National Assembly and 
before the National Assembly is next dissolved, appoint such number of persons as he 
considers necessary to enhance the representation of the National Assembly as regards 
special interests or skills, to be nominated members of the National Assembly, so, however, 
that there are not more than eight such members as any one time.
(2) Subject to the provisions of this Article, a person may be appointed as a nominated 
member if he is qualified under Article 64 and is not disqualified under Article 65 for election 
as an elected member.
(3) A person may not be appointed as a nominated member if he was a candidate for election 
in the last preceding general election or in any subsequent by-election.
(As amended by Act No. 18 o f1996)
69. [Speaker]
(1) There shall be a Speaker of the National Assembly who shall be elected by the members 
of the Assembly from among persons who are qualified to be elected as members of the 
Assembly but are not members of the Assembly.
(2) The Speaker shall vacate his office ~
(a) if any circumstances arise that, if he were not Speaker, would disqualify him for election 
as such;
(b) when the National Assembly first sits after any dissolution of the National Assembly; or
(c) if the National Assembly resolves, upon a motion supported by the votes of not less than 
two-thirds of all the members thereof, that he shall be removed from office.
(3) No business shall be transacted in the National Assembly, other than an election to the 
office of Speaker, at any time when the office of Speaker is vacant.
(As amended by Act No. 18 o f1996)
70. [Deputy Speaker]
(1) There shall be a Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly who shall be elected by the 
members of the Assembly from among members of the Assembly.
(2) The members of the National Assembly shall elect a person to the office of Deputy 
Speaker when the Assembly first sits after any dissolution of the National Assembly and, if
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the office becomes vacant otherwise than by reason o f the dissolution of the National 
Assembly, at the first sitting of the Assembly after the office becomes vacant.
(3) The Deputy Speaker shall vacate his office —
(a) if he ceases to be a member of the National Assembly;
(b) if he assumes the office of President or becomes the Vice-President, a Minister, a Deputy 
Minister or holds or acts in any office prescribed in that behalf by or under an Act of 
Parliament; or
(c) if the National Assembly resolves that he should be removed from office.
(As amended by Act No. 18 o f1996)
71. [Tenure of office o f members of National Assembly]
(1) Every member of the National Assembly, with the exception of the Speaker, shall vacate 
his seat in the Assembly upon the dissolution of the National Assembly.
(2) A member of the National Assembly shall vacate his seat in the Assembly —
(a) if he ceases to be a citizen of Zambia;
(b) if he acts contrary to the code of conduct prescribed by an Act of Parliament;
(c) in the case of an elected member, if he becomes a member o f a political party other than 
the party, of which he was an authorised candidate when he was elected to the National 
Assembly or, if having been an independent candidate, he joins a political party or having 
been a member of a political, he becomes an independent;
(d) if he assumes the office of President;
(e) if he is sentenced by a court in Zambia to death or to imprisonment, by whatever name 
called, for a term exceeding six months;
(f) if any circumstances arise that, if he were not a member o f the Assembly, would cause 
him to be disqualified for election as such under Article 65;
(g) if, under the authority of any such law as is referred to in Article 22 or 25 —
(i) his freedom of movement has been restricted or he has been detained for a continuous 
period exceeding six months;
(ii) his freedom of movement has been restricted and he has immediately thereafter been 
detained and the total period of restriction and detention together exceeds six months; or
(iii) he has been detained and immediately thereafter his freedom of movement has been 
restricted and the total period of detention and restriction together exceeds six months.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (2), where any member of the National 
Assembly who has been sentenced to death or imprisonment, adjudged or declared to be of 
unsound mind, adjudged or declared bankrupt or convicted or reported guilty of any offence
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prescribed under clause (4) of Article 65 appeals against the decision or applied for a free 
pardon in accordance with any law, the decision shall not have effect for the purpose of this 
Article until the final determination of such appeal or application:
Provided that —
(i) such member shall not, pending such final determination, exercise his functions or receive 
any remuneration as a member of the National Assembly; and
(ii) if, on the final determination of the members appeal or application, his conviction is set 
aside, or he is granted a free pardon, or he is declared not to be of unsound mind or bankrupt 
or guilty of an offence prescribed under clause (4) of Article 65, he shall be entitled to resume 
his functions as a member of the National Assembly unless he has previously resigned, and to 
receive remuneration as a member for the period during which he did not exercise his 
functions by reason of the provisions of paragraph (i) of this proviso.
(As amended by Act No. 18 o f1996)
72. [Determination of questions as to membership of National Assembly]
(1) The High Court shall have power to hear and determine any question whether -
(a) any person has been validly elected or nominated as a member of the National Assembly 
or the seat of any member has become vacant;
(b) any person has been validly elected as Speaker or Deputy Speaker of the National 
Assembly or, having been so elected, has vacated the office of Speaker or Deputy Speaker.
(2) An appeal from the determination of the High Court under this Article shall lie to the 
Supreme Court:
Provided that an appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any determination of the High 
Court on any question of law including the interpretation of this Constitution.
(As amended by Act No. 18 o f1996)
73. [Clerk and Staff of National Assembly]
There shall be a Clerk of the National Assembly and such other offices in the department of 
the Clerk of the National Assembly as may be prescribed by an Act of Parliament.
(As amended by Act No. 18 o f1996)
74. [Removal of nominated member by President]
The President may, at any time, terminate the appointment of any nominated member 
appointed under Article 68 and appoint any other person in that member’s stead.
(As amended by Act No. 18 o f1996)
75. [The franchise]
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(1) Every citizen of Zambia who has attained the age of eighteen years shall, unless he is 
disqualified by Parliament from registration as a voter for the purposes of elections to the 
National Assembly, be entitled to be registered as such a voter under a law in that behalf, and 
no other person may be so registered.
(2) Every person who is registered in any constituency as a voter for the purpose of elections 
to the National Assembly shall, unless he is disqualified by Parliament from voting in such 
elections on grounds of his having been convicted of an offence in connection with elections 
or, on the grounds of his having been reported guilty of such an offence by the court trying an 
election petition or, on the grounds of his being in lawful custody at the date of the election, 
be entitled so to vote in that constituency in accordance with the provisions made by or under 
an Act of Parliament, and no other person may so vote.
(As amended by Act No. 18 o f1996)
76. [Electoral Commission]
(1) There is hereby established an autonomous Electoral Commission to supervise the 
registration of voters, to conduct Presidential and Parliamentary elections and to review the 
boundaries of the constituencies into which Zambia is divided for the purposes of elections to 
the National Assembly.
(2) An Act of Parliament shall provide for the composition and operations of the Electoral 
Commission appointed by the President under this Article.
(As amended by Act No. 18 o f1996)
77. [Constituencies and elections]
(1) Zambia shall be divided into constituencies, for purposes of elections to the National 
Assembly so that the number of such constituencies, the boundaries of which shall be such as 
an Electoral Commission prescribes, shall be equal to the number of seats of elected members 
in the National Assembly.
(2) In delimiting the constituencies, the Commission shall have regard to the availability of 
means of communication and the geographical features of the area to be divided into 
constituencies:
Provided that the constituencies shall be so delimited that there shall be at least ten 
constituencies in each administrative Province.
(3) Each constituency shall return one member only to the National Assembly.
(4) The boundaries of each constituency shall be such that the number of inhabitants thereof 
is as nearly equal to the population quota as is reasonably practicable:
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Provided that the number of inhabitants of a constituency may be greater or less than the 
population quota in order to take account of means of communication, geographical features 
and the difference between urban and rural areas in respect of density of population and to 
take account of the proviso to clause (2).
78. [Exercise of legislative power of Parliament]
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the legislative power of Parliament shall be 
exercised by Bills passed by the National Assembly and assented to by the President.
(2) No bill(other than such a Bill as is mentioned in Article 27) shall be presented to the 
President until after the expiration of three days from the third reading of the Bill by the 
National Assembly, and where a Bill is referred to a tribunal in accordance with Article 27, 
that Bill shall not be presented to the President for assent until the tribunal has reported on the 
Bill or the time for making a report has expired, whichever is the earlier.
(3) Where a Bill is presented to the President for assent he shall either assent or withhold his 
assent.
(4) Subject to clause (5), where the President withholds his assent to a Bill, the President may 
return the Bill to the National Assembly with a message requesting that the National 
Assembly reconsiders the Bill or any specified provision thereof and, in particular, any such 
amendments as he may recommend in his message, and when a Bill is so returned, the 
National Assembly shall reconsider the Bill accordingly, and if the Bill is passed by the 
National Assembly on a vote of not less than two thirds of all the members of the National 
Assembly, with or without amendment, and presented to the President for assent, the 
President shall assent to the Bill within twenty-one days of its presentation, unless he sooner 
dissolves Parliament.
(5) Notwithstanding clause (4), where the President withholds his assent to a Bill, the Bill 
shall not again be presented for assent.
(6) Where a bill that has been duly passed is assented to in accordance with the provisions of 
this Constitution it shall become law and the President shall thereupon cause it to be 
published in the Gazette as a law.
(7) No law made by Parliament shall come into operation until it has been published in the 
Gazette, but Parliament may postpone the coming into operation of any such law and may 
make laws with retrospective effect.
(8) All laws made by Parliament shall be styled "Acts" and the words of enactment shall be 
"Enacted by the Parliament of Zambia".
(As amended by Act No, 18 o f1996)
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79. [Alteration of Constitution]
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Article, Parliament may alter this Constitution or the 
Constitution of Zambia Act, 1991.
(2) Subject to cause (3) a bill for the alteration of this Constitution or the Constitution of 
Zambia Act, 1991 shall not be passed unless —
(a) not less than thirty days before the first reading of the bill in the National Assembly the 
text of the bill is published in the Gazette; and
(b) the bill is supported on second and third readings by the votes of not less than two thirds 
of all the members of the Assembly.
(3) A bill for the alteration of Part III of this Constitution or of this Article shall not be passed 
unless before the first reading of the bill in the National Assembly it has been put to a 
National referendum with or without amendment by not less than fifty per cent of persons 
entitled to be registered as voters for the purposes of Presidential and parliamentary elections.
(4) Any referendum conducted for the purposes of clause (3) shall be so conducted and 
supervised in such manner as may be prescribed by or under an Act of Parliament.
(5) In this Article —
(a) references to this Constitution or the Constitution of Zambia Act, 1991 include reference 
to any law that amends or replaces any of the provisions of this Constitution or that Act; and
(b) references to the alteration of this Constitution or the Constitution of Zambia Act, 1991 or 
of any Part of Article include references to the amendment, modification or re-enactment 
with or without amendment or modification, of any provision for the time being contained in 
this Constitution, that Act, Part or Article, the suspension or repeal or any such provision and 
the making of different provision in lieu of such provision, and the addition of new 
provisions, to this Constitution, that Act, Part or Article.
(6) Nothing in this Article shall be so construed as to require the publication of any 
amendment to any such bill as is referred to in clause (2) proposed to be moved in the 
National Assembly.
80. [Statutory instruments]
(1) Nothing in Article 62 shall prevent Parliament from conferring on any person or authority 
power to make statutory instruments.
(2) Every statutory instrument shall be published in the Gazette not later than twenty-eight 
days after it is made or, in the case of a statutory instrument which will not have the force of 
law unless it is approved by some person or authority other than the person or authority by
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which it was made, not later than twenty-eight days after it is so approved, and if it is not so 
published it shall be void from the date on which it was made.
(3) Where a tribunal appointed under Article 27 reports to the President that any provision of 
a statutory instrument is inconsistent with any provision of this Constitution, the President 
may, by order annul that statutory instrument and it shall thereupon be void from the date on 
which it was made.
(As amended by Act No. 18 o f1996)
81. [Restrictions with regard to certain financial measures]
Except upon the recommendation of the President signified by the Vice-President or a 
Minister, the National Assembly shall not —
(a) proceed upon any Bill(including an amendment to a Bill) that, in the opinion of the person 
presiding, makes provision for any of the following purposes:
(i) for the imposition of taxation or the alteration of taxation otherwise than by reduction;
(ii) for the imposition of any charge upon the general revenues of the Republic or the 
alteration of any such charge otherwise than by reduction;
(iii) for the payment, issue or withdrawal from the general revenues of the Republic of any 
moneys not charged thereon or any increase in the amount of such payment, issue or 
withdrawal; or
(iv) for the composition or remission of any debt due to the Government; or
(b) proceed upon any motion (including any amendment to a motion) the effect of which, in 
the opinion of the person presiding, would be to make provision for any of those purposes.
(As amended by Act No. 18 o f1996)
82. [President may address National Assembly]
(1) The President may, at any time, attend and address the National Assembly.
(2) The President may send messages to the National Assembly and any such message shall 
be read, at the first convenient sitting of the National Assembly after it is received, by the 
Vice-President or by a Minister designated by the President.
(As amended by Act No. 18 o f1996)
83. [Presiding National Assembly]
There shall preside at any sitting of the National Assembly -
(a) the Speaker of the National Assembly;
(b) in the absence of the Speaker, the Deputy Speaker; or
(c) in the absence of the Speaker and of the Deputy Speaker, such member of the Assembly 
as the Assembly may elect for that purpose.
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(As amended by Act No. 18 o f ¡996)
84. [Voting and quorum]
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this Constitution all questions at any sitting of the 
National Assembly shall be determined by a majority of votes of the members present and 
voting other than the Speaker or the person acting as Speaker as the case may be.
(2) The Speaker or person acting as such shall not vote in the first instance, but shall have and 
exercise a casting vote if  there is an equality of votes.
(3) The National Assembly shall have power to act notwithstanding any vacancy in the 
membership thereof, and any proceedings in the National Assembly shall be valid 
notwithstanding that it is discovered subsequently that some person who was not entitled to 
do so, voted or otherwise took part in the proceedings.
(4) The quorum for a meeting of the National Assembly shall be one third of the total number 
of members of the National Assembly and if at any time during a meeting of the National 
Assembly objection is taken by any member present that there is no quorum, it shall be the 
duty of the Speaker or person acting as such, either to adjourn the National Assembly or, as 
he may think fit, to suspend the meeting until there is a quorum.
(As amended by Act No. 18 o f1996)
85. [Unqualified persons sitting or voting]
Any person who sits or votes in the National Assembly knowing or having reasonable 
grounds for knowing that he is not entitled to do so, shall be liable to a penalty not exceeding 
one thousand penalty units or such other sum as may be prescribed by Parliament for each 
day on which he so sits or votes, which penalty shall be recoverable by action in the High 
Court at the suit of the Attorney-General.
(As amended by Act No. 18 o f1996)
86. [Procedure in National Assembly]
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the National Assembly may determine its 
own procedure.
(2) The National Assembly may act notwithstanding any vacancy in its membership 
(including any vacancy not filled when the National Assembly first meets after any 
dissolution of Parliament) and the presence or participation of any person not entitled to be 
present or to participate in the proceedings of the National Assembly shall not invalidate 
those proceedings.
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(3) In the selection of members of committees, the National Assembly shall seek to ensure 
that equitable representation of the political parties or groups that are represented in the 
National Assembly as well as of the members not belonging to any such parties or groups.
(As amended by Act No. 18 o f1996)
87. [Privileges and immunities of National Assembly]
(1) The National Assembly and its members shall have such privileges, powers and 
immunities as may be prescribed by an Act of Parliament.
(2) Notwithstanding subclause (1) the law and custom of the Parliament of England shall 
apply to the National Assembly with such modifications as may be prescribed by or under an 
Act of Parliament.
(As amended by Act No. 18 o f1996)
88. [Dissolution of Parliament and related matters]
(1) Subject to the provisions of clause (4) each session of Parliament shall be held at such 
place within Zambia and shall commence at such time as the President may appoint.
(2) There shall be a session of Parliament at least once every year so that a period of twelve 
months shall not intervene between the last sitting of the National Assembly in one session 
and the commencement of the next session.
(3) The President may at any time summon a meeting of the National Assembly.
(4) Subject to the provisions of clause (1) of Article 37, the sittings o f the National Assembly 
in any session of Parliament after the commencement of that session shall be held at such 
times and on such days as the National Assembly shall appoint.
(5) The President may at any time prorogue Parliament.
(6) Subject to clause (9) the National Assembly -
(a) shall, unless sooner dissolved, continue for five years from the date of its first sitting after 
the commencement of this Constitution or after any dissolution and shall then stand 
dissolved;
(b) may, by a two thirds majority of the members thereof dissolve itself; or
(c) may be dissolved by the President at any time.
(7) Whenever the National Assembly is dissolved under this Article, there shall be 
Presidential elections and elections to the National Assembly and the first session of the new 
Parliament shall commence within three months from the date of the dissolution.
(8) At any time when the Republic of Zambia is at war, Parliament may from time to time 
extend the period of five years specified in clause (6) for not more than twelve months at a 
time:
Provided that the life of the National Assembly shall not be extended under this clause for 
more than five years.
(9) If, after a dissolution of Parliament and before the holding of the general elections, the 
President considers that owing to the existence of a state of war or of a state of emergency in 
Zambia or any part thereof, it is necessary to recall Parliament, the President may summon 
the Parliament that has been dissolved to meet and that Parliament shall be deemed to be the 
Parliament for the time being, but the general election of members of the National Assembly 
shall proceed and the Parliament that has been recalled shall, if not sooner dissolved again, 
stand dissolved on the day appointed for the nomination of candidates in that general 
election.
(As amended by Act No. 18 o f1996)
89. [Oaths to be taken by Speaker and Members]
The Speaker of the National Assembly, before assuming the duties of his office, and every 
member of the National Assembly before taking his seat therein, shall take and subscribe 
before the National Assembly the oath of allegiance.
(As amended by Act No. 18 o f1996)
90. [The Investigator-General]
(1) There shall be an Investigator-General of the Republic who shall be appointed by the 
President in consultation with the Judicial Service Commission and shall be the Chairman of 
the Commission for Investigations.
(2) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as Investigator-General —
(a) unless he is qualified to be appointed a judge of the High Court; or
(b) if he holds the office of President, Vice-President, Minister or Deputy Minister, is a 
member of the National Assembly or is a public officer.
(3) Subject to the provisions of this section, a person appointed Investigator-General shall 
vacate his office on attaining the age of sixty-five years:
Provided that the President may permit a person who has attained that age to continue in 
office for such period as may be necessary to complete and submit any report on, or do any 
other thing in relation to, any investigation that was commenced by him before the attained 
age.
(4) A person appointed as Investigator-General shall forthwith vacate any office prescribed 
by an Act of Parliament.
(5) A person appointed as Investigator-General may be removed from office for 
incompetence or inability to perform the functions of his office (whether arising from
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infirmity of body or mind or from any other cause) or from misbehaviour, but shall not be so 
removed except in accordance with the provisions of this Article.
(6) If  the National Assembly by resolution supported by the votes of not less than two-thirds 
of all the members of that House, resolves that the question of removing the Investigator- 
General ought to be investigated, the Speaker of the National Assembly shall send a copy to 
the Chief Justice who shall appoint a tribunal consisting of a Chairman and two other persons 
to inquire into the matter.
(7) The Chairman and one other member of the tribunal shall be persons who hold or have 
held high judicial office.
(8) The tribunal shall inquire into the matter and report thereon to the President.
(9) Where such a tribunal advises the President that the Investigator-General ought to be 
removed from office for incompetence or inability or for misbehaviour, the President shall 
remove the Investigator-General from office.
(10) If  the question of removing the Investigator-General from office has been referred to a 
tribunal under this Article, the President may suspend him from performing any functions of 
his office, and any such suspension may at any time be revoked by the President and shall in 
any case cease to have effect if the tribunal shall advise the President that the Investigator- 
General ought not to be removed.
(11) If there is a vacancy in the office of the Investigator-General, or if the Investigator- 
General is temporarily absent from Zambia or otherwise unable to exercise the functions of 
his office, the President may appoint a person qualified to be a Judge of the High Court to 
exercise the functions of the office of the Investigator-General under this Article.
(12) A person appointed to the office of Investigator-General may resign upon giving three 
months' notice to the President.
(13) The functions, powers and procedures of the Investigator-General shall be as provided 
by an Act of Parliament.
(As amended by Act No. 18 o f1996)
PART VI
THE JUDICATURE
(As amended by Act No. 18 o f1996)
Article
91. [Courts]
(1) The Judicature of the Republic shall consist of:
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(a) the Supreme Court of Zambia;
(b) the High Court of Zambia;
(c) the Industrial Relations Court;
(d) the Subordinate Courts;
(e) the Local Courts; and
(f) such other courts as may be prescribed by an Act of Parliament.
(2) The Judges, members, magistrates and justices, as the case may be, of the courts 
mentioned in clause (1) shall be independent, impartial and subject only to this Constitution 
and the law and shall conduct themselves in accordance with a code of conduct promulgated 
by Parliament.
(3) The Judicature shall be autonomous and shall be administered in accordance with the 
provisions of an Act of Parliament.
92. [Supreme Court]
(1) There shall be a Supreme Court of Zambia which shall be the final court of appeal for the 
Republic and shall have such jurisdiction and powers as may be conferred on it by this 
Constitution or any other law.
(2) The judges of the Supreme Court shall be — <;
(a) the Chief Justice;
(b) the Deputy Chief Justice;
(c) seven Supreme Court judges or such greater number as may be prescribed by an Act of 
Parliament.
(3) The office of the Chief Justice, Deputy Chief Justice or of a Supreme Court Judge shall 
not be abolished while there is a substantive holder thereof.
(4) The Supreme Court shall be a superior court of record, and, except as otherwise provided 
by Parliament, shall have all the powers of such a court.
(5) When the Supreme Court is determining any matter, other than an interlocutory matter, it 
shall be composed of an uneven number of judges not being less than three except as 
provided for under Article 41.
(6) The Chief Justice may make rules with respect to the practice and procedure of the 
Supreme Court in relation to jurisdiction and powers of the Supreme Court.
93. [Appointment of judges of Supreme Court]
(1) The Chief Justice and Deputy Chief Justice shall, subject to ratification by the National 
Assembly, be appointed by the President.
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(2) The judges of the Supreme Court shall, subject to ratification by the National Assembly, 
be appointed by the President.
(3) If  the office of Chief Justice is vacant or if the Chief Justice is on leave or is for any 
reason unable to perform the functions of that office, then, until a person has been appointed 
to, and has assumed the functions of, that office or until the person holding that office has 
resumed those functions, as the case may be, the President may appoint the Deputy Chief 
Justice or a Supreme Court judge to perform such functions.
(4) Without prejudice to the generality of clause (5), if the office of Deputy Chief Justice is 
vacant or the Deputy Chief Justice is on leave or is for any other reason unable to perform the 
functions of his office, the President may appoint another judge of the Supreme Court to act 
as Deputy Chief Justice.
(5) If the office of a Supreme Court judge is vacant, or if any Supreme Court judge is 
appointed to act as Chief Justice or Deputy Chief Justice, or if any Supreme Court judge is on 
leave or is for any reason unable to perform the functions of that office, the President may 
appoint a person qualified for appointment as a judge of the Supreme Court to act as a 
Supreme Court judge.
(6) A person may act as the Chief Justice, Deputy Chief Justice or a Supreme Court judge 
notwithstanding that he has attained the age prescribed by Article 98.
(6) A puisne judge appointed to act as Deputy Chief Justice or Supreme Court judge, as the 
case may be, pursuant to clause (4) or (5), shall continue to be a judge of the High Court and 
may continue to perform the functions of the office of puisne judge.
94. [High Court]
(1) There shall be a High Court for the Republic which shall have, except as to the 
proceedings in which the Industrial Relations Court has exclusive jurisdiction under the 
Industrial and Labour Relations Act [Act No. 27 of 1993], unlimited or original jurisdiction 
to hear and determine any civil or criminal proceedings under any law and such jurisdiction 
and powers as may be conferred on it by this Constitution or any other law.
(2) The High Court shall be divided into such divisions as may be determined by an Act of 
Parliament
(3) The Chief Justice shall be an ex-officio judge of the High Court.
(4) The other judges of the High Court shall be such number of puisne judges as may be 
prescribed by Parliament.
(5) The office of a puisne judge shall not be abolished while there is a substantive holder 
thereof.
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(6) The High Court shall be a superior court of record and, except as otherwise provided by 
Parliament, shall have the powers of such a court.
(7) The High Court shall have jurisdiction to supervise any civil or criminal proceedings 
before any subordinate court or any court-martial and may make such orders, issue such writs 
and give such directions as it may consider appropriate for the purpose of ensuring that 
justice is duly administered by any such court.
(8) The Chief Justice may make rules with respect to the practice and procedure of the High 
Court in relation to the jurisdiction and powers conferred on it by clause (7).
95. [Appointment of Puisne Judges, Chairman and Deputy Chairmen of the Industrial 
Relations Court]
(1) The puisne judges shall, subject to ratification by the National Assembly, be appointed by 
the President on the advice of the Judicial Service Commission.
(2) The Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the Industrial Relations Court shall be appointed 
by the President on the advice of the Judicial Service Commission.
(3) The provisions of Articles 98 and 99 shall apply to the Chairman and the Deputy 
Chairman of the Industrial Relations Court, with the necessary modifications.
96. [Acting judge of Supreme Court or of the High Court to act or hold office until 
appointment expires or is revoked]
(1) Any person appointed under Article 93 to act as a judge of the Supreme Court shall 
continue to act for the period of that person's appointment or, if no such period is specified, 
until his appointment is revoked by the President:
Provided that the President may permit a person whose appointment to act as a judge of the 
Supreme Court has expired or been revoked to continue to act for such period as may be 
necessary to enable that person to deliver judgement or to do any other thing in relation to 
proceedings that were commenced before such person.
97. [Qualifications for appointment as Supreme Court judge, puisne judge, Chairman and 
Deputy Chairman of the Industrial Relations Court]
(1) Subject to clause (2), a person shall not be qualified for appointment as a judge of the 
Supreme Court, a puisne judge or Chairman or Deputy Chairman of the Industrial Relations 
Court unless —
(a) he holds or has held high judicial office; or
(b) he holds one of the specified qualifications and has held one or other of the following 
qualifications —
(i) in the case of a Supreme Court Judge, for a total period of not less than fifteen years; or
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(ii) in the case of a puisne judge, the Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the Industrial 
Relations Court, for a total period of not less than ten years.
(2) Where the President or the Judicial Service Commission, as the case may be, is satisfied 
that, by reason of special circumstances, a person who holds one of the specified 
qualifications is worthy, capable and suitable to be appointed as a judge of the Supreme 
Court, a puisne judge, or Chairman or Deputy Chairman of the Industrial Relations Court, 
notwithstanding that he has not held one or other of those qualifications for a total period of 
not less than fifteen or ten years, as the case may be, the President acting in the case of a 
judge of the Supreme Court, puisne judge or Chairman or Deputy Chairman of the Industrial 
Relations Court in accordance with the advice of the Judicial Service Commission, may 
dispense with the requirement that such person shall have holds one or other of the specified 
qualifications for a total period of not less than the period specified in clause (1).
(3) In this Article, "the specified qualifications" means the professional qualifications 
specified in the Legal Practitioners Act [Cap. 48], one of which must be held by any person 
before he may apply under that Act to be admitted as a practitioner in the Republic.
(4) For the purposes of this Article and of Articles 93 and 94, "a person qualified for 
appointment" means a judge of the Supreme Court, a puisne judge or Chairman or Deputy 
Chairman of the Industrial Relations Court and includes a person in respect of whom the 
President or Judicial Service Commission, as the case may be, is satisfied as provided for in 
clause (2).
98. [Tenure of office of judges of Supreme and High Court]
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Article, a person holding the office of a judge of the 
Supreme Court or the office of a judge of the High Court shall vacate that office on attaining 
the age of sixty-five years:
Provided that the President —
(a) may permit a judge of the High Court in accordance with the advice of the Judicial 
Service Commission, or a judge of the Supreme Court, who has attained that age to continue 
in office for such period as may be necessary to enable him to deliver judgement or to do any 
other thing in relation to proceedings that were commenced before him before he attained that 
age:
(b) may appoint a judge of the High Court in accordance with the advice of the Judicial 
Service Commission or a judge of the Supreme Court, who has attained the age of sixty-five 
years, for such further period, not exceeding seven years, as the President may determine.
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(2) A judge of the Supreme Court, High Court, Chairman or Deputy Chairman of the 
Industrial Relations Court may be removed from office only for inability to perform the 
functions of his office, whether arising from infirmity of body or mind, incompetence or 
misbehaviour and shall not be so removed except in accordance with the provisions of this 
Article.
(3) If the President considers that the question of removing a judge of the Supreme Court or 
of the High Court under this Article ought to be investigated, then —
(a) he shall appoint a tribunal which shall consist of a Chairman and not less than two other 
members, who hold or have held high judicial office;
(b) the tribunal shall inquire into the matter and report on the facts thereof to the President 
and advise the President whether the judge ought to be removed from office under this 
Article for inability as aforesaid or for misbehaviour.
(4) Where a tribunal appointed under clause (3) advises the President that a judge of the 
Supreme Court or of the High Court ought to be removed from office for inability, or 
incompetence or for misbehaviour, the President shall remove such judge from office.
(5) If the question of removing a judge of the Supreme Court or of the High Court from office 
has been referred to a tribunal under clause (3), the President may suspend the judge from 
performing the functions of his office, and any such suspension may at any time be revoked 
by the President and shall in any case cease to have effect if the tribunal advises the President 
that the judge ought not to be removed from office.
(6) The provisions of this Article shall be without prejudice to the provisions of Article 96.
99. [Oaths to be taken by judge]
A judge of the Supreme Court or of the High Court shall not enter upon the duties of his 
office unless he has taken and subscribed the oath of allegiance and such oath for the due 
execution of his office as may be prescribed by or under an Act of Parliament:
Provided that a person who has once taken and subscribed to the said oaths may enter upon 
the duties of any such office without again taking and subscribing such oaths.
PART VII
DEFENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY
(As amended by Act No. 18 o f1996)
Article
100. [The Zambia Defence Force]
(1) There shall be an armed force to be known as the Zambia Defence Force.
3 7 8
(2) The Zambia Defence Force shall be non-partisan, national in character, patriotic, 
professional, disciplined, productive and subordinate to the civilian authority as established 
under this Constitution.
(3) Members of the Zambia Defence Force shall be citizens of Zambia and of good character.
(4) No person shall raise an armed force except in accordance with this Constitution.
101. [Functions of Defence Force]
The functions of the Zambia Defence Force shall be to —
(a) preserve and defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Zambia;
(b) co-operate with the civilian authority in emergency situations and in cases of natural 
disasters;
(c) foster harmony and understanding between the Zambia Defence Force and civilians; and
(d) engage in productive activities for the development of Zambia.
102. [Parliament to regulate Defence Force]
Parliament shall make laws regulating the Zambia Defence Force, and in particular, providing 
for—
(a) the organs and structures of the Zambia Defence Force;
(b) the recruitment of persons into the Zambia Defence Force from every district of Zambia;
(c) the terms and conditions of service of members of the Zambia Defence Force; and
(d) the deployment of troops outside of Zambia.
103. [The Zambia Police Force]
(1) There shall be a police force to be known as the Zambia Police Force and such other 
police forces as Parliament may by law prescribe.
(2) Subject to the other provisions of this Constitution, every police force in Zambia shall be 
organised and administered in such a manner and shall have such functions as Parliament 
may by law prescribe.
(3) The Zambia Police Force shall be nationalistic, patriotic, professional, disciplined, 
competent and productive; and its members shall be citizens of Zambia and in good 
character.
104. [Functions of Zambia Police Force]
The functions of the Zambia Police Force shall include the following:
(a) to protect life and property;
(b) to preserve law and order;
(c) to detect and prevent crime;
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(d) to co-operate with the civilian authority and other security organs established under this 
Constitution and with the population generally.
105. [Parliament to regulate Zambia Police Force]
Parliament shall make laws regulating the Zambia Police Force, and in particular, providing 
for --
(a) the organs and structures of the Zambia Police Force;
(b) the recruitment of persons into the Zambia Police Force from every district of Zambia;
(c) terms and conditions of service of members of the Zambia Police Force; and
(d) the regulation generally of the Zambia Police Force.
106. [Prison service]
There shall be the Zambia Prison Service.
107. [Parliament to regulate Zambia Prison Service]
Parliament shall make laws regulating the Zambia Prison Service, and in particular, providing 
for --
(a) the organs and structures of the Zambia Prison Service;
(b) the recruitment of persons to the Zambia Prison Service from every district of Zambia;
(c) the terms and conditions of service of members of the Zambia Prison Service; and
(d) the regulation generally of the Zambia Prison Service.
108. [Zambia Security Intelligence Services]
(1) There shall be a Zambia Security Intelligence Service.
(2) Parliament shall make laws regulating the Zambia Security Intelligence Service, and in 
particular, providing for —
(a) the organs and structures of the Zambia Security Intelligence Service;
(b) the recruitment of persons into the Zambia Security Intelligence Service from every 
district of Zambia;
(c) the terms and conditions of service of members of the Zambia Security Intelligence 
Service; and
(d) the regulation generally of the Zambia Security Intelligence Service.
PART VIII
LOCAL GOVERNMENT SYSTEM 
(As amended by Act No. 18 o f1996)
Article
109. [Local Government system]
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(1) There shall be such system of local government in Zambia as may be prescribed by an 
Act of Parliament.
(2) The system of local government shall be based on democratically elected councils on the 
basis of universal adult suffrage.
PART IX
DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLES OF STATE POLICY AND THE DUTIES OF A CITIZEN
(As amended by Act No. 18 o f1996)
Article
110. [Application of Directive Principles of State Policy]
(1) The Directive Principles of State Policy set out in this Part shall guide the Executive, the 
Legislature and the Judiciary, as the case may be, in the —
(a) development of national policies;
(b) implementation of national policies;
(c) making and enactment of laws; and
(d) application of the Constitution and any other law.
(2) The application of the Directive Principles of State Policy may be observed only in so far 
as State resources are able to sustain their application, or if the general welfare of the public 
so unavoidably demands, as may be determined by Cabinet.
111. [Directives not to be justiciable]
The Directive Principles of State Policy set out in this Part shall not be justiciable and shall 
not thereby, by themselves, despite being referred to as rights in certain instances, be legally 
enforceable in any court, tribunal or administrative institution or entity.
112. [Directive Principles of State Policy]
The following Directives shall be the Principles of State Policy for the purposes of this Part: 
the State shall be based on democratic principles;
(b) the State shall endeavour to create an economic environment which shall encourage 
individual initiative and self reliance among the people and promote private investment;
(c) the State shall endeavour to create conditions under which all citizens shall be able to 
secure adequate means of livelihood and opportunity to obtain employment;
(d) the State shall endeavour to provide clean and safe water, adequate medical and health 
facilities and decent shelter for all persons, and take measures to constantly improve such 
facilities and amenities;
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(e) the State shall endeavour to provide equal and adequate educational opportunities in all 
fields and at all levels for all;
(f) the State shall endeavour to provide to persons with disabilities, the aged and other 
disadvantaged persons such social benefits and amenities as are suitable to their needs and are 
just and equitable;
(g) the State shall take measures to promote the practice, enjoyment and development by any 
person of that person's culture, tradition, custom and language insofar as these are not 
inconsistent with this Constitution;
(h) the State shall strive to provide a clean and healthy environment for all;
(i) the State shall promote sustenance, development and public awareness of the need to 
manage the land, air and water resources in a balanced and suitable manner for the present 
and future generation; and
(j) the State shall recognise the right of every person to fair labour practices and safe and 
healthy working conditions.
113. [Duties of the citizens]
It shall be the duty of every citizen to —
(a) be patriotic and loyal to Zambia and to promote its well-being;
(b) contribute to the well-being of the community where that citizen lives, including the 
observance of health controls;
(c) foster national unity and live in harmony with others;
(d) promote democracy and the rule of law;
(e) vote in national and local government elections;
(f) provide defence and military service when called upon;
(g) cany out with discipline and honesty legal public functions;
(h) pay all taxes and duties legally due and owing to the State; and
(i) assist in the enforcement of the law at all times.
PARTX
FINANCE
(As amended by Act No. 18 o f1996)
Article
114. [Imposition of taxation]
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Article, no taxation shall be imposed or altered except by 
or under an Act of Parliament.
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(2) Except as provided by clauses (3) and (4), Parliament shall not confer upon any other 
person or authority power to impose or to alter, otherwise than by reduction, any taxation.
(3) Parliament may make provision under which the President or the Vice-President or a 
Minister may by order provide that, on or after the publication of a Bill being a Bill approved 
by the President that it is proposed to introduce into the National Assembly and providing for 
the imposition or alteration of taxation, such provisions of the Bill as may be specified in the 
order shall, have the force of law for such period and subject to such conditions as may be 
prescribed by Parliament:
Provided that any such order shall, unless sooner revoked, case to have effect —
(i) if  the Bill to which it relates is not passed within such period from the date of its first 
reading in the National Assembly as may be prescribed by Parliament;
(ii) if, after the introduction of the Bill to which it relates, Parliament is prorogued or the 
National Assembly is dissolved;
(iii) if, after the passage of the Bill to which it relates, the President refuses his assent thereto; 
or
(iv) at the expiration of a period of four months from the date on which it came into operation 
or such longer period from the date as may be specified in any resolution passed by the 
National Assembly after the Bill to which it relates has been introduced.
(4) Parliament may confer upon any authority established by law for the purposes of local 
government power to impose taxation within the area for which that authority is established 
and to alter taxation so imposed.
(5) Where the Appropriation Act in respect of a financial year has not come into force at the 
expiration of six months from the commencement of that financial year, the operation of any 
law relating to the collection or recovery of any tax upon any income or profits or any duty or 
customs or excise shall be suspended until that Act comes into force:
Provided that --
(i) in any financial year in which the National Assembly stands dissolved at the 
commencement of that year the period of six months shall begin from the day upon which the 
National Assembly first sits following that dissolution instead of from the commencement of 
the financial year;
(ii) the provisions of this clause shall not apply in any financial year in which the National 
Assembly is dissolved after the laying of estimates in accordance with Article 115 and before 
the Appropriation by Parliament.
115. [Withdrawal of moneys from general revenues]
3 8 3
(1) No moneys shall be expended from the general revenues of the Republic unless --
(a) the expenditure is authorised by a warrant under the hand of the President;
(b) the expenditure is charged by this Constitution or any other law on the general revenues 
of the Republic; or
(c) the expenditure is o f moneys received by a department of government and is made under 
the provisions of any law which authorises that department to retain and expend those 
moneys for defraying the expenses of the department.
(2) No warrant shall be issued by the President authorising expenditure from the general 
revenues of the Republic unless --
(a) the expenditure is authorised by an Appropriation Act;
(b) the expenditure is necessary to canry on the services of the Government in respect of any 
period, not exceeding four months, beginning at the commencement of a financial year 
during which the Appropriation Act for that financial year is not in force;
(c) the expenditure has been proposed in a supplementary estimate approved by the National
Assembly;
(d) no provision exists for the expenditure and the President considers that there is such an 
urgent need to incur the expenditure that it would not be in the public interest to delay the 
authorisation of the expenditure until such time as a supplementary estimate can be laid 
before and approved by the National Assembly; or
(e) the expenditure is incurred on capital projects continuing from the previous financial year 
and is so incurred before commencement of the Appropriation Act for the current financial 
year.
(3) the President shall, immediately after he signs any warrant authorising expenditure from 
the general revenues o f the Republic, cause a copy of the warrant to be transmitted to the 
Auditor-General.
(4) The issue of warrants under paragraph (d) of clause (2), the investment of moneys 
forming part of the general revenues of the Republic and the making of advances from such 
revenues shall be subject to such limitations and conditions as Parliament may from time to 
time prescribe.
(5) For the purposes o f this Article the investment of moneys forming part of the general 
revenues of the Republic or the making of recoverable advances therefrom shall not be 
regarded as expenditure, and the expression "investment of moneys" means investment in 
readily marketable securities and deposits with a financial institution approved by the 
Minister responsible for finance.
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116. [Supplementary estimates in respect of expenditure authorised by warrant ]
Where in any financial year any expenditure has been authorised by a warrant issued by the 
President under paragraph (d) of clause (2) Article 113, the Minister responsible for finance 
shall cause a supplementary estimate relating to that expenditure to be laid before the 
National Assembly for its approval before the expiration of a period of four months from the 
issue of the warrant or, if the National Assembly is not sitting at the expiration of that period, 
at the first sitting of the National Assembly thereafter.
117. [Appropriation Acts and Supplementary Appropriation Acts]
(1) The Minister responsible for finance shall cause to be prepared and shall lay before the 
National Assembly within three months after the commencement of each financial year 
estimates of the revenues and expenditure of the Republic for that financial year.
(2) When the estimates of expenditures have been approved by the National Assembly, the 
heads of the estimates together with the amount approved in respect of each shall be included 
in a Bill to be known as an Appropriation Bill which shall be introduced in the National 
Assembly to provide for the payment of those amounts for the purposes specified out of the 
general revenues of the Republic.
(3) Nothing in this Article shall be construed as requiring the approval of the National 
Assembly for that part of any estimates which relate to, or as requiring the inclusion in an 
Appropriation Bill of provisions authorising the expenditure of, sums which are charged on 
the general revenues of the Republic by this Constitution or any other law.
(4) Where any supplementary expenditure has been authorised in respect of any financial 
year for any purpose and —
(a) no amount has been appropriated for that purpose under any head of expenditure by the 
Appropriation Act for that financial year; or
(b) the amount of the supplementary expenditure is such that the total amount expended for 
the purposes of the head of expenditure in which expenditure for that purpose was included is 
in excess of the amount so appropriated under that head, the Minister responsible for finance 
shall introduce in the National Assembly not later than fifteen months after the end of that 
financial year or, if the National Assembly is not sitting at the expiration of that period, 
within one month of the first sitting of the National Assembly thereafter, a Bill, to be known 
as a Supplementary Appropriation Bill, confirming the approval of Parliament of such 
expenditure, or excess of expenditure, as the case may be.
(5) Where in any financial year, expenditure has been incurred without the authorisation of 
Parliament, the Minister responsible for finance shall, on approval of such expenditure by the
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appropriate committee of the National Assembly, introduce in the National Assembly, not 
later than thirty months after the end of that financial year or, if the National Assembly is not 
sitting at the expiration of that period, within one month of the first sitting of the National 
Assembly thereafter, a  Bill to be known as the Excess Expenditure Appropriation Bill, for the 
approval by Parliament of such expenditure.
118. [Financial report]
(1) The Minister responsible for finance shall cause to be prepared and shall lay before the
National Assembly not later than nine months after the end of each financial year a financial 
report in respect of that year. v-
(2) A financial report in respect o f the financial year shall include accounts showing the 
revenue and other moneys received by the Government in that financial year, the expenditure 
of the Government in that financial year other than expenditure charged by this Constitution 
or any other law on the general revenues o f the Republic, the payments made in the financial 
year otherwise than for the purposes of expenditure, a statement of the financial position of 
the Republic at the end of the financial year and such other information as Parliament may 
prescribe.
119. [Remuneration o f certain officers]
(1) There shall be paid to the holders of the offices to which this Article applies such salary 
and such allowances as may be prescribed by or under an Act of Parliament.
(2) The salaries and any allowances payable to the holders of the offices to which this Article 
applies shall be a charge on the general revenues of the Republic.
(3) The salary payable to the holder of any office to which this Article applies and his terms 
of office shall not be altered to his disadvantage after his appointment.
(4) Where a person's salary or terms of office depend upon his option, the salary or terms for 
which he opts shall, for the purposes of clause (3), be deemed to be more advantageous to 
him than any others for which he might have opted.
(5) This Article applies to the offices of judge of the Supreme Court, Attorney-General, judge 
of the High Court, Investigator-General, Solicitor-General, Director of Public Prosecutions, 
Secretary to Cabinet and Auditor-General and to such other offices as may be prescribed by 
an Act of Parliament.
120. [Public debt]
(1) There shall be charged on the general revenues of the Republic all debt charges for which 
the Government is liable.
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(2) For the purposes of the Article, debt charges include interest, sinking fund charges, the 
repayment or amortisation of debt, and all expenditure in connection with the raising of loans 
on the security of the revenues of the former Protectorate of Northern Rhodesia or the 
Republic and on the service and redemption of debt thereby created.
121. [Auditor-General]
(1) There shall be an Auditor-General for the Republic whose office shall be a public office 
and who shall, subject to ratification by the National Assembly, be appointed by the 
President.
(2) It shall be the duty of the Auditor General --
(a) to satisfy himself that the provisions of this Part are being complied with;
(b) to satisfy himself that the moneys expended have been applied to the purposes for which 
they were appropriated by the Appropriation Act or in accordance with the approved 
supplementary estimates, or in accordance with the Excess Expenditure Appropriation Act, as 
the case may be, and that the expenditure conforms to the authority that governs it;
(c) to audit the accounts relating to the general revenues of the Republic and the expenditure 
of moneys appropriated by Parliament, the National Assembly, the Judicature, the accounts 
relating to the stocks and stores of the Government and the accounts of such other bodies as 
may be prescribed by or under any law;
(d) to audit the accounts relating to any expenditure charged by this Constitution or any other 
law on the general revenues of the Republic and to submit a report thereon to the President 
not later than twelve months after the end of each financial year.
(3) The Auditor-General and any officer authorised by him shall have access to all books, 
records, reports and other documents relating to any of the accounts referred to in clause (2).
(4) The Auditor-General shall, not later, than twelve months after the end of each financial 
year, submit a report on the accounts referred to in paragraph (c) of clause (2) in respect of 
that financial year to the President who shall, not later than seven days after the first sitting of 
the National Assembly next after the receipt of such report, cause it to be laid before the 
National Assembly; and if the President makes default in laying the report before the 
National Assembly, the Auditor-General shall submit the report to the Speaker of the 
National Assembly, or if the office of Speaker is vacant or if the Speaker is for any reason 
unable to perform the functions of his office, to the Deputy Speaker, who shall cause it to be 
laid before the National Assembly.
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(5) The Auditor-General shall perform such other duties and exercise such other powers in 
relation to all accounts of the Government or the accounts of other public authorities or other 
bodies as may be prescribed by or under any law.
(6) In the exercise of his functions under clauses(2), (3) and (4), the Auditor-General shall not 
be subjected to the direction or control of any person or authority.
122. [Tenure of office o f Auditor General]
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Article, a person holding the office of Auditor-General 
shall vacate his office when he attains the age of sixty years.
(2) A person holding the office of Auditor-General may be removed from office only for 
inability to perform the functions of his office, whether arising from infirmity of body or 
mind, or for incompetence or for misbehaviour and shall not be so removed except in 
accordance with the provisions of this Article.
(3) If the National Assembly resolves that the question of removing a person holding the 
office of Auditor-General from office under this Article ought to be investigated then —
(a) the National Assembly shall, by resolution, appoint a tribunal which shall consist of a 
Chairman and not less than two other members, who hold or have held high judicial office;
(b) the tribunal shall inquire into the matter and report on the facts thereof to the National 
Assembly;
(c) the National Assembly shall consider the report of the tribunal at the first convenient 
sitting of the National Assembly after it is received and may, upon such consideration, by 
resolution, remove the Auditor-General from office.
(4) If the question of removing a person holding the office of Auditor-General from office 
has been referred to a tribunal under this Article, the National Assembly may, by resolution, 
suspend that person from performing the functions of his office, and any such suspension 
may at any time be revoked by the Assembly by resolution and shall in any case cease to 
have effect if, upon consideration of the report of the tribunal in accordance with the 
provisions of this Article, the National Assembly does not remove the Auditor-General from 
office.
(5) A person who holds or has held the office of Auditor-General shall not be appointed to 
hold or to act in any other Public Office.
(6) A person who holds the office of Auditor-General may resign upon giving three months’ 
notice to the President.
388
PART XI
SERVICE COMMISSIONS
(As amended by Act No. 18 o f1996)
Article
123. [Commissions]
(1) There shall be established for the Republic a Judicial Service Commission which shall 
have the functions conferred on it by this Constitution and such other functions and powers, 
as may be prescribed by or under an Act of Parliament.
(2) Parliament may establish for the Republic other Commissions which, together with the 
Judicial Service Commission, are hereafter collectively referred to as Service Commissions, 
which shall have such functions and powers in relation to the public service, or in relation to 
persons in public employment other than constitutional office holders or public officers, as 
may be prescribed by or under an Act of Parliament.
(3) Commissions other than Service Commissions may be established for the Republic by or 
under an Act of Parliament and shall have such functions and powers as may be prescribed by 
or under such an Act.
(4) Nothing in the foregoing precludes provision being made by or under an Act of 
Parliament to confer on a Service Commission functions and powers in relation to matters 
other than public employment.
124. [Pension laws and protection]
(1) The law to be applied with respect to any pension benefits that were granted to any person 
before the commencement of this Constitution shall be the law that was in force at the date on 
which those benefits were granted or any law in force at a later date that is not less favourable 
to that person.
(2) The law to be applied with respect to any pensions benefits not being benefits to which 
clause (1) applies, shall --
(a) in so far as those benefits are wholly in respect of a period of service as a public officer, 
as any officer in the department of the Clerk of the National Assembly, or as a member of the 
armed forces, that commenced before the commencement of this Constitution, be the law that 
was in force immediately before that date; and
(b) in so far as those benefits are wholly or partly in respect of a period of service as a public 
officer, as any officer in the department of the Clerk of the National Assembly, or as a 
member of the armed forces, that commenced after the commencement of this Constitution,
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be the law in force on the date on which that period of service commenced; or any law in 
force at a later date that is not less favourable to that person.
(3) Where a person is entitled to exercise an option as to which of two or more laws shall 
apply in his case, the law for which he opts shall, for the purposes of this Article, be deemed 
to be more favourable to him than the other law or laws.
(4) All pensions benefits shall, except to the extent to which they are a charge on a fund 
established by or under any law and have been duly paid out o f that fund to the person or 
authority to whom payment is due, be a charge on the general revenues of the Republic.
(5) In this Article "pension benefits” means any pensions, compensation, gratuities or other 
like allowances for persons in respect of their service as public officers, as officers in the 
department of the Clerk of the National Assembly or as members of the armed forces or for 
the widows, children, dependants or personal representatives o f such persons in respect of 
such service.
(6) Reference in this Article to the law with respect to pension benefits include, without 
prejudice to their generality, references in the law regulating the circumstances in which such 
benefits may be granted or in which the grant of such benefits may be refused, the law 
regulating the circumstances in which any such benefits that have been granted may be 
withheld, reduced in amount or suspended, and the law regulating the amount of any such 
benefits:
Provided that, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Constitution or any 
other written law, such references shall not be so construed as to include the law regulating 
the law of compulsory retirement.
(7) In this Article —
(a) references to service as a public officer includes references to service as a public officer 
under the Government of the territories which on the 24th October, 1964, became the 
sovereign Republic of Zambia and references to service as a member of the teaching service 
of the said Government,
(b) references to service as an officer in the department of the Clerk of the National Assembly 
includes reference to service as an officer in the department of the Clerk of the Legislative 
Assembly of the said territories; and
(c) references to service as a member of the armed forces include references to service as a 
member of the armed forces of the said territories.
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PART XII
HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION
(As amended by Act No. 18 o f1996)
Article
125. [Establishment of Human Rights Commission and its independence]
(1) There is hereby established a Human Rights Commission.
(2) The Human Rights Commission shall be autonomous.
126. [Functions, powers, composition, procedure, etc. of Human Rights Commission]
The functions, powers, composition, funding and administrative procedures, including the 
employment of staff, of the Human Rights Commission shall be prescribed by or under an 
Act of Parliament.
PART XIII
CHIEFS AND HOUSE OF CHIEFS
(As amended by Act No. 18 o f1996)
Article
127. [The Institution of Chief]
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the Institution of Chief shall 
area of Zambia in accordance with the culture, customs and traditions or 
aspirations of the people to who it applies.
(2) In any community, where the issue of a Chief has not been resolved, the issue shall be 
resolved by the community concerned using a method prescribed by an Act of Parliament.
128. [Concept and principles relating to the Institution of Chiefs]
The following concepts and principles shall apply to Chiefs:
(a) the Institution of Chief shall be a corporation sole with perpetual succession and with 
capacity to sue and be sued and to hold assets or properties in trust for itself and the peoples 
concerned;
(b) nothing in paragraph (a) shall be taken to prohibit a Chief from holding any asset or 
property acquired in a personal capacity; and
(c) a traditional leader or cultural leader shall enjoy such privileges and benefits as may be 
conferred by the Government and the local government or as that leader may be entitled to 
under culture, custom and tradition.
129. [Chief not to be partisan]
A person shall not, while remaining a Chief, join or participate in partisan politics.
exist in any 
wishes and
130. [House of Chiefs]
There shall be a House of Chiefs for the Republic which shall be an advisoiy body to the 
Government on traditional, customary and any other matters referred to it by the President.
131. [Functions of House of Chiefs]
Notwithstanding Article 130, the House of Chiefs may —
(a) consider and discuss any Bill dealing with, or touching on, custom or tradition before it is 
introduced into the National Assembly;
(b) initiate, discuss and decide on matters that relate to customary law and practice;
(c) consider and discuss any other matter referred to it for its consideration by the President 
or approved by the President for consideration by the House; and
(d) submit resolutions on any Bill or other matter referred to it to the President, and the 
President shall cause such resolutions to be laid before the National Assembly.
132. [Composition of House of Chiefs]
(1) The House of Chiefs shall consist of twenty-seven Chiefs.
(2) The members referred to in clause (1) shall consist of three chiefs elected by the Chiefs 
from each of the nine Provinces of the Republic.
(3) The Chairman and the Vice-Chairman shall be elected from amongst the members.
133. [Tenure of office and vacancy]
(1) A member of the House of Chiefs —
(a) shall hold office for a period of three years and may be re-elected for a further period of 
three years; or
(b) may resign upon giving one month’s notice in writing to the Chairman.
(2) The office of member shall become vacant —
(a) upon his death;
(b) if he ceases to be a Chief;
(c) if any other circumstances arise that would cause him to be disqualified for election;
(d) if he becomes a candidate to any election, or accepts an appointment, to any office in a 
political party;
(e) if he is adjudged or becomes an undischarged bankrupt; or
(f) if he is declared or becomes of unsound mind under any law in Zambia.
134. [Oaths of members of House of Chiefs]
The Chairman and every member of the House of Chiefs shall take an oath of allegiance.
135. [Staff of House of Chiefs]
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There shall be a Clerk of the House of Chiefs and such other staff as may be necessary for 
carrying out the functions under this PArticle
136. [President may make regulations]
Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the President may by statutory instrument, 
make regulations for —
(a) the appointment of the Clerk and other officers of the House of Chiefs;
(b) provide for the remuneration of the Chairman, the Vice-Chairman and other members of 
the House;
(c) the proceedings and conduct of the House of Chiefs;
(d) the application of any of the privileges and immunities of the National Assembly and its 
members to the House of Chiefs and its members; and
(e) such other matters as are necessary or conducive to the better carrying out of the purposes 
of this Article
PART XIV 
MISCELLANEOUS
(As amended by Act No. 18 o f1996)
Article
137. [Resignations]
(1) Any person who is appointed or elected to any office established by this Constitution may 
resign from that office by writing under his hand addressed to the persons or authority by 
whom he was appointed or elected:
Provided that in the case of a person who holds office as Speaker or Deputy Speaker of the 
National Assembly his resignation from that office shall be addressed to the National 
Assembly, and in the case of an elected or nominated member o f the National Assembly his 
resignation shall be addressed to the Speaker.
(2) The resignation of any person from any office established by this Constitution shall take 
effect when the writing signifying the resignation is received by the person or authority to 
whom it is addressed or by any person authorised by that person or authority to receive it.
138. [Reappointment and concurrent appointments]
(1) Where any person has vacated any office established by this Constitution he may, if 
qualified, again be appointed or elected to hold that office in accordance with the provisions 
of this Constitution.
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(2) Where a power is conferred by this Constitution upon any person to make any 
appointment to any office, a person may be appointed to that office notwithstanding that 
some other person may be holding that office, when that other person is on leave of absence 
pending the relinquishment of the office; and where two or more persons are holding the 
same office by reason of an appointment made in pursuance of this clause, then for the 
purposes of any function conferred upon the holder of that office, the person last appointed 
shall deemed to be the sole holder of the office.
139. [Interpretation]
(1) In this Constitution, unless the context otherwise requires —
"Act of Parliament" means a law enacted by Parliament;
"Article" means an Article of this Constitution;
"Chief’ means a person who is recognised by the President under the provisions of the Chiefs 
Act or any law amending or replacing that Act as the Litunga of Western Province, a 
Paramount Chief, Senior Chief, Chief or Sub-Chief or a person who is appointed as Deputy 
Chief;
"clause" means a clause of the Article in which the word occurs;
"financial year" means the period of twelve months ending on the 31st December in any year 
or on such other day as may be prescribed by or under an Act of Parliament: 
Provided that by or under an Act of Parliament prescribing a day other than the 31st 
December as the terminal day of the financial year the said period of twelve months may be 
extended or reduced for any one financial year for the purpose of effecting such prescribed 
change;
"the Gazette” means the official Gazette of the Government of Zambia;
"High Court" means the High Court established by this Constitution;
"high judicial office" means the office of a judge of a court of unlimited jurisdiction in civil 
and criminal matters in some part of the Commonwealth or in the Republic or Ireland or the 
office of a court having jurisdiction in appeals from such a court;
"House" means the National Assembly;
"meeting" means all sittings of the National Assembly held during a period beginning when 
the National Assembly first sits after being summoned at any time and terminating when the 
National Assembly is adjourned sine die or at the conclusion of a session;
"oath" includes affirmation;
"the oath of allegiance" means such oath of allegiance as may be prescribed by law; 
"paragraph" means a paragraph of the clause in which the word occurs;
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"person" includes any company or association or body of persons, corporate or 
unincorporate;
"public office" means an office of emolument in the public office;
"public officer" means a person holding or acting in any public office;
"the public service" subject to clauses (2) and (3) shall have the meaning assigned to it by an 
Act of Parliament;
"session" means the sittings of the National Assembly beginning when it first sits after the 
coming into operation of this Constitution or after Parliament is prorogued or dissolved at any 
time and ending when Parliament is prorogued or is dissolved without having been 
prorogued;
"sitting" means a period during which the National Assembly is sitting without adjournment 
and includes any period during which it is in committee;
"statutory instrument" means any proclamation, regulation, order, mle, notice or other 
instrument, (not being an Act of Parliament) of a legislative as distinct from an executive 
character;
"Supreme Court" means the Supreme Court of Zambia established by this Constitution.
(2) In this Constitution, references to offices in the public service shall be construed as 
including references to the offices of judges of the Supreme Court and of the High Court, and 
to the offices of Chairman, Deputy Chairman, and members of the Industrial Relations Court.
(3) In this Constitution references to an office in the public service shall not be construed as 
including references to the offices of the Attorney-General, or a member of any Commission 
established by this Constitution or by an Act of Parliament or to the office of the Clerk of the 
National Assembly or any office in the department of the Clerk of the National Assembly.
(4) For the purposes of this Constitution, a person shall not be considered as holding a public 
office by reason only of the fact he is in receipt of a pension or other like allowance in respect 
of service under the Government of Zambia or of its predecessor Government.
(5) A person shall not be regarded as disqualified for appointment to any office to which a 
public officer is not qualified to be appointed by reason only that he holds a public office if 
he is on leave of absence pending relinquishment of that office.
(6) In this Constitution, unless the context otherwise requires, a reference to the holder of an 
office by the term designating his office shall be construed as including a reference to any 
person for the time being lawfully acting in or performing the functions of that office: 
Provided that nothing in this clause shall apply to references to the President or Vice- 
President in Articles 36,37,39, and 45.
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(7) References in this Constitution to the power to remove a public officer from his office 
shall be construed as including references to any power conferred by any law to require or 
permit that officer to retire from the public service: 
Provided that nothing in this clause shall be construed as conferring on any person or 
authority power to require a judge of the Supreme Court or of the High Court, the 
Investigator-General, the Auditor-General or the Director of Public Prosecutions to retire 
from the public service.
(8) Any provision in this Constitution that vests in any person or authority power to remove 
any public officer from his office shall be without prejudice to the power of any person or 
authority to abolish any office or to any law providing for the compulsory retirement of 
public officers generally or any class of public officers on attaining an age specified therein.
(9) Where power is vested by this Constitution in any person or authority to appoint any 
person to act in or perform the functions of any office if the holder thereof is himself unable 
to perform those functions, no such appointment shall be called in question on the ground that 
the holder of the office was not unable to perform those functions.
(10) No provision of this Constitution that any person or authority shall not be subject to the 
direction or control of any other person or authority in the exercise of any functions under 
this Constitution shall be construed as precluding a court of law from exercising jurisdiction 
in relation to any question whether that person or authority has performed those functions in 
accordance with this Constitution or any other law.
(11) When any power is conferred by this Constitution to make any Proclamation, statutory 
instrument, order, regulation or rule, or to issue any direction or certificate or confer 
recognition, the power shall be construed as including the power, exercisable in like manner, 
to amend or revoke any such Proclamation, statutory instrument, order, regulation, rule, 
direction or certificate or to withdraw any such recognition: Provided that nothing in this 
clause shall apply to the power to issue a certificate conferred by clause (2) of Article 36.
(12)
(a) Any reference in this Constitution to a law that amends or replaces any other law shall be 
construed as including a reference to a law that modifies, re-enacts with or without 
amendment or modification, or makes different provision in lieu of that other law.
(b) Where any Act passed after the commencement of this Constitution repeals and re-enacts, 
with or without modification, any provisions thereof, references in this Constitution to the 
provisions so repealed shall, unless the contrary intention appears, be construed as references 
to the provisions so re-enacted.
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(c) Where any Act passed after the commencement of this Constitution repeals any provision 
thereof then, unless the contrary intention appears, the repeal shall not --
(i) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect; or
(ii) affect the previous operation of any provision so repealed or anything duly done or 
suffered under any provision so repealed; or
(iii) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any 
provision so repealed; or
(iv) affect any penalty, forfeiture or confiscation or punishment incurred under any provision 
so repealed; or
(v) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, 
privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or confiscation or punishment as aforesaid, 
and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or 
enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or confiscation or punishment may be imposed, as
if the repealing Act had not been passed.
(13) In this Constitution, unless the context otherwise requires, words and expressions 
importing the masculine gender include females.
(14) In this Constitution, unless the context otherwise requires, words and expressions in the 
singular include the plural and words and expressions in the plural include the singular.
(15) Where this Constitution confers any power or imposes any duty, the power may be 
exercised and the duty shall be performed from time to time as occasion requires.
(16) Where by any Act which repeals and re-enacts, with or without modification, any 
provision of this Constitution, and which is not to come into force immediately on the 
publication thereof, there is conferred --
(a) a power to make or a power exercisable by making statutory instruments; or
(b) a power to make appointments; or
(c) a power to do any other thing for the purposes of the provision in question;
that power may be exercised at any time on or after the date of publication of the Act in the 
Gazette:
Provided that no instrument, appointment or thing made or done under that power shall, 
unless it is necessary to bring the Act into force, have any effect until the commencement of 
the Act.
(17) In computing time for the purposes of any provision of this Constitution, unless a 
contrary intention is expressed --
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(a) a period of days from the happening o f an event or the doing of any act or thing shall be 
deemed to be exclusive of the day on which the event happens or the act or thing is done;
(b) if the last day of the period is Sunday or a public holiday which days are in this clause 
referred to as "excluded days" the period shall include the next following day, not being an 
excluded day;
(c) where any act or proceeding is directed or allowed to be done or taken on a certain day, 
then, if that day happens to be an excluded day the act or proceeding shall be considered as 
done or taken in due time if it is done or taken the next day afterwards, not being an excluded 
day;
(d) where an act or proceeding is directed or allowed to be done or taken within any time not 
exceeding six days, excluded days shall not be reckoned in the computation of the time.
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CONSTITUTION DE LA REPUBLIQUE DU BENIN
LOI No 90-32 DU 11 DECEMBRE 1990 PORTANT CONSTITUTION DE LA 
REPUBLIQUE DU Bénin
LE HAUT CONSEIL DE LA REPUBLIQUE, conformément à la Loi Constitutionnelle du 
13 août 1990, a proposé, LE PEUPLE BENINOIS a adopté au Référendum Constituant du 2 
décembre 1990, LE PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE promulgue la Constitution dont la 
teneur suit:
PREAMBULE
Le Dahomey, proclamé République le 4 décembre 1958, a accédé à la souveraineté 
internationale le 1er août 1960. Devenu République Populaire du Bénin le 30 novembre 
1975, puis République du Bénin le 1er mars 1990, il a connu une évolution constitutionnelle 
et politique mouvementée depuis son accession à l'indépendance. Seule est restée pérenne 
l'option en faveur de la République. Les changements successifs de régimes politiques et de 
gouvernements n'ont pas émoussé la détermination du Peuple Béninois à rechercher dans son 
génie propre, les valeurs de civilisation culturelles, philosophiques et spirituelles qui animent 
les formes de son patriotisme.
Ainsi, la Conférence des Forces Vives de la Nation tenue à Cotonou, du 19 au 28 février 
1990, en redonnant confiance au peuple, a permis la réconciliation nationale et l'avènement 
d'une ère de Renouveau Démocratique. Au lendemain de cette Conférence, NOUS, PEUPLE 
BENINOIS,
• Réaffirmons notre opposition fondamentale à tout régime politique fondé sur l'arbitraire, la 
dictature, l'injustice, la corruption, la concussion, le régionalisme, le népotisme, la 
confiscation du pouvoir et le pouvoir personnel;
- Exprimons notre ferme volonté de défendre et de sauvegarder notre dignité aux yeux du 
monde et de retrouver la place et le rôle de pionnier de la démocratie et de la défense des 
droits de l'homme qui furent naguère les nôtres;
- Affirmons solennellement notre détermination par la présente Constitution de créer un Etat 
de droit et de démocratie pluraliste, dans lequel les droits fondamentaux de l'homme, les 
libertés publiques, la dignité de la personne humaine et la justice sont garantis, protégés et 
promus comme la condition nécessaire au développement véritable et harmonieux de chaque 
Béninois tant dans sa dimension temporelle, culturelle que spirituelle;
- Réaffirmons notre attachement aux principes de la démocratie et des Droits de l'Homme tels 
qu'ils ont été définis par la Charte des Nations-Unies de 1945 et la Déclaration Universelle
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des Droits de l’Homme de 1948, à la Charte Africaine des Droits de l'Homme et des Peuples 
adoptée en 1981 par l'Organisation de l'Unité Africaine, ratifiée par le Bénin le 20 janvier 
1986 et dont les dispositions font partie intégrante de la présente Constitution et du droit 
béninois et ont une valeur supérieure à la loi interne;
- Affirmons notre volonté de coopérer dans la paix et l'amitié avec tous les peuples qui 
partagent nos idéaux de liberté, de justice, de solidarité humaine, sur la base des principes 
d'égalité, d'intérêt réciproque et de respect mutuel de la souveraineté nationale et de l'intégrité 
territoriale;
- Proclamons notre attachement à la cause de l'Unité Africaine et nous engageons à tout 
mettre en oeuvre pour réaliser l'intégration sous-régionale et régionale;
-Adoptons solennellement la présente Constitution qui est la Loi Suprême de l'Etat et à 
laquelle nous jurons loyalisme, fidélité et respect.
TITRE 1ER : DE L ' ETAT ET DE LA SOUVERAINETE.
Article 1
L’Etat du Bénin est une République indépendante et souveraine.
- La Capitale de la République du Bénin est PORTO-NOVO.
- L'Emblème national est le drapeau tricolore vert, jaune et rouge. En partant de la hampe, 
une bande verte sur toute la hauteur et sur les deux cinquièmes de sa longueur, deux bandes 
horizontales égales:
la supérieure jaune, l'inférieure rouge.
- L'Hymme de la République est T  AUBE NOUVELLE".
- La Devise de la République est "FRATERNITE-JUSTICE-TRAVAIL".
- La langue officielle est le Français.
- Le Sceau de l'Etat, constitué par un disque de cent vingt millimètres de diamètre, représente:
- à l’avers une pirogue chargée de six étoiles à cinq rais voguant sur des ondes, accompagnée 
au chef d'un arc avec une flèche en palme soutenu de deux récades en sautoir et, dans le bas, 
d'une banderole portant la devise "FRATERNITE-JUSTICE-TRAVAIL" avec, à l'entour, 
l'inscription "République du Bénin";
- et au revers un écu coupé au premier de sinople, au deuxième parti d'or et de gueules, qui 
sont les trois couleurs du drapeau, l'écu entouré de deux palmes au naturel les tiges passées en 
sautoir.
- Les armes du Bénin sont:
Ecartelé au premier quartier d'un ch/teau Somba d'or;
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Au deuxième d'argent à l'Etoile du Bénin au naturel c'est-à-dire une croix à huit pointes 
d'azur anglées de rayons d'argent et de sable en abîme;
Au troisième d'argent palmier de sinople chargé d'un fruit de gueule;
Au quatrième d'argent au navire de sable voguant sur une mer d'azur avec en brochant sur U 
ligne de l'écartelé un losange de gueule;
-Supports:
deux panthères d'or tachetées;
- Timbre:
deux comes d'abondance de sable d'où sortent des épis de mats;
- Devises:
Fratemité-Justice-Travail en caractère de sable sur une banderole.
Article 2
La République du Bénin est une et indivisible, laïque et démocratique. Son principe est: 
le Gouvernement du Peuple, par le Peuple et pour le Peuple,
Article 3
La souveraineté nationale appartient au Peuple. Aucune fraction du Peuple, aucune 
communauté, aucune corporation, aucun parti ou association politique, aucune organisation 
syndicale ni aucun individu ne peut s'en attribuer l'exercice. La souveraineté s'exerce 
conformément à la présente Constitution qui est la Loi Suprême de l'Etat. Toute loi, tout texte 
réglementaire et tout acte administratif contraires à ces dispositions sont nuis et non avenus. 
En conséquence, tout citoyen a le droit de se pourvoir devant la Cour Constitutionnelle contre 
les lois, textes et actes présumés inconstitutionnels.
Article 4 -
Le Peuple exerce sa souveraineté par ses représentants élus et par voie de référendum. Les 
conditions de recours au référendum sont déterminées par la présente Constitution et par une 
loi organique. La Cour Constitutionnelle veille à la régularité du référendum et en proclame 
les résultats.
Article 5
Les Partis politiques concourent à l’expression du suffrage. Ils se forment et exercent 
librement leurs activités dans les conditions déterminées par la Charte des Partis politiques. 
Ils doivent respecter les principes de la souveraineté nationale, de la démocratie, de l’intégrité 
territoriale et la laïcité de l'Etat.
Article 6
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Le suffrage est universel, égal et secret. Sont électeurs, dans les conditions déterminées par la 
loi, tous les nationaux béninois des deux sexes âgés de dix-huit ans révolus et jouissant de 
leurs droits civils et politiques.
TITRE II : DES DROITS ET DES DEVOIRS DE LA PERSONNE HUMAINE.
Article 7
Les droits et les devoirs proclamés et garantis par la Charte Africaine des Droits de l'Homme 
et des Peuples adoptée en 1981 par l'Organisation de l'Unité Africaine et ratifiée par le Bénin 
le 20 janvier 1986 font partie intégrante de la présente Constitution et du Droit béninois. 
Article 8
La personne humaine est sacrée et inviolable. L'Etat a l’obligation absolue de la respecter et 
de la protéger. Il lui garantit un plein épanouissement. A cet effet, il assure à ces citoyens 
l'égal accès à la santé, à l'éducation, à la culture, à l'information, à la formation 
professionnelle et à l'emploi.
Article 9
Tout être humain a droit au développement et au plein épanouissement de sa personne dans 
ses dimensions matérielle, temporelle, intellectuelle et spirituelle, pourvu qu'il ne viole pas 
les droits d'autrui ni n'enfreigne l'ordre constitutionnel et les bonnes moeurs.
Article 10
Toute personne a droit à la culture. L'Etat a  le devoir de sauvegarder et de promouvoir les 
valeurs nationales de civilisation tant matérielles que spirituelles, ainsi que les traditions 
culturelles.
Article 11
Toutes les communautés composant la Nation béninoise jouissent de la liberté d'utiliser leurs 
langues parlées et écrites et de développer leur propre culture tout en respectant celles des 
autres. L'Etat doit promouvoir le développement de langues nationales d’intercommunication. 
Article 12
L'Etat et les collectivités publiques garantissent l’éducation des enfants et créent les 
conditions favorables à cette fin.
Article 13
L'Etat pourvoit à l'éducation de la jeunesse par des écoles publiques. L'enseignement primaire 
est obligatoire. L'Etat assure progressivement la gratuité de l'enseignement public.
Article 14
402
Les institutions et les communautés religieuses peuvent également concourir à l'éducation de 
la jeunesse. Les écoles privées, laïques ou confessionnelles, peuvent être ouvertes avec 
l'autorisation et le contrôle de l'Etat. Les écoles privées peuvent bénéficier des subventions de 
l'Etat dans les conditions déterminées par la loi.
Article 15
Tout individu a droit à la vie, à la liberté, à la sécurité et à l'intégrité de sa personne.
Article 16
Nul ne peut être arrêté ou inculpé qu'en vertu d'une loi promulguée antérieurement aux faits 
qui lui sont reprochés. Aucun citoyen ne peut être contraint à l'exil.
Article 17
Toute personne accusée d'un acte délictueux est présumée innocente jusqu'à ce que sa 
culpabilité ait été légalement établie au cours d'un procès public durant lequel toutes les 
garanties nécessaires à sa libre défense lui auront été assurées. Nul ne sera condamné pour 
des actions ou omissions qui, au moment où elles ont été commises, ne constituaient pas une 
infraction d’après le droit national. De même, il ne peut être infligé de peine plus forte que 
celle qui était applicable au moment où l'infraction a été commise.
Article 18
Nul ne sera soumis à la torture, ni à des sévices ou traitements cruels, inhumains ou 
dégradants. Nul n'a le droit d’empêcher un détenu ou un prévenu de se faire examiner par un 
médecin de son choix. Nul ne peut être détenu dans un établissement pénitentiaire s'il ne 
tombe sous le coup d'une loi pénale en vigueur. Nul ne peut être détenu pendant une durée 
supérieure à quarante-huit heures que par la décision d’un magistrat auquel il doit être 
présenté. Ce délai ne peut être prolongé que dans des cas exceptionnellement prévus par la loi 
et qui ne peut excéder une période supérieure à huit jours.
Article 19
Tout individu, tout agent de l'Etat qui se rendrait coupable d'acte de torture, de sévices ou 
traitements cruels, inhumains ou dégradants dans l'exercice ou à l'occasion de l’exercice de 
ses fonctions, soit de sa propre initiative, soit sur instruction, sera puni conformément à la loi. 
Tout individu, tout agent de l'Etat est délié du devoir d'obéissance lorsque l'ordre reçu 
constitue une atteinte grave et manifeste au respect des droits de l'homme et des libertés 
publiques.
Article 20
Le domicile est inviolable. Il ne peut y être effectué de visites domiciliaires ou de 
perquisitions que dans les formes et conditions prévues par la loi.
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Article 21
Le secret de la correspondance et des communications est garanti par la loi.
Article 22
Toute personne a droit à la propriété. Nul ne peut être privé de sa propriété que pour cause 
d'utilité publique et contre juste et préalable dédommagement.
Article 23
Toute personne a droit à la liberté de pensée, de conscience, de religion, de culte, d'opinion et 
d'expression dans le respect de l'ordre public établi par la loi et les règlements. L'exercice du 
culte et l’expression des croyances s'effectuent dans le respect de la laïcité de l’Etat. Les 
institutions, les communautés religieuses ou philosophiques ont le droit de se développer sans 
entraves. Elles ne sont pas soumises à la tutelle de l'Etat. Elles règlent et administrent leurs 
affaires d'une manière autonome.
Article 24
La liberté de la presse est reconnue et garantie par l'Etat. Elle est protégée par la Haute 
Autorité de l'Audio-Visuel et de la Communication dans les conditions fixées par une loi 
organique.
Article 25
L'Etat reconnaît et garantit, dans les conditions fixées par la loi, la liberté d'aller et venir, la 
liberté d'association, de réunion, de cortège et de manifestation.
Article 26
L'Etat assure à tous l'égalité devant la loi sans distinction d'origine, de race, de sexe, de 
religion, d'opinion politique ou de position sociale. L'homme et la femme sont égaux en droit. 
L'Etat protège la famille et particulièrement la mère et l'enfant. Il veille sur les handicapés et 
les personnes /gées.
Article 27
Toute personne a droit à un environnement sain, satisfaisant et durable et a le devoir de le 
défendre. L'Etat veille à la protection de l'environnement.
Article 28
Le stockage, la manipulation et l'évacuation des déchets toxiques ou polluants provenant des 
usines et autres, unités industrielles ou artisanales installées sur le territoire national sont 
réglementés par la loi.
Article 29
404
Le transit, l'importation, le stockage, l'enfouissement, le déversement sur le territoire national 
des déchets toxiques ou polluants étrangers et tout accord y relatif constituent un crime contre 
la Nation. Les sanctions applicables sont définies par la loi.
Article 30
L'Etat reconnaît à tous les citoyens le droit au travail et s'efforce de créer les conditions qui 
rendent la jouissance de ce droit effective et garantissent au travailleur la juste rétribution de 
ses services ou de sa production.
Article 31
L'Etat reconnaît et garantit le droit de grève. Tout travailleur peut défendre, dans les 
conditions prévues par la loi, ses droits et ses intérêts soit individuellement, soit 
collectivement ou par l'action syndicale. Le droit de grève s'exerce dans les conditions 
définies par la loi.
Article 32
La défense de la Nation et de l'intégrité du territoire de la République est un devoir sacré pour 
tout citoyen béninois. Le service militaire est obligatoire. Les conditions d'accomplissement 
de ce devoir sont déterminées par la loi.
Article 33
Tous les citoyens de la République du Bénin ont le devoir de travailler pour le bien commun, 
de remplir toutes leurs obligations civiques et professionnelles, de s'acquitter de leurs 
contributions fiscales.
Article 34
Tout citoyen béninois, civil ou militaire, a le devoir sacré de respecter, en toutes 
circonstances, la Constitution et l'ordre constitutionnel établi ainsi que les lois et règlements 
de la République.
Article 35
Les citoyens chargés d'une fonction publique ou élus à une fonction politique ont le devoir de 
l'accomplir avec conscience, compétence, probité, dévouement et loyauté dans l'intérêt et le 
respect du bien commun.
Article 36
Chaque Béninois a le devoir de respecter et de considérer son semblable sans discrimination 
aucune et d'entretenir avec les autres des relations qui permettent de sauvegarder, de renforcer 
et de promouvoir le respect, le dialogue et la tolérance réciproque en vue de la paix et de la 
cohésion nationale.
Article 37
405
Les biens publics sont sacrés et inviolables. Tout citoyen béninois doit les respecter 
scrupuleusement et les protéger. Tout acte de sabotage, de vandalisme, de corruption, de 
détournement, de dilapidation ou d'enrichissement illicite est réprimé dans les conditions 
prévues par la loi.
Article 38
L'Etat protège à l'étranger les droits et intérêts légitimes des citoyens béninois.
Article 39
Les étrangers bénéñcient sur le territoire de la République du Bénin des mêmes droits et 
libertés que les citoyens béninois et ce, dans les conditions déterminées par la loi. Ils sont 
tenus de se conformer à la Constitution, aux lois et aux règlements de la République.
Article 40
L’Etat a le devoir d'assurer la diffusion et l'enseignement de la Constitution, de la Déclaration 
Universelle des Droits de l'Homme de 1948, de la Charte Africaine des Droits de l’Homme et 
des Peuples de 1981 ainsi que de tous les instruments internationaux dûment ratifiés et 
relatifs aux Droits de l'Homme. L'Etat doit intégrer les droits de la personne humaine dans les 
programmes d'alphabétisation et d'enseignement aux différents cycles scolaires et 
universitaires et dans tous les programmes de formation des Forces Années, des Forces de 
Sécurité Publique et Assimilés. L'Etat doit également assurer dans les langues nationales par 
tous les moyens de communication de masse, en particulier par la radiodiffusion et la 
télévision, la diffusion et l'enseignement de ces mêmes droits.
TITRE III : DU POUVOIR EXECUTIF.
Article 41
Le Président de la République est le Chef de l'Etat. Il est l'élu de la Nation et incarne l'unité 
nationale. Il est le garant de l'indépendance nationale, de l'intégrité territoriale et du respect 
de la Constitution, des traités et accords internationaux.
Article 42
Le Président de la République est élu au suffrage universel direct pour un mandat de cinq ans, 
renouvelable une seule fois. En aucun cas, nul ne peut exercer plus de deux mandats 
présidentiels.
Article 43
L'élection du Président de la République a lieu au scrutin uninominal majoritaire à deux 
tours.
Article 44
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Nul ne peut être candidat aux fonctions de Président de la République s'il:
- n'est de nationalité béninoise de naissance ou acquise depuis au moins dix ans;
- n'est de bonne moralité et d’une grande probité;
- ne jouit de tous ses droits civils et politiques;
• n'est âgé de 40 ans au moins et 70 ans au plus à la date de dépôt de sa candidature;
- ne réside sur le territoire de la République du Bénin au moment des élections;
- ne jouit d’un état complet de bien-être physique et mental dûment constaté par un collège de 
trois médecins assermentés désignés par la Cour Constitutionnelle.
Article 45 |
Le Président de la République est élu à la majorité absolue des suffrages exprimés. Si celle-ci 
n'est pas obtenue au premier tour de scrutin, il est procédé, dans un délai de quinze jours, à un 
second tour. Seuls peuvent se présenter au second tour de scrutin les deux candidats qui ont
i
recueilli le plus grand nombre de suffrages au premier tour. En cas de désistement de l'un ou ¡
l'autre des deux candidats, les suivants se présentent dans l'ordre de leur classement après le 
premier scrutin. Est déclaré élu au second tour le candidat ayant recueilli la majorité relative 
des suffrages exprimés.
Article 46
La convocation des électeurs est faite par décret pris en Conseil des Ministres.
Article 47
Le premier tour du scrutin de l'élection du Président de la République a lieu trente jours au 
moins et quarante jours au plus avant la date d'expiration des pouvoirs du Président en 
exercice. Le mandat du nouveau Président de la République prend effet pour compter de la 
date d'expiration du mandat de son prédécesseur. |
Article 48
i
La loi fixe les conditions d’éligibilité, de présentation des candidatures, de déroulement du j !
scrutin, de dépouillement et de proclamation des résultats de l'élection du Président de la f !
République. La loi fixe la liste civile du Président de la République et détermine la pension à f
allouer aux anciens Présidents de la République. Toutefois, pour compter de la promulgation Í;
de la présente Constitution, seuls les Présidents de la République constitutionnellement élus 
pourront bénéficier des dispositions du précédent alinéa. j
Article 49 ■
La Cour Constitutionnelle veille à la régularité du scrutin et en constate les résultats. 'i
L'élection du Président de la République fait l'objet d'une proclamation provisoire. Si aucune j
contestation relative à la régularité des opérations électorales n’a été déposée au Greffe de la j
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Cour par l'un des candidats dans les cinq jours de la proclamation provisoire, la Cour déclare 
le Président de la République définitivement élu. En cas de contestation, la Cour est tenue de 
statuer dans les dix jours de la proclamation provisoire; sa décision emporte proclamation 
définitive ou annulation de l'élection. Si aucune contestation n’a été soulevée dans le délai de 
cinq jours et si la Cour Constitutionnelle estime que l'élection n’était entachée d’aucune 
irrégularité de nature à en entraîner l'annulation, elle proclame l'élection du Président de la 
République dans les quinze jours qui suivent le scrutin. En cas d’annulation, il sera procédé à 
un nouveau tour de scrutin dans les quinze jours de la décision.
Article 50
En cas de vacance de la Présidence de la République par décès, démission ou empêchement 
définitif, l'Assemblée Nationale se réunit pour statuer sur le cas à la majorité absolue de ses 
membres. Le Président de l'Assemblée Nationale saisit la Cour Constitutionnelle qui constate 
et déclare la vacance de la Présidence de la République. Les fonctions de Président de la 
République, à l'exception de celles mentionnées aux articles 54 alinéa 3, 58, 60, 101 et 154 
sont provisoirement exercées par le Président de l'Assemblée Nationale. L’élection du 
nouveau Président de la République a lieu trente jours au moins et quarante jours au plus 
après la déclaration du caractère définitif de la vacance. En cas de mise en accusation du 
Président de la République devant la Haute Cour de Justice, son intérim est assuré par le 
Président de la Cour Constitutionnelle qui exerce toutes les fonctions de Président de la 
République à l'exception de celles mentionnées aux articles 54 alinéa 3, 58, 60, 101 et 154. 
En cas d'absence du territoire, de maladie et de congé du Président de la République, son 
intérim est assuré par un membre du Gouvernement qu'il aura désigné et dans la limite des 
pouvoirs qu'il lui aura délégués.
Article 51
Les fonctions de Président de la République sont incompatibles avec l'exercice de tout autre 
mandat électif, de tout emploi public, civil ou militaire et de toute autre activité 
professionnelle.
Article 52
Durant leurs fonctions, le Président de la République et les membres du Gouvernement ne 
peuvent par eux-mêmes, ni par intermédiaire rien acheter ou prendre en bail qui appartienne 
au domaine de l'Etat, sans autorisation préalable de la Cour Constitutionnelle dans les 
conditions fixées par la loi. Ils sont tenus, lors de leur entrée en fonction et à la fin de celle-ci, 
de faire sur l'honneur une déclaration écrite de tous leurs biens et patrimoine adressée à la 
Chambre des Comptes de la Cour Suprême. Ils ne peuvent prendre part aux marchés de
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fournitures et aux adjudications pour les administrations ou institutions relevant de l'Etat ou 
soumises à leur contrôle.
Article 53
Avant son entrée en fonction, le Président de la République prête le serment suivant 
"Devant Dieu, les M/nes des Ancêtres, la Nation et devant le Peuple béninois, seul détenteur
de la souveraineté; Nous............, Président de la République, élu conformément aux lois de
la République jurons solennellement - de respecter et de défendre la Constitution que le 
Peuple béninois s'est librement donnée;
- de remplir loyalement les hautes fonctions que la Nation nous a confiées;
- de ne nous laisser guider que par l'intérêt général et le respect des droits de la personne 
humaine, de consacrer toutes nos forces à la recherche et à la promotion du bien commun, de 
la paix et de l'unité nationale;
- de préserver l'intégrité du territoire national;
- de nous conduire partout en fidèle et loyal serviteur du peuple. En cas de paijurc, que nous 
subissions les rigueurs de la loi". Le serment est reçu par le Président de la Cour 
Constitutionnelle devant l'Assemblée Nationale et la Cour suprême.
Article 54
Le Président de la République est le détenteur du pouvoir exécutif. Il est le chef du 
Gouvernement, et à ce titre, il détermine et conduit la politique de la Nation. Il exerce le 
pouvoir réglementaire. Il dispose de l'Administration et de la Force Armée. Il est responsable 
de la Défense Nationale. Il nomme, après avis consultatif du bureau de l'Assemblée 
Nationale, les membres du Gouvernement; il fixe leurs attributions et met fin à leurs 
fonctions. Les membres du Gouvernement sont responsables devant lui. Les fonctions de 
membres du Gouvernement sont incompatibles avec l'exercice de tout mandat parlementaire, 
de tout emploi public, civil ou militaire et de toute activité professionnelle. Les actes du 
Président de la République autres que ceux prévus aux articles 60 et 115 sont contresignés 
par les Ministres chargés de leur exécution.
Article 55
Le Président de la République préside le Conseil des Ministres. Le Conseil des Ministres 
délibère obligatoirement sur:
- les décisions déterminant la politique générale de l'Etat;
- les projets de loi;
- les ordonnances et les décrets réglementaires.
Article 56
Le Président de la République nomme trois des sept membres de la Cour Constitutionnelle. 
Après avis du Président de l'Assemblée Nationale, il nomme en Conseil des Ministres: 
le Président de la Cour Suprême, le Président de la Haute Autorité de l'Audio-Visuel et de la 
Communication, le Grand Chancelier de l’Ordre National. Il nomme également en Conseil 
des Ministres:
les membres de la Cour Suprême, les Ambassadeurs, les Envoyés extraordinaires, les 
Magistrats, les Officiers Généraux, et Supérieurs, les Hauts Fonctionnaires dont la liste est 
fixée par une loi organique.
Article 57 f
Le Président de la République a l'initiative des lois concurremment avec les membres de 
l'Assemblée Nationale. Il assure la promulgation des lois dans les quinze jours qui suivent la 
transmission qui lui en est faite par le Président de l'Assemblée Nationale. Ce délai est réduit 
à cinq jours en cas d'urgence déclarée par l’Assemblée Nationale. Il peut, avant l'expiration de 
ces délais, demander à l'Assemblée Nationale une seconde délibération de la loi ou de 
certains de ses articles. Cette seconde délibération ne peut être refusée. Si l'Assemblée 
Nationale est en fin de session, cette seconde délibération a lieu d'office lors de la session 
ordinaire suivante. Le vote pour cette seconde délibération est acquis à la majorité absolue 
des membres composant l'Assemblée Nationale. Si après ce dernier vote, le Président de la 
République refuse de promulguer la loi, la Cour Constitutionnelle, saisie par le Président de 
l'Assemblée Nationale, déclare la loi exécutoire si elle est conforme à la Constitution. La 
même procédure de mise à exécution est suivie lorsque à l’expiration du délai de 
promulgation de quinze jours prévu à l'alinéa 2 du présent article, il n’y a ni promulgation, ni 
demande de seconde lecture.
Article 58
Le Président de la République, après consultation du Président de l'Assemblée Nationale et 
du Président de la Cour Constitutionnelle, peut prendre l'initiative du référendum sur toute 
question relative à la promotion et au renforcement des Droits de l'Homme, à l’intégration 
sous-régionale ou régionale et à l'organisation des pouvoirs publics.
Article 59
Le Président de la République assure l’exécution des lois et garantit celle des décisions de 
justice.
Article 60
Le Président de République a le droit de grace. Il exerce ce droit dans les conditions définies 
par l'article 130.
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Article 61
Le Président de la République accrédite les Ambassadeurs et les Envoyés extraordinaires 
auprès des puissances étrangères; les Ambassadeurs et les Envoyés extraordinaires des 
puissances étrangères sont accrédités auprès de lui.
Article 62
Le Président de la République est le chef suprême des Armées. Il nomme en conseil des 
Ministres les membres du Conseil Supérieur de la Défense et préside les réunions dudit 
Conseil. La composition, l'organisation et le fonctionnement du Conseil Supérieur de b 
Défense sont fixés par une loi.
Article 63
Le Président de la République peut, outre les fonctions spécialisées de défense de l'intégrité 
territoriale dévolues à l’Armée, faire concourir celle-ci au développement économique de b 
Nation et à toutes autres t/ches d'intérêt public dans les conditions définies par la loi.
Article 64
Tout membre des Forces Armées ou de Sécurité Publique qui désire être candidat aux 
fonctions de Président de la République doit au préalable donner sa démission des Forces 
Armées ou de Sécurité Publique. Dans ce cas, l'intéressé pourra prétendre au bénéfice des 
droits acquis conformément aux statuts de son corps.
Article 65
Toute tentative de renversement du régime constitutionnel par les personnels des Forces 
Armées ou de Sécurité Publique sera considérée comme une forfaiture et un crime contre b 
Nation et l'Etat et sera sanctionnée conformément à la loi.
Article 66
En cas de coup d'Etat, de putsch, d'agression par des mercenaires ou de coup de force 
quelconque, tout membre d'un organe constitutionnel a le droit et le devoir de faire appel i 
tous les moyens pour rétablir la légitimité constitutionnelle, y compris le recours aux accords 
de coopération militaire ou de défense existants. Dans ces circonstances, pour tout Béninois, 
désobéir et s'organiser pour faire échec à l'autorité illégitime constituent le plus sacré des 
droits et le plus impératif des devoirs.
Article 67
Le Président de la République ne peut faire appel à des Forces Armées ou de Police 
étrangères pour intervenir dans un conflit intérieur sauf dans les cas prévus à l'article 66. 
Article 68
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Lorsque les institutions de la République, l'indépendance de la Nation, l'intégrité du territoire 
national ou l'exécution des engagements internationaux sont menacées de manière grave et 
immédiate et que le fonctionnement régulier des pouvoirs publics et constitutionnels est 
menacé ou interrompu, le Président de la République, après consultation du Président de 
l'Assemblée Nationale et du Président de la Cour Constitutionnelle, prend en Conseil des 
Ministres les mesures exceptionnelles exigées par les circonstances sans que les droits des 
citoyens garantis par la Constitution soient suspendus. Il en informe la Nation par un 
message. L'Assemblée Nationale se réunit de plein droit en session extraordinaire.
Article 69
Les mesures prises doivent s'inspirer de la volonté d'assurer aux pouvoirs publics et 
constitutionnels dans les moindres délais, les moyens d'accomplir leur mission. L'Assemblée 
Nationale fixe le délai au terme duquel le Président de la République ne peut plus prendre des 
mesures exceptionnelles.
Article 70
Le Président de la République peut déléguer certains de ses pouvoirs aux ministres, sauf ceux 
prévus aux articles 54 alinéa 3, 60,61,101,115, 133 et 144.
Article 71
Le Président de la République ou tout membre de son Gouvernement peut, dans l’exercice de 
ses fonctions gouvernementales, être interpellé par l'Assemblée Nationale. Le Président de la 
République répond à ces interpellations par lui-même ou par l'un de ses ministres qu'il 
délègue spécialement devant l’Assemblée Nationale. En la circonstance, l'Assemblée 
Nationale peut prendre une résolution pour faire des recommandations au Gouvernement. 
Article 72
Le Président de la République adresse une fois par an un message à l'Assemblée Nationale 
sur l'état de la Nation. Il peut aussi, à tout moment, adresser des messages à l’Assemblée 
Nationale. Ces messages ne donnent lieu à aucun débat; ils peuvent toutefois inspirer les 
travaux de l’Assemblée.
Article 73
La responsabilité personnelle du Président de la République est engagée en cas de haute 
trahison, d'outrage à l'Assemblée, ou d'atteinte à l'honneur et à la probité.
Article 74
Il y a haute trahison lorsque le Président de la République a violé son serment, est reconnu 
auteur, co-auteur ou complice de violations graves et caractérisées des Droits de l'Homme, de
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cession d'une partie du territoire national ou d’acte attentatoire au maintien d'un 
environnement sain, satisfaisant, durable et favorable au développement.
Article 75
Il y a atteinte à l'honneur et à la probité notamment lorsque le comportement personnel du 
Président de la République est contraire aux bonnes moeurs ou qu'il est reconnu auteur, co­
auteur ou complice de malversations, de corruption, d'enrichissement illicite.
Article 76
Il y a outrage à l’Assemblée Nationale lorsque, sur des questions posées par l'Assemblée 
Nationale sur l'activité gouvernementale, le Président de la République ne fournit aucune 
réponse dans un délai de trente jours.
Article 77
Passé ce délai, le Président de l'Assemblée Nationale saisit la Cour Constitutionnelle de ce 
manquement grave aux dispositions constitutionnelles. La Cour Constitutionnelle statue dans 
les trois jours. Le Président de la République est tenu de fournir des réponses à l'Assemblée 
Nationale dans les plus brefs délais et dans tous les cas avant la fin de la session en cours. A 
l'expiration de ce délai, si aucune suite n'est donnée par le Président de la République à la 
décision de la Cour, le Président de la République est déféré devant la Haute Cour de Justice 
pour outrage à l'Assemblée Nationale.
Article 78
Les faits prévus aux Articles 74 à 77 seront poursuivis et punis selon les dispositions des 
Articles 136 à 138 de la présente Constitution.
TITRE IV : DU POUVOIR LEGISLATIF.
I : DE L* ASSEMBLEE NATIONALE.
Article 79
Le Parlement est constitué par une Assemblée unique dite Assemblée Nationale dont les 
membres portent le titre de député. Il exerce le pouvoir législatif et contrôle l'action du 
Gouvernement.
Article 80
Les députés sont élus au suffrage universel direct. La durée du mandat est de quatre ans. Ils 
sont rééligibles. Chaque député est le représentant de la Nation toute entière et tout mandat 
impératif est nul.
Article 81
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La loi fixe le nombre des membres de l'Assemblée Nationale, les conditions d'éligibilité, le 
régime des incompatibilités, les conditions dans lesquelles il est pourvu aux sièges vacants. 
La Cour Constitutionnelle statue souverainement sur la validité de l'élection des députés. 
Tout membre des Forces Armées ou de Sécurité Publique qui désire être candidat aux 
fonctions de député doit au préalable donner sa démission des Forces Armées ou de Sécurité 
Publique. Dans ce cas, l'intéressé pourra prétendre au bénéfice des droits acquis 
conformément aux statuts de son corps.
Article 82
L'Assemblée Nationale est dirigée par un Président assisté d’un Bureau. Ils sont élus pour la 
durée de la législature dans les conditions fixées par le Règlement Intérieur de ladite 
Assemblée. Lorsqu’il assure l'intérim du Président de la République dans les conditions 
prévues à l'article 50 de la présente Constitution, le Président de l'Assemblée Nationale est 
remplacé dans ses fonctions conformément au Règlement Intérieur de l'Assemblée.
Article 83
En cas de vacance de la Présidence de l'Assemblée Nationale par décès, démission ou toute 
autre cause, l'Assemblée élit un nouveau Président dans les quinze jours qui suivent la 
vacance, si elle est en session; dans le cas contraire, elle se réunit de plein droit dans les 
conditions fixées par le Règlement Intérieur. En cas de nécessité, il est pourvu au 
remplacement des autres membres du Bureau conformément aux dispositions du Règlement 
Intérieur de ladite Assemblée.
Article 84
Le Président de l’Assemblée Nationale doit rendre compte à l'Assemblée de sa gestion et de 
ses activités et lui fournir toutes explications qui lui seront demandées. Tout député peut 
adresser au Président de l'Assemblée des questions écrites ou orales sur ses activités et sa 
gestion. L'Assemblée Nationale peut constituer une commission d'enquête chargée de lui 
faire un rapport circonstancié. Aux termes de ce rapport, l'Assemblée Nationale peut 
demander la démission de son Président à la majorité des deux tiers de ses membres. Si ce 
quorum est atteint, le Président de l'Assemblée Nationale est automatiquement démis de ses 
fonctions, tout en conservant son titre de député. L'Assemblée Nationale procède dans un 
délai de quinze jours à l'élection d’un nouveau Président.
Article 85
Si à l'ouverture d'une session, le quorum de la moitié plus un des membres composant 
l'Assemblée Nationale n'est pas atteint, la séance est renvoyée au troisième jour qui suit. Les 
délibérations sont alors valables, quel que soit le quorum.
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Article 86
Les séances de l'Assemblée ne sont valables que si elles se déroulent au lieu ordinaire de ses 
sessions, sauf cas de force majeure dûment constaté par la Cour Constitutionnelle. Le compte 
rendu intégral des débats de l'Assemblée Nationale est publié au Journal Officiel.
Article 87
L’Assemblée se réunit de plein droit en deux sessions ordinaires par an. La première session 
s’ouvre dans le cours de la première quinzaine du mois d’avril. La deuxième session s'ouvre 
dans le cours de la seconde quinzaine du mois d'octobre. Chacune des sessions ne peut 
excéder trois mois.
Article 88
L’Assemblée Nationale est convoquée en session extraordinaire par son Président, sur un 
ordre du jour déterminé, à la demande du Président de la République ou à la majorité absolue 
des députés. La durée d'une session extraordinaire ne peut excéder quinze jours. L'Assemblée 
Nationale se sépare sitôt l'ordre du jour épuisé.
Article 89
Les travaux de l'Assemblée Nationale ont lieu suivant un Règlement Intérieur qu'elle adopte 
conformément à la Constitution. Le Règlement Intérieur détermine:
• la composition, les règles de fonctionnement du Bureau ainsi que les pouvoirs et 
prérogatives de son Président;
- le nombre, le mode de désignation, la composition, le rôle et la compétence de ses 
commissions permanentes, ainsi que celles qui sont spéciales et temporaires;
- la création de commissions d'enquête parlementaires dans le cadre du contrôle de l'action 
gouvernementale;
- l'organisation des services administratifs dirigés par un Secrétaire Général Administratif, 
placé sous l'autorité du Président de l'Assemblée Nationale;
- le régime de discipline des députés au cours des séances de l'Assemblée;
- les différents modes de scrutin, à l’exclusion de ceux prévus expressément par la présente 
Constitution.
Article 90
Les membres de l'Assemblée Nationale jouissent de l'immunité parlementaire.
En conséquence, aucun député ne peut être poursuivi, recherché, arrêté, détenu ou jugé à 
l’occasion des opinions ou votes émis par lui dans l’exercice de ses fonctions. Aucun député 
ne peut, pendant la durée des sessions, être poursuivi ou arrêté en matière criminelle ou 
correctionnelle qu'avec l'autorisation de l'Assemblée Nationale, sauf les cas de flagrant délit.
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Aucun député ne peut, hors session, être arrêté qu'avec l'autorisation du Bureau de 
l'Assemblée Nationale, sauf les cas de flagrant délit, de poursuites autorisées ou de 
condamnation définitive. La détention ou la poursuite d’un député est suspendue si 
l’Assemblée Nationale le requiert par un vote à la majorité des deux tiers.
Article 91
Les députés perçoivent des indemnités parlementaires qui sont fixées par la loi.
Article 92
Tout député nommé à une fonction ministérielle perd d'office son mandat parlementaire.
Les conditions de son remplacement sont fixées par la loi.
Article 93
Le droit de vote des députés est personnel. Le Règlement Intérieur de l’Assemblée Nationale 
peut autoriser exceptionnellement la délégation de vote. Dans ce cas, nul ne peut recevoir 
délégation de plus d'un mandat.
II : DES RAPPORTS ENTRE L'ASSEMBLEE : ET LE GOUVERNEMENT.
Article 94
L'Assemblée Nationale informe le Président de la République de l'ordre du jour de ses 
séances et de celui de ses commissions.
Article 95
Les membres du Gouvernement ont accès aux séances de l'Assemblée Nationale. Il sont 
entendus à la demande d'un député, d'une commission ou à leur propre demande. Ils peuvent 
se faire assister par des experts.
Article 96
L'Assemblée Nationale vote la loi et consent l'impôt.
Article 97
La loi est votée par l'Assemblée Nationale à la majorité simple. Cependant, les lois 
auxquelles la présente Constitution confère le caractère de lois organiques sont votées et 
modifiées dans les conditions suivantes:
- la proposition ou le projet n'est soumis à la délibération et au vote de l'Assemblée qu'après 
l'expiration d'un délai de quinze jours après son dépôt sur le Bureau de l'Assemblée;
- le texte ne peut être adopté qu'à la majorité absolue des membres composant l'Assemblée;
- les lois organiques ne peuvent être promulguées qu'après déclaration par la Cour 
Constitutionnelle de leur conformité à la Constitution.
Article 98
Sont du domaine de la loi les règles concernant:
416
- la citoyenneté, les droits civiques et les garanties fondamentales accordées aux citoyens 
pour l'exercice des libertés publiques; les sujétions imposées, dans l’intérêt de la défense 
nationale et la sécurité publique, aux citoyens en leur personne et en leurs biens;
- la nationalité, l'état et la capacité des personnes, les régimes matrimoniaux, les successions 
et les libéralités;
•la procédure selon laquelle les coutumes seront constatées et mises en harmonie avec les 
principes fondamentaux de la Constitution;
• la détermination des crimes et délits ainsi que les peines qui leur sont applicables;
- l'amnistie;
- l'organisation des juridictions de tous ordres et la procédure suivie devant ces juridictions, la 
création de nouveaux ordres de juridiction, le statut de la magistrature, des offices 
ministériels et des auxiliaires de justice;
- l'assiette, le taux et les modalités de recouvrement des impositions de toute nature;
- le régime d'émission de la monnaie;
- le régime électoral du Président de la République, des membres de l'Assemblée Nationale et 
des Assemblées Locales;
- la création des catégories d'établissements publics;
- le Statut Général de la Fonction Publique;
- le Statut des Personnels militaires, des Forces de Sécurité Publique et Assimilés;
- l'organisation générale de l'Administration;
- l'organisation territoriale, la création et la modification de Circonscriptions administratives 
ainsi que les découpages électoraux;
- l'état de siège et l'état d’urgence:
La loi détermine les principes fondamentaux:
- de l'organisation de la défense nationale;
- de la libre administration des collectivités territoriales, de leurs compétences et de leurs 
ressources;
- de l'enseignement et de la recherche scientifique;
- du régime de la propriété, des droits réels et des obligations civiles et commerciales;
- des nationalisations et dénationalisations d’entreprises et des transferts de propriété d' 
entreprises du secteur public au secteur privé;
- du droit du travail, de la sécurité sociale, du droit syndical et du droit de grève;
- de l'aliénation et de la gestion du domaine de l'Etat;
- de la mutualité et de l'épargne;
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- de l'organisation de la production;
- de la protection de l'environnement et de la conservation des ressources naturelles;
- du régime des transports et des télécommunications;
- du régime pénitentiaire.
Article 99
Les lois de finances déterminent les recettes et les dépenses de l'Etat. Les lois de règlement 
contrôlent l'exécution des lois de finances, sous réserve de l'apurement ultérieur des comptes 
de la Nation par la Chambre des Comptes de la Cour Suprême. Les lois de programme fixent 
les objectifs de l'action économique et sociale de l'Etat.
Article 100
Les matières autres que celles qui sont du domaine de la loi ont un caractère réglementaire. 
Les textes de forme législative intervenus en ces matières antérieurement à l'entrée en vigueur 
de la présente Constitution peuvent être modifiés par décret pris après avis de la Cour 
Constitutionnelle.
Article 101
La déclaration de guerre est autorisée par l'Assemblée Nationale. Lorsque, à la suite de 
circonstances exceptionnelles, l'Assemblée Nationale ne peut siéger utilement, la décision de 
déclaration de guerre est prise en Conseil des Ministres par le Président de la République qui 
en informe immédiatement la Nation. L'état de siège et l'état d'urgence sont décrétés en 
Conseil des Ministres, après avis de l'Assemblée Nationale. La prorogation de l'état du siège 
ou de l'état d'urgence au-delà de quinze jours ne peut être autorisée que par l'Assemblée 
Nationale. Lorsque l'Assemblée Nationale n'est pas appelée à se prononcer, aucun état de 
siège ou état d'urgence ne peut être décrété sans son autorisation, dans les soixante jours qui 
suivent la date de mise en vigueur d'un précédent état de siège ou d'urgence.
Article 102
Le Gouvernement peut, pour l'exécution de son programme, demander à l'Assemblée 
Nationale de voter une loi l'autorisant à prendre par ordonnance pendant un délai limité des 
mesures qui sont normalement du domaine de la loi. Cette autorisation ne peut être accordée 
qu'à la majorité des deux tiers des membres de l'Assemblée Nationale. Les ordonnances sont 
prises en Conseil des Ministres, après avis de la Cour Constitutionnelle. Elles entrent en 
vigueur dès leur publication, mais deviennent caduques si le projet de la loi de ratification 
n'est pas déposé devant l'Assemblée avant la date fixée par la loi d'habilitation. A l'expiration 
du délai mentionné au premier alinéa du présent article, les ordonnances ne peuvent plus être 
modifiées que par la loi dans leurs dispositions qui sont du domaine législatif.
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Article 103
Les députés ont le droit d'amendement.
Article 104
Les propositions, projets et amendements qui ne sont pas du domaine de la loi sont 
irrecevables. L'irrecevabilité est prononcée par le Président de l'Assemblée Nationale après 
délibération du Bureau. S'il apparaît que la proposition ou l'amendement sont contraires à une 
délégation accordée en vertu de l'article 102 de la présente Constitution, le Gouvernement 
peut opposer l'irrecevabilité. En cas de contestation sur les alinéas 1 et 3 du présent article, la 
Cour Constitutionnelle, saisie par le Président de l'Assemblée Nationale ou le Gouvernement, 
statue dans un délai de huit jours.
Article 105
L'initiative des lois appartient concurremment au Président de la République et aux membres 
de l'Assemblée Nationale. Les projets de loi sont délibérés en Conseil des Ministres, après 
avis motivé de la Cour Suprême saisie conformément à l'article 132 de la présente 
Constitution et déposés sur le Bureau de l'Assemblée Nationale. Les projets et propositions 
de loi sont envoyés avant délibération en séance plénière, à la commission compétente de 
l'Assemblée Nationale pour examen. Le projet du budget de l’Assemblée Nationale ne peut 
être examiné en commission ou en séance plénière sans avoir été au préalable soumis au 
Bureau de ladite Assemblée.
Article 106
La discussion des projets de loi porte sur le texte présenté par la commission. Celle-ci, à la 
demande du Gouvernement, doit porter à la connaissance de l'Assemblée Nationale les points 
sur lesquels il y a désaccord avec le Gouvernement.
Article 107
Les propositions et amendements déposés par les députés ne sont pas recevables lorsque leur 
adoption aurait pour conséquence soit une diminution des ressources publiques, soit la 
création ou l'aggravation d’une charge publique, à moins qu'ils ne soient accompagnés d'une 
proposition d'augmentation de recettes ou d'économies équivalentes.
Article 108
i Les députés peuvent, par un vote à la majorité des trois quarts, décider de soumettre toute 
question au référendum.
I Article 109
j L'Assemblée Nationale vote le projet de loi de finances dans les conditions déterminées par la
I loi. L'Assemblée Nationale est saisie du projet de loi de finances au plus tard une semaine
I
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avant l'ouverture de la session d'octobre. Le projet de loi de finances doit prévoir les recettes 
nécessaires à la couverture intégrale des dépenses.
Article 110
L'Assemblée Nationale vote le budget en équilibre. Si l'Assemblée Nationale ne s'est pas 
prononcée, à la date du 31 décembre, les dispositions du projet de loi de finances peuvent être 
mises en vigueur par ordonnance. Le Gouvernement saisit, par ratification, l'Assemblée 
Nationale convoquée en session extraordinaire dans un délai de quinze jours. Si l'Assemblée 
Nationale n'a pas voté le budget à la fin de cette session extraordinaire le budget est établi 
définitivement par ordonnance.
Article 111
Si le projet de loi de finances n'a pu être déposé en temps utile pour être promulgué avant le 
début de l'exercice, le Président de la République demande d'urgence à l'Assemblée Nationale 
l'autorisation d'exécuter les recettes et les dépenses de l'Etat par douzièmes provisoires.
Article 112
L'Assemblée Nationale règle les comptes de la Nation selon les modalités prévues par la loi 
organique de finances. Elle est, à cet effet, assistée de la Chambre des Comptes de la Cour 
Suprême, qu’elle charge de toutes enquêtes et études se rapportant à l'exécution des recettes et 
des dépenses publiques, ou à la gestion de la trésorerie nationale, des collectivités 
territoriales, des administrations ou institutions relevant de l'Etat ou soumises à son contrôle. 
Article 113
Le Gouvernement est tenu de fournir à l'Assemblée Nationale toutes explications qui lui 
seront demandées sur sa gestion et sur ses activités. Les moyens d'information et de contrôle 
de l’Assemblée Nationale sur l'action gouvernementale sont: 
l'interpellation conformément à l’article 71 ; 
la question écrite;
la question orale avec ou sans débat, non suivie de vote;
la commission parlementaire d'enquête. Ces moyens s’exercent dans les conditions 
déterminées par le Règlement Intérieur de l'Assemblée Nationale.
TITRE V : DE LA COUR CONSTITUTIONNELLE.
Article 114
La Cour Constitutionnelle est la plus haute juridiction de l'Etat en matière constitutionnelle. 
Elle est juge de la constitutionnalité de la loi et elle garantit les droits fondamentaux de la
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| personne humaine et les libertés publiques. Elle est l’organe régulateur du fonctionnement des
! institutions et de l’activité des pouvoirs publics.
J Article 115
j La Cour Constitutionnelle est composée de sept membres dont quatre sont nommés par le
| Bureau de l'Assemblée Nationale et trois par le Président de la République pour un mandat deJ cinq ans renouvelable une seule fois. Aucun membre de la Cour Constitutionnelle ne peut
I siéger plus de dix ans. Pour être membre de la Cour Constitutionnelle, outre la condition de
compétence professionnelle, il faut être de bonne moralité et d’une grande probité. La Cour 
Constitutionnelle comprend:
trois magistrats ayant une expérience de quinze années au moins dont deux sont nommés par 
le Bureau de l’Assemblée Nationale et un par le Président de la République; 
deux juristes de haut niveau, professeurs ou praticiens de droit, ayant une expérience de 
quinze années au moins nommés l’un par le Bureau de l'Assemblée Nationale et l’autre par le 
Président de la République;
deux personnalités de grande réputation professionnelle nommées l'une par le Bureau de 
l’Assemblée Nationale et l'autre par le Président de la République. Les membres de la Cour J  Constitutionnelle sont inamovibles pendant la durée de leur mandat. Ils ne peuvent être
| poursuivis ou arrêtés sans l'autorisation de la Cour Constitutionnelle et du Bureau de la Cour
! Suprême siégeant en session conjointe sauf les cas de flagrant délit. Dans ces cas, le Président
I de la Cour Constitutionnelle et le Président de la Cour Suprême doivent être saisis
immédiatement et au plus tard dans les quarante-huit heures. Les fonctions de membre de la 
Cour Constitutionnelle sont incompatibles avec la qualité de membre de Gouvernement, 
l'exercice de tout mandat électif, de tout emploi public, civil ou militaire, de toute autre 
activité professionnelle ainsi que de toute fonction de représentation nationale, sauf dans le 
cas prévu à l'article 50 alinéa 3. Une loi organique détermine l’organisation et le
i
fonctionnement de la Cour Constitutionnelle, la procédure suivie devant elle, notamment les 
délais pour sa saisine de même que les immunités et le régime disciplinaire de ses membres. 
Article 116
Le Président de la Cour Constitutionnelle est élu par ses pairs pour une durée de cinq ans 
parmi les magistrats et juristes membres de la Cour.
Article 117
La Cour Constitutionnelle - Statue obligatoirement sur.
la constitutionnalité des lois organiques et des lois en général avant leur promulgation;
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les Règlements Intérieurs de l'Assemblée Nationale, de la Haute Autorité de lAudio-Visuel et 
de la Communication et du Conseil Economique et Social avant leur mise en application, 
quant à leur conformité à la Constitution;
la constitutionnalité des lois et des actes réglementaires censés porter atteinte aux droits 
fondamentaux de la personne humaine et aux libertés publiques et en général, sur la violation 
des droits de la personne humaine; 
les conflits d'attributions entre les institutions de l'Etat.
- Veille à la régularité de l'élection du Président de la République; examine les réclamations, 
statue sur les irrégularités qu'elle aurait pu, par elle-même relever et proclame les résultats du 
scrutin; statue sur la régularité du référendum et en proclame les résultats;
- Statue, en cas de contestation, sur la régularité des élections législatives;
- Fait de droit partie de la Haute Cour de justice à l'exception de son Président.
Article 118
Elle est également compétente pour statuer sur les cas prévus aux articles 50, 52, 57, 77, 86, 
100, 102,104 et 147.
Article 119
Le Président de la Cour Constitutionnelle est compétent pour:
- recevoir le serment du Président de la République;
- donner son avis au Président de la République dans les cas prévus aux articles 58 et 68;
- assurer l'intérim du Président de la République dans le cas prévu à l’article 50 alinéa 3. 
Article 120
La Cour Constitutionnelle doit statuer dans le délai de quinze jours après qu'elle a été saisie 
d'un texte de loi ou d'une plainte en violation des droits de la personne humaine et des libertés 
publiques. Toutefois, à la demande du Gouvernement, s’il y a urgence, ce délai est ramené à 
huit jours. Dans ce cas, la saisine de la Cour Constitutionnelle suspend le délai de 
promulgation de la loi.
Article 121
La Cour Constitutionnelle, à la demande du Président de la République ou de tout membre de 
l'Assemblée Nationale, se prononce sur la constitutionnalité des lois avant leur promulgation. 
Elle se prononce d'office sur la constitutionnalité des lois et de tout texte réglementaire 
censés porter atteinte aux droits fondamentaux de la personne humaine et aux libertés 
publiques. Elle statue plus généralement sur les violations des droits de la personne humaine 
et sa décision doit intervenir dans un délai de huit jours.
Article 122
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Tout citoyen peut saisir la Cour Constitutionnelle sur la constitutionnalité des lois, soit 
directement, soit par la procédure de l’exception d'inconstitutionnalité invoquée dans une 
affaire qui le concerne devant une juridiction. Celle-ci doit surseoir jusqu’à la décision de la 
Cour Constitutionnelle qui doit intervenir dans un délai de trente jours.
Article 123
Les lois organiques avant leur promulgation, les Règlements Intérieurs de l'Assemblée 
Nationale, de la Haute Autorité de l’Audio-Visuel et de la Communication et du Conseil 
Economique et Social avant leur mise en application, doivent être soumis à la Cour 
Constitutionnelle qui se prononce sur leur conformité à la Constitution.
Article 124
Une disposition déclarée inconstitutionnelle ne peut être promulguée ni mise en application. 
Les décisions de la Cour Constitutionnelle se sont susceptibles d'aucun recours. Elles 
s'imposent aux pouvoirs publics et à toutes les autorités civiles, militaires et juridictionnelles.
TITRE VI: DU POUVOIR JUDICIAIRE.
Article 125
Le Pouvoir Judiciaire est indépendant du Pouvoir législatif et du Pouvoir Exécutif. Il est 
exercé par la Cour Suprême, les Cours et Tribunaux créés conformément à la présente 
Constitution.
Article 126
La justice est rendue au nom du Peuple Béninois. Les juges ne sont soumis, dans l'exercice de 
leurs fonctions, qu'à l'autorité de la loi. Les magistrats du siège sont inamovibles.
Article 127
Le Président de la République est garant de l'indépendance de la justice. Il est assisté par le 
Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature.
Article 128
Le Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature statue comme Conseil de discipline des magistrats. 
La composition, les attributions, l'organisation et le fonctionnement du Conseil Supérieur de 
la Magistrature sont fixés par une loi organique.
Article 129
Les magistrats sont nommés par le Président de la République, sur proposition du Garde des 
Sceaux, Ministre de la Justice, après avis du Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature.
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Article 130
Le Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature étudie les dossiers de gr/ce et les transmet avec son 
avis motivé au Président de la République.
I : DE LA COUR SUPREME.
Article 131
La Cour Suprême est la plus haute juridiction de l’Etat en matière administrative, judiciaire et 
des comptes de l’Etat. Elle est également compétente en ce qui concerne le contentieux des 
élections locales. Les décisions de la Cour Suprême ne sont susceptibles d'aucun recours. 
Elles s'imposent au Pouvoir Exécutif, au Pouvoir Législatif, ainsi qu'à toutes les juridictions. 
Article 132
La Cour Suprême est consultée par le Gouvernement plus généralement sur toutes les 
matières administratives et juridictionnelles. Elle peut, à la demande du Chef de l'Etat, être 
chargée de la rédaction et de la modification de tous les textes législatifs et réglementaires, 
préalablement à leur examen par l'Assemblée Nationale.
Article 133
Le Président de la Cour Suprême est nommé pour une durée de cinq ans par le Président de la 
République, après avis du Président de l'Assemblée Nationale, parmi les magistrats et les 
juristes de haut niveau, ayant quinze ans au moins d'expérience professionnelle par décret 
pris en Conseil des Ministres. Il est inamovible pendant la durée de son mandat qui n'est 
renouvelable qu'une seule fois. Les fonctions du Président de la Cour Suprême sont 
incompatibles avec la qualité de membre de Gouvernement, l'exercice de tout mandat électif, 
de tout emploi public, civil ou militaire, de toute autre activité professionnelle ainsi que de 
toute fonction de représentation nationale.
Article 134
Les Présidents de Chambre et les Conseillers sont nommés parmi les magistrats et les juristes 
de haut niveau, ayant quinze ans au moins d’expérience professionnelle, par décret pris en 
Conseil des Ministres par le Président de la République, sur proposition du Président de la 
Cour Suprême et après avis du Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature. La loi détermine le 
Statut des magistrats de la Cour Suprême.
II : DE LA HAUTE COUR DE JUSTICE.
Article 135
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La Haute Cour de Justice est composée des membres de la Cour Constitutionnelle, à 
l'exception de son Président, de six députés élus par l'Assemblée Nationale et du Président de 
la Cour Suprême. La Haute Cour élit en son sein son Président. Une loi organique fixe les 
règles de son fonctionnement ainsi que la procédure suivie devant elle.
Article 136
La Haute Cour de Justice est compétente pour juger le Président de la République et les 
membres du Gouvernement à raison de faits qualifiés de haute trahison, d’infractions 
commises dans l'exercice ou à l’occasion de l'exercice de leurs fonctions, ainsi que pour juger 
leurs complices en cas de complot contre la sûreté de l'Etat. Les juridictions de droit commun 
restent compétentes pour les infractions perpétrées en dehors de l'exercice de leurs fonctions 
et dont ils sont pénalement responsables.
Article 137
La Haute Cour de Justice est liée par la définition des infractions et par la détermination des 
sanctions résultant des lois pénales en vigueur à l'époque des faits. La décision de poursuite 
puis la mise en accusation du Président de la République et des membres du Gouvernement 
est votée à la majorité des deux tiers des députés composant l'Assemblée Nationale, selon la 
procédure prévue par le Règlement Intérieur de l'Assemblée Nationale. L'instruction est 
menée par les magistrats de la Chambre d'Accusation de la Cour d'Appel ayant juridiction sur 
le lieu du siège de l'Assemblée Nationale.
Article 138
Le Président de la République et les membres du Gouvernement sont suspendus de leurs 
fonctions en cas de mise en accusation pour haute trahison, outrage à l'Assemblée Nationale 
et toute atteinte à l'honneur et à la probité. En cas de condamnation, ils sont déchus de leurs 
charges.
TITRE VII : DU CONSEIL ECONOMIQUE ET SOCIAL.
Article 139
Le Conseil Economique et Social donne son avis sur les projets de loi, d'ordonnance ou de 
décret ainsi que sur les propositions de loi qui lui sont soumis. Les projets de loi de 
programme à caractère économique et social lui sont obligatoirement soumis pour avis. Le 
Président de la République peut consulter le Conseil Economique et Social sur tout problème 
à caractère économique, social, culturel, scientifique et technique. Le Conseil Economique et 
Social peut, de sa propre initiative, sous forme de recommandation, attirer l'attention de 
l'Assemblée Nationale et du Gouvernement sur les réformes d'ordre économique et social qui
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lui paraissent conformes ou contraires à l'intérêt général. Sur la demande du Gouvernement, 
le Conseil Economique et Social désigne un de ses membres pour exposer devant les 
Commissions de l’Assemblée Nationale l'avis du Conseil sur les projets ou propositions de 
lois qui lui ont été soumis.
Article 140
Le Conseil Economique et Social élit en son sein son Président et les membres de son 
Bureau. La composition, l'organisation et le fonctionnement du Conseil Economique et Social 
sont fixés par une loi organique.
Article 141
Les membres du Conseil Economique et Social perçoivent des indemnités de session et de 
déplacement. Le montant de ces indemnités est fixé par décret pris en Conseil des Ministres.
TITRE VIII : DE LA HAUTE AUTORITE DE V  AUDIO-VISUEL ET DE LA 
COMMUNICATION.
Article 142
La Haute Autorité de l'Audio-Visuel et de la Communication a pour mission de garantir et 
d'assurer la liberté et la protection de la presse, ainsi que de tous les moyens de 
communication de masse dans le respect de la loi. Elle veille au respect de la déontologie en 
matière d'information et à l'accès équitable des partis politiques, des associations et des 
citoyens aux moyens officiels d'information et de communication.
Article 143
Le Président de la Haute Autorité de l’Audio-Visuel et de la Communication est nommé, 
après consultation du Président de l'Assemblée Nationale, par décret pris en Conseil des 
Ministres. La composition, les attributions, l'organisation et le fonctionnement de la Haute 
Autorité de l'Audio-Visuel et de la Communication sont fixés par une loi organique.
TITRE IX î DES TRAITES ET ACCORDS INTERNATIONAUX.
Article 144
Le Président de la République négocie et ratifie les traités et accords internationaux.
Article 145
Les traités de paix, les traités ou accords relatifs à l'organisation internationale, ceux qui 
engagent les finances de l'Etat, ceux qui modifient les lois internes de l'Etat, ceux qui 
comportent cession, échange ou adjonction de territoire, ne peuvent être ratifiés qu'en vertu
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d'une loi. Nulle cession, nul échange, nulle adjonction de territoire n'est valable sans le 
consentement des populations intéressées.
Article 146
Si la Cour Constitutionnelle saisie par le Président de la République ou par le Président de 
l'Assemblée Nationale a déclaré qu'un engagement international comporte une clause 
contraire à la Constitution, l'autorisation de la ratifier ne peut intervenir qu'après la révision 
de la Constitution.
Article 147
Les traités ou accords régulièrement ratifiés ont, dès leur publication, une autorité supérieure 
à celle des lois, sous réserve pour chaque accord ou traité, de son application par l'autre 
partie.
Article 148
La République du Bénin peut conclure avec d'autres Etats des accords de coopération ou 
d'association sur la base des principes d'égalité, de respect mutuel de la souveraineté, des 
avantages réciproques et de la dignité nationale.
Article 149
La République du Bénin, soucieuse de réaliser lTJnité Africaine, peut conclure tout accord 
d'intégration sous-régionale ou régionale conformément à l'article 145.
TITRE X : DES COLLECTIVITES TERRITORIALES.
Article 150
Les collectivités territoriales de la République sont créées par la loi.
Article 151
Ces collectivités s'administrent librement par des conseils élus et dans les conditions prévues 
par la loi.
Article 152
Aucune dépense de souveraineté de l'Etat ne saurait être imputée à leur budget.
Article 153
L'Etat veille au développement harmonieux de toutes les collectivités territoriales sur la base 
de la solidarité nationale, des potentialités régionales et de l'équilibre inter-régional.
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TITRE XI : DE LA REVISION.
Article 154
L'initiative de la Révision de la Constitution appartient concurremment au Président de la 
République, après décision prise en Conseil des Ministres et aux membres de l’Assemblée 
Nationale. Pour être pris en considération, le projet ou la proposition de révision doit être 
voté à la majorité des trois quarts des membres composant l'Assemblée Nationale.
Article 155
La révision n'est acquise qu'après avoir été approuvée par référendum, sauf si le projet ou la 
proposition en cause a été approuvé à la majorité des quatre cinquièmes des membres 
composant l’Assemblée Nationale. ;
Article 156
Aucune procédure de révision ne peut être engagée ou poursuivie lorsqu'il est porté atteinte à 
l'intégrité du territoire, La forme républicaine et la laïcité de l'Etat ne peuvent faire l'objet 
d'une révision.
TITRE XII ï DISPOSITIONS TRANSITOIRES ET FINALES.
Article 157
La présente Constitution devra être promulguée dans les huit jours après son adoption au 
référendum. Le Président de la République devra entrer en fonction, l'Assemblée devra se 
réunir au plus tard le 1er avril 1991. *;
Le Haut Conseil de la République et le Gouvervement de transition continueront d'exercer 
leurs fonctions jusqu'à l'installation des institutions nouvelles. Le serment du Président de la 
République sera reçu par le Président du Haut Conseil de la République en Assemblée 
plénière. L'Assemblée Nationale sera installée par le Président du Haut Conseil de la 
République en présence des membres dudit Conseil.
Article 158
La législation en vigueur au Bénin jusqu'à la mise en place des nouvelles institutions reste 
applicable, sauf intervention de nouveaux textes en ce qu'elle n'a rien de contraire à la 
présente Constitution.
Article 159
La présente Constitution sera soumise au référendum. Les dispositions nécessaires à son 
application feront l'objet, soit de lois votées par le Haut Conseil de la République, soit de 
décrets pris en Conseil des Ministres. Les attributions dévolues par la présente Constitution à
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la Cour Constitutionnelle seront exercées par le Haut Conseil de la République jusqu’à 
l'installation des institutions nouvelles.
Article 160
La présente Loi sera exécutée comme Constitution de la République du Bénin.
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